Washington v. Alta Loma School Dist.

Filed 10/2/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA MELISSA WASHINGTON, D088028 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2304148) v. ALTA LOMA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Tony Raphael, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Egality Law and Tamra M. Smith for Plaintiff and Appellant. Fozi Dwork & Modafferi and Daniel S. Modafferi for Defendant and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Public school districts may not classify a teacher as a temporary employee “unless the position in which he or she is employed is ‘a position the law defines as temporary.’ ” (Stockton Teachers Assn. CTA/NEA v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 446, 457 (Stockton).) Education Code section 44920 permits school districts to hire and classify a teacher as a temporary employee for up to one school year to replace a teacher who “has been granted leave for a semester or a year, or is experiencing long-term illness.” 1 (Italics added.) Relying on section 44920, the Alta Loma School District (District) defends its classification of Melissa Washington as a temporary employee for the three consecutive years she taught at the District’s elementary school. Specifically, the District claims it hired Washington to fill in for two permanent teachers who were sharing one full-time teaching position under a voluntary job-sharing arrangement. It contends such a job-sharing arrangement constitutes “leave” under section 44920, permitting the District to classify Washington as a temporary employee and ultimately to summarily dismiss her after her third year of teaching. We disagree. We hold the term “leave” under section 44920 means “leave of absence.” Part-time work such as a teacher’s reduction in workload due to a voluntary job-sharing arrangement does not constitute a leave of absence under section 44920 that permits the hiring and classification of his or her replacement as a temporary employee. In reaching this conclusion, we follow our Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, 826 (Balen) that temporary classifications for teachers should be strictly construed. We thus agree with Washington that she was misclassified as a temporary employee during the entire term of her employment. Under the Education Code, Washington defaulted to the classification of a probationary 1 We use “teacher” to mean a “certificated teacher,” a person who holds a valid teaching credential issued by the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing and is legally authorized to teach in California’s public schools. (See Stockton, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 452 [“Certificated employees are those who have a credential or certificate issued by California’s Commission on Teacher Credentialing. (Ed. Code, §§ 44001–44006.)”].) Additionally, all further undesignated statutory references are to the Education Code. 2 employee for the first two school years, after which she became a permanent employee by operation of law for the third year. As a permanent employee, the District was not permitted to summarily dismiss Washington. The trial court erred by concluding otherwise and denying Washington’s petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085). We reverse the judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to issue a writ of mandate directing the District to reinstate Washington as a permanent employee with the seniority date of August 2, 2019, and to hold further proceedings to determine her damages for lost compensation. In doing so, we reject the District’s argument that the doctrine of laches bars the relief we grant Washington. BACKGROUND I. Washington’s Employment and Classification by the District Washington began work at the District on August 2, 2019, when she was hired to teach a first-grade class at Stork Elementary for the entire 2019–2020 school year. During her interview, Washington was told she would be filling a new teaching position created by a last-minute increase in enrollment. Phillip Suttner, Stork Elementary’s principal at the time, also testified he hired Washington for an additional first-grade class that was added due to increased enrollment. Washington was not informed during her interview that she would be hired as a temporary employee rather than a probationary employee. But when she arrived at the District’s office to sign her employment contract, she was presented with a contract for temporary employment. The human resources director told Washington it was “ ‘just part of the process’ ” and that she would be reclassified as a probationary employee in the future. The 3 employment contract Washington signed stated, “You are a temporary employee and will be required to render service for such length of time during the school year as the District governing board may direct. Employment is subject to termination by the governing board at any time.” Washington twice asked Principal Suttner during her first school year about her temporary classification, and Suttner told her both times that he expected her to be classified as a probationary employee for the next school year. From speaking with Suttner and the human resources director, Washington understood that “the District’s regular procedure was to start new employees off with temporary status, then switch them to probationary 1, then to