Atiyeh v. American Business Bank CA4/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketG065739
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Atiyeh v. American Business Bank CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LANNETTE ATIYEH et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G065739
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01444101)
AMERICAN BUSINESS BANK,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Julianne S. Bancroft, Judge. Affirmed. Requests for Judicial Notice. Denied.
Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal. Denied.
Lannette Atiyeh and Andy Atiyeh, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Prenovost, Normandin, Dawe & Rocha and Tom R. Normandin
for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiffs and appellants Lannette Atiyeh and Andy Atiyeh1
appeal from the denial of their ex parte application for a temporary
restraining order to set aside and stay the recording of the allegedly improper
sale of their home by defendant and respondent American Business Bank
(ABB). We conclude plaintiffs have not demonstrated the trial court erred in
denying their ex parte application. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2024, plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action
against ABB related to the alleged improper sale of their home. The
complaint asserted what it labeled as six causes of action for fraud,
unconscionability, declaratory relief, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, quiet title, and injunctive relief.
On July 8, 2025, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application seeking a
temporary restraining order “to set aside and stay the recording of the
improper sale on their home” by ABB. It was accompanied by a supporting
memorandum of points and authorities with exhibits. Among other things,
plaintiffs argued ABB had sold their house on June 27, 2025, for less than its
value and ABB “violated [plaintiffs’] fundamental due process and statutory
protections.” (Boldface omitted.) The record does not reflect that plaintiffs
filed a supporting declaration.
On July 9, 2025, ABB filed an opposition with exhibits. Later
that same day, plaintiffs filed a “supplemental notice of urgency and response
to defendants’ opposition to temporary restraining order.” (Capitalization
omitted.)
1
At times in the record, this plaintiff’s first name is listed as
Ashraf.
2
The trial court denied the ex parte application in a minute order,
also dated July 9, 2025. The court stated, “[p]laintiffs have failed to disclose
previous applications to this court in this case and another case requesting
substantially the same relief, which was denied.” Citing California Rules of
Court, rule 3.1202(c), it found plaintiffs “have also failed to ‘make an
affirmative factual showing . . . of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or
any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.’” The court further
found there was “little likelihood [p]laintiffs will prevail on the merits of this
case, and the relative balance of harms does not favor one party over the
other.”
On July 10, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the July
9, 2025 order.
DISCUSSION
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not
only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “To rebut that presumption, appellant has the burden to
show error with cogent argument supported by legal authority and citation to
the record. [Citation.] ‘“The appellant bears this burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision, regardless of
the applicable standard of review.”’” (Consumer Protection Group, LLC v.
Signal Brands, LLC (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 214, 226.)
“‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on its
own seeking error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument
with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed
3
to have been waived.’” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
“‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it
with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.’” (Br. C. v. Be. C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 259, 264.) Plaintiffs, who
are proceeding in propria persona, are “‘to be treated like any other party and
[are] entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants
and attorneys.’” (Nwosu, at p. 1247.) “Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro.
per. litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Ibid.)
I.
SCOPE OF THIS APPEAL
“‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of
appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.’ [Citation.] We have no
jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (Faunce v.
Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170.) Here, plaintiffs’ notice of appeal is
from the trial court’s July 9, 2025 order denying their ex parte application.
Plaintiffs, however, assert many arguments regarding purported
actions and orders that are outside the scope of this appeal. For example,
plaintiffs argue “summary judgment was void because it was never served,
entered without jurisdiction, and multiple triable issues required a hearing.”
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.) Indeed, plaintiffs assert all orders
entered by the trial court after their July 10, 2025 notice of appeal should be
vacated because they “are void because the superior court was divested of
jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 916.” (Boldface omitted.)
Plaintiffs argue the void orders would include the court’s “September 8–10,
2025 vexatious-litigant orders . . . , the $25,000 undertaking, the 400-page
summary judgment entered without service, and the October 24, 2025
dismissal . . . .” Plaintiffs have not provided developed argument, with
4
citation to applicable authority, that other orders are properly within the
scope of this appeal. Our review here is limited to whether the trial court
erred in denying plaintiffs’ ex parte application on July 9, 2025.2
II.
