In re B.B. CA2/3

Filed 11/13/26 In re B.B. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE B354100 In re B.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25PSJP00068A) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.B., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed. Brian Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.  Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ L.B. (father) appeals a juvenile custody order issued pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4.1 Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his requests for joint legal custody and unmonitored visitation. We find no error and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Detention and Petition Father and L.S. (mother) have one child together, B.B., who was born in April 2019. When this case began, the parents had been in a relationship for about 10 years and had lived together for about six years. Father had one prior arrest for intimate partner battery, but the matter was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence after mother declined to press charges. In May 2025, father went through mother’s phone while she was asleep and concluded she had been talking to other men. Father woke mother, attempted to strangle her with one hand, and pinned her against a wall. He then picked mother up and threw her outside the apartment, where she fell and hit her face on the concrete. When mother tried to get up, six-year-old B.B. ran towards mother, and father knocked them both to the ground. Mother and B.B. both suffered lacerations. Neighbors 1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 called the police and father was arrested. B.B. was treated for facial abrasions and a lip laceration requiring sutures. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) in July 2025. The petition alleged that father physically assaulted mother in B.B.’s presence, injuring mother and B.B. In July 2025, the juvenile court detained B.B. from father and released her to mother. Father was permitted weekly monitored visits with B.B. On July 17, 2025, father pled not guilty to misdemeanor willful infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant and willful injury to a child. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 273a, subd. (a).) Pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, the criminal court issued a criminal protective order pending trial, which provided as follows: ● Father must not “harass, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy or damage personal or real property, disturb the peace of, keep under surveillance, annoy by phone or other electronic means (including repeatedly contact), impersonate (on the internet, electronically, or otherwise), or block movements of” mother and B.B. ● Father must not “contact [mother and B.B.], directly or indirectly, by any means, including by telephone, mail, email or other electronic means, or through a third party.” However, “[c]ontact through an attorney under reasonable restrictions set by the court does not violate this order.” ● Exceptions: Father “may have peaceful contact with [mother and B.B.], as an exception to the no-contact and stay- away orders . . . only for the safe exchange of children and court- 3 ordered visitation as stated in [¶] [(a)] the family, juvenile, or probate court order in (case number): 25PSPT00260, [and] [¶] [(b)] any family, juvenile, or probate court order issued after the date this order is signed.”2 On September 17, 2025, the court sustained the allegations of the petition and ordered B.B. removed from father and placed with mother under DCFS supervision. The court ordered mother to enroll in individual counseling and a domestic violence support group for victims, and ordered father to engage in individual counseling and a 52-week batterer’s intervention program. Father was permitted nine hours of monitored visits with B.B. weekly. Six-Month Review Hearing In March 2026, DCFS reported that mother had completed domestic violence and parenting classes and had begun individual counseling. Father had begun monitored visits with B.B. in November 2025, and visits reportedly were positive. Father was attending domestic violence classes weekly, but had not begun individual counseling. DCFS recommended that the court terminate jurisdiction and order joint legal custody, sole physical custody to mother, and monitored visits for father. At the March 20, 2026 six-month review hearing, DCFS’s counsel stated that DCFS was recommending joint legal custody. Counsel noted, however, that the criminal protective order remained in place pending the resolution of father’s criminal case, so counsel “would anticipate an argument [that] it shouldn’t be joint legal.” Counsel “submit[ted] that issue to the court.” 2 In June 2025, mother filed case No. 25PSPT00260 seeking child custody and visitation orders. 4  Mother’s counsel asked that the court award mother sole legal and sole physical custody based on the domestic violence incident between the parents. Counsel noted that the criminal case remained open, the criminal protective order remained in place, and there were “power and control dynamics” that made joint legal custody inappropriate. The court interrupted mother’s counsel’s argument to note that the criminal protective order allowed contact between father and mother only “for the safe exchange of children.” Thus, the court said, “I believe legally I have to order sole legal custody. They can’t talk. Them talking about anything other than court- ordered visitation is a violation of this criminal protective order.” Father’s counsel asked the court to award joint legal custody, asserting that although the criminal protective order did not allow for direct contact between mother and father, “they can communicate via [a] third party.” The court disagreed, stating that under the criminal protective order, mother and father “can’t communicate through a third party.” Father’s counsel responded that father “will submit on the sole legal custody issue with respect to mother as well as the sole physical custody.” Counsel continued: “[Father] does understand there is a CPO in place. I have advised him to . . . request to modify that in his criminal court hearing in order to make further modifications to the custody order.” Counsel then asked the court to permit father unmonitored visits, noting that father “has been engaging in the domestic violence program since this case has opened[,] . . . has accepted responsibility for his actions, is working on being the best version of himself, has learned how to remove himself from risky . . . situations.” 