County of Los Angeles Child Support Servs. v. Tellez CA2/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB340835
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 County of Los Angeles Child Support Servs. v. Tellez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES B340835
CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES
DEPARTMENT,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
22STPB12635)
v.
DANIELLE TELLEZ, as Trustee,
etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ruben Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Dodd & Associates, John L. Dodd; Morris & Morris
and John Stuart Morris for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant
Attorney General, Maureen C. Onyeagbako and Ricardo
Enriquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
______________________________
Danielle Tellez (Tellez), as trustee of The Isidro B. Misquez
and Mary Belen Misquez Revocable Living Trust (Trust), appeals
an order compelling payment of the child support arrearages
owed by Nicholas Misquez (Nicholas)1 from a supplemental needs
trust of which he is the primary beneficiary. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The Child Support Judgment
Nicholas has a son named Jacob Nicholas Acosta Misquez
(Jacob), who was born in March 1998. In June 2002, when Jacob
was four years old, a court entered a judgment that ordered
Nicholas to pay monthly child support for Jacob (Judgment). By
December 2022, Nicholas owed $176,831.15 in child support on
the Judgment.
II. The Trust
On January 28, 2010, Nicholas’s parents, Mary Belen
Misquez and Isidro Misquez (Mary and Isidro, or Trustors),
established the Trust. Mary died in March 2015. Isidro restated
the Trust in July 2018, and died in August 2022.
Nicholas is the only child, and Jacob is the only grandchild,
of Mary and Isidro. Pursuant to the Trust’s terms, Nicholas is
the primary beneficiary and Jacob is the contingent beneficiary
1 We refer to all members of the Misquez family by their first
names for clarity and ease of reference. No disrespect is
intended.
2
who receives the remaining trust property should Nicholas die
before complete distribution.
The Trust directs the trustee to administer Nicholas’s
interest as a supplemental needs trust: “Your Trustee may
distribute discretionary amounts of income and principal for the
supplemental needs of Nicholas . . . not otherwise provided by
governmental financial assistance and benefits, or by the
providers of services.” The Trust broadly defines Nicholas’s
supplemental needs and states the objective “that Nicholas . . .
live as independently, productively, and happily as possible.”
However, “[t]he purpose of Nicholas[’s] . . . supplemental needs
trust is to provide for his needs without disqualifying him from
governmental assistance and benefits.” A valuation indicated
that the Trust had assets valued at $1,038,839.57 as of December
31, 2022.
III. The Petition and Objection
In December 2022, the County of Los Angeles Child
Support Services Department (Department) filed a petition to
enforce the Judgment against the Trust pursuant to Probate
Code section 15305, subdivision (c).2 The Department sought an
order directing Tellez to pay unpaid child support of $176,831.15,
plus interest and child support arrearages that accrue after
December 19, 2022, from Nicholas’s interest in the Trust.
In March 2023, Tellez filed an objection to the petition
because the Trust is only intended to provide for Nicholas’s
supplemental needs. In relevant part, Tellez stated: “The
provisions for the [supplemental needs trust] were implemented
by Grantor due to Grantor’s numerous concerns regarding
2 Unless otherwise stated, statutory references are to the
Probate Code.
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Nicholas’[s] access to the funds. Specifically, Nicholas is
unemployed and receiving General Relief. He has a criminal
record and spent time in a mental hospital after being found
incompetent to stand trial in 2019.”
At a hearing in July 2023, Tellez’s counsel argued: “It’s a
question here of whether or not the trustee is abusing her
discretion. She’s clearly not. Her intent is to follow the trust and
make distributions solely towards [Nicholas’s] special needs. [¶]
And, as indicated, even if she were to give him some small
amount of cash, which she has no intent to do, but even if she
were, the enforcement of judgment law prevents interception of
that.”
In June 2024, Tellez filed a supplemental objection. In
relevant part, Tellez asserted that there was no “current support
obligation” since Jacob was 26 years old, and “if the child support
judgment is paid, that money will NOT go to Jacob, nor
contribute towards his support. Instead it will go to the child
support obligee, which is Jacob’s mother, Jessica P. Acosta.”
Tellez further asserted that “[r]equiring the Trustee in this case
to pay the child support judgment . . . will instead have the
Trustors’ money be delivered outside of their family line in a
manner that will provide no benefit to their grandchild.”