THE DENIAL OF THE EX PARTE APPLICATION
“Various court rules govern ex parte proceedings, which are
designed to afford relief on an essentially emergency basis. ‘A court will not
grant ex parte relief “in any but the plainest and most certain of cases.”’
[Citation.] Substantively, ‘[a]n applicant must make an affirmative factual
showing in a declaration containing competent testimony based on personal
knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory
basis for granting relief ex parte.’ [Citations.] ‘A trial court should deny an ex
parte application absent the requisite showing.’ [Citation.] Further, entry of
any type of injunctive relief has been described as a delicate judicial power, to
be exercised with great caution. [Citation.] This is doubly true when granting
relief on an expedited basis using an ex parte request for a temporary
restraining order rather than a properly noticed preliminary injunction.”
(Newsom v. Superior Court (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1097.) “We review a
2
Although we need not decide as part of this appeal whether any
subsequent order entered by the trial court is void, we note “an appeal from
the denial of a preliminary injunction does not stay further trial court
proceedings on the merits. Because the injunction ‘amounts to a mere
preliminary or interlocutory order to keep the subject of litigation in status
quo pending the determination of the action on its merits’ [citation], the
affirmance or reversal of its denial does not and cannot eliminate the need for
additional proceedings on the merits. Section 916 [of the Code of Civil
Procedure] therefore does not automatically stay such proceedings.” (Varian
Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 191.)
5
trial court’s ruling on an ex parte application for abuse of discretion.” (People
ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Suh (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 253, 257.)
Here, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the trial court abused its
discretion in denying their ex parte application. Plaintiffs did not submit a
declaration in support of their ex parte application, and they therefore failed
to “‘make an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing
competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm,
immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.’”
(Newsom v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097; accord Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c).) Plaintiffs do not directly address this failure
in their opening brief. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the ex parte application given plaintiffs’ failure to submit a
declaration containing competent testimony.
In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue the trial court did not deny
their ex parte application for lack of a declaration making an affirmative
factual showing, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c). This
argument does not carry the day for two reasons. First, it misstates the
court’s order, which quoted (and cited) California Rules of Court, rule
3.1202(c), stating, “[p]laintiffs have also failed to ‘make an affirmative factual
showing . . . of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory
basis for granting relief ex parte.’”3 Even if it had not done so, “[w]e may
3
When quoting California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c), the trial
court’s order used ellipses to omit: “in a declaration containing competent
testimony based on personal knowledge.” That omission shortened the
quotation, and we do not interpret it as showing the court did not rely on this
ground to deny the ex parte application.
6
affirm the trial court’s decision on any grounds which appear in the record.”
(Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624, 628.)4
Plaintiffs argue the July 9, 2025 order violated due process
because “it was issued without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, without
review of [plaintiffs’] reply, and under a misapplied legal framework.” We
conclude plaintiffs have not demonstrated a denial of due process. In its
minute order denying the ex parte application, the trial court expressly
stated it had reviewed and considered plaintiffs’ ex parte application and
memorandum of points and authorities and ABB’s opposition. To the extent
plaintiffs are suggesting the trial court was required to hold a hearing before
denying their ex parte application, they provide no developed argument, with
citation to applicable authority, supporting such an argument. “[T]rial courts
can, and often do, rule on ex parte applications without a formal hearing.”
(Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 506, 517.)
As to plaintiffs’ assertion that the trial court committed
reversible error by not reviewing their reply brief before issuing its order, this
argument also fails. First, it is not clear that the court received plaintiffs’
reply brief before it issued its ruling; the record indicates plaintiffs filed their
“supplemental notice of urgency and response to defendants’ opposition to
temporary restraining order” on the same day the court issued its order
denying the ex parte application for a temporary restraining order.