5  Minor’s counsel submitted on “a family [law] order that gives mother sole legal and physical custody based on all the analysis that has been presented by the court.” Regarding visits, counsel said B.B. loved her father and enjoyed visits with him, but recommended that visits remain monitored. The court awarded sole legal and physical custody to mother “because of the criminal protective order.” It denied father’s request for unmonitored visits and ordered father to complete domestic violence classes and 12 individual counseling sessions, noting the severity of the domestic violence, father’s infrequent visitation, and father’s very recent enrollment in individual counseling. The court advised father that he could ask the family court for unmonitored visits and joint custody once “[the] criminal protective order is modified” and father completed his domestic violence program and individual counseling. The juvenile court entered a final custody order on March 20, 2026. Father timely appealed. DISCUSSION Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by awarding mother sole legal custody and denying his request for unmonitored visitation. We disagree. I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Granting Mother Sole Legal Custody “When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it is empowered to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation.” (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1122, citing § 362.4; see also In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203.) Such orders become part of any family court proceeding concerning the same child “and will remain in effect 6 until they are terminated or modified by the family court.” (In re T.H., at p. 1123.) The family law presumption favoring joint custody does not apply to juvenile court custody orders entered upon termination of jurisdiction. (In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206; In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711–713.) Instead, “ ‘[w]hen making a custody determination in any dependency case, the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102–103.) The juvenile court has broad discretion to make orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32; In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094), and we review the juvenile court’s custody orders for an abuse of discretion (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112–113). A court abuses its discretion “if there is no reasonable basis on which it could conclude that its decision advanced the best interests of the child” or “if it applies improper criteria or makes incorrect legal assumptions.” (In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497, italics omitted.) Father concedes the juvenile court had discretion to award mother sole legal custody if doing so was in B.B.’s best interests. He urges, however, that the juvenile court never made a best interests determination because it believed the criminal protective order precluded an award of joint legal custody. Father contends this was error because Penal Code section 136.2, 7 on which the criminal protective order was based, “expressly preserves the juvenile court’s authority to make custody orders.”3 Initially, we note that father overstates the scope of the juvenile court’s power under Penal Code section 136.2 to craft custody orders. Under subdivision (e)(3) of that section, when a defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, a family or juvenile court may order custody and visitation between the defendant and his children, but any custody or visitation order “shall make reference to and . . . acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of an appropriate criminal protective order.” Under subdivision (f)(1), a juvenile or family court order permitting contact between a restrained person and his children “shall not contain language, either printed or handwritten, that violates a ‘no-contact order’ issued by a criminal court.” (Italics added.) Thus, while Penal Code section 136.2 allows a juvenile court to enter a custody or visitation order that permits contact between a criminal defendant and his children, any such order is constrained by the terms of the criminal protective order—that is, the juvenile court “shall not” order what the criminal protective order forbids.4 3 On appeal, DCFS takes no position as to the legal custody order. 4 In an appropriate case, a family or juvenile court judicial officer may seek modification of a criminal protective order pursuant to court communication protocols required by the Penal Code and Rules of Court. (See Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (f); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.445; Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 2.30(d).) No modification was sought or requested in this case. 8  We also reject father’s characterization of the basis for the juvenile court’s order. Father argues the juvenile court believed that criminal protective orders categorically prohibit joint legal custody. But the juvenile court’s statements suggest otherwise. While the juvenile court initially stated it “legally [had] to order sole legal custody” because of the criminal protective order, it immediately provided further explanation. Specifically, the court observed that the criminal protective order entered in this case limited the parents’ communication to that necessary for court- ordered visitation. The court then noted—correctly—that the parents “talking about anything other than court-ordered visitation is a violation of this criminal protective order.” These comments suggest the juvenile court concluded that joint legal custody was inappropriate because the specific criminal protective order entered in this case prohibited the parents from communicating on topics other than the safe exchange of B.B. and visitation—not because it believed that a parent subject to a criminal protective order can never hold joint legal custody with a protected party. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that joint legal custody was not appropriate in the present case. “Joint legal custody” means that both parents “shall share the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.” (Fam. Code, § 3003.) Joint custody does not necessarily require the consent of both parents as to all decisions relating to a child’s health, education, and welfare, but joint custody orders commonly provide that parents “must discuss and consent in making decisions on” a variety of matters, including choice of school, starting or terminating mental health counseling or 9 therapy, participating in extracurricular activities, selecting doctors, dentists, or other health professionals, participating in religious activities, and out-of-country or out-of-state travel. (Form FL-341(E) [joint custody attachment to custody order]; see also Fam. Code, § 3083 [in awarding joint custody, court “shall specify the circumstances under which the consent of both parents is required to be obtained”].) Requiring mother to consult with father about parenting decisions pertaining to B.B. would deprive mother of the protection afforded her by the criminal protective order—to have no direct or indirect contact with father other than as necessary “for the safe exchange of children and court-ordered visitation.” The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by concluding that joint legal custody was not appropriate under the circumstances of the present case.5 5 Lugo v. Corona (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 865, does not support father’s arguments. There, a family court denied a wife’s request for a civil domestic violence restraining order against her husband on the ground that a criminal protective order was already in place. (Id. at pp. 867, 869.) The Court of Appeal held the family court erred because under the plain language of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act and the Penal Code, “both criminal and civil protective orders may coexist and address the same parties.” (Lugo, at p. 869.) The issue in the present case, however, is not whether a family or juvenile court has jurisdiction to enter orders concerning parties that are also subject to or protected by criminal protective orders—the juvenile court in the present case recognized that it had such authority and exercised it. Instead, we are concerned with the terms of coexisting criminal protective and custody orders, and the juvenile court’s efforts to ensure that the two would not conflict. Lugo did not 10  Father appears to contend on appeal that the juvenile court should have considered crafting an order for joint legal custody that would have, in practice, allowed each parent to effectively make decisions about B.B.’s health, education, and welfare without talking to each other, or issued an order that would essentially remain unenforceable until the criminal protective order was modified or terminated. Father forfeited any such contention by failing to raise it below. The juvenile court reasonably assessed the limitations the criminal protective order would place on the parents’ ability to collaborate or inform each other of decisions regarding B.B. It rejected DCFS’s recommendation of joint legal custody on that basis. To the extent father sought an order that would creatively avoid those limitations, it was his burden to make such a request in the juvenile court. He did not do so. Instead, his counsel suggested only that the parents could communicate through the paternal grandmother—and when the juvenile court noted otherwise, counsel “submit[ted]” on the legal custody issue and told the court she had advised father to seek a modification of the criminal protective order at his next criminal court hearing.6 The juvenile court was not required to explore the matter further. (See, e.g., In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046 [“The court does not err by failing to do that which it is not requested to do.”]; In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 501 [by failing to litigate relative placement preference issue or request a ruling address this issue, nor did it hold that a criminal protective order cannot constrain a juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 6 Father’s counsel did not suggest, as he does on appeal, that the parties had the ability or willingness to use legal counsel as their means of communication after the case closed. 11 from the juvenile court, father failed to preserve the issue on appeal].) II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Father’s Request for Unmonitored Visitation When making a visitation order under section 362.4, the juvenile court “must be guided by the totality of the circumstances and issue orders that are in the child’s best interests.” (In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112; see also In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 [under § 362.4, “ ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child’ ”]; In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973 [“[I]n making exit orders, the juvenile court must look at the best interests of the child”].) We review visitation provisions of a juvenile custody order for abuse of discretion. (In re Reyna R. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 486, 493; In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) Father does not suggest that the monitored visitation order was not in B.B.’s best interests. Instead, he contends the juvenile court relied on factors—father’s failure to visit B.B. consistently and to engage in individual counseling—that “were substantially of DCFS’s [own] making.” He therefore urges that the juvenile court’s monitored visitation order was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. At a six-month and 12-month review hearing under section 366.21, a juvenile court may terminate reunification services and set a hearing to terminate parental rights only if it concludes by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has received reasonable services. (§§ 361.5, 366.21, subd. (e)(3), (g)(1), (2), (4); Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 620.) The applicable statutes do not require a 12 similar determination when a juvenile court returns a child to the parents and terminates dependency jurisdiction, however. Instead, as noted above, the sole inquiry is the child’s best interests. (See In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112; In re T.S., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 513; In re John W., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 973.) Father cites just one case for the proposition that “a parent’s relationship with his child [may not] be adversely affected by a visitation deficit attributable to the failure to implement the court’s own visitation order,” but the case does not apply in the present circumstances. In In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, the Court of Appeal held that because a mother had not received court-ordered visitation with her child, the order terminating her parental rights was constitutionally infirm. (Id. at pp. 1504–1505.) But we are aware of no authority, and father cites none, for the proposition that a juvenile custody order placing a child with one or more parents implicates comparable due process concerns, or that an agency’s alleged failure to provide appropriate enhancement services to a noncustodial parent limits a juvenile court’s power to order monitored visits in a juvenile custody order. 13  DISPOSITION The March 20, 2026 order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ADAMS, P. J. We concur: HANASONO, J. PÁNUCO, J. 14