Marriage of Michelle N. and David N. CA6

Filed 10/28/26 Marriage of Michelle N. and David N. CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of MICHELLE and H053610 DAVID N. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 21FL000590) MICHELLE N., ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING; Respondent, NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT v. DAVID N., Appellant. THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion, filed October 7, 2026, be modified as follows: In the final paragraph of part II.C.3 commencing on page 17, at the end of the second full sentence ending “in modifying the visitation order,” add as footnote 7 the following footnote: 7 Because we have rejected each of father’s individual contentions of error on appeal, we also reject his claim of cumulative error. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 377.) There is no change in the judgment. Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.  ____________________________ Adams, J. ____________________________ Grover, Acting P. J. ____________________________ Lie, J. 2 Filed 10/7/26 Marriage of Michelle N. and David N. CA6 (unmodified opinion) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of MICHELLE and H053610 DAVID N. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 21FL000590) MICHELLE N., Respondent, v. DAVID N., Appellant. Appellant David N. (father) and respondent Michelle N. (mother) are the parents of one child, I.N. In 2025, mother filed a request for order (RFO) seeking to modify father’s visitation with I.N.1 The family court granted mother’s request and limited father’s in-person contact with I.N. to professionally supervised visitation. Father now appeals from the modified visitation order. He argues the family court erred by denying his request for a hearing with live testimony under Family Code2 section 217, failing to make statutory findings that the visitation order was in I.N.’s best 1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to the parties by their first names and last initials, and to their minor child by initials only. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1), (11).) No disrespect is intended. 2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. interests, and misapplying section 3044. Father also contends the family court’s evidentiary considerations were improper. We disagree and affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We derive our factual summary from the limited clerk’s transcript.3 Mother (who is not participating in this appeal) and father were married for four and a half years. Their marriage was dissolved in 2021 through a judgment incorporating a marital settlement agreement. Mother obtained a restraining order against father in September 2021 pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (§ 6200 et seq.). In July 2022, the family court awarded mother sole legal and physical custody of I.N. after an evidentiary hearing. According to mother, the court also found that the section 3044 presumption applied and was not rebutted by father. Mother’s restraining order was renewed in January 2024 and expires in 2028.4 In May 2024, the family court modified the restraining order’s visitation provisions. Pursuant to that modification, father was permitted unsupervised visitation with I.N. along with telephone or video calls during noncustodial periods according to a specified schedule. 3 We deny father’s request for judicial notice of a certified minute order (Monterey County Superior Court Case no. MS338235A) dismissing father’s convictions for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and disturbing the peace (id., § 415), pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4. “[W]e ‘generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court’ and will do so only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ ” (Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722, 746.) No such exceptional circumstances are presented here. 4 We previously granted father’s motion to augment the record to include his declaration dated January 10, 2024, and its attached exhibits, which appears to have been filed by father in opposition to mother’s January 2024 application to renew the original 2021 restraining order. 2  A. MOTHER’S REQUEST TO MODIFY THE VISITATION ORDER In January 2025, mother filed an RFO to modify the visitation order. She also submitted an ex parte application for temporary emergency orders, requesting that father’s contact with I.N. be limited to professionally supervised visitation until the RFO hearing. The family court granted mother’s request for temporary orders and set the RFO for hearing on shortened time. Mother alleged in her supporting declaration that father was experiencing paranoia, was unstable, and had exposed I.N. to information about the parents’ conflict. She described receiving messages from father in which he expressed feeling unsafe conducting custody exchanges in Monterey County and stated that strangers had yelled at him and wanted to kill him. He also believed the Marina Police Department, Monterey County Sheriff’s Office, and Monterey County District Attorney’s Office were conspiring against him. Mother included descriptions of online videos posted by father in which he conveyed animosity towards police and discussed possible violent confrontations in I.N.’s presence. Mother stated that father told I.N. that she was responsible for the conspiracy, and that father’s behavior was negatively affecting I.N. She feared that father still possessed a handgun he had owned during their marriage, which I.N. had reported seeing when he was with father. Mother was also concerned that father might abscond with I.N. because father travelled frequently to Indonesia. Finally, mother alleged that father had refused to disclose his current address, making it impossible for her to locate father and I.N. if a welfare check was necessary during