Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 County of Los Angeles Child Support Servs. v. Tellez CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES B340835 CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES DEPARTMENT, (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22STPB12635) v. DANIELLE TELLEZ, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ruben Garcia, Judge. Affirmed. John L. Dodd & Associates, John L. Dodd; Morris & Morris and John Stuart Morris for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General, Maureen C. Onyeagbako and Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ______________________________ Danielle Tellez (Tellez), as trustee of The Isidro B. Misquez and Mary Belen Misquez Revocable Living Trust (Trust), appeals an order compelling payment of the child support arrearages owed by Nicholas Misquez (Nicholas)1 from a supplemental needs trust of which he is the primary beneficiary. We affirm. BACKGROUND I. The Child Support Judgment Nicholas has a son named Jacob Nicholas Acosta Misquez (Jacob), who was born in March 1998. In June 2002, when Jacob was four years old, a court entered a judgment that ordered Nicholas to pay monthly child support for Jacob (Judgment). By December 2022, Nicholas owed $176,831.15 in child support on the Judgment. II. The Trust On January 28, 2010, Nicholas’s parents, Mary Belen Misquez and Isidro Misquez (Mary and Isidro, or Trustors), established the Trust. Mary died in March 2015. Isidro restated the Trust in July 2018, and died in August 2022. Nicholas is the only child, and Jacob is the only grandchild, of Mary and Isidro. Pursuant to the Trust’s terms, Nicholas is the primary beneficiary and Jacob is the contingent beneficiary 1 We refer to all members of the Misquez family by their first names for clarity and ease of reference. No disrespect is intended. 2 who receives the remaining trust property should Nicholas die before complete distribution. The Trust directs the trustee to administer Nicholas’s interest as a supplemental needs trust: “Your Trustee may distribute discretionary amounts of income and principal for the supplemental needs of Nicholas . . . not otherwise provided by governmental financial assistance and benefits, or by the providers of services.” The Trust broadly defines Nicholas’s supplemental needs and states the objective “that Nicholas . . . live as independently, productively, and happily as possible.” However, “[t]he purpose of Nicholas[’s] . . . supplemental needs trust is to provide for his needs without disqualifying him from governmental assistance and benefits.” A valuation indicated that the Trust had assets valued at $1,038,839.57 as of December 31, 2022. III. The Petition and Objection In December 2022, the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Department (Department) filed a petition to enforce the Judgment against the Trust pursuant to Probate Code section 15305, subdivision (c).2 The Department sought an order directing Tellez to pay unpaid child support of $176,831.15, plus interest and child support arrearages that accrue after December 19, 2022, from Nicholas’s interest in the Trust. In March 2023, Tellez filed an objection to the petition because the Trust is only intended to provide for Nicholas’s supplemental needs. In relevant part, Tellez stated: “The provisions for the [supplemental needs trust] were implemented by Grantor due to Grantor’s numerous concerns regarding 2 Unless otherwise stated, statutory references are to the Probate Code. 3 Nicholas’[s] access to the funds. Specifically, Nicholas is unemployed and receiving General Relief. He has a criminal record and spent time in a mental hospital after being found incompetent to stand trial in 2019.” At a hearing in July 2023, Tellez’s counsel argued: “It’s a question here of whether or not the trustee is abusing her discretion. She’s clearly not. Her intent is to follow the trust and make distributions solely towards [Nicholas’s] special needs. [¶] And, as indicated, even if she were to give him some small amount of cash, which she has no intent to do, but even if she were, the enforcement of judgment law prevents interception of that.” In June 2024, Tellez filed a supplemental objection. In relevant part, Tellez asserted that there was no “current support obligation” since Jacob was 26 years old, and “if the child support judgment is paid, that money will NOT go to Jacob, nor contribute towards his support. Instead it will go to the child support obligee, which is Jacob’s mother, Jessica P. Acosta.” Tellez further asserted that “[r]equiring the Trustee in this case to pay the child support judgment . . . will instead have the Trustors’ money be delivered outside of their family line in a manner that will provide no benefit to their grandchild.” Tellez also claimed an exemption for Nicholas in the amount of $30,825 in cash, corresponding to a $29,275 homestead exemption and a $1,550 property exemption under Code of Civil Procedure section 703.140, subdivision (b)(1) and (5). IV. The Trial Court’s Ruling In July 2024, the trial court issued a minute order granting the Department’s petition. Citing Ventura County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Brown (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 144 (Ventura 4 County) and Pratt v. Ferguson (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 102 (Pratt), the trial court found that payment of the support obligation would be equitable and reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Tellez timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Payments from the Trust A. Applicable law Section 15305 provides in relevant part: “(c) Whether or not the beneficiary has the right under the trust to compel the trustee to pay income or principal or both to or for the benefit of the beneficiary, the court may, to the extent that the court determines it is equitable and reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case, order the trustee to satisfy all or part of the support judgment out of all or part of future payments that the trustee, pursuant to the exercise of the trustee’s discretion, determines to make to or for the benefit of the beneficiary. [¶] (d) This section applies to a support judgment notwithstanding any provision in the trust instrument.” A “support judgment” is “a money judgment for support of the trust beneficiary’s spouse or former spouse or minor child.” (§ 15305, subd. (a).) In Ventura County, the Court of Appeal interpreted section 15305, subdivision (c), as follows: “By enacting section 15305, the Legislature intended to allow a support creditor to satisfy court-ordered child support obligations where the parent is a trust beneficiary. The statute was crafted to preclude a beneficiary’s efforts to avoid a support obligation. The fact that 5 the statute refers to payments made by the trustee demonstrates legislative intent that the trustee make distributions from the trust. Although a trustee may be given broad discretion, it may not exercise its discretion with an improper motive. . . . [¶] [U]nder section 15305, subdivision (c), a court may overcome the trustee’s discretion under the narrow circumstances present here: when there is an enforceable child support judgment that the trustee refuses to satisfy.” (Ventura County, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) In Pratt, the Court of Appeal followed Ventura County and reversed the trial court’s denial of a petition to compel a trustee to satisfy child support orders. The court gave the following directions to the trial court on remand: “Pursuant to Probate Code section 15305, subdivision (c), . . . the trial court and the Trustee shall give consideration to the Trustors’ intent to provide support for [the beneficiary’s] children, the strong public policy in favor of payment of child support obligations, and the principle that where a trustee has discretion to make or withhold a payment, the trustee may not act in bad faith or with an improper motive, including an intent to avoid child support obligations.” (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.) B. Standard of review We review the trial court’s determination per section 15305, subdivision (c), for abuse of discretion. (See Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 114–115; In re Marriage of Furie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816, 830.) Under this standard, “[w]e reverse the [order] only if in the circumstances of the case, viewed most favorably in support of the decision, the decision exceeds ‘the bounds of reason’ [citation], and therefore a judge could not reasonably have reached that decision under applicable law. 6 [Citations.]” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957.) We review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence. (Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 519, 544.) Applying this standard, “ ‘we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[An] order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 (Arceneaux).) To the extent we are called upon to interpret a statute or the language of the Trust, then our review is de novo. (See Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 109.) C. The trial court did not err in finding that payment was equitable and reasonable Tellez contends that the Department did not allege, and thus the trial court did not find, that she “was abusing her discretion” and was “acting ‘in bad faith or with an improper motive’ ” to shield Trust assets from the Judgment. We disagree. The Department sufficiently alleged that Tellez abused her discretion by refusing to satisfy the Judgment. More important, the trial court found that it had “the authority to overcome the trustee’s discretion to direct payment of the obligation” under Ventura County. The trial court found that “there is an enforceable child support judgment that the trustee refuses to satisfy.” Accordingly, the trial court found that it is “equitable and reasonable under . . . [section] 15305[, subdivision] (c) to compel the trustee to pay the child support 7 judgment in full.” These findings are sufficient because Tellez withdrew her request for a statement of decision. (Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133–1134.) Regardless, on appeal, we “infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58; see