Tellez also claimed an exemption for Nicholas in the
amount of $30,825 in cash, corresponding to a $29,275 homestead
exemption and a $1,550 property exemption under Code of Civil
Procedure section 703.140, subdivision (b)(1) and (5).
IV. The Trial Court’s Ruling
In July 2024, the trial court issued a minute order granting
the Department’s petition. Citing Ventura County Dept. of Child
Support Services v. Brown (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 144 (Ventura
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County) and Pratt v. Ferguson (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 102 (Pratt),
the trial court found that payment of the support obligation
would be equitable and reasonable under the circumstances of
this case.
Tellez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Ordering Payments from the Trust
A. Applicable law
Section 15305 provides in relevant part: “(c) Whether or not
the beneficiary has the right under the trust to compel the
trustee to pay income or principal or both to or for the benefit of
the beneficiary, the court may, to the extent that the court
determines it is equitable and reasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case, order the trustee to satisfy
all or part of the support judgment out of all or part of future
payments that the trustee, pursuant to the exercise of the
trustee’s discretion, determines to make to or for the benefit of
the beneficiary. [¶] (d) This section applies to a support
judgment notwithstanding any provision in the trust
instrument.” A “support judgment” is “a money judgment for
support of the trust beneficiary’s spouse or former spouse or
minor child.” (§ 15305, subd. (a).)
In Ventura County, the Court of Appeal interpreted
section 15305, subdivision (c), as follows: “By enacting section
15305, the Legislature intended to allow a support creditor to
satisfy court-ordered child support obligations where the parent
is a trust beneficiary. The statute was crafted to preclude a
beneficiary’s efforts to avoid a support obligation. The fact that
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the statute refers to payments made by the trustee demonstrates
legislative intent that the trustee make distributions from the
trust. Although a trustee may be given broad discretion, it may
not exercise its discretion with an improper motive. . . . [¶]
[U]nder section 15305, subdivision (c), a court may overcome the
trustee’s discretion under the narrow circumstances present here:
when there is an enforceable child support judgment that the
trustee refuses to satisfy.” (Ventura County, supra,
117 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.)
In Pratt, the Court of Appeal followed Ventura County and
reversed the trial court’s denial of a petition to compel a trustee
to satisfy child support orders. The court gave the following
directions to the trial court on remand: “Pursuant to Probate
Code section 15305, subdivision (c), . . . the trial court and the
Trustee shall give consideration to the Trustors’ intent to provide
support for [the beneficiary’s] children, the strong public policy in
favor of payment of child support obligations, and the principle
that where a trustee has discretion to make or withhold a
payment, the trustee may not act in bad faith or with an
improper motive, including an intent to avoid child support
obligations.” (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.)
B. Standard of review
We review the trial court’s determination per
section 15305, subdivision (c), for abuse of discretion. (See Pratt,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 114–115; In re Marriage of Furie
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816, 830.) Under this standard, “[w]e
reverse the [order] only if in the circumstances of the case, viewed
most favorably in support of the decision, the decision exceeds
‘the bounds of reason’ [citation], and therefore a judge could not
reasonably have reached that decision under applicable law.
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[Citations.]” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957.)
We review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial
evidence. (Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of
Oakland (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 519, 544.) Applying this
standard, “ ‘we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[An] order of a
lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all
intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130,
1133 (Arceneaux).)
To the extent we are called upon to interpret a statute or
the language of the Trust, then our review is de novo. (See Pratt,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 109.)
C. The trial court did not err in finding that
payment was equitable and reasonable
Tellez contends that the Department did not allege, and
thus the trial court did not find, that she “was abusing her
discretion” and was “acting ‘in bad faith or with an improper
motive’ ” to shield Trust assets from the Judgment. We disagree.
The Department sufficiently alleged that Tellez abused her
discretion by refusing to satisfy the Judgment.
More important, the trial court found that it had “the
authority to overcome the trustee’s discretion to direct payment
of the obligation” under Ventura County. The trial court found
that “there is an enforceable child support judgment that the
trustee refuses to satisfy.” Accordingly, the trial court found that
it is “equitable and reasonable under . . . [section] 15305[,
subdivision] (c) to compel the trustee to pay the child support
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judgment in full.”