his parenting time. Father filed a declaration in response to mother’s RFO in January 2025. There, father claimed mother was pre-emptively retaliating against him because he had intended to file a contempt motion against her for repeatedly violating the order allowing him telephone and video calls with I.N. He denied being mentally ill, threatening violence or exposing I.N. to any harm. He opposed supervised visitation because he believed it sent 3 a “harmful message” to I.N. that he was “unfit as a parent;” he stated he would refuse to participate in supervised visitation and would wait to resume unsupervised visitation after mother started complying with the visitation provisions of the restraining order. B. JANUARY 27, 2025 RFO HEARING There is no reporter’s transcript of the January 27, 2025 hearing (January 27 hearing). The minute order indicates that the family court kept in place the temporary order for professionally supervised visitation and referred the parties to Family Court Services (FCS) for a fact-based inquiry report under section 3183, subdivision (b).5 After the hearing, the court issued an amended restraining order incorporating the visitation modification and a findings and order after hearing. C. APRIL 2025 UPDATING DECLARATIONS The record indicates that the hearing to review the fact-based inquiry report was originally scheduled for April but was continued to July. Both parties filed updating declarations before the April hearing was continued. In his declaration, father repeated many of the statements he made in his earlier declaration. He again claimed that mother’s RFO was retaliatory, and that she had “denied court-ordered phone calls for years.” He explained that he is a “public intertest advocate” and that his online comments concerning the Marina Police Department were in response to “having experienced firsthand non-community based policing tactics.” He maintained that he was not mentally ill, had no history of mental illness “beyond periodic depression,” and asserted that mother’s allegations were “baseless” and “defamatory.” Mother summarized in her declaration efforts she made to retain a supervised visitation provider who was acceptable to father. According to mother, father had 5 Section 3183, subdivision (b) permits the trial court to order, with the parties’ agreement, a fact-based inquiry in which a family court liaison investigates safety allegations or obtains input from a child, or both, and then reports the information back to the court. 4 refused supervised visitation and told her that I.N. would know it was her choice not to allow unsupervised visits. She cited instances in which father had suggested to I.N. during telephone calls that she was responsible for the lack of visits. Finally, she alleged father had attempted to circumvent the supervised visitation order by arranging for parent-teacher meetings and requesting that I.N. also attend the meetings. D. THE FACT-BASED INQUIRY REPORT The FCS liaison completed the fact-based inquiry report in June 2025. He did not identify any specific safety concerns but noted that father and mother continued to disagree whether supervised visitation was appropriate or necessary. The liaison related that I.N. expressed a strong desire for in-person visitation and opined that it was unfair he could not see father, which father told I.N. was mother’s fault “ ‘because she’s in charge.’ ” In response to the liaison’s questioning, I.N. reported that “he had not seen any problems” between his parents during custody exchanges, but became “restless, began avoiding eye contact, and made efforts to change the subject” and “very clearly was not comfortable with the topic and did not want to talk about it.” The liaison reported that no supervised visits had occurred since the previous hearing, but father and I.N. had spoken regularly during video calls. The liaison summarized 15 police reports involving father and mother between 2016 and 2025. The most serious incident occurred in 2016, when father was charged with a violation of Penal Code section 273.5 after mother reported that he grabbed her by the throat, threw her to the ground, and then hit her repeatedly. In January 2019, Marina police officers responded to a “heated verbal exchange” between mother and father that did not result in any criminal charges. In February 2019, father was arrested and charged with violating his probation conditions (presumably arising from father’s 2016 conviction) after another “heated verbal dispute”; those charges were later withdrawn “due to a re-interpretation of the language in his probation conditions.” In 2021, mother reported multiple violations of the restraining order based on father’s text messages, but 5 no charges were filed. The remaining police reports involved various disputes related to custody exchanges, none of which resulted in criminal charges. E. MOTHER’S JULY 2025 UPDATING DECLARATION Mother filed another updating declaration in July 2025. She stated that father had sent her more harassing messages, which she reported to the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office and apparently resulted in misdemeanor charges and a warrant for father’s arrest. She alleged father’s online blog contained images of confidential reports regarding I.N., as well as secretly recorded audio from a previous court hearing despite the trial court’s denial of father’s request to record the hearings. She alleged that father’s telephone calls were negatively affecting I.N., including that I.N. had been “visibly anxious with an upset stomach” before the calls and “tired and withdrawn” afterwards. She stated that I.N. had also reported that father told him that mother was preventing father from calling him. In addition, she alleged that father continued to berate her in front of I.N. during telephone calls and accused her of preventing visitation. F. JULY 14, 2025 HEARING AND MINUTE ORDER There is no reporter’s transcript of the July 14, 2025 hearing (July 14 hearing) at which the trial court reviewed the fact-based inquiry report. The minute order reflects that the family court heard argument from each party’s counsel and took the matter under submission. The court issued an order on July 15, 2025 (July 15 order) and attached it to the minute order. The order states in full: “The Court inquired the reason why [father] had not filed a declaration in light of the local rules. The Court finds that [father] failed to demonstrate that the current orders are not in the best interest of the child pursuant to Family Code sections 3011, 3040, and 3044. [Father] not having made a basis for an evidentiary hearing, the Court denies the request for a Family Code 217 hearing for that reason.” 