Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 Spazz v. Schneider CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE SPAZZ, INC. et al., B342475 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 22STCV03507) GURSEY SCHNEIDER, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Balaban & Spielberger, Daniel K. Balaban, Andrew J. Spielberger, and Vanessa L. Loftus-Brewer; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy and Shea S. Murphy for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Clark Hill, Penelope Deihl, and Elizabeth A. Evans for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiffs and appellants Spazz, Inc. (Spazz), Slang East/West, LLC (Slang), Robert Trujillo (Robert), and Robert’s wife Chloe Trujillo (Chloe) (collectively, plaintiffs) sued defendant and respondent Gursey Schneider LLP (Gursey) after Gursey’s employee, Stacey Summers (Summers), failed to file plaintiffs’ taxes for a number of years. Gursey filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was not vicariously liable for Summers’s wrongdoing because plaintiffs were Summers’s personal clients, not clients of the firm. Plaintiffs filed a dueling motion for summary adjudication asking the court to find the contrary, i.e., that Gursey was vicariously liable as a matter of law. The trial court granted Gursey’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication. We now consider whether the trial court correctly resolved the vicarious liability issue. I. BACKGROUND A. Summers’s Work for Plaintiffs Gursey provides accounting, business management, and litigation support to its clients, including the preparation of tax returns. Gursey has a formal client intake process to onboard new clients and formalize the representation. Summers became a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) around 2002. For some period thereafter, Summers worked as an accountant at an accounting firm called Schwartz Kales. She became a salaried employee at Gursey in 2006 and held the title of “Tax Director” starting in June 2013. In her capacity as a CPA employed by Gursey, Summers provided certified public accounting services to clients. She had her own office in Gursey’s office suite. 2 Summers met Robert (a guitarist in the band Metallica) in high school and was a longtime friend of Robert and Chloe. Spazz and Slang are companies affiliated with Robert. Summers began preparing plaintiffs’ taxes before she was employed by Gursey. She had an oral agreement with plaintiffs pursuant to which she handled their bookkeeping and tax returns in exchange for a flat fee. When Summers worked at her prior firm, Summers submitted a personal invoice for the work she performed for plaintiffs. That invoice was not prepared on Schwartz Kales letterhead. After Summers began working for Gursey, she personally invoiced plaintiffs for tax preparation work until approximately 2013 or 2014 and she paid herself from plaintiffs’ account. Summers was not compensated for the work she did for plaintiffs after 2013 or 2014. The amount Summers charged plaintiffs was much less than what Summers knew Gursey would charge. Plaintiffs never signed a retainer agreement with Gursey. While Summers was employed at Gursey, Robert came to the Gursey office to sign his tax returns. Robert had business meetings with Summers at Gursey approximately five times per year. Liz Bernal (Bernal), the lead executive assistant at Gursey, observed Robert visit Summers at Gursey three or four times. Tanisha Cole (Cole), an administrative assistant at Gursey, once escorted “a man named ‘Trujillo’” to a meeting with Summers in a Gursey conference room. When Cole received mail addressed to Robert, Spazz, or Slang at the Gursey office, she delivered that mail to Summers. Summers emailed plaintiffs from her Gursey email address while employed there. There were thousands of emails between 3 Summers and plaintiffs on the Gursey computer system. Gursey had the ability to review Summers’s emails. Plaintiffs never received emails from any other Gursey employee. Some, but not all, of the tax returns Summers prepared for plaintiffs while she was employed by Gursey identified Gursey on the return. Some of plaintiffs’ tax returns on the Gursey computer system were password protected. Though Summers had plaintiffs sign tax returns for the years 2014 through 2018, those returns were never actually filed. In February 2020, a representative of plaintiffs contacted Gursey to report plaintiffs’ tax returns had not been timely prepared and filed, resulting in significant penalties and interest. In late February and early March 2020, Summers removed paper files concerning plaintiffs from the Gursey office and deleted some, but not all, of the electronic files concerning plaintiffs from the Gursey computer system. Summers’s employment at Gursey was terminated in March 2020. Gursey did not have a signed engagement letter with plaintiffs and had no records of invoices or evidence reflecting the receipt of payment for work done on behalf of plaintiffs. B. The Pleadings Plaintiffs sued Summers and Gursey in connection with the failure to file their tax returns.1 The second amended and operative complaint (the complaint) alleges three causes of action: fraudulent concealment; breach of fiduciary duty; and 1 The original complaint is not in the appellate record. 