Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 Atiyeh v. American Business Bank CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE LANNETTE ATIYEH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, G065739 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024- 01444101) AMERICAN BUSINESS BANK, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julianne S. Bancroft, Judge. Affirmed. Requests for Judicial Notice. Denied. Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal. Denied. Lannette Atiyeh and Andy Atiyeh, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Prenovost, Normandin, Dawe & Rocha and Tom R. Normandin for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiffs and appellants Lannette Atiyeh and Andy Atiyeh1 appeal from the denial of their ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to set aside and stay the recording of the allegedly improper sale of their home by defendant and respondent American Business Bank (ABB). We conclude plaintiffs have not demonstrated the trial court erred in denying their ex parte application. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2024, plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action against ABB related to the alleged improper sale of their home. The complaint asserted what it labeled as six causes of action for fraud, unconscionability, declaratory relief, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quiet title, and injunctive relief. On July 8, 2025, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application seeking a temporary restraining order “to set aside and stay the recording of the improper sale on their home” by ABB. It was accompanied by a supporting memorandum of points and authorities with exhibits. Among other things, plaintiffs argued ABB had sold their house on June 27, 2025, for less than its value and ABB “violated [plaintiffs’] fundamental due process and statutory protections.” (Boldface omitted.) The record does not reflect that plaintiffs filed a supporting declaration. On July 9, 2025, ABB filed an opposition with exhibits. Later that same day, plaintiffs filed a “supplemental notice of urgency and response to defendants’ opposition to temporary restraining order.” (Capitalization omitted.) 1 At times in the record, this plaintiff’s first name is listed as Ashraf. 2 The trial court denied the ex parte application in a minute order, also dated July 9, 2025. The court stated, “[p]laintiffs have failed to disclose previous applications to this court in this case and another case requesting substantially the same relief, which was denied.” Citing California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c), it found plaintiffs “have also failed to ‘make an affirmative factual showing . . . of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.’” The court further found there was “little likelihood [p]laintiffs will prevail on the merits of this case, and the relative balance of harms does not favor one party over the other.” On July 10, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the July 9, 2025 order. DISCUSSION “‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “To rebut that presumption, appellant has the burden to show error with cogent argument supported by legal authority and citation to the record. [Citation.] ‘“The appellant bears this burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision, regardless of the applicable standard of review.”’” (Consumer Protection Group, LLC v. Signal Brands, LLC (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 214, 226.) “‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed 3 to have been waived.’” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) “‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’” (Br. C. v. Be. C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 259, 264.) Plaintiffs, who are proceeding in propria persona, are “‘to be treated like any other party and [are] entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’” (Nwosu, at p. 1247.) “Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Ibid.) I. SCOPE OF THIS APPEAL “‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.’ [Citation.] We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170.) Here, plaintiffs’ notice of appeal is from the trial court’s July 9, 2025 order denying their ex parte application. Plaintiffs, however, assert many arguments regarding purported actions and orders that are outside the scope of this appeal. For example, plaintiffs argue “summary judgment was void because it was never served, entered without jurisdiction, and multiple triable issues required a hearing.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) Indeed, plaintiffs assert all orders entered by the trial court after their July 10, 2025 notice of appeal should be vacated because they “are void because the superior court was divested of jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 916.” (Boldface omitted.) Plaintiffs argue the void orders would include the court’s “September 8–10, 2025 vexatious-litigant orders . . . , the $25,000 undertaking, the 400-page summary judgment entered without service, and the October 24, 2025 dismissal . . . .” Plaintiffs have not provided developed argument, with 4 citation to applicable authority, that other orders are properly within the scope of this appeal. Our review here is limited to whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ ex parte application on July 9, 2025.2 II. THE DENIAL OF THE EX PARTE APPLICATION “Various court rules govern ex parte proceedings, which are designed to afford relief on an essentially emergency basis. ‘A court will not grant ex parte relief “in any but the plainest and most certain of cases.”’ [Citation.] Substantively, ‘[a]n applicant must make an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.’ [Citations.] ‘A trial court should deny an ex parte application absent the requisite showing.’ [Citation.] Further, entry of any type of injunctive relief has been described as a delicate judicial power, to be exercised with great caution. [Citation.] This is doubly true when granting relief on an expedited basis using an ex parte request for a temporary restraining order rather than a properly noticed preliminary injunction.” (Newsom v. Superior Court (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1097.) “We review a 2 Although we need not decide as part of this appeal whether any subsequent order entered by the trial court is void, we note “an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction does not stay further trial court proceedings on the merits. Because the injunction ‘amounts to a mere preliminary or interlocutory order to keep the subject of litigation in status quo pending the determination of the action on its merits’ [citation], the affirmance or reversal of its denial does not and cannot eliminate the need for additional proceedings on the merits. Section 916 [of the Code of Civil Procedure] therefore does not automatically stay such proceedings.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 191.) 5 trial court’s ruling on an ex parte application for abuse of discretion.” (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Suh (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 253, 257.) Here, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in denying their ex parte application. Plaintiffs did not submit a declaration in support of their ex parte application, and they therefore failed to “‘make an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.’” (Newsom v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097; accord Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c).) Plaintiffs do not directly address this failure in their opening brief. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the ex parte application given plaintiffs’ failure to submit a declaration containing competent testimony. In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue the trial court did not deny their ex parte application for lack of a declaration making an affirmative factual showing, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c). This argument does not carry the day for two reasons. First, it misstates the court’s order, which quoted (and cited) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c), stating, “[p]laintiffs have also failed to ‘make an affirmative factual showing . . . of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.’”3 Even if it had not done so, “[w]e may 3 When quoting California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c), the trial court’s order used ellipses to omit: “in a declaration containing competent testimony based on personal knowledge.” That omission shortened the quotation, and we do not interpret it as showing the court did not rely on this ground to deny the ex parte application. 6 affirm the trial court’s decision on any grounds which appear in the record.” (Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624, 628.)4 Plaintiffs argue the July 9, 2025 order violated due process because “it was issued without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, without review of [plaintiffs’] reply, and under a misapplied legal framework.” We conclude plaintiffs have not demonstrated a denial of due process. In its minute order denying the ex parte application, the trial court expressly stated it had reviewed and considered plaintiffs’ ex parte application and memorandum of points and authorities and ABB’s opposition. To the extent plaintiffs are suggesting the trial court was required to hold a hearing before denying their ex parte application, they provide no developed argument, with citation to applicable authority, supporting such an argument. “[T]rial courts can, and often do, rule on ex parte applications without a formal hearing.” (Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, 517.) As to plaintiffs’ assertion that the trial court committed reversible error by not reviewing their reply brief before issuing its order, this argument also fails. First, it is not clear that the court received plaintiffs’ reply brief before it issued its ruling; the record indicates plaintiffs filed their “supplemental notice of urgency and response to defendants’ opposition to temporary restraining order” on the same day the court issued its order denying the ex parte application for a temporary restraining order. (Capitalization omitted.) If the court did receive and review the reply, it is not obliged to identify in its order every item it reviewed and considered. (See 4 Plaintiffs cite People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, but that case did not address on what basis the denial of an ex parte application may be affirmed. 7 Barboni v. Tuomi (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 340, 352 [“declin[ing] to impose on the trial bench an unduly burdensome requirement that any order issued without a hearing must specifically state that an opposition was considered”].) And even if the trial court issued its order without having seen or reviewed plaintiffs’ reply, that does not demonstrate the trial court committed reversible error. Plaintiffs cite no authority holding they are entitled to file a reply on an ex parte application and the trial court is obliged to review such a reply before ruling on the ex parte application.5 Plaintiffs also generally argue they were “denied any meaningful access to a judicial forum capable of adjudicating ABB’s foreclosure authority” and appear to assert issues with other orders, including the trial court order setting trial for May 2026 and the court’s dismissal of the action. As discussed above, other orders are not within the scope of this appeal. Moreover, the trial court’s July 9, 2025 denial of plaintiffs’ ex parte application did not somehow preclude all review of the merits of plaintiffs’ claims; it simply denied an ex parte temporary restraining order. III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND MOTION On September 9, 2025, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice of five documents: (1) the July 9, 2025 minute order from this action; (2) ABB’s July 9, 2025 opposition to plaintiffs’ ex parte application from this 5 Citing In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, plaintiffs assert “[a] ruling issued before consideration of the reply is a per se violation of due process.” Carlsson concerned a trial and the violation of due process under the circumstances of that case, including that “the family law judge suddenly declared an end to the trial before the husband had finished putting on his case-in-chief.” (Id. at p. 284.) Carlsson does not stand for the proposition that it is a per se violation of due process to not consider a reply brief on an ex parte application. 8 action; (3) a September 8, 2025 minute order from this action; (4) ABB’s April 25, 2025 motion to deem plaintiffs vexatious litigants, to require them to furnish security, and for entry of a prefiling order; and (5) a purported “side- by-side comparison” (capitalization and boldface omitted) of text from ABB’s filings and court orders. We deny this request for judicial notice. The July 9, 2025 minute order and opposition from this action are already in the record on appeal; the September 8, 2025 minute order and April 25, 2025 motion from this action are not necessary to our resolution of this appeal; and the purported side-by-side comparison is unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal and also not the proper subject of judicial notice. (See County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29 [denying “requests for judicial notice on the ground the materials in question are unnecessary to resolution of the appeal”]; Evid. Code, §§ 451, 452, 459.) On December 5, 2025, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice of another five documents: (1) a November 2, 2023 opinion from the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of California in case No. 23- 20862; (2) a May 13, 2024 memorandum from the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in case No. 23-1185; (3) an April 28, 2025 memorandum from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in case No. 24-3692; (4) a trustee’s deed upon sale; and (5) a verdict form from Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2021-01206191. We deny this request for judicial notice as these documents are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal.6 6 On December 12, 2025, plaintiffs submitted another document that was entitled, “exhibits request for judicial notice in support of appellants’ opening brief.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) This included the same exhibits that were included with the December 5, 2025 9 On December 23, 2025, ABB filed a motion to augment the record on appeal, which sought to add more than 100 documents to the record, and on January 16, 2026, ABB filed a request for judicial notice of seven documents. We deny ABB’s motion to augment and request for judicial notice as those documents are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal or already part of the record. DISPOSITION The July 9, 2025 order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal. Appellants’ requests for judicial notice are denied. Respondent’s motion to augment the record on appeal and request for judicial notice are denied. GOODING, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. SCOTT, J. request for judicial notice, as well as additional exhibits. To the extent plaintiffs are seeking judicial notice of the documents included in their December 12, 2025 filing, we also deny that request. 10