6  Father timely appealed from the minute order, which is an appealable order after final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2) [entry date of appealable minute order “is the date it is entered in the permanent minutes”]; cf. Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377– 1378.) II. DISCUSSION Father contends on appeal that the family court improperly denied his request for live testimony and cross-examination of witnesses under section 217; failed to make findings under sections 3011, 3020, and 3100, and misapplied section 3044; and erred in its consideration of the evidence. We address these contentions but begin by describing well-established appellate principles and the legal standards that govern our review. A. APPELLATE PRINCIPLES The analysis of any issue raised on appeal begins with one premise: a trial court order is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the order. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608– 609 (Jameson).) Even though mother did not file a respondent’s brief, it remains father’s affirmative burden to show reversible error. (In re Marriage of Davies (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 851, 854.) Father challenges the July 15 order through which the family court left in place the temporary order limiting father’s in-person contact with I.N. to professionally supervised visitation. He has provided only a clerk’s transcript; there is no settled statement or reporter’s transcript of either the January 27 or the July 14 hearings. However, “[a] proper record includes a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement of any hearing leading to the order being challenged on appeal.” (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574 (Elena S.); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).) Although father is self- represented, he is not exempt from the rules governing appeals. “A self-represented party 7 is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants having attorneys.” (Elena S., at p. 574.)6 Given the state of the record, we must treat this appeal as one on the “judgment roll,” subject to the following rules: error must be affirmatively shown by the record and will not be presumed on appeal; the validity of the judgment or order on its face may be determined by looking only to the matters constituting part of the judgment roll; where no error appears on the face of a judgment roll record, all intendments and presumptions must be in support of the judgment, and any condition of facts consistent with the validity of the judgment will be presumed to have existed rather than one which would defeat it. (Elena S., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574–575; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324–325.) 6 In his appellate brief, father indicated that he was not seeking a settled statement but reserved “the right to pursue a settled statement if this Court later determines it is necessary for meaningful review.” We directed father to confirm the scope of the record on appeal by verifying whether he sought a decision based on the clerk’s transcript alone or whether he intended to seek leave to augment the record. Father responded that he seeks review based on the clerk’s transcript “as to issues apparent from the written record,” but added that to the extent this court concludes that a record of the oral proceedings is necessary, he “requests leave to pursue a limited settled statement.” We cannot oblige that request because it was solely father’s obligation to provide an adequate record. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) “[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984.) Father also argues that the absence of a reporter’s transcript is not due to any failure on his part but to the superior court’s “practice or policy of not providing reporters” for family law hearings. However, trial courts are generally not required to provide a court reporter in family law proceedings unless a party qualifies for a fee waiver and makes a timely request. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(3), (c)(2), (e)(1); Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 623.) Under the Superior Court of Monterey County, Local Rules, rule 19.11, a party who has been granted a fee waiver must file a request for a court reporter at least 10 days prior to the hearing. Father has not demonstrated that he was granted a fee waiver or that he made a timely request for a court reporter for either the January 27 or July 14 hearings. 8  B. LEGAL STANDARD AND STANDARD OF REVIEW “Under California’s statutory scheme governing child custody and visitation determinations, the overarching concern is the best interest of the child.” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 (Montenegro).) “When determining the best interest of the child, relevant factors include the health, safety and welfare of the child, any history of abuse by one parent against the child or the other parent, and the nature and amount of contact with the parents. [Citation.]” (Ibid., citing § 3011; In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 955–956.) Visitation orders are reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion test. (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255; Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1163.) “Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion if there is no reasonable basis on which the court could conclude its decision advanced the best interests of the child. [Citation.] ‘Under this test, we must uphold the trial court “ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.” ’ [Citation.]” (Chalmers v. Hirschkop (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 289, 299 (Chalmers).) “Where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the correct result for the decision of the trial court.” (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 118.) In his appellate brief, Father acknowledges the best interests standard and the abuse of discretion test but contends that the July 15 order must instead be subjected to “strict scrutiny” review and the “least restrictive means” standard because it burdens his fundamental parental rights. We reject this contention. Constitutional due process principles do not apply to visitation disputes between a child’s parents, as opposed to those between a parent and a non-parent. (Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1157; H.S. v. N.S. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1142, italics omitted [“In custody disputes between parents, the only standard that must be met to satisfy constitutional due process is the best interest of the child showing.”].) The United 9 States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, which father cites in support of this argument, does not hold otherwise. (Id. at pp. 100–101 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [“In short, a fit parent’s right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another”]; italics omitted.) And the other cases father relies on, none of which involve child custody or custody-related disputes between the parents of a child, do not support his position. Accordingly, we examine the record to determine whether the family court abused its discretion in finding that professionally supervised visitation was in I.N.’s best interests. C. FATHER HAS NOT SHOWN REVERSIBLE ERROR 1. Father Forfeited His Request for Live Testimony Father contends the family court improperly denied his request under section 217 for an evidentiary hearing, which he opines “was essential” due to “contested factual and credibility issues.” Father asserts that without live testimony and cross-examination, he was unfairly prevented from challenging purported inaccuracies and omissions in the fact-based inquiry report and was deprived of an opportunity to present his own evidence. We review a ruling denying an evidentiary hearing under section 217 for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 837; In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 390 (Hearn).) Section 217 provides that in family law proceedings “the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing.” (Id., subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113(a).) This includes live testimony from an FCS liaison. (See McLaughlin v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 473, 483 [local court rule that required child custody counselors to submit recommendations without supportive reasoning but prohibited cross-examination of the counselor violated due process].) However, “[i]n appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony,” and if it does so, the court “shall state its reasons for the 10 finding on the record or in writing.” (§ 217, subd. (b); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113(c).) Additionally, “the right to live testimony under Family Code section 217 may be forfeited” for failure to comply with the statute’s procedural requirements. (In re Marriage of Cohen (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 574, 582 (Cohen); In re Marriage of George & Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476, 481–482 (George) [appellant’s failure to “follow the proper procedures [section 217] to ensure that [ex-husband’s] live testimony was available for the family court to receive,” meant that “the family court was not required to receive any such testimony”]; Chalmers, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 313 [trial court did not err in failing to hold evidentiary hearing on motion to modify order denying visitation where moving party did not file § 217 motion, did not comply with § 217’s requirements, and court made finding there was good cause to deny request for live testimony].) For example, in Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th, the appellate court held that a husband forfeited his right to live testimony under section 217 by not asking to testify or to cross- examine wife or other witnesses either in his responsive declaration or at the hearing. (Id. at pp. 390–391.) Similarly, the husband in Cohen, forfeited an evidentiary hearing under section 217 because he did not request to testify or cross-examine witnesses in his written opposition to wife’s motion to dismiss and did not submit a witness list. (Cohen, at p. 582.) Here, the record shows that father did not make a request for live testimony or to cross-examine the liaison or any other witnesses in the documents he filed before the July 14 hearing. Nor does the record contain a witness list from father, which is required under the statute and corresponding rules of court. (§ 217, subd. (c) [“A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113(e) [“Witness lists required by Family Code section 217(c) must be served along with the request for order or responsive papers in the manner required for 11 the service of those documents”].) The only evidence in the record that father made a section 217 request is one sentence from the family court’s July 15 order: “[father] not having made a basis for an evidentiary