probationary 2.” Washington testified that “quite a few people,” including all the first-grade teachers, told her it was the normal process that she would be classified as probationary in the next school year. Suttner told her that for the 2019–2020 school year, “all other teachers hired the same year were also offered temporary contracts, with no exceptions.” In March of the 2019–2020 school year, the COVID-19 pandemic began, and Washington switched to teaching her class remotely. Washington attested, “Around the end of the 2019–2020 school year, [Principal] Suttner told me that due to the uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic, the District would only offer me a temporary contract for the 2020–2021 school year, and would switch me to probationary the following school year.” As Washington recalled, Suttner apologized to her for the situation, and stated that, without exception, all the temporary teachers had been offered only temporary positions for the upcoming school year. Washington signed an employment contract with the same provisions regarding temporary employment as she had signed the previous year. 4  During the 2020–2021 school year, Washington taught third grade remotely because of the pandemic. Toward the end of that year, Suttner again told Washington that the District would offer her only a temporary contract for the 2021–2022 school year. As Washington testified, “Again, he apologized profusely. He said, this has never happened. I’m not sure what’s going on. But the [D]istrict did say that, again, because they’re unsure of the enrollment and numbers because of COVID, that I would be, again, a temporary teacher for another year. [¶] He did let me know that it would be—it might be possible for the following year to possibly even get tenureship, since I’d already been there a good amount of time, for three—for almost three years.” As in the previous year, Suttner told Washington that all the teachers on temporary contracts who would be returning the next year had been offered temporary contracts for the next school year, and “there were no exceptions.” After that conversation, Washington signed an employment contract for the 2021–2022 school year, which contained the same provisions regarding temporary employment as the previous contracts. Washington explained that when the secretary in the human resources office gave her the contract to sign, “she apologized that this never happens, that she’s got quite a few temporary teachers going on their third year now as a temporary teacher.” The secretary “reiterated, as well, that for the following year, that [Washington] may be offered tenureship just because [she had] been there for so long.” During the 2021–2022 school year, Washington began teaching third grade, but after approximately two weeks, the school switched her to fifth grade for the remainder of the school year. 5  In early March 2022, about eight weeks before the school year ended, the District’s Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources, Donna Carlson, told Washington the District would not be offering her, or any of the temporary teachers, a contract for the 2022–2023 school year. Carlson stated the decision was due to the loss of funding related to the COVID-19 pandemic and because of low enrollment. Washington applied for temporary teaching positions that the District advertised for the next school year, but she was not hired. II. Petition for Writ of Mandate In February 2023, Washington filed a verified petition for writ of mandate directing the District to reinstate her as a permanent employee with a seniority date of August 2, 2019. She further sought an order requiring that the District make her whole for lost wages and benefits, and any other appropriate relief. Relevant here, in the petition’s first cause of action Washington alleged she was misclassified as a temporary employee. Washington asserted she should have been classified as a probationary employee for her first two school years with the District, and then as a permanent employee in her third year. As such, the District could terminate Washington’s employment at the end of her third year only if it followed the required procedures specified in the Education Code for terminating permanent employees. The District therefore had a mandatory duty to employ Washington as a permanent employee until it followed the proper procedures to terminate her employment. 2 2 Washington alleged in the second cause of action that even if she was properly classified as a temporary employee, the District failed to afford her 6  In October 2024, Washington filed a motion for a peremptory writ of mandate, which the District opposed. 3 In March 2025, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion and considered the parties’ evidence which included, among other things, the deposition testimony of Washington and Principal Suttner. 4 In its opposition memorandum, the District claimed Washington was properly classified as a temporary teacher for each of the three school years because, each time, she was hired as a placeholder for two permanent certificated teachers at Stork Elementary, M.L. and A.H. Under a job- sharing arrangement, M.L. and A.H. shared one full-time teaching position. preferential reemployment rights under section 44918 because it hired new teachers, instead of her, to fill the vacant positions for which she applied. Because we conclude that the District improperly classified her as a temporary employee, we need not consider Washington’s claim for preferential reemployment. We thus limit our discussion to the first cause of action. Washington also sought an award of attorney fees under Government Code section 800. On the District’s motion, the trial court struck her prayer for attorney fees. Washington has not appealed this aspect of the court’s decision. 