Vu v. Vu CA6

Filed 11/9/26 Vu v. Vu CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PHUONG VU, H053992 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24CV428658) v. SONNI VU, Defendant and Respondent. This appeal, though from a civil action, arises from disputes between former spouses that were previously litigated during their marital dissolution proceedings. Plaintiff and appellant Phuong Vu (Phuong),1 representing herself, appeals from the trial court’s order sustaining defendant and respondent Sonni Vu’s (Sonni) demurrer without leave to amend to her complaint for damages based on allegations of domestic violence. Because Phuong has provided neither an adequate brief nor a sufficient record on appeal to enable meaningful appellate review, we affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We provide a summary of the relevant facts from the limited appellate record. In 2019, Sonni initiated proceedings in family court to dissolve the parties’ marriage. In August 2020, Phuong sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against 1 As is common in cases involving parties with the same surname, we refer to Phuong and Sonni by their first names for the sake of clarity. We intend no disrespect. Sonni in the dissolution proceedings. Following an evidentiary hearing in 2022, the family court found that “[n]o domestic violence had occurred,” and denied Phuong’s request. In January 2024, Phuong filed a complaint in civil court against Sonni as the sole defendant. The complaint, entitled “Domestic Violence,” contains the following statement in its entirety: “My name is Phuong Vu and I am suing my ex-spouse for domestic violence damages that [h]e has caused. My domestic violence case: # 202210 79818-2020. I want my ex-spouse Sonni Vu [t]o pay for mental, health, and time that [h]e has caused during the DV case in Aug[ust] 2020. I am currently going through divorce case with Sonni Vu. My divorce case # 19FL003205. I feel and believe that Sonni Vu should and need to pay me Phuong Vu compensation for damages that lead up to my current situation of health issue, and unemployment. Thanks. Please help me.”2 Sonni filed a demurrer to the complaint and moved to strike it, contending that it failed to state a cause of action, was uncertain, and was barred by the statute of limitations, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. More specifically, he argued that the complaint was factually deficient, was untimely under the three-year limitations period governing damages claims for domestic violence, and was based upon allegations already adjudicated in the marital dissolution proceedings. Sonni supported his arguments with a request for judicial notice of minute orders, pleadings, and other documents filed in family court. Before the demurrer hearing, Phuong filed two documents in the civil case, one titled as “Evidence” and the other as “Opposition Evidence.” In those documents, Phuong described difficulties she encountered in reporting her domestic violence claims to law enforcement and in pursuing the DVRO in family court, including that her former counsel was ineffective. Phuong asserted in opposition to the demurrer that she had “a 2 Italicized portions denote spelling and grammatical errors in the original pleading. 2 lot of evidence” to present at the hearing but neither identified that evidence nor explained how it could cure the complaint’s defects should the court permit leave to amend. After the demurrer hearing, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling, sustained the demurrer, and denied the motion to strike as moot. As part of the written order filed after the hearing, the court granted Sonni’s request for judicial notice in part and took notice of the orders and other documents filed in the dissolution proceedings. Having done so, the court determined that Phuong had “repeatedly sought and was denied domestic violence restraining orders in the parties’ family law case” and noted that the family court had rejected her domestic violence allegations, including those based on an incident that purportedly occurred in August 2020. The court also observed that Phuong’s complaint relied on the same police report she submitted in support of her DVRO application. Applying the “priority-of-jurisdiction” rule3 and the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, the court concluded that Phuong was barred from relitigating the same allegations already adjudicated adversely to her in the martial dissolution proceedings. And since the trial court found there was no reasonable possibility that Phuong could state a viable claim, it sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case. Phuong timely appealed.4 3 The “priority-of-jurisdiction” rule, also known as the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, “provides that when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of the others.” (BBBB Bonding Corp. v. Caldwell (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 349, 374.) The rule has been applied in situations enmeshing two departments of a single superior court, such that “[o]ne department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court.” (Ford v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737, 742.) 4 The order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing the case is appealable as a judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d [“All dismissals ordered by the court shall be in the form of a written order signed by the court and … when so filed shall constitute judgments and be effective for all purposes”]; Moorer v. Noble L.A. 3  II. DISCUSSION A. Appellate Principles We generally review a judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, “ ‘exercising our independent judgment as to whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Beverage v. Apple, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 736, 746.) However, as we will explain, we are unable to undertake a review of the order underlying this appeal because both Phuong’s opening brief and the appellate record are substantially deficient. For any appeal, our review starts with the “fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate … that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson).) Indeed, “[o]n appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend, the plaintiff has the burden of proving error.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) To demonstrate error, an appellant must, at a minimum, provide a compliant appellate brief and an adequate record. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1245–1247 (Nwosu); Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) provides that all appellate briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” That same rule also requires that an appellant’s opening brief “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record” and “[s]tate the nature of the action, the relief sought in the trial court, and the judgment or order appealed from.” (Id., rule 8.204(a)(2)(A) & (a)(2)(C).) Furthermore, an “appellant must present Events, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 736, 741, fn. 3 [“order of dismissal, signed by the trial court and entered by the court clerk, constitutes a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 581d”].) 4 meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.]” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) The appellant’s burden “requires more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong” because “ ‘[i]ssues do not have a life of their own[.]’ [Citation.]” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).) When an appellant asserts a point on appeal, “ ‘but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority’ ” we may treat the point as forfeited. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 (Nelson).) We do not independently search the record for error (Nwosu, at p. 1246), and “[w]e are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) Moreover, we must treat a party who acts as her own attorney like any other party and hold them to the same rules of procedure. (Nwosu, at p. 1247.) Aside from a compliant brief, “[u]nder well-established rules of appellate procedure, … the appellant[] has the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622; accord, Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 [“It is the appellant’s affirmative duty to show error by an adequate record”].) We do not speculate as to the contents of missing portions of the record or issues appellant may have raised below. (See Kearl v. Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1051–1052.) “ ‘[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ [Citation.]” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) B. Analysis Phuong’s appellate brief does not satisfy the rules and principles outlined above. The brief offers no summary of significant facts, no citations to the record, and no pertinent factual or legal analysis. Although she appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer, Phuong does not engage with the arguments Sonni made in support of the demurrer or discuss the trial court’s reasons for sustaining it. Instead, much of Phuong’s 5 brief consists of assertions that do not bear on the issues raised by the demurrer. For example, Phuong incorrectly argues at the outset of her brief that she “responds to the Motion for Summary Judgment” filed by Sonni and granted by the trial court and claims she “will demonstrate that there remain numerous material facts in dispute, as well as issues regarding credibility.” She goes on to raise various claims of unfairness concerning the marital dissolution proceedings, the conduct of counsel in those proceedings, and law enforcement’s response to her domestic violence allegations. Phuong also focused most of her presentation during oral argument on those same matters. Although we acknowledge Phuong’s frustration and disappointment with the manner in which her allegations of domestic violence were addressed by the family court and other institutions, our jurisdiction in this case permits only a review of the order specified in the notice of appeal. (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [court of appeal has “no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal”].) Moreover, like the trial court, we cannot consider either the credibility of the parties or factual matters outside the complaint unless properly subject to judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [when reviewing a ruling on demurrer, appellate court cannot consider “the substance of declarations, matter not subject to judicial notice, or documents judicially noticed but not accepted for the truth of their contents”]; Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034 [demurrer “ ‘tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading,’ ” not the “ ‘truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct’ ”].) Phuong does not explain where in the record the factual contentions asserted in her brief can be found, why those matters fall within the permissible scope of judicial notice, or how those matters would cure the complaint’s defects. Therefore, even if we were to overlook the mistaken references to a motion for summary judgment, we must disregard those contentions. (Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc. (2002) 6 99 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1379 [appellate court may disregard factual contentions not supported by proper citations to the record]; Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [issues asserted without reasoned argument in appellate briefs are forfeited].) Additionally, Phuong has not provided an adequate record. On an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellate record must contain, at minimum, the operative complaint, the demurrer, and any documents filed in support of the demurrer or relied on by the trial court. (See World Business Academy v. California State Lands Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 476, 492 [“The California Rules of Court provide that the appellate record in a civil case must contain pertinent written documents from the superior court proceedings being reviewed.”].) Here, Phuong included in the record the complaint, the demurrer and motion to strike, and Sonni’s 2-page request for judicial notice. However, Phuong did not include most of the actual documents from the marital dissolution proceedings that the trial court judicially noticed in ruling on the demurrer, such as Phuong’s DVRO request, her supporting declarations, or the judgment on reserved issues. We cannot say the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer was erroneous if we are unable to review the same documents used by the trial court to find that Phuong’s domestic violence claims were previously adjudicated. Although we are mindful that Phuong is self-represented, that status does not exempt her from compliance with the basic rules of appellate procedure. (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247; Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520 [self- represented party “ ‘is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys’ ”].) Because Phuong’s appellate brief and the record on appeal do not allow for meaningful review, she has forfeited any claims of error. (Nelson, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 862; Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) As such, we are left to apply the presumption of correctness and affirm the trial court’s order. (Jameson, at pp. 608–609.) 7  III. DISPOSITION The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).) 8  ______________________________________ Adams, J. WE CONCUR: ____________________________________ Greenwood, P. J. ____________________________________ Danner, J. H053992 Vu v. Vu