hearing, the Court denies the request for a Family Code 217 hearing for that reason.” But without a reporter’s transcript of the July 14 hearing or a settled statement detailing what occurred, the contours of father’s section 217 request and any response from the family court made at the hearing are unknown. Although father argues the court erred because it “made no on-the-record finding of good cause to dispense with live testimony under section 217, subdivision (b),” we are unable to review that claim on a judgment roll appeal and must presume the family court stated reasons sufficient to support its order denying an evidentiary hearing. (See Elena S., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574–575; see also Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 678 [“Absent an indication in the record that an error occurred, we must presume that there was no error”]; Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 [“ ‘if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the record he provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court could be affirmed,’ ” the appellant defaults.].) What is known from the record is that father’s section 217 request was procedurally deficient. Thus, following Hearn and Cohen, we conclude that father forfeited the right to live testimony at the July 14 hearing. Regardless, any violation of section 217 was harmless. (See Cohen, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 582; George, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 484; Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 392.) The primary factual basis for mother’s RFO was father’s recent online behavior and his conduct toward mother and I.N., which mother alleged was evidence that father’s mental condition was deteriorating. Father offers no compelling argument demonstrating it was reasonably probable that the result of the proceedings could have been different if he were permitted to cross examine the liaison 12 regarding historical facts he asserts were mistaken or present additional evidence about mother’s non-compliance with court orders, a topic father had already addressed in two declarations. (Cohen, at p. 582 [error harmless where it was “not reasonably probable that live testimony” would undermine the court’s disposition].) For these reasons, father has not met his burden to show the family court abused its discretion by denying his request under section 217 for a hearing with live testimony. 2. Specific Factual Findings Were Not Required Father contends the family court was required to make specific findings in writing or on the record under sections 3011, 3020 and 3100 to support its determination that father failed to demonstrate that supervised visitation was not in I.N.’s best interests. As an initial matter, we deem father’s argument forfeited because it is unsupported by cogent argument or applicable legal authority obligating the court to make explicit findings under those statutes in circumstances similar to this case. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.) We are not required to supply arguments for a party or address issues raised without relevant legal argument. (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115–1116.) Issues that are unsupported by pertinent or cognizable argument may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived.”].) But even considering father’s argument on the merits, we are unpersuaded. Section 3011 provides the factors courts must consider in making a determination of the best interests of the child. As relevant here, subdivision (a)(5)(A) of section 3011 requires the court to state its reasons in writing or on the record only when it orders unsupervised visitation for a parent after allegations concerning that parent’s history of abuse have been brought to the court’s attention. (§ 3011, subd. (a)(5)(A).) Here, the 13 family court did not have to state its reasons because it did not make an order granting father unsupervised visitation. Similarly, section 3020 does not require the court to state its reasons or make explicit findings. That section declares California’s public policy to “ensure that the health, safety, and welfare of children shall be the court’s primary concern in determining the best interests of children when making orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of children … [¶] … [and] ensure that children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage parents to share their rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy, except when the contact would not be in the best interests of the child.” (Id., subds. (a)-(c).) The statute provides that when the policies set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 3020 conflict, the court’s visitation order “shall be made in a manner that ensures the health, safety, and welfare of the child and the safety of all family members.” (Id., subd. (c).) Nothing in section 3020 requires the family court to explicitly detail its balancing of these policies and memorialize its conclusions in writing or on the record. The family court likewise was not required to make explicit findings under section 3100. In relevant part, section 3100 provides that if an order “has been issued restraining a parent, the court shall consider whether the best interest of the child requires that visitation by that parent be suspended, denied, or limited to situations in which a third person, specified by the court, is present, including virtual visitation.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(A).) Subdivision (b)(2) of section 3100 provides that “[i]n determining the type of visitation with the restrained party, if any, is in the best interest of the child pursuant to paragraph (1), the court shall consider the nature of the acts that led to the protective order, the period of time that has elapsed since that order, and whether the restrained party has committed further acts of abuse.