also Arceneaux, supra, at pp. 1133–1134.) Tellez identifies nothing to suggest otherwise. D. The trial court’s order is supported by substantial evidence Tellez next argues that she acted in good faith, and consistently with the Trustors’ intent, in refusing to satisfy the Judgment. We agree with the holdings in Ventura County and Pratt: Tellez “may not exercise h[er] discretion to avoid distributions under the Trust with the improper motive to prevent the Trust estate from being used to satisfy [the trustee’s] child support obligations.” (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. As an initial matter, nothing in the Trust supports Tellez’s decision not to satisfy the Judgment. “ ‘To determine the extent of the trustee’s discretion, we look to the intention of the trustor, as manifested in the trust instrument.’ [Citations.]” (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) Here, the trustors’ intent was to provide for Nicholas’s “supplemental needs.” The Trust broadly defines Nicholas’s supplemental needs to include “medical and dental expenses; annual independent checkups; clothing and equipment; programs of training, education, treatment, and rehabilitation; private residential care; transportation, including vehicle purchases; maintenance; insurance; and essential dietary needs” and also 8 “spending money; additional food; clothing; electronic equipment such as radio, recording and playback devices, television, and computer equipment; camping; vacations; athletic contests; movies; trips; and money to purchase appropriate gifts for relatives and friends.” Although the Trustee is “not obligated or compelled to make specific payments,” the Trustee “shall make expenditures so that Nicholas[’s] . . . standard of living will be comfortable and enjoyable.” The primary limitation is that Tellez should make distributions without disqualifying Nicholas from receiving governmental assistance and benefits. Accordingly, the Trustee must consider, among other things, “any other known income or resources of the beneficiary that are reasonably available . . . [and] resource and income limitations of any assistance program.” Tellez did not provide any evidence concerning the financial assistance that Nicholas was receiving from the government or that all his needs were being met from other resources. Nor did Tellez show that satisfying the Judgment would disqualify Nicholas from receiving government benefits. Tellez supported her decision by arguing before the trial court that any disbursement would go to the mother of Nicholas’s child, a person “outside of their family line [and] in a manner that will provide no benefit to their grandchild.” However, Tellez also acknowledged that Jacob is the Trustors’ only grandchild, he is the “ultimate beneficiary” of the Trust, and the Judgment was intended to provide for his support. Similarly, Tellez argued that Jacob is no longer a minor, but as the trial court noted, section 15305 does not distinguish between newer support judgments relating to minor children and older support judgments relating to adult children. 9 Finally, the trial court found that the Trust has over $1 million in assets and “Nicholas’[s] own support will not be jeopardized by the trust’s payment of the child support judgment.” In other words, the trial court found that Tellez could continue to satisfy the Trust’s intent even after satisfying the Judgment. Tellez does not challenge these findings on appeal. Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Tellez acted with an improper motive to avoid child support obligations, thereby abusing her discretion as trustee. We also find that in the absence of a request for a statement of decision the trial court’s factual findings are supported by sufficient substantial evidence. Effectively, Tellez asks us to independently weigh the evidence and reach a different decision. (See Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) That is not our role. E. Tellez’s arguments are not persuasive 1. Young v. McCoy Tellez argues that this case is governed by Young v. McCoy (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1078 (Young). In Young, the Court of Appeal held that section 15305.5, subdivision (c), “does not allow a court to order a trustee to invade the assets of a discretionary trust in order to pay a restitution judgment creditor if the trustee has permissibly exercised its discretion to make no payments to the beneficiary of the trust.” (Id. at p. 1080, italics added.) As discussed in Young, “[s]ection 15305.5 clearly was derived from section 15305, . . . [t]he structure of the two statutes is identical, and the language is also identical but for the definition and use of ‘support judgment’ in section 15305 as against ‘restitution judgment’ in section 15305.5.” (Id. at p. 1088, fn. 12.) Given these similarities, Tellez urges us to “adopt the same construction 10 of section 15305, subdivision (c) as Young did of section 15305.5, subdivision (c).” We need not decide whether section 15305 and section 15305.5 should be interpreted in the same manner. Even if so, as discussed, Tellez did not “permissibly” exercise her discretion because she decided not to satisfy the Judgment in bad faith or with an improper motive. As Young noted, “[s]ection 15305.5 . . . permits the court to interfere with the trustee’s discretion only when it has been abused.” (Young, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089.) 