3 Washington filed a motion to augment the appellate record with an annotated version of the declaration that her attorney filed in support of the motion for a peremptory writ of mandate. According to Washington, the annotated declaration “superimpose[s] in red text the page numbers in the appellate record where the evidence cited in the original declaration can be found.” The District opposes augmentation. Although we appreciate counsel’s intention to assist us in locating specific documents in the appellate record, we deny the motion to augment because the annotated declaration was not before the trial court. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3) [“Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court.”].) 4 The parties have not provided us with a reporter’s transcript from the hearing at which the parties presented oral argument. 7 The District argued the job-sharing arrangement constituted “leave” within the meaning of section 44920, which authorized it to hire and classify Washington as a temporary employee. The District also asserted that Washington’s misclassification claim was barred by the doctrine of laches because she delayed more than three years in raising the claim. The trial court found the evidence established, contrary to the District’s claim, Washington “was not hired as a temporary employee to fill a specific vacancy created by the [M.L./A.H.] job share.” (Italics added.) In making this finding, the court credited Principal Suttner’s testimony that Washington was hired because of “increased enrollment.” As the court summarized, Suttner testified “there was going to be a Kindergarten–First Grade combo, or a First–Second Grade combo, but the ‘numbers increased’ and the ‘combo was dissolved just before the [2019–2020] school year started, and whoever was going to teach that combo class would have gone to either the straight [Kindergarten] or the straight second grade class. And [Washington] was brought in to teach the straight first grade class.’ ” Suttner also explained that “under the job share agreement, [M.L. and A.H.] each worked 50% of the school year and shared the same fourth grade class. . . . When asked if the job share had ‘anything to do with [Washington] being hired,’ he said: ‘No. The job share was in place before we needed an extra teacher.’ ” The trial court found this evidence supported Washington’s argument that she was not hired to fill “a specific vacancy created by the [M.L./A.H.] job share,” but it determined Washington could nonetheless be “properly classified as a temporary [employee] based on a shortage of permanent teachers resulting from the [M.L./A.H.] job share.” (Italics added.) Based on 8 the District’s spreadsheets of teacher assignments, 5 the court found the number of temporary teachers during the years Washington was employed did not “exceed[ ] the total number of teacher vacancies created as a result of permanent and probationary employees being on leave at any one time,” and “that would include teacher vacancies resulting from job share arrangements.” Critical to the court’s ruling was its agreement with “the District’s interpretation that either [M.L.] or [A.H.] were effectively on leave at any given time during the entire school years under their job share agreement” within the meaning of section 44920. Consequently, on March 25, 2025, the court denied Washington’s petition. As to the District’s laches argument, the trial court ruled the issue was “moot” because it found Washington failed to carry her burden on her misclassification claim. But it explained that if it were to consider the issue, “the District’s laches argument would be persuasive.” In the court’s view, the doctrine of laches applied because Washington worked for three school years as a temporary employee and waited until February 2023 to file her petition, even though she testified that during her first school year “ ‘quite a few people’ led her to believe she would be reclassified from temporary to probationary” for the next school year. DISCUSSION The question presented in Washington’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of her petition for writ of mandate is whether the District was statutorily authorized to classify her as a temporary employee during her 5 Although it relied on the District’s spreadsheets, the trial court noted Washington’s argument that “the District’s records indicate the number of temporary teachers hired far exceeded the number employees on leave” during her three years of employment and that her supporting evidence was “somewhat persuasive in that it highlights some inconsistencies in the District’s arguments and its documentation.” 9 employment with the District. The District has identified a single theory for its classification of Washington as a temporary employee: it maintains the grant of a job-sharing arrangement between two permanent teachers is a grant of “leave” under section 44920 that permits the hiring and classification of a temporary teacher to fill in. We turn to the classification scheme under the Education Code and section 44920 to determine whether the situation presented here authorizes temporary classification. “In reviewing a trial court’s judgment on a petition for writ of mandate, we apply the substantial evidence test to the trial court’s factual findings and exercise our independent judgment on legal issues, such as the interpretation of statutory provisions.” (Edwards v. Lake Elsinore Unified School Dist. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539–1540 (Edwards); accord Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 (Kavanaugh).) I. Classification Scheme Under the Education Code “The Education Code establishes four possible classifications for certificated employees [(i.e. teachers)]: permanent, probationary, substitute and temporary.” (Taylor v. Board of Trustees (1984) 36 Cal.3d 500, 504 (Taylor).) It authorizes the governing boards of school districts “to hire, classify, promote and dismiss” teachers, but it establishes “a complex and somewhat rigid scheme to govern a board’s exercise of its decisionmaking power.” (Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 917; see § 44831.) The proper classification of a teacher into one of these four categories “is often critical, for such status has ramifications for both the teacher and the district throughout the employment relationship.” (Kavanaugh, at p. 917.) 10  Classification, and the time of classification, determines “a teacher’s rights to reelection (retention) and promotion . . . and to determining the level of procedural protections to which a teacher is entitled should he or she be dismissed or nonreelected.” (Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 921.) “For example, if a certificated probationary employee works for two complete consecutive school years and is then reelected for the next succeeding year, the employee is deemed elevated to permanent status by operation of law. (§ 44929.21, subd. (b).) In some circumstances, a probationary employee who is not informed of his or her nonreelection by March 15th of the current school year is deemed reelected for the following school year. (§§ 44929.21, subd. (b), 44955, subd. (c).) If a certificated employee works as a temporary employee for a complete school year and is then ‘reemployed for the following school year in a position requiring certification qualifications [he or she] must be classified by the governing board as a probationary employee and the previous year’s employment as a temporary employee shall be deemed one year’s employment as a probationary employee for purposes of acquiring permanent status.’ (§ 44917; see also § 44920.)” (Kavanaugh, at p. 917.) “In general, permanent employees may not be dismissed unless one or more statutorily enumerated grounds are shown. (§ 44932.) Probationary employees may not be dismissed during the school year except for cause or unsatisfactory performance (§ 44948.3), but, on timely notice, ‘may be nonreelected without any showing of cause, without any statement of reasons, and without any right of appeal or administrative redress.’ ” (Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 917.) “ ‘Substitute and temporary employees, on the other hand, fill the short range needs of a school district and generally may be summarily released.’ ” (Ibid.) This means “temporary teachers may be dismissed ‘[a]t the pleasure of the [governing] board prior to 11 serving during one school year at least 75 percent of the number of days the regular schools of the district are maintained’ (§ 44954, subd. (a)), and after that time so long as the temporary employee is notified before the end of the school year (id., subd. (b)).” (Kavanaugh, at pp. 917–918.) Unless the Education Code requires that a teacher be classified as permanent, substitute, or temporary, he or she “must be classified as probationary.” (Stockton, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 450–451.) In other words, “probationary status is the default classification when the code does not specify another classification.” (Id. at p. 456; see also § 44915 [a district “shall classify as probationary employees, those persons employed in positions requiring certification qualifications for the school year, who have not been classified as permanent employees or as substitute employees”].) II. Temporary Classifications Are Strictly Construed As our high court explained, “[t]he essence of the statutory classification system is that continuity of service restricts the power to terminate employment which the institution’s governing body would normally possess.” (Balen, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 826.) “Because the substitute and temporary classifications are not guaranteed procedural due process by statute, they are narrowly defined by the Legislature, and should be strictly interpreted.” (Ibid.) Implementing this rule of strict interpretation, in Balen our Supreme Court determined that “because the teacher did not satisfy any of the specific definitions of temporary employment, the district had no discretion to classify him as temporary.” (Vasquez v. Happy Valley Union School Dist. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 969, 983 (Vasquez), citing Balen, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 827–828, 829–831.) “Since Balen, appellate courts have interpreted the 12 temporary classifications narrowly—so much so that if a teacher does not satisfy the statutory grounds for a temporary classification, the default or catchall provision of section 44915 mandates the district classify the teacher as a probationary employee. . . . In other words, it is no longer the case that a school district and a teacher are free to negotiate a teacher’s classification in cases of a statutory gap.” (Vasquez, at p. 983.) If a teacher “occupies a position the Code defines as temporary, [the teacher] is a temporary employee; if it is not a position that requires temporary classification (or permanent or substitute), [the teacher] is a probationary employee. (§ 44915.) The Code grants school districts no discretion to deviate from this statutory classification scheme.” (Bakersfield Elementary Teachers Assn. v. Bakersfield City School Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1299 (Bakersfield).) “The purpose of the classification scheme is ‘to limit rather than enlarge the power of school districts to classify teachers as temporary employees.’ ” (Stockton, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 456, citing Bakersfield, at p. 1280.) “The Education Code restricts a school district’s use of temporary employees, because ‘otherwise the benefits resulting from employment security for teachers could be subordinated to the administrative needs of a district.’ ” (Stockton, at pp. 456–457.) Thus “the Education Code narrowly defines the circumstances in which teachers may be classified as temporary, apparently due to a specific concern school districts might exploit that designation to the detriment of the employees, in an attempt to maintain maximum flexibility in hiring teachers from year to year: ‘The Code recognizes two general kinds of temporary employees: those who are employed to serve for less than three or four months, or in some types of limited, emergency, or temporary assignments or classes (see §§ 44919, 44921, 44986); and those who are employed for up to 13 one year to replace a certificated employee who is on leave or has a lengthy illness (see §§ 44920, 44918).’ ” (Henderson v. Newport-Mesa Unified School Dist. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 478, 491, quoting Bakersfield, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281.) We now turn to the temporary employment classification under section 44920. III. A Voluntary Job-Sharing Arrangement Does Not Constitute “Leave” Authorizing Temporary Employment Classification Under Section 44920 Section 44920 provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 44917 and 44919, the governing board of a school district may employ as a teacher, for a complete school year, but not less than one semester during a school year unless the date of rendering first paid service begins during the second semester and prior to March 15th, any person holding appropriate certification documents, and may classify such person as a temporary employee. The employment of such persons shall be based upon the need for additional certificated employees during a particular semester or year because a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester or year, or is experiencing long-term illness, and shall be limited, in number of persons so employed, to that need, as determined by the governing board.” (Italics added.) Here, the District contends that it hired Washington because “a certificated employee ha[d] been granted leave for a semester or year.” (§ 44920.) According to the District, when it approved the job-sharing arrangement of two permanent certificated employees at Stork Elementary, M.L. and A.H., that approval was equivalent to allowing M.L. and A.H. to take leave from their full-time teaching duties, as each of them switched to working only half of the time. As such, the District argues, it was authorized 14 to hire Washington as a temporary employee due to the “leave” created when it approved the job-sharing arrangement for M.L. and A.H. Washington disputes whether the evidence supports the District’s claim she was hired because of the M.L./A.H. job-sharing arrangement. As noted, the trial court found the evidence, in particular Principal Suttner’s testimony, supported Washington’s contention that she was not hired to fill a specific vacancy created by the M.L./A.H. job-sharing arrangement. Notwithstanding that the trial court’s factual finding is owed deference if supported by substantial evidence, we need not resolve this factual question. As we will explain, the District’s proffered justification for classifying Washington as a temporary employee fails for a more fundamental reason: The job-sharing arrangement the District approved for M.L. and A.H. does not qualify as a circumstance under which “a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester or year” within the meaning of section 44920. In the District, job-sharing arrangements are addressed in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the District and the Alta Loma Educators Association. 6 In Article V of the CBA, titled “Teaching Hours,” job sharing “is defined as that procedure where two (2) current unit members request to jointly share on an equal time basis full-time daily instructional duties.” According to the CBA, the District may grant a job- sharing arrangement “at its sole discretion” under specified conditions and procedures. Importantly, teachers approved for a job-sharing arrangement do not have a unilateral right to immediately return to a previous position after termination of a job-sharing arrangement. Instead, the CBA states, “Unit members in the time share program requesting return to full-time 6 The appellate record contains relevant portions of the “2021–2022” CBA. 15 teaching will be placed back into full-time teaching at their request at approximately the same grade level, subject to the seniority provisions of Article XI, ‘Transfer Procedures,’ and Article XII, ‘Reassignment,’ and when it does not result in the laying off of a probationary or permanent teacher.” (Italics added.) Further, “[e]ach job sharing arrangement shall be for one (1) year or until the next full-time teaching assignment, for which the teacher is qualified, becomes available.” (Italics added.) Distinct from a job-sharing arrangement, Article X of the CBA is titled “Leaves of Absence.” In that article, “[a] leave of absence is an authorization for an employee to be absent from duty, generally for a specific period of time and for an approved purpose.” The CBA explains that “[a] leave protects the employee by holding a place for him/her in the District. If the employee notifies the District of their intent to return to duty for the following year no later than March 1 of the year they are on leave, the employee shall be returned to the same position he/she held when the leave was granted, provided the position still exists. . . . Exists means, for the purpose of this Article, that the position is still at the administrative site when the employee returns from leave regardless of who covered the position during the employee’s leave of absence.” As the relevant facts are largely undisputed, whether a job-sharing arrangement such as the one here constitutes “leave” for the purposes of section 44920 is primarily a question of statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to 16 harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ ” ’ ” (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856.) In authorizing temporary employment “because a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester or year,” section 44920 does not provide a definition for the term “leave.” (§ 44920, italics added.) However, because “ ‘ “Education Code sections bearing upon the same subject should be read and construed together” ’ ” (Vasquez, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 984), we reasonably infer that the word “leave” in section 44920 is a shorthand for the phrase “leave of absence” that is used in other parts of the Education Code. The concept of a “leave of absence” is extensively discussed in Article 3 of Chapter 4 of Part 25 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Education Code, which is titled “Resignations, Dismissals and Leaves of Absences.” There, section 44962 states that “[g]overning boards of school districts may grant leaves of absence to persons employed in positions requiring certification qualifications.” Specific statutory sections in Article 3 provide for and describe various types of leaves that may be granted, including: mandatory or permissive leaves for employees charged with certain criminal offenses (§ 44940); various types of medical, parental and workers compensation leaves (§§ 44942, 44964, 44965, 44977, 44977.5, 44978.2, 44984); leave for study or travel (§ 44966); personal necessity leave (§ 44981); bereavement leave (§ 44985); disability leave (§ 44986); and leave to serve in certain 17 elected or appointed positions (§§ 44987, 44987.3). None of the leaves described in Article 3 include a job-sharing arrangement. Consistent with how the District’s CBA defines it, job sharing is a type of part-time work arrangement under which teachers at the District are allowed to reduce their workload. And distinct from “leave of absence,” a part time work arrangement generally falls under Article 2 of Chapter 4 of Part 25 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Education Code, which is titled “Employment.” 7 Specifically, section 44922 states “the governing board of a school district or a county superintendent of schools may establish regulations which allow their certificated employees to reduce their workload from full-time to part-time duties.” Based on the statutory framework as a whole, in which reduced workload arrangements are not categorized as a type of leave of absence, we conclude the Legislature did not intend, in section 44920, to refer to the type of job-sharing arrangement described in the CBA when it stated that a district could hire an employee on a temporary basis when “a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester or year” (§ 44920). Our conclusion is faithful to the rule that we must narrowly interpret the 7 At least one type of leave identified in the Education Code can take the form of a part-time schedule. Specifically, section 44987 requires a district to grant leave to enable an employee to serve as an elected officer of a public employee organization, including “attendance by the employee at periodic, stated, special, or regular meetings of the body of the organization on which the employee serves as an officer.” (§ 44987, subd. (a)(2).) Case law holds that an employee covered by that provision must, upon request, be given “half-time leave” to serve the public employee organization. (Tracy Educators Assn. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 530, 534.) However, that case law has no relevance here because the record contains no indication that M.L. and A.H. were approved for a job-sharing arrangement due to any service as elected officers of a public employee organization. 18 temporary classifications in the Education Code. (Balen, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 826; Vasquez, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 982.) Our conclusion is further underscored by the plain commonsense meaning of the term “leave of absence.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines a leave of absence as “[a] worker’s temporary absence from employment or duty with the intention to return.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1068, col. 2, italics added.) This definition is consistent with the CBA, which describes a leave of absence as “protect[ing] the employee by holding a place for him/her in the District.” A job-sharing arrangement as described in the CBA does not meet this common definition of a leave of absence because there is no expectation that the participating employee will return to the same position. Instead, the CBA states that if an employee in a job-sharing arrangement requests to return to full-time teaching, that employee will be placed back at the same grade level only “when it does not result in the laying off of a probationary or permanent teacher” and when a full-time position “becomes available.” Accordingly, the type of job-sharing arrangement at issue here does not qualify as a leave of absence as that term is commonly used. The District contends that American Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d 100 (American Federation) supports its treatment of the M.L./A.H. job-sharing arrangement as “leave” within the meaning of section 44920 because American Federation established that “a teacher does not need to be fully removed from any work at the school district to be on leave.” Building on that concept, the District argues that the M.L./A.H. job-sharing arrangement may be described as a “leave” even though M.L. and A.H. were still physically present at the District on a part- time basis. We are not persuaded. 19  American Federation concerned a teacher hired to teach a class normally taught by another teacher who had been reassigned to a categorically funded reading program. (American Federation, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 103.) The replacement teacher asserted “her temporary classification was incorrect because she was not employed in a categorically funded program,” as asserted by the district. 8 (Ibid.) Although the court in American Federation agreed the replacement teacher was not employed in a categorically funded program, it concluded her temporary classification was proper because she was filling in for the regularly-assigned teacher who was effectively placed on a “leave of absence” by virtue of re-assignment to a categorically funded program. 9 (American Federation, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at pp. 106–107.) In concluding a teacher assigned to a categorically funded 8 At the time, the Education Code provided that “ ‘instructors in classes conducted under . . . categorically funded projects’ were excepted from the tenure provisions of the Education Code” and could be “ ‘terminated at the expiration of the contract or specially funded project without regard to other requirements of this code respecting the termination of probationary or permanent employees.’ ” (American Federation, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 103, fn. 2.) 9 In reaching this conclusion, American Federation referred to section 13337.3, which was subsequently renumbered as section 44920. (American Federation, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at pp. 106–107; Stats. 1976, ch. 1010, § 2; Taylor, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 507 [“In the 1976 reorganization of the Education Code, . . . section 13337.3 became section 44920.”].) As does the present-day version of section 44920, section 13337.3 “authorize[d] school districts to hire certificated employees for a complete school year or for no less than a semester and to classify them as temporary, based on the need for additional certificated employees, because a certificated employee has been granted a leave for a semester or year or has a long-term illness.” (American Federation, at p. 106, fn. 3; see also Santa Barbara Federation of Teachers v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist. (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 223, 234, fn. 5 (Santa Barbara) [setting forth the full text of section 13337.3 prior to statutory reorganization].) 20 program was on “leave,” the court rejected the appellant’s argument that “a permanent employee who is on leave [must] be physically absent from the school district.” (Id. at p. 107.) We are not persuaded that American Federation is relevant to our analysis of the statutory question before us. For one thing, American Federation is not on point because it does not analyze whether a job-sharing arrangement constitutes “leave” within the meaning of section 44920. Instead it considered whether a teacher in a categorically funded position may be considered as being on “leave” within the meaning of section 44920. But to the extent the issue decided in American Fede