Spazz v. Schneider CA2/5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB342475
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Spazz v. Schneider CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SPAZZ, INC. et al., B342475
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV03507)
GURSEY SCHNEIDER,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
Balaban & Spielberger, Daniel K. Balaban, Andrew J.
Spielberger, and Vanessa L. Loftus-Brewer; Esner, Chang, Boyer
& Murphy and Shea S. Murphy for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Clark Hill, Penelope Deihl, and Elizabeth A. Evans for
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiffs and appellants Spazz, Inc. (Spazz), Slang
East/West, LLC (Slang), Robert Trujillo (Robert), and Robert’s
wife Chloe Trujillo (Chloe) (collectively, plaintiffs) sued defendant
and respondent Gursey Schneider LLP (Gursey) after Gursey’s
employee, Stacey Summers (Summers), failed to file plaintiffs’
taxes for a number of years. Gursey filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing it was not vicariously liable for Summers’s
wrongdoing because plaintiffs were Summers’s personal clients,
not clients of the firm. Plaintiffs filed a dueling motion for
summary adjudication asking the court to find the contrary, i.e.,
that Gursey was vicariously liable as a matter of law. The trial
court granted Gursey’s motion for summary judgment and denied
plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication. We now consider
whether the trial court correctly resolved the vicarious liability
issue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Summers’s Work for Plaintiffs
Gursey provides accounting, business management, and
litigation support to its clients, including the preparation of tax
returns. Gursey has a formal client intake process to onboard
new clients and formalize the representation.
Summers became a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
around 2002. For some period thereafter, Summers worked as an
accountant at an accounting firm called Schwartz Kales. She
became a salaried employee at Gursey in 2006 and held the title
of “Tax Director” starting in June 2013. In her capacity as a CPA
employed by Gursey, Summers provided certified public
accounting services to clients. She had her own office in Gursey’s
office suite.
2
Summers met Robert (a guitarist in the band Metallica) in
high school and was a longtime friend of Robert and Chloe.
Spazz and Slang are companies affiliated with Robert. Summers
began preparing plaintiffs’ taxes before she was employed by
Gursey. She had an oral agreement with plaintiffs pursuant to
which she handled their bookkeeping and tax returns in
exchange for a flat fee.
When Summers worked at her prior firm, Summers
submitted a personal invoice for the work she performed for
plaintiffs. That invoice was not prepared on Schwartz Kales
letterhead. After Summers began working for Gursey, she
personally invoiced plaintiffs for tax preparation work until
approximately 2013 or 2014 and she paid herself from plaintiffs’
account. Summers was not compensated for the work she did for
plaintiffs after 2013 or 2014. The amount Summers charged
plaintiffs was much less than what Summers knew Gursey would
charge. Plaintiffs never signed a retainer agreement with
Gursey.
While Summers was employed at Gursey, Robert came to
the Gursey office to sign his tax returns. Robert had business
meetings with Summers at Gursey approximately five times per
year. Liz Bernal (Bernal), the lead executive assistant at Gursey,
observed Robert visit Summers at Gursey three or four times.
Tanisha Cole (Cole), an administrative assistant at Gursey, once
escorted “a man named ‘Trujillo’” to a meeting with Summers in a
Gursey conference room. When Cole received mail addressed to
Robert, Spazz, or Slang at the Gursey office, she delivered that
mail to Summers.
Summers emailed plaintiffs from her Gursey email address
while employed there. There were thousands of emails between
3
Summers and plaintiffs on the Gursey computer system. Gursey
had the ability to review Summers’s emails. Plaintiffs never
received emails from any other Gursey employee.
Some, but not all, of the tax returns Summers prepared for
plaintiffs while she was employed by Gursey identified Gursey on
the return. Some of plaintiffs’ tax returns on the Gursey
computer system were password protected.
Though Summers had plaintiffs sign tax returns for the
years 2014 through 2018, those returns were never actually filed.
In February 2020, a representative of plaintiffs contacted Gursey
to report plaintiffs’ tax returns had not been timely prepared and
filed, resulting in significant penalties and interest. In late
February and early March 2020, Summers removed paper files
concerning plaintiffs from the Gursey office and deleted some, but
not all, of the electronic files concerning plaintiffs from the
Gursey computer system.
Summers’s employment at Gursey was terminated in
March 2020. Gursey did not have a signed engagement letter
with plaintiffs and had no records of invoices or evidence
reflecting the receipt of payment for work done on behalf of
plaintiffs.
B. The Pleadings
Plaintiffs sued Summers and Gursey in connection with the
failure to file their tax returns.1 The second amended and
operative complaint (the complaint) alleges three causes of
action: fraudulent concealment; breach of fiduciary duty; and
1
The original complaint is not in the appellate record.
4
constructive fraud. The operative complaint alleges defendants
were acting as actual or ostensible agents of each other. In broad
strokes, the lawsuit alleges Summers was acting in the course
and scope of her employment with Gursey when she provided tax
and business consulting services to plaintiffs; Summers and
Gursey had a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to tax,
business, and/or financial matters; and Summers and Gursey
intentionally concealed the fact that some of plaintiffs’ tax
returns were not filed even though Summers had plaintiffs sign
the returns and told them the returns were filed.
Gursey answered the complaint with a general denial and
pled various affirmative defenses, including its 18th affirmative
defense, which asserted it was not liable for any acts or omissions
of other defendants who acted outside the course and scope of
their employment at the time of the alleged actions. Gursey also
filed a cross-complaint against Summers seeking equitable
indemnity and contribution.
C. Gursey’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Gursey filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Gursey owed
plaintiffs no legal duty and could not be vicariously liable for
Summers’s alleged wrongdoing.2 Gursey argued it did not owe a
2
Gursey’s motion asserted it was also seeking, in the
alternative, summary adjudication as to each cause of action.
Gursey did not, however, articulate a basis upon which it could
be granted summary adjudication as to the fraud causes of
action. Gursey also did not separately address its alternative
request for summary adjudication in its separate statement.
5
duty to plaintiffs under the doctrine of respondeat superior
because vicarious liability cannot be imposed for an employee’s
purely personal activity and Summers was not acting within the
scope of her employment. Gursey additionally argued it did not
owe any fiduciary duty to plaintiffs and could not be directly
liable under principles of actual or ostensible agency.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing there was a causal
nexus between Gursey’s provision of tax services and Summers’s
alleged concealment of her failure to file plaintiffs’ taxes.
Plaintiffs also argued there was evidence that Summers did not
substantially deviate from her employment when committing the
alleged wrongs. Plaintiffs further argued that Summers was
Gursey’s agent and, as a result, her knowledge should be imputed
to Gursey.
In connection with Gursey’s summary judgment motion,
Gursey submitted a declaration from Stephan Wasserman, the
managing partner of Gursey. He declared Gursey’s formal client
intake process to onboard new clients includes a conflict check
and an engagement letter, which each tax client executes each
year. He further stated that a prospective client is only added to
the client roster when the signed engagement letter is returned,
at which point the billing software is updated to reflect the new
client. He averred these steps were not completed for plaintiffs.
Gursey and plaintiffs submitted dueling excerpts from
Summers’s deposition in which she made seemingly inconsistent
statements regarding her understanding as to whether plaintiffs
were her clients or Gursey’s. In one excerpt, when Summers was
asked if plaintiffs were her client rather than Gursey’s client, she
responded, “They were my client.” In another, when Summers
was asked if she considered plaintiffs to be Gursey’s client, she
6
responded, “I considered them to be a client of mine, and I mean,
I was an accountant at . . . Gursey, so yeah.”
Plaintiffs submitted deposition testimony from Robert and
Chloe stating they believed Summers was working on behalf of
Gursey when she provided them with accounting services.
Plaintiffs also submitted an excerpt from Summers’s deposition
in which she stated there were passwords on some of plaintiffs’
tax returns because she uploaded some documents from her prior
firm that were already password-protected; Summers testified
she did not believe documents she created while at Gursey had
passwords. Plaintiffs additionally submitted excerpts from
Summers’s deposition in which she suggested certain Gursey
partners knew she did work for Robert .
D. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication3
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary adjudication
regarding Gursey’s 18th affirmative defense that asked the court
to declare as a matter of law that the firm was vicariously liable
for Summers’s alleged wrongdoing. The evidence plaintiffs
submitted in support of their motion was virtually identical to
the evidence they submitted in support of their opposition to
Gursey’s motion. Similarly, the evidence Gursey submitted in
3
Summers also filed a motion for summary judgment as to
Gursey’s cross-complaint. No party appeals from the trial court’s
ruling on that motion and we do not discuss it. We do note,
however, that any evidence submitted only in support of
Summers’s motion (i.e., not also submitted in support of the other
summary judgment/adjudication filings) is not properly before us
in this appeal and we do not consider it.
7
opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication was
nearly identical to the evidence that it submitted in support of its
motion for summary judgment.
E. The Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court granted Gursey’s motion for summary
judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary
adjudication.
The trial court concluded Gursey met its initial burden of
showing Summers’s acts were outside the scope of her
employment based on the evidence that Gursey did not prepare
an engagement letter for plaintiffs, Summers hid and deleted
records related to her work for plaintiffs, other Gursey employees
did not participate in the tax preparation work, Gursey was not
compensated for the work, and Gursey did not participate in or
have any knowledge of Summers’s work for plaintiffs. The court
concluded Summers’s work for plaintiffs was personal in nature
and plaintiffs’ mere presence at her place of employment was
insufficient to give rise to liability under respondeat superior. It
also concluded plaintiffs failed to show a triable issue of material
fact existed as to whether Summers’s preparation of tax returns
for a non-Gursey client was foreseeable and within the scope of
her employment.
The trial court further found Gursey was not liable under
agency principles. The court stated plaintiffs were required to
demonstrate a triable issue of fact existed as to whether Gursey’s
representations or conduct—not Summers’s—caused plaintiffs to
believe they were Gursey clients or that Summers’s actions were
undertaken on Gursey’s behalf. The court found Gursey met its
initial burden of showing plaintiffs were not its clients, Gursey
8
did not confer actual authority on Summers to take plaintiffs on
as clients, and Gursey did not act in a manner that would allow
plaintiffs to believe Summers had authority to act on its behalf in
preparing plaintiffs’ taxes. The court rejected plaintiffs’
argument that Gursey gave Summers apparent authority to
provide tax services to plaintiffs because it believed Gursey’s
representation that Summers was a Tax Director at Gursey and
its provision of an office in the firm’s suite were necessary to and
inherent in Summers’s employment. The court also rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that some Gursey partners knew about
Summers’s work for plaintiffs because it found some of the
evidence was hearsay and the remaining evidence did not suffice
to show Gursey knew Summers was performing work for
plaintiffs purportedly on Gursey’s behalf.
As for plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication, the
court explained it was moot based on its order granting summary
judgment for Gursey. But the court additionally remarked that
plaintiffs had not met their initial burden on summary
adjudication because they relied on Summers’s employment with
Gursey and Gursey’s provision of an office to Summers—neither
of which demonstrated as a matter of law that Summers’s actions
were within the scope of her employment, were foreseeable, or
were done pursuant to her authority as Gursey’s agent.
II. DISCUSSION
It is undisputed that Summers was employed by Gursey
during the relevant timeframe, provided CPA services to clients
at Gursey, and provided services to plaintiffs in her capacity as a
CPA. The summary judgment record also reveals Summers
undisputedly and repeatedly used Gursey’s offices and Gursey’s
9
computer systems to provide services to plaintiffs. These and
other facts we shall discuss suffice to raise a triable issue as to
whether Summers’s actions were within the scope of her
employment. On the other hand, there is also substantial
evidence supporting Gursey’s contention that plaintiffs were
Summers’s personal clients: plaintiffs were Summers’s clients
before her transition to Gursey, they never signed an engagement
letter with Gursey, they never directly worked with any other
Gursey accountants, Summers never entered plaintiffs into
Gursey’s system as clients, and Summers did not ensure Gursey
was compensated for any of her work for plaintiffs. A trial is
necessary to resolve these conflicting facts, or conflicting
inferences to be drawn from the facts (see, e.g., Visitacion
Investment, LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties, LLC (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 1081, 1096), at least in connection with Gursey’s
liability on a respondeat superior basis. And that means it was
error to grant Gursey’s summary judgment motion but it was
appropriate to deny plaintiffs’ dueling motion for summary
adjudication.
A. Respondeat Superior Doctrine
The “respondeat superior rule provides that ‘an employer
may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee
within the scope of employment.’ [Citation.]” (Patterson v.
Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 491.) In California,
the “scope of employment” is interpreted broadly for purposes of
respondeat superior. (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa
Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1004.) For actions to be within the
scope of employment, there must be “a nexus between the
employee’s tort and the employment to ensure that liability is
10
properly placed upon the employer.” (Bailey v. Filco, Inc. (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1560.)
“[A]n employee’s tortious act may be within the scope of
employment even if it contravenes an express company rule and
confers no benefit to the employer.” (Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th
at 1004.) However, “a deviation from the employee’s duties that
is ‘so material or substantial as to amount to an entire departure’
from those duties will take the employee’s conduct out of the
scope of employment.” (Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v.
Department of Transportation (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 87, 95.)
“Imposing liability for the employee’s conduct upon the
employer has nothing to do with the employer’s fault.” (Musgrove
v. Silver (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 694, 707.) Rather, “[u]nder
respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the ‘“risks that may
fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the
enterprise [the employer] has undertaken,”’ that is, ‘the risks
inherent in or created by the enterprise.’ [Citation.]”
(Halliburton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 94.) “Generally, the
determination of whether an employee has acted within the scope
of employment is a question of fact. But it becomes a question of
law for our independent consideration when ‘“‘the facts are
undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.’”’
[Citation.]” (Inter Mountain Mortg., Inc. v. Sulimen (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441.)
Though courts have articulated multiple tests to determine
whether respondeat superior applies in a given circumstance,
plaintiffs’ appellate briefing focuses on one: the foreseeability
test. The test states that for vicarious liability to attach, “[t]he
tortious conduct ‘must be “a generally foreseeable consequence of
the [employer’s] activity.”’” (PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller,
11
Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 384, 391.) In this usage, foreseeability “‘merely
means that in the context of the particular enterprise an
employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would
seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other
costs of the employer’s business.’ [Citations.]” (Lisa M. v. Henry
Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 299.)
B. Summary Judgment Was Incorrectly Granted, but
Summary Adjudication Was Appropriately Denied
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication “only when ‘all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact . . . .’” (Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 1168, 1179; see also Lunardi v. Great-West Life
Assurance Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 807, 819 [“A summary
adjudication motion is subject to the same rules and procedures
as a summary judgment motion”].) “In reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, we independently evaluate the record,
liberally construing the evidence supporting the party opposing
the motion, and resolving any doubts in his or her favor.
[Citation.]” (Patterson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 499-500.) We review
the decision de novo and “decide independently whether the facts
not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving
party as a matter of law.” (Mattei v. Corporate Management
Solutions, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 116, 122.)
Triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Summers
was acting within the scope of her employment when she
provided accounting services to plaintiffs. It is undisputed that
Summers was performing work in her capacity as a CPA, the
12
very same capacity in which Gursey asserts she provided services
to its clients, when she committed the allegedly tortious acts. It
is also undisputed Summers met with plaintiffs in Gursey’s
offices (and at least some of these meetings took place when other
Gursey employees were present), communicated with plaintiffs
using her Gursey email, and prepared at least some of plaintiffs’
tax forms in such a way that Gursey’s name appeared on them.4
Based on this evidence, a factfinder could appropriately
determine a nexus existed between Summers’s alleged torts and
her employment at Gursey. The risk that one of Gursey’s
employees would prepare taxes for individuals or companies that
did not undergo Gursey’s formal client intake process was a
generally foreseeable risk inherent and incidental to Gursey’s
business providing accounting services. (See, e.g., Inter
Mountain, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at 1442 [risk that a loan
representative, employed by a business that solicited mortgage
loans, would submit a fraudulent loan application was a
4
Gursey contends there is no evidence Summers rendered
professional services to plaintiffs during her usual work hours,
but the record indicates otherwise. While it is true there is no
evidence in the summary judgment record establishing what
Summers’s customary work hours were, there is evidence that
Summers performed at least some of her work for plaintiffs when
other Gursey employees (namely Cole and Bernal) were in the
office too. This strongly supports an inference she performed at
least some work during business hours. Additionally, though
Gursey contends the timing of Summers’s work is irrelevant to
establishing vicarious liability, that goes too far. While the
timing of the work is not alone sufficient to establish respondeat
superior liability, it is certainly relevant to the inquiry.
13
generally foreseeable risk].) At a minimum, Summers’s
employment as a CPA placed her in the position of being able to
perform tax and accounting work without formally notifying
Gursey.5 Such an occurrence was “‘not so unusual or startling
that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it
among other costs of the employer’s business.’” (Lisa M., supra,
12 Cal.4th at 299.) While Gursey may not have officially known
about Summers’s conduct, it may nevertheless be vicariously
liable if a factfinder is ultimately convinced Summers was acting
within the scope of her employment.
Gursey’s principal argument to the contrary is that Gursey
could not foresee Summers engaging in a “secret and hidden side
job” getting personally paid to prepare taxes for a longtime
friend. But that characterization is inapt. It is true Summers
did not ensure plaintiffs went through Gursey’s formal client
intake process. But Summers was not furtively performing work
for plaintiffs and taking contemporaneous steps to hide that
work. Rather, Summers openly brought plaintiffs into her office
multiple times, used her Gursey email (which Gursey was
authorized to monitor) to communicate with plaintiffs, had
another Gursey employee delivering plaintiffs’ mail to her, and
used her Gursey computer to prepare at least some of their tax
paperwork. That Summers deleted some of the relevant files
after plaintiffs discovered her failure to file their taxes and
reported the issue to Gursey does not somehow make her
5
The record does not reveal whether Summers had any job
duties other than providing certified public accountant services to
Gursey clients, including whether her duties changed or
expanded in 2013, when she was given the title “Tax Director.”
14
previously overt acts covert—it may simply show a motivation to
destroy otherwise incriminating evidence.
Gursey also relies on three cases finding an employee’s acts
were purely personal and thus not within the scope of their
employment to contend Summers’s acts were similarly not within
the scope of her employment. But none of the cases upon which
Gursey relies involve facts akin to those here.
In Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 163, an
employee of a winery used the winery’s equipment to pick up
grapes for the purpose of making his own wine, outside of his
working hours. In Marez v. Lyft, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 569,
573-574, a driver who rented a vehicle from Lyft through a
program that allowed drivers to use a rented vehicle for both
personal and work-related purposes, got into a car crash while
driving home from a different job, on a day he neither worked for
Lyft nor had any intention of doing so. And in Hoblitzell v. City
of Ione (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 675, 678, 683, a law enforcement
officer and a building inspector employed by the defendant city
interfered with work at a job site outside the city’s jurisdiction
and while in civilian clothing, and at the request of an individual
instead of the city. None of these cases involves a situation
analogous to the one at hand here, where the evidence presented
at summary judgment established that Summers performed work
of the type she performed for her employer, in her employer’s
office, using her employer’s resources, at least partially during
the workday and in the presence of other employees. While, as
we discuss infra, there is some contrary evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could rely on to conclude Summers’s actions
were not within the scope of her employment, the record does not
demonstrate there are no triable issues of material fact on
15
respondeat superior liability, particularly since we must liberally
construe the evidence in plaintiffs’ favor (with respect to Gursey’s
motion for summary judgment).
This same point, however, establishes the trial court was
right to deny plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication because
there is no undisputed evidence Summers was acting in the scope
of her employment. To the contrary, her testimony as to whether
plaintiffs were her clients or Gursey’s clients was inconsistent.
She began providing accounting services to plaintiffs prior to
becoming employed at Gursey. She did not ensure plaintiffs
signed an engagement letter with Gursey. And Gursey was never
paid for any of the work Summers did for plaintiffs. These facts
could support a finding—at trial—that Summers was performing
work for plaintiffs in her personal capacity rather than acting
within the scope of her employment.
So the bottom line is that a trial is necessary.6 A material
dispute of fact exists as to the applicability of respondeat superior
6
To the extent Gursey contends that, in the alternative to
affirmance of summary judgment, it is entitled to summary
adjudication of the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
because it did not knowingly undertake a fiduciary obligation to
plaintiffs, the argument is both legally incorrect (Moore v.
Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 133
[suggesting defendants who owed no fiduciary duty to the
plaintiff could still be liable “on the basis of a recognized theory of
secondary liability, such as respondeat superior”]) and
procedurally improper because Gursey did not separately assert a
basis for summarily adjudicating the breach of fiduciary duty
cause of action in its separate statement (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1350(b)).
16
liability and we need not reach plaintiffs’ remaining arguments
for reversal. (See, e.g., Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 156, 163, fn. 7.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary
adjudication is affirmed. The summary judgment is reversed,
and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order
denying Gursey’s motion for summary judgment and to hold
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs
are awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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