(Capitalization omitted.) If the court did receive and review the reply, it is not
obliged to identify in its order every item it reviewed and considered. (See
4
Plaintiffs cite People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th
56, but that case did not address on what basis the denial of an ex parte
application may be affirmed.
7
Barboni v. Tuomi (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 340, 352 [“declin[ing] to impose on
the trial bench an unduly burdensome requirement that any order issued
without a hearing must specifically state that an opposition was
considered”].) And even if the trial court issued its order without having seen
or reviewed plaintiffs’ reply, that does not demonstrate the trial court
committed reversible error. Plaintiffs cite no authority holding they are
entitled to file a reply on an ex parte application and the trial court is obliged
to review such a reply before ruling on the ex parte application.5
Plaintiffs also generally argue they were “denied any meaningful
access to a judicial forum capable of adjudicating ABB’s foreclosure
authority” and appear to assert issues with other orders, including the trial
court order setting trial for May 2026 and the court’s dismissal of the action.
As discussed above, other orders are not within the scope of this appeal.
Moreover, the trial court’s July 9, 2025 denial of plaintiffs’ ex parte
application did not somehow preclude all review of the merits of plaintiffs’
claims; it simply denied an ex parte temporary restraining order.
III.
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND MOTION
On September 9, 2025, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice
of five documents: (1) the July 9, 2025 minute order from this action;
(2) ABB’s July 9, 2025 opposition to plaintiffs’ ex parte application from this
5
Citing In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281,
plaintiffs assert “[a] ruling issued before consideration of the reply is a per se
violation of due process.” Carlsson concerned a trial and the violation of due
process under the circumstances of that case, including that “the family law
judge suddenly declared an end to the trial before the husband had finished
putting on his case-in-chief.” (Id. at p. 284.) Carlsson does not stand for the
proposition that it is a per se violation of due process to not consider a reply
brief on an ex parte application.
8
action; (3) a September 8, 2025 minute order from this action; (4) ABB’s April
25, 2025 motion to deem plaintiffs vexatious litigants, to require them to
furnish security, and for entry of a prefiling order; and (5) a purported “side-
by-side comparison” (capitalization and boldface omitted) of text from ABB’s
filings and court orders. We deny this request for judicial notice. The July 9,
2025 minute order and opposition from this action are already in the record
on appeal; the September 8, 2025 minute order and April 25, 2025 motion
from this action are not necessary to our resolution of this appeal; and the
purported side-by-side comparison is unnecessary to our resolution of this
appeal and also not the proper subject of judicial notice. (See County of San
Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29 [denying
“requests for judicial notice on the ground the materials in question are
unnecessary to resolution of the appeal”]; Evid. Code, §§ 451, 452, 459.)
On December 5, 2025, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice
of another five documents: (1) a November 2, 2023 opinion from the United
States Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of California in case No. 23-
20862; (2) a May 13, 2024 memorandum from the United States Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in case No. 23-1185; (3) an April 28,
2025 memorandum from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in case No. 24-3692; (4) a trustee’s deed upon sale; and (5) a verdict
form from Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2021-01206191. We
deny this request for judicial notice as these documents are unnecessary to
our resolution of this appeal.6
6
On December 12, 2025, plaintiffs submitted another document
that was entitled, “exhibits request for judicial notice in support of
appellants’ opening brief.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) This
included the same exhibits that were included with the December 5, 2025
9
On December 23, 2025, ABB filed a motion to augment the record
on appeal, which sought to add more than 100 documents to the record, and
on January 16, 2026, ABB filed a request for judicial notice of seven
documents. We deny ABB’s motion to augment and request for judicial notice
as those documents are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal or
already part of the record.
DISPOSITION
The July 9, 2025 order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its
costs on appeal. Appellants’ requests for judicial notice are denied.
Respondent’s motion to augment the record on appeal and request for judicial
notice are denied.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
request for judicial notice, as well as additional exhibits. To the extent
plaintiffs are seeking judicial notice of the documents included in their
December 12, 2025 filing, we also deny that request.
10