These findings are sufficient because Tellez withdrew her
request for a statement of decision. (Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d
at pp. 1133–1134.) Regardless, on appeal, we “infer the trial
court made all factual findings necessary to support the
judgment.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 42, 58; see also Arceneaux, supra, at pp. 1133–1134.)
Tellez identifies nothing to suggest otherwise.
D. The trial court’s order is supported by
substantial evidence
Tellez next argues that she acted in good faith, and
consistently with the Trustors’ intent, in refusing to satisfy the
Judgment. We agree with the holdings in Ventura County and
Pratt: Tellez “may not exercise h[er] discretion to avoid
distributions under the Trust with the improper motive to
prevent the Trust estate from being used to satisfy [the trustee’s]
child support obligations.” (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.)
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. As
an initial matter, nothing in the Trust supports Tellez’s decision
not to satisfy the Judgment. “ ‘To determine the extent of the
trustee’s discretion, we look to the intention of the trustor, as
manifested in the trust instrument.’ [Citations.]” (Pratt, supra,
3 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.)
Here, the trustors’ intent was to provide for Nicholas’s
“supplemental needs.” The Trust broadly defines Nicholas’s
supplemental needs to include “medical and dental expenses;
annual independent checkups; clothing and equipment; programs
of training, education, treatment, and rehabilitation; private
residential care; transportation, including vehicle purchases;
maintenance; insurance; and essential dietary needs” and also
8
“spending money; additional food; clothing; electronic equipment
such as radio, recording and playback devices, television, and
computer equipment; camping; vacations; athletic contests;
movies; trips; and money to purchase appropriate gifts for
relatives and friends.” Although the Trustee is “not obligated or
compelled to make specific payments,” the Trustee “shall make
expenditures so that Nicholas[’s] . . . standard of living will be
comfortable and enjoyable.”
The primary limitation is that Tellez should make
distributions without disqualifying Nicholas from receiving
governmental assistance and benefits. Accordingly, the Trustee
must consider, among other things, “any other known income or
resources of the beneficiary that are reasonably available . . .
[and] resource and income limitations of any assistance
program.” Tellez did not provide any evidence concerning the
financial assistance that Nicholas was receiving from the
government or that all his needs were being met from other
resources. Nor did Tellez show that satisfying the Judgment
would disqualify Nicholas from receiving government benefits.
Tellez supported her decision by arguing before the trial
court that any disbursement would go to the mother of Nicholas’s
child, a person “outside of their family line [and] in a manner
that will provide no benefit to their grandchild.” However, Tellez
also acknowledged that Jacob is the Trustors’ only grandchild, he
is the “ultimate beneficiary” of the Trust, and the Judgment was
intended to provide for his support. Similarly, Tellez argued that
Jacob is no longer a minor, but as the trial court noted, section
15305 does not distinguish between newer support judgments
relating to minor children and older support judgments relating
to adult children.
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Finally, the trial court found that the Trust has over
$1 million in assets and “Nicholas’[s] own support will not be
jeopardized by the trust’s payment of the child support
judgment.” In other words, the trial court found that Tellez could
continue to satisfy the Trust’s intent even after satisfying the
Judgment. Tellez does not challenge these findings on appeal.
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that Tellez acted with an
improper motive to avoid child support obligations, thereby
abusing her discretion as trustee. We also find that in the
absence of a request for a statement of decision the trial court’s
factual findings are supported by sufficient substantial evidence.
Effectively, Tellez asks us to independently weigh the evidence
and reach a different decision. (See Howard v. Owens Corning
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) That is not our role.
E. Tellez’s arguments are not persuasive
1. Young v. McCoy
Tellez argues that this case is governed by Young v. McCoy
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1078 (Young). In Young, the Court of
Appeal held that section 15305.5, subdivision (c), “does not allow
a court to order a trustee to invade the assets of a discretionary
trust in order to pay a restitution judgment creditor if the trustee
has permissibly exercised its discretion to make no payments to
the beneficiary of the trust.” (Id. at p. 1080, italics added.) As
discussed in Young, “[s]ection 15305.5 clearly was derived from
section 15305, . . . [t]he structure of the two statutes is identical,
and the language is also identical but for the definition and use of
‘support judgment’ in section 15305 as against ‘restitution
judgment’ in section 15305.5.” (Id. at p. 1088, fn. 12.) Given
these similarities, Tellez urges us to “adopt the same construction
10
of section 15305, subdivision (c) as Young did of section 15305.5,
subdivision (c).”