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Section 3100 only requires the court to make explicit findings if it determines a party or parent is staying or 14 residing in a confidential domestic violence shelter, which provision does not apply here. (Id., subd. (e)(1)-(3).) Finally, we do not find merit in father’s argument that the family court misapplied section 3044 by failing to analyze the statute’s factors and state its findings. Section 3044 provides for a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a perpetrator of domestic violence is detrimental to the best interests of the child. (Id., subd. (a).) Section 3044 expressly requires a court to explain its reasons in writing or on the record if it finds the presumption of detriment has been overcome. (City and County of San Francisco v. H.H. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 531, 542.) Based on this record and considering the issues raised in mother’s RFO, we cannot discern the particular reason the family court cited section 3044 in the July 15 order because it was not considering a modification to the order granting mother sole legal and physical custody of I.N. But for that reason, we view any error in citing section 3044 as harmless. (In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [burden is on appellant “ ‘in every case to show that the claimed error is prejudicial; i.e., that it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice’ ”].) 3. Father’s Evidentiary Challenges are Unreviewable Father contends in a series of arguments that the family court erred by relying on certain evidence that was unfavorable to him while disregarding other evidence that he deems more favorable. To that end, father claims the court placed “dispositive weight” on the inaccurate and “one-sided” liaison’s report while ignoring unrebutted “direct evidence” that mother failed to comply with the order for telephone and video contact between father and I.N. According to father, by “deciding contested issues while refusing to allow any testing of the report,” the court failed to recognize inaccuracies related to child abuse allegations that were determined unfounded by the Monterey County Department of Family and Children’s Services. He argues the court treated mother’s restraining order as “a central predicate for its ongoing supervised-visitation 15 framework” and found it “as controlling on the question of current danger and appropriate restrictions” without conducting a “meaningful hearing.” And father represents that the court improperly relied on his outstanding arrest warrants in reaching its decision because those warrants were “outside the evidentiary record.” As a preliminary matter, we cannot evaluate the merits of father’s evidentiary challenges. “Where, as here, the appeal is on the judgment roll alone, ‘[t]he question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings [of the trial court] is not open.’ [Citations.] Instead, ‘the evidence is conclusively presumed to support the findings, and the only questions presented are the sufficiency of the pleadings and whether the findings support the judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Nu Digital Marketing, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 283, 288.) Without a reporter’s transcript or settled statement, there is no basis for this court to assess either the evidence relied upon by the family court or any reasons for discounting or excluding other evidence. To the extent father’s argument can be read to claim a lack of substantial evidence to support the family court’s conclusion that professionally supervised visitation was in I.N.’s best interests, we are mindful that “ ‘[t]he power of a reviewing court begins and ends with a determination of whether there is in the record substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports the result reached; and we must also assume in favor of the determination below the existence of every fact which the trier of facts could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1521.) We do not gauge the strength of father’s case in opposing mother’s RFO but determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the family court’s best interests finding. Nor do we reassess the credibility of witnesses on appeal. (Id. at p. 1531.) As noted ante, our review is a deferential one. (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255.) With that in mind, the family court could have reasonably concluded, crediting mother’s declarations describing father’s behavior both before and after she filed the 16 RFO, that continuing to allow father unsupervised visitation would have been detrimental to I.N.’s health, safety, and welfare, which is the “primary concern” for a best interests determination. (§ 3020, subd. (a).) Additionally, the court could have permissibly concluded, after balancing the factors described in subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 3020, that professionally supervised visitation most appropriately reconciled the policy to ensure I.N.’s safety with the policy that he has frequent and continuing contact with father. In short, there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the family court’s order. As we have indicated ante, the standard of appellate review of visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test. Measured by that standard, and because father has not met his burden to demonstrate reversible error, we must conclude that the family court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the visitation order. III. DISPOSITION The trial court’s July 15, 2025 order is affirmed. As mother has not participated in this appeal, there is no basis for awarding appellate costs. 17  ______________________________________ Adams, J. WE CONCUR: ____________________________________ Grover, Acting P. J. ____________________________________ Lie, J. H053610 In re the Marriage of MICHELLE N. and DAVID N.