2. The terms of the Trust Tellez contends that Ventura County and Pratt are distinguishable because they concerned a spendthrift trust and a “shutdown clause,” respectively. “A spendthrift trust is a trust that provides that the beneficiary’s interest cannot be alienated before it is distributed to the beneficiary.” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849.) A shutdown clause prohibits a trustee from making distributions under defined circumstances. (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–113.) By contrast, Tellez argues that the Trust is a supplemental needs trust. This is a distinction without a difference. Section 15305 “applies to a support judgment notwithstanding any provision in the trust instrument.” (§ 15305, subdivision (d), italics added.) As stated in Ventura County, “it is unnecessary to characterize the type of trust before us [because] [i]t is undisputed that appellant alone has discretion to make payments from the Trust.” (Ventura County, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 150; see also Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.) Similarly here, only Tellez has discretion to make payments from the Trust. The type of trust is not determinative. 11 3. Jacob’s age Tellez contends that section 15305, subdivision (c), does not apply because Jacob is now an adult. We agree with Tellez’s concession before the trial court that this is not a “winning argument.” Section 15305, subdivision (a), states that a “ ‘support judgment’ means a money judgment for support of the trust beneficiary’s spouse or former spouse or minor child.” (§ 15305, subdivision (a).) The term “minor child” refers to the type of judgment that can be enforced against the trust, not a deadline by which a petition to enforce must be filed. Tellez’s construction would place a time limit on enforcing a child support judgment, but not a spousal support judgment (since a “spouse” is always a spouse or a former spouse). That construction is unreasonable because both spousal and child support judgments are enforceable until paid in full. (Fam. Code, § 291, subds. (a), (b).) 4. Future payments versus principal Finally, Tellez argues that section 15305, subdivision (c), permits support judgments to be satisfied from “future payments” to the beneficiary, not the principal of the Trust. We disagree. “[S]ection 15305 gives the trial court discretion to order a trustee to make distributions of income and principal to satisfy the final child support orders.” (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 106, italics added.) II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in its Ruling on the Claims of Exemption Tellez contends that the trial court erred by ordering a levy on exempt funds. A claim of exemption may only be claimed “by the judgment debtor or a person acting on behalf of the judgment debtor.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 703.020, subd. (b)(1).) Tellez is not 12 the judgment debtor and she has not shown that she was authorized, in her capacity as trustee, to act on behalf of the judgement debtor (Nicholas). Therefore, Tellez lacks standing to appeal the trial court’s ruling on the claims of exemption. (See City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 678.) Further, Tellez has not shown that the trial court erred. Although Nicholas appeared before the trial court, he did not file a claim of exemption or a financial statement showing the amount of property necessary for his support. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 703.530.) Tellez also acknowledged the Trust had approximately $1,038,839.57 in assets and she only claimed exemptions for Nicholas totaling $30,825. As the trial court found, “the value of the trust assets at issue after accounting for this exemption far exceeds the outstanding child support judgment in the amount of $176,831.” The trial court reasonably concluded that granting the Department’s petition would not impact Nicholas’s exempt property. Finally, Tellez argues that a significant portion of the Trust is exempt from child support enforcement pursuant to Pratt and sections 15301, 15306.5, and 15307. This argument lacks merit. Tellez relies on a part of Pratt concerning the enforcement of a community property judgment by the debtor’s former husband. (Pratt, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) Child support judgments are treated separately than community property debts and are enforced pursuant to section 15305, as analyzed above. The Probate Code sections that apply to general creditors (§§ 15301, 15306.5, 15307), as discussed in Pratt, do not apply to this case. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. The Department is awarded its costs 13 on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. GOORVITCH, J. We concur: CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. RICHARDSON, J. 14