Vlavianos v. Westlake La Baya Co. CA2/3

Filed 10/22/26 Vlavianos v. Westlake La Baya Co. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE HARALAMBOS VLAVIANOS, B351722 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25VECV05157) v. WESTLAKE LA BAYA CO., et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Eric Harmon, Judge. Affirmed. Haralambos Vlavianos, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Zelms Erlich Lenkov, Rinat Klier-Erlich and Matthew Schonlick, for Defendant and Respondent Fred M. Szkolnik. Gary Fidler & Associates and Gary D. Fidler, for Defendant and Respondent Glenn E. Freeman. No appearance for Defendants and Respondents Westlake La Baya Co. and E. Chavez. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗  Plaintiff and appellant Haralambos Vlavianos filed suit against defendants and respondents Westlake La Baya Co. (Westlake), Fred Szkolnik, and Glenn Freeman (together, respondents). Vlavianos now appeals from a trial court order granting respondents’ special motions to strike the allegations against them under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 We affirm the order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 In September 2025, Vlavianos sued Westlake, Szkolnik, Freeman, “E. Chavez,” and several Does.3 According to the complaint, Freeman is an officer or agent of Westlake. Szkolnik is a lawyer who represented Westlake in certain unlawful detainer proceedings. Chavez is a process server. The complaint alleged that in 2025, Westlake filed two separate unlawful detainer actions in Ventura County and Los Angeles County. According to the complaint, Westlake identified itself as a partnership in the Ventura action and a corporation in the Los Angeles action. Based on these contradictory filings, the complaint alleged that Westlake made false statements in at 1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 We take our facts from the complaint and the parties’ evidence in support of and opposition to the special motion to strike. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [court “shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based”].) 3 The complaint erroneously identified Szkolnik as Fred M. Szkolknik. We employ the spelling used in Szkolnik’s briefing. 2 least one of the actions. The complaint alleged that Freeman verified the filings and that Szkolnik was Westlake’s counsel of record in both actions. The complaint also alleged that the defendants filed expired and unenforceable leases in support of an opposition to a demurrer in one of the actions. The complaint further alleged that in both unlawful detainer actions, Westlake obtained court orders permitting service by posting at Vlavianos’s commercial property, but not his residential property. According to the complaint, Chavez violated the court orders by trespassing onto Vlavianos’s “gated residential property . . . and attempt[ing] to serve and post notices” relating to one action. The complaint also alleged that Chavez made false statements in a proof of service. The complaint brought claims against all defendants for negligence, fraud, abuse of process, IIED, and civil conspiracy. It also brought a trespass claim against “Chavez and those who directed him.” In October 2025, Szkolnik filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to section 425.16. Westlake and Freeman moved to strike the complaint the following month. Both motions argued that Vlavianos’s claims arise from protected litigation activity, because they all related to the earlier unlawful detainer actions. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (2).) The motions both asserted that the alleged misconduct was absolutely protected by the litigation privilege found in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). As for the trespass claim, Szkolnik’s motion argued that the complaint did not identify Szkolnik as a defendant or allege that he directed Chavez. Out of an abundance of caution, however, the motion argued that Szkolnik did not trespass on Vlavianos’s 3 property or cause Chavez to do so. Szkolnik declared that he provided Chavez with Vlavianos’s address and a court order authorizing service by mail, but he did not instruct Chavez on how to serve Vlavianos. Westlake and Freeman’s motion also argued that the complaint did not allege that they directed Chavez. Both motions also contended that Vlavianos could not prevail on the merits of any of the claims. Each motion requested attorney fees. Vlavianos separately opposed the motions in November 2025. Each opposition asserted that Vlavianos’s claims did not arise from protected activity because the complaint alleged that respondents engaged in illegal conduct, not petitioning activity. The oppositions further argued that the litigation privilege did not apply because the alleged acts were illegal. Both oppositions also contended that Vlavianos could establish a probability of success on the claims for fraud, abuse of process, IIED, and civil conspiracy. The oppositions did not assert that Vlavianos would prevail on his claims for negligence and trespass. Finally, the oppositions requested limited discovery. In support of the oppositions, Vlavianos filed a declaration that attached a May 2025 unlawful detainer complaint filed by Westlake against Smooch Beverages, USA, Inc. (Smooch); a June 2025 unlawful detainer complaint and an August 2025 amended complaint filed by Westlake against Smooch and Vlavianos; a five-line screenshot of a document that Vlavianos described as respondents’ trial brief in an unidentified lawsuit; an excerpt from Westlake’s opposition to a motion to continue a trial in a 4 2020 unlawful detainer action against Smooch; and a June 2024 email from Szkolnik to Vlavianos.4 The trial court granted