4 constructive fraud. The operative complaint alleges defendants were acting as actual or ostensible agents of each other. In broad strokes, the lawsuit alleges Summers was acting in the course and scope of her employment with Gursey when she provided tax and business consulting services to plaintiffs; Summers and Gursey had a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to tax, business, and/or financial matters; and Summers and Gursey intentionally concealed the fact that some of plaintiffs’ tax returns were not filed even though Summers had plaintiffs sign the returns and told them the returns were filed. Gursey answered the complaint with a general denial and pled various affirmative defenses, including its 18th affirmative defense, which asserted it was not liable for any acts or omissions of other defendants who acted outside the course and scope of their employment at the time of the alleged actions. Gursey also filed a cross-complaint against Summers seeking equitable indemnity and contribution. C. Gursey’s Motion for Summary Judgment Gursey filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Gursey owed plaintiffs no legal duty and could not be vicariously liable for Summers’s alleged wrongdoing.2 Gursey argued it did not owe a 2 Gursey’s motion asserted it was also seeking, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to each cause of action. Gursey did not, however, articulate a basis upon which it could be granted summary adjudication as to the fraud causes of action. Gursey also did not separately address its alternative request for summary adjudication in its separate statement. 5 duty to plaintiffs under the doctrine of respondeat superior because vicarious liability cannot be imposed for an employee’s purely personal activity and Summers was not acting within the scope of her employment. Gursey additionally argued it did not owe any fiduciary duty to plaintiffs and could not be directly liable under principles of actual or ostensible agency. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing there was a causal nexus between Gursey’s provision of tax services and Summers’s alleged concealment of her failure to file plaintiffs’ taxes. Plaintiffs also argued there was evidence that Summers did not substantially deviate from her employment when committing the alleged wrongs. Plaintiffs further argued that Summers was Gursey’s agent and, as a result, her knowledge should be imputed to Gursey. In connection with Gursey’s summary judgment motion, Gursey submitted a declaration from Stephan Wasserman, the managing partner of Gursey. He declared Gursey’s formal client intake process to onboard new clients includes a conflict check and an engagement letter, which each tax client executes each year. He further stated that a prospective client is only added to the client roster when the signed engagement letter is returned, at which point the billing software is updated to reflect the new client. He averred these steps were not completed for plaintiffs. Gursey and plaintiffs submitted dueling excerpts from Summers’s deposition in which she made seemingly inconsistent statements regarding her understanding as to whether plaintiffs were her clients or Gursey’s. In one excerpt, when Summers was asked if plaintiffs were her client rather than Gursey’s client, she responded, “They were my client.” In another, when Summers was asked if she considered plaintiffs to be Gursey’s client, she 6 responded, “I considered them to be a client of mine, and I mean, I was an accountant at . . . Gursey, so yeah.” Plaintiffs submitted deposition testimony from Robert and Chloe stating they believed Summers was working on behalf of Gursey when she provided them with accounting services. Plaintiffs also submitted an excerpt from Summers’s deposition in which she stated there were passwords on some of plaintiffs’ tax returns because she uploaded some documents from her prior firm that were already password-protected; Summers testified she did not believe documents she created while at Gursey had passwords. Plaintiffs additionally submitted excerpts from Summers’s deposition in which she suggested certain Gursey partners knew she did work for Robert . D. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication3 Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary adjudication regarding Gursey’s 18th affirmative defense that asked the court to declare as a matter of law that the firm was vicariously liable for Summers’s alleged wrongdoing. The evidence plaintiffs submitted in support of their motion was virtually identical to the evidence they submitted in support of their opposition to Gursey’s motion. Similarly, the evidence Gursey submitted in 3 Summers also filed a motion for summary judgment as to Gursey’s cross-complaint. No party appeals from the trial court’s ruling on that motion and we do not discuss it. We do note, however, that any evidence submitted only in support of Summers’s motion (i.e., not also submitted in support of the other summary judgment/adjudication filings) is not properly before us in this appeal and we do not consider it. 7 opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication was nearly identical to the evidence that it submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment. E. The Trial Court’s Decision The trial court granted Gursey’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication. The trial court concluded Gursey met its initial burden of showing Summers’s acts were outside the scope of her employment based on the evidence that Gursey did not prepare an engagement letter for plaintiffs, Summers hid and deleted records related to her work for plaintiffs, other Gursey employees did not participate in the tax preparation work, Gursey was not compensated for the work, and Gursey did not participate in or have any knowledge of Summers’s work for plaintiffs. The court concluded Summers’s work for plaintiffs was personal in nature and plaintiffs’ mere presence at her place of employment was insufficient to give rise to liability under respondeat superior. It also concluded plaintiffs failed to show a triable issue of material fact existed as to whether Summers’s preparation of tax returns for a non-Gursey client was foreseeable and within the scope of her employment. The trial court further found Gursey was not liable under agency principles. The court stated plaintiffs were required to demonstrate a triable issue of fact existed as to whether Gursey’s representations or conduct—not Summers’s—caused plaintiffs to believe they were Gursey clients or that Summers’s actions were undertaken on Gursey’s behalf. The court found Gursey met its initial burden of showing plaintiffs were not its clients, Gursey 8 did not confer actual authority on Summers to take plaintiffs on as clients, and Gursey did not act in a manner that would allow plaintiffs to believe Summers had authority to act on its behalf in preparing plaintiffs’ taxes. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Gursey gave Summers apparent authority to provide tax services to plaintiffs because it believed Gursey’s representation that Summers was a Tax Director at Gursey and its provision of an office in the firm’s suite were necessary to and inherent in Summers’s employment. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that some Gursey partners knew about Summers’s work for plaintiffs because it found some of the evidence was hearsay and the remaining evidence did not suffice to show Gursey knew Summers was performing work for plaintiffs purportedly on Gursey’s behalf. As for plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication, the court explained it was moot based on its order granting summary judgment for Gursey. But the court additionally remarked that plaintiffs had not met their initial burden on summary adjudication because they relied on Summers’s employment with Gursey and Gursey’s provision of an office to Summers—neither of which demonstrated as a matter of law that Summers’s actions were within the scope of her employment, were foreseeable, or were done pursuant to her authority as Gursey’s agent. II. DISCUSSION It is undisputed that Summers was employed by Gursey during the relevant timeframe, provided CPA services to clients at Gursey, and provided services to plaintiffs in her capacity as a CPA. The summary judgment record also reveals Summers undisputedly and repeatedly used Gursey’s offices and Gursey’s 9 computer systems to provide services to plaintiffs. These and other facts we shall discuss suffice to raise a triable issue as to whether Summers’s actions were within the scope of her employment. On the other hand, there is also substantial evidence supporting Gursey’s contention that plaintiffs were Summers’s personal clients: plaintiffs were Summers’s clients before her transition to Gursey, they never signed an engagement letter with Gursey, they never directly worked with any other Gursey accountants, Summers never entered plaintiffs into Gursey’s system as clients, and Summers did not ensure Gursey was compensated for any of her work for plaintiffs. A trial is necessary to resolve these conflicting facts, or conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts (see, e.g., Visitacion Investment, LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1096), at least in connection with Gursey’s liability on a respondeat superior basis. And that means it was error to grant Gursey’s summary judgment motion but it was appropriate to deny plaintiffs’ dueling motion for summary adjudication. A. Respondeat Superior Doctrine The “respondeat superior rule provides that ‘an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment.’ [Citation.]” (Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 491.) In California, the “scope of employment” is interpreted broadly for purposes of respondeat superior. (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1004.) For actions to be within the scope of employment, there must be “a nexus between the employee’s tort and the employment to ensure that liability is 10 properly placed upon the employer.” (Bailey v. Filco, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1560.) “[A]n employee’s tortious act may be within the scope of employment even if it contravenes an express company rule and confers no benefit to the employer.” (Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 1004.) However, “a deviation from the employee’s duties that is ‘so material or substantial as to amount to an entire departure’ from those duties will take the employee’s conduct out of the scope of employment.” (Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. Department of Transportation (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 87, 95.) “Imposing liability for the employee’s conduct upon the employer has nothing to do with the employer’s fault.” (Musgrove v. Silver (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 694, 707.) Rather, “[u]nder respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the ‘“risks that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise [the employer] has undertaken,”’ that is, ‘the risks inherent in or created by the enterprise.’ [Citation.]” (Halliburton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 94.) “Generally, the determination of whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment is a question of fact. But it becomes a question of law for our independent consideration when ‘“‘the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.’”’ [Citation.]” (Inter Mountain Mortg., Inc. v. Sulimen (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441.) Though courts have articulated multiple tests to determine whether respondeat superior applies in a given circumstance, plaintiffs’ appellate briefing focuses on one: the foreseeability test. The test states that for vicarious liability to attach, “[t]he tortious conduct ‘must be “a generally foreseeable consequence of the [employer’s] activity.”’” (PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, 11 Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 391.) In this usage, foreseeability “‘merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.’ [Citations.]” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 299.) B. Summary Judgment Was Incorrectly Granted, but Summary Adjudication Was Appropriately Denied A court may grant a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “only when ‘all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact . . . .’” (Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1179; see also Lunardi v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 807, 819 [“A summary adjudication motion is subject to the same rules and procedures as a summary judgment motion”].) “In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we independently evaluate the record, liberally construing the evidence supporting the party opposing the motion, and resolving any doubts in his or her favor. [Citation.]” (Patterson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 499-500.) We review the decision de novo and “decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” (Mattei v. Corporate Management Solutions, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 116, 122.) Triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Summers was acting within the scope of her employment when she provided accounting services to plaintiffs. It is undisputed that Summers was performing work in her capacity as a CPA, the 12 very same capacity in which Gursey asserts she provided services to its clients, when she committed the allegedly tortious acts. It is also undisputed Summers met with plaintiffs in Gursey’s offices (and at least some of these meetings took place when other Gursey employees were present), communicated with plaintiffs using her Gursey email, and prepared at least some of plaintiffs’ tax forms in such a way that Gursey’s name appeared on them.4 Based on this evidence, a factfinder could appropriately determine a nexus existed between Summers’s alleged torts and her employment at Gursey. The risk that one of Gursey’s employees would prepare taxes for individuals or companies that did not undergo Gursey’s formal client intake process was a generally foreseeable risk inherent and incidental to Gursey’s business providing accounting services. (See, e.g., Inter Mountain, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at 1442 [risk that a loan representative, employed by a business that solicited mortgage loans, would submit a fraudulent loan application was a 4 Gursey contends there is no evidence Summers rendered professional services to plaintiffs during her usual work hours, but the record indicates otherwise. While it is true there is no evidence in the summary judgment record establishing what Summers’s customary work hours were, there is evidence that Summers performed at least some of her work for plaintiffs when other Gursey employees (namely Cole and Bernal) were in the office too. This strongly supports an inference she performed at least some work during business hