Marriage of K.S. and M.S. CA4/3

Filed 10/29/26 Marriage of K.S. and M.S. CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE In re the Marriage of K.S. and M.S. K.S., G066290 Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 18D005803) v. OPINION M.S., Respondent. Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Thomas James Lo, Judge. Affirmed. K.S., in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.  K.S. (father) appeals from an order denying his custody request and his motion to seal records. Based on the inadequate record and briefing, he is unable to meet his burden to show prejudicial error. We affirm. FACTS We draw these facts from the reporter’s transcript. A restraining order has been in place for many years limiting father’s interactions with M.S. (mother) and her two daughters, one of whom is father’s minor daughter. In November 2022, mother moved to renew that restraining order. After hearing testimony from mother, her adult daughter, and father, the trial court found the protected parties had “a reasonable and genuine apprehension of future abuse by [father].” The restraining order was renewed for five years with the same terms and conditions previously in place, including an order that father’s visitation with his daughter be monitored. Nearly three years later, mother filed an ex parte request that included what the trial court described as “concerning items and information.” We do not have the request itself. The trial court temporarily suspended father’s visitation rights. At the initial hearing, father requested that anything reported “be redacted or made confidential so it’s not for the public to view.” Father stated he was worried about his own welfare and his job, as well as “the welfare of [his] daughter.” The trial court advised him to file a separate motion on that issue. It then continued the hearing date. At the continued hearing in October 2025, the court considered mother’s and father’s requests for order, and father’s motion to seal records. We do not have any of these documents. The trial court stated mother’s allegations had since been investigated by social services and were not substantiated. Father requested a child custody evaluation. The court 2 declined because the restraining order protecting his daughter is in place through 2027. After hearing from the parties, the court issued an amended domestic violence restraining order that reinstated the previous custody arrangement with monitored visitation. Father then asked the court rule on his motion to seal records. The trial court denied the motion, finding “no overriding interest to seal the records.” DISCUSSION Father challenges the trial court’s ruling on three fronts: (1) the trial court should have appointed the child custody evaluator he requested; (2) the trial court’s denial of his motion to seal was erroneous because the court failed to articulate findings and incorrectly concluded a minor’s privacy is not an overriding interest; and (3) the trial court’s actions amount to a violation of due process. A trial court’s orders and judgment are presumed correct, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate, based on the appellate record, that the court committed a reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) If an appellant fails to provide an adequate record, the court’s decision must be affirmed. (Ibid.; see State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WallDesign Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1528, fn. 1 [“‘if it is not in the record, it did not happen’”].) These rules apply to self-represented litigants. (See Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 323.) The appellate record here is scant. It includes only the case summary prepared by the clerk (the docket, essentially), the restraining order, and the transcripts of three hearings. None of the parties’ motions, requests for order, other filings, or evidence are included in the record. Additionally, father’s briefing includes no citations to the record. (Cal. Rules 3 of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [brief must cite “volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”]; see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985 [procedural rules apply to self-represented parties].) Considering information which can be ascertained from the record, father has not met his burden to show prejudicial error. He first contends the trial court should have allowed a full custody evaluation. Family Code section 3111 gives the court discretion to appoint a child custody evaluator when there is a “contested proceeding involving child custody or visitation rights.” (Fam. Code, § 3111, subd. (a).) These evaluations are not routine and are ordered only when the court finds it is in the best interest of the child. (Ibid.) Father’s only articulated reason for this request was that mother lied in her recent accusations and “this has been going on so long.” This is not sufficient to establish that a custody evaluation or change in custody might be in the best interest of the child. Without more, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in declining to reevaluate custody. Next, father challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to seal. The trial court may order a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish an overriding interest that is stronger than the right of public access to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).) As we do not have the motion, the record is silent on what documents father wanted sealed and what facts or legal support was provided to the trial court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(1) [motion must include a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing].) “To the extent the court relied on documents not before us, our review is hampered. We cannot presume error from an incomplete record.” (Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412.) 4  We can infer from father’s comments to the trial court that he wanted to seal mother’s ex parte motion and the allegations therein. Father challenges the trial court’s finding on two fronts. First, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request “without analysis or findings.” Second, he contends “[p]rotection of a minor’s privacy qualifies as an overriding interest,” but provides no legal authority for that contention, and no factual assertion of how his daughter’s privacy interests are at issue. The transcript indicates father wanted “what was reported” to be confidential and that he does not want “to drag [his] daughter’s name through the dirt like this.” This is too vague to establish an overriding interest or to establish the trial court’s finding is error. Finally, father contends the trial court violated his due process rights by “conditioning [its] consideration” of his motions on his acceptance of the court’s order to return to the prior restraining order’s terms. Again, however, we are impeded by the limited record. The record we have does not support father’s contention. We know the trial court stated an inclination to deny mother’s request for order and reinstate father’s monitored visitation rights, a result that seems to take both mother’s and father’s requests into consideration. The court then gave father the option of accepting this result or leaving the temporary orders in place, which would mean he had no visitation rights. Before that choice was offered, father had an opportunity to address mother’s allegations by filing his request for order. The hearing was even continued to give father more time to prepare. And he was given a chance to address the court at the hearing. Father was not denied due process. 5  DISPOSITION The trial court’s October 7, 2025 sixth amended restraining order is affirmed. As respondent has not appeared, no costs are awarded. SCOTT, J. WE CONCUR: MOTOIKE, P. J. DELANEY, J. 6