both motions in December 2025. The court began by denying Vlavianos’s request for discovery, because Vlavianos did not file a noticed motion to conduct discovery as specified in section 425.16, subdivision (g). Next, the court noted that the trespass claim in the complaint was brought only against “Chavez and those who directed him.” Because that count did not name Szkolnik, Freeman, or Westlake as a defendant, the court determined that the trespass claim was not brought against respondents. The court therefore did not address the trespass claim in its ruling. The court concluded that the remaining claims—for negligence, fraud, abuse of process, IIED, and civil conspiracy— arise from protected activity. It specifically reasoned that these claims are premised on litigation activity, namely, filing documents with the court and serving documents in anticipation of litigation. The court rejected Vlavianos’s argument that this activity is not protected because it was illegal. It noted that respondents disputed this accusation and concluded that the issue must be resolved in connection with the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis—that is, whether Vlavianos could establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. At the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, the court concluded that Vlavianos failed to meet his burden of establishing a likelihood of success on any of his claims. The court noted that Vlavianos’s opposition to Westlake and 4 Vlavianos declared that the email was sent on June 24, 2024. The email itself is dated June 24, but no year is indicated. 5 Freeman’s motion did not address the negligence claim. The court determined that a negligence claim against Szkolnik failed as a matter of law because Vlavianos was never represented by Szkolnik, nor was he an intended third-party beneficiary. As for the claims for fraud and IIED, the court concluded that Vlavianos failed to identify any evidence of respondents’ intent, a required element of both causes of action. For the abuse of process claim, the court found that Vlavianos failed to submit any evidence that respondents willfully misused court procedures. Finally, the court found that Vlavianos presented no evidence that respondents agreed to commit any tort, as is required for a civil conspiracy claim. The court also concluded that the litigation privilege protected the communications and activity underlying all of plaintiffs’ claims. Finally, since respondents prevailed, the court awarded attorney fees to their respective counsel. Vlavianos timely appealed from the order granting respondents’ special motions to strike. DISCUSSION5 I. Legal framework and standard of review “To combat lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights (typically known as strategic lawsuits 5 Westlake did not appear on appeal, and Freeman joined Szkolnik’s respondent’s brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) Vlavianos therefore argues that Westlake is in “default” and that any arguments as to Freeman stand “unrebutted.” However, “it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct . . . .” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 6 against public participation, or SLAPPs), the Legislature has authorized a special motion to strike claims that are based on a defendant’s engagement in such protected activity. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).)” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park).) The resolution of a special motion to strike involves two steps. First, the court must determine “whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) At this stage, the defendant has the burden “to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Ibid.) If the defendant satisfies this burden, at the second step, “for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Our review is de novo. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) “We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Ibid.) We “shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) We do not “weigh the evidence, but accept plaintiff’s submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Park, at p. 1067.) 594, 608–609 (Jameson).) Thus, regardless of respondents’ conduct, it is Vlavianos’s burden “to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 609.) 7 II. The trial court did not err in declining to address the trespass cause of action Vlavianos first argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the trespass cause of action was not brought against respondents, and by declining to analyze that claim in resolving respondents’ anti-SLAPP motions. We find no error. “A plaintiff’s complaint ultimately defines the contours of the claims” for purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion. (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 936 (Bel Air Internet).) The complaint brought a trespass claim “against Chavez and those who directed him,” but not against Westlake, Freeman, or Szkolnik. And while the complaint brought five other causes of action against “all defendants,” Vlavianos chose to approach the trespass claim differently.6 Our analysis is necessarily constrained by the contours of Vlavianos’s complaint, which does not name respondents in the trespass claim. (Ibid.) Nor do any factual allegations in the complaint suggest or imply that any respondent directed Chavez to trespass. Just four factual allegations address the service issue, but none of these mention any other defendant. Paragraph 5 alleged that Chavez is a process server who served notices at Vlavianos’s residence without authority and filed false proofs of service. Paragraphs 19 and 44 alleged that Chavez unlawfully trespassed into Vlavianos’s gated property. And Paragraph 20 alleged that Vlavianos made false claims in a proof of service. 6 To the extent that Vlavianos was “ignorant of the name of a defendant” who directed Chavez, he was obligated to amend the complaint once he learned that person’s identity. (§ 474.) The record does not include any amended complaint. 8  On appeal, Vlavianos argues that the reference to “those who directed” Chavez was intended to reference respondents. Perhaps this is true. But our analysis is not guided by Vlavianos’s unwritten intent. Rather, we are bound by the parameters of the complaint itself. (Bel Air Internet, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 936.) As we have discussed, the complaint simply did not bring a trespass claim against respondents. Vlavianos also asserts that the trial court was obligated to assess each claim in his complaint in resolving the anti-SLAPP motions. For this proposition, Vlavianos cites Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 (Baral). Baral held that an anti-SLAPP motion may challenge distinct claims within pleaded causes of action, if those claims arise from protected activity. (Id. at p. 396.) It did not hold that a court assessing an anti-SLAPP motion must analyze every cause of action in the complaint, without limitation. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the trespass claim was not brought against Westlake, Freeman, or Szkolnik. III. Vlavianos’s claims against respondents arise from protected activity Section 425.16, subdivision (e), describes four categories of conduct “ ‘in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ ” which are protected by the anti- SLAPP statute. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) The categories include “any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding” and “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 9 speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (4).) A defendant moving to strike a claim or complaint bears the burden “to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) Westlake, Freeman, and Szkolnik met this burden. The complaint primarily alleged that respondents made false statements in legal filings. Specifically, Westlake identified itself as a corporation in one unlawful detainer action and as a partnership in another action. Freeman, as Westlake’s officer, verified these pleadings, and Szkolnik was Westlake’s counsel of record. Later, when defendants opposed a demurrer in one of the actions, they relied upon an expired and unenforceable lease. Based on these facts, the negligence cause of action alleged that defendants breached duties to comply with “truthful pleading standards.” The fraud cause of action alleged that Freeman fraudulently verified false pleadings and that Szkolnik signed them with knowledge of their falsity. The abuse of process claim alleged that defendants misused unlawful detainer filings. The IIED claim alleged that defendants’ conduct was outrageous and that they intended to cause severe emotional distress. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim alleged that all defendants acted in concert to commit the unlawful acts described in the complaint. In sum, each of the causes of action primarily arise from respondents’ acts of filing, signing, or verifying documents in two unlawful detainer actions. “The filing of lawsuits is an aspect of the First Amendment right of petition.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup); Navellier v. 10 Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90 (Navellier) [“The constitutional right of petition encompasses ‘ “ ‘the basic act of filing litigation.’ ” ’ ”]; § 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (4).) The complaint also alleged that Chavez trespassed on Vlavianos’s personal property while serving, or attempting to serve, certain documents. The causes of action also arise from this conduct. Specifically, the negligence claim alleged that defendants unlawfully served Vlavianos, and the abuse of process claim alleged that defendants misused “service mechanisms.” And the claims for IIED and civil conspiracy both rely generally on all of the factual allegations in the complaint. The question is whether the claims against respondents arise from Chavez’s trespass. The complaint did not allege, and Vlavianos submitted no evidence to suggest, that Westlake or Freeman directed Chavez in any way. The claims against Westlake and Freeman did not arise from the alleged unlawful service. Szkolnik, on the other hand, admitted that he hired Chavez to serve Vlavianos. But he also declared that he did not direct Chavez to serve the documents in any particular manner. The act of serving legal papers necessary to initiate a lawsuit is protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1480, citing Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [prelitigation communications protected].) We conclude that Szkolnik’s conduct in hiring a process server—the only conduct that is in any way connected to Chavez’s alleged trespass—constitutes protected activity. Thus, all of the claims against respondents arise from protected activity. 11  On appeal, Vlavianos asserts that the claims for fraud, abuse of process, IIED, and civil conspiracy claims did not arise from protected activity.7 We assess each argument in turn. As for the fraud claim, Vlavianos asserts that his allegations arise from respondents’ contradictory statements in legal filings. Yet, the gravamen of this claim is not that the representations were false, but that they were fraudulent because they were made in court. For example, the complaint specifically alleged that Westlake intended to “mislead judicial officers.” To the extent that this conduct constitutes fraud, that is because it was done in the context of legal proceedings, meaning it constitutes protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (4).) Next, Vlavianos asserts that the gravamen of the abuse of process claim is that respondents used personal service mechanisms improperly to harass Vlavianos at his home. Again, the crux of this claim is that respondents misused the legal process. Indeed, “ ‘it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that would not fall under the protection of the [anti-SLAPP] statute.’ ” (Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181, 200– 201.) Vlavianos argues that the IIED claim is based on unprotected conduct because it is premised on respondents 7 Vlavianos’s opening brief did not argue that the negligence claim does not arise from protected activity. Although he made this argument in his reply, “we do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them earlier.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen).) Vlavianos made no attempt to demonstrate good cause. 12 “targeting” his home, and “counsel’s written statement effectively acknowledging the distress was intentionally caused.” These assertions are unsupported by any citation to the clerk’s transcript, meaning the point is arguably forfeited. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez) [appellant must “provide adequate record citations”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [same].) However, based on our independent review of the record, Vlavianos appears to reference the June 2024 email from Szkolnik to Vlavianos, which Vlavianos filed in support of his oppositions to the anti-SLAPP motions. In the email, Szkolnik stated: “Any distress caused to any residents of the residence you mentioned is the result of your actions.” It is difficult to know exactly what to make of this communication—it plainly references an earlier incident at Vlavianos’s home, but the document does not describe that event. In short, this document does not establish that any conduct underlying the IIED claim was not protected activity. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609 [trial court ruling is presumed correct; appellant’s burden is to demonstrate reversible error].) Next, Vlavianos claims that the civil conspiracy claim does not arise from petitioning activity because it alleged a conspiracy to commit fraud and to abuse legal process. “There is no separate tort of civil conspiracy and no action for conspiracy to commit a tort unless the underlying tort is committed and damage results therefrom. [Citation.] The significance of a conspiracy theory of liability is that each member may be held jointly liable as a tortfeasor, even though he or she may not have participated directly in the underlying tort.” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136.) As we have discussed, the causes of action for fraud and abuse of 13 process arise from protected activity. Thus, any civil conspiracy claim premised on those torts necessarily also arises from protected activity. Finally, Vlavianos also asserts that respondents entered a civil conspiracy with Chavez to trespass on Vlavianos’s private property. Vlavianos fails to cite any allegations in the complaint or evidence in the record to support this assertion. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609 [appellant’s burden is to demonstrate reversible error]; Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [appellant must support arguments with citations to the record].) As we have discussed, the complaint did not allege any facts consistent with this theory. Additionally, Szkolnik’s declaration in support of his anti-SLAPP motion asserted that he did not instruct Chavez regarding the method of service.8 Thus, while the record supports that Szkolnik hired Chavez, Vlavianos has not identified any evidence that Szkolnik instructed Chavez to trespass. In turn, we cannot conclude that the civil conspiracy claim arises from any such conduct. 8 For the first time in his appellate reply brief, Vlavianos asserts that Szkolnik made contradictory statements in a declaration filed in one of the unlawful detainer actions. He argues that this contradiction creates a fact dispute that may not be resolved at this stage. Ordinarily we disregard arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) Even if we were inclined to reach this issue, Vlavianos forfeited the point by failing to provide any record citation that would allow us to identify the declaration. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) And the materials that Vlavianos submitted in support of his oppositions did not include any such declaration. 14  In sum, respondents satisfied their burden under the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis by demonstrating that the claims against them arise from protected activity. IV. Vlavianos failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success A. Applicable law and standard of review At the second step of the special motion to strike analysis, the plaintiff “ ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) The court must “ ‘accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff . . . .’ [Citation.] The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Ibid.) “[A] plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater).) B. Vlavianos has not established that he is likely to prevail on his claims against respondents On appeal, Vlavianos argues that the allegations in a verified complaint are sufficient to establish that he is likely to prevail on his claims against respondents. To support this proposition, he cites Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 354. But the court in Karnazes expressly rejected this very argument, noting that “pleadings do not constitute evidence” and affirming an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion where the 15 appellant submitted no evidence supporting her claims. (Ibid.) Indeed, “a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 940.) Because Vlavianos’s appellate briefing does not cite or describe any evidence that would support his claims, we affirm. (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 (Dills) [appellate court will not develop appellant’s arguments].) Relatedly, Vlavianos asserts that the trial court erred by applying a summary judgment-like standard to the prong two analysis. Vlavianos argues that the prong two analysis must focus on whether a plaintiff can establish that his or her claims have minimal merit. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.) But our high court has expressly described the minimal merit analysis as “as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ ” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) We find no error in the trial court’s approach. Finally, Vlavianos notes that discovery in the underlying litigation was automatically stayed after respondents filed their special motions to strike, as required by section 425.16, subdivision (g). Vlavianos therefore argues that he was unable to obtain the evidence necessary to defeat the motions. Yet, even after discovery is stayed due to a pending anti-SLAPP motion, “[t]he court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted . . . .” (Ibid.) Vlavianos’s oppositions requested leave to take discovery. But the court rejected this request because Vlavianos did not notice and file a motion seeking leave to take discovery. On appeal, Vlavianos does not acknowledge or challenge this ruling. And 16 even if he did, we would find no basis to reverse. (Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 357 [trial court did not abuse discretion in denying discovery continuance requested within opposition to anti-SLAPP motion].) C. Vlavianos has not established any reversible error relating to the litigation privilege At the second step, the plaintiff must also “show that any asserted defenses are inapplicable as a matter of law or make a prima facie showing of facts that, if accepted, would negate such defenses.” (Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 288 (Weeden).) Here, respondents asserted, and the trial court concluded, that the litigation privilege applies. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) That privilege protects “ ‘any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ [Citation.] The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) On appeal, Vlavianos does not dispute that the litigation privilege applies to statements that respondents made in the unlawful detainer actions, or noncommunicative acts—such as coordinating service of process—necessarily related to that litigation. However, Vlavianos argues that the privilege does not extend to the physical trespass that Chavez allegedly committed here. Yet, as we have discussed, the complaint did not allege, and there is no evidence in the record to support, that any respondent trespassed on Vlavianos’s property or directed Chavez 17 to do so. Accordingly, even assuming that Chavez’s physical trespass is not protected by the litigation privilege, Vlavianos fails to explain why any of respondents’ actions were not privileged. (Weeden, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 288 [at second step, plaintiff’s burden is to demonstrate that any defenses raised by defendant are inapplicable]; Dills, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 890, fn. 1 [appellate court will not develop appellant’s arguments].) Relatedly, Vlavianos also contends that the privilege is inapplicable because respondents “concede[], or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law . . . .” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320.) According to Vlavianos, the court in an unidentified proceeding—but presumably one of the unlawful detainer actions—issued an order limiting service of documents to commercial premises. And, respondents’ “opposition papers”—presumably in the same action— “acknowledged that service was directed to and attempted at the residential address,” and thus conceded that the documents were served in a manner contrary to a court order. The problem with these arguments is that they are unsupported by any citation to the record. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [appellant must “provide adequate record citations”].) Although we have no obligation to do so, we have examined the declaration and exhibits that Vlavianos filed in support of his oppositions to the anti-SLAPP motions below. Vlavianos did not submit any trial court order or any document described as an “opposition.” And although he included one excerpt from respondents’ trial brief, that excerpt does not mention service of any documents. Because Vlavianos failed to 18 identify any evidence to support this point, we reject it as forfeited. (Ibid.) VI. We affirm the attorney fee awards Finally, Vlavianos also asks this court to reverse the attorney fee awards in favor of respondents. This challenge is entirely contingent on the success of Vlavianos’s challenge to the order granting respondents’ anti-SLAPP motions. Because we affirm that order, we also affirm the attorney fee awards. 19  DISPOSITION We affirm the order granting Westlake and Freeman’s special motion to strike and Szkolnik’s special motion to strike. Szkolnik is awarded his appellate costs. Because Freeman merely joined in Szkolnik’s appellate briefing, he shall bear his own appellate costs. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS HANASONO, J. We concur: ADAMS, P. J. ASHWORTH, J.* * Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 20