We need not decide whether section 15305 and
section 15305.5 should be interpreted in the same manner. Even
if so, as discussed, Tellez did not “permissibly” exercise her
discretion because she decided not to satisfy the Judgment in bad
faith or with an improper motive. As Young noted, “[s]ection
15305.5 . . . permits the court to interfere with the trustee’s
discretion only when it has been abused.” (Young, supra,
147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089.)
2. The terms of the Trust
Tellez contends that Ventura County and Pratt are
distinguishable because they concerned a spendthrift trust and a
“shutdown clause,” respectively. “A spendthrift trust is a trust
that provides that the beneficiary’s interest cannot be alienated
before it is distributed to the beneficiary.” (Carmack v. Reynolds
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849.) A shutdown clause prohibits a trustee
from making distributions under defined circumstances. (Pratt,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–113.) By contrast, Tellez argues
that the Trust is a supplemental needs trust.
This is a distinction without a difference. Section 15305
“applies to a support judgment notwithstanding any provision in
the trust instrument.” (§ 15305, subdivision (d), italics added.)
As stated in Ventura County, “it is unnecessary to characterize
the type of trust before us [because] [i]t is undisputed that
appellant alone has discretion to make payments from the Trust.”
(Ventura County, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 150; see also Pratt,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.) Similarly here, only Tellez has
discretion to make payments from the Trust. The type of trust is
not determinative.
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3. Jacob’s age
Tellez contends that section 15305, subdivision (c), does not
apply because Jacob is now an adult. We agree with Tellez’s
concession before the trial court that this is not a “winning
argument.”
Section 15305, subdivision (a), states that a “ ‘support
judgment’ means a money judgment for support of the trust
beneficiary’s spouse or former spouse or minor child.” (§ 15305,
subdivision (a).) The term “minor child” refers to the type of
judgment that can be enforced against the trust, not a deadline
by which a petition to enforce must be filed. Tellez’s construction
would place a time limit on enforcing a child support judgment,
but not a spousal support judgment (since a “spouse” is always a
spouse or a former spouse). That construction is unreasonable
because both spousal and child support judgments are
enforceable until paid in full. (Fam. Code, § 291, subds. (a), (b).)
4. Future payments versus principal
Finally, Tellez argues that section 15305, subdivision (c),
permits support judgments to be satisfied from “future payments”
to the beneficiary, not the principal of the Trust. We disagree.
“[S]ection 15305 gives the trial court discretion to order a trustee
to make distributions of income and principal to satisfy the final
child support orders.” (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 106,
italics added.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in its Ruling on the
Claims of Exemption
Tellez contends that the trial court erred by ordering a levy
on exempt funds. A claim of exemption may only be claimed “by
the judgment debtor or a person acting on behalf of the judgment
debtor.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 703.020, subd. (b)(1).) Tellez is not
12
the judgment debtor and she has not shown that she was
authorized, in her capacity as trustee, to act on behalf of the
judgement debtor (Nicholas). Therefore, Tellez lacks standing to
appeal the trial court’s ruling on the claims of exemption. (See
City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 678.)
Further, Tellez has not shown that the trial court erred.
Although Nicholas appeared before the trial court, he did not file
a claim of exemption or a financial statement showing the
amount of property necessary for his support. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 703.530.) Tellez also acknowledged the Trust had
approximately $1,038,839.57 in assets and she only claimed
exemptions for Nicholas totaling $30,825. As the trial court
found, “the value of the trust assets at issue after accounting for
this exemption far exceeds the outstanding child support
judgment in the amount of $176,831.” The trial court reasonably
concluded that granting the Department’s petition would not
impact Nicholas’s exempt property.
Finally, Tellez argues that a significant portion of the Trust
is exempt from child support enforcement pursuant to Pratt and
sections 15301, 15306.5, and 15307. This argument lacks merit.
Tellez relies on a part of Pratt concerning the enforcement of a
community property judgment by the debtor’s former husband.
(Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) Child support judgments
are treated separately than community property debts and are
enforced pursuant to section 15305, as analyzed above. The
Probate Code sections that apply to general creditors (§§ 15301,
15306.5, 15307), as discussed in Pratt, do not apply to this case.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The Department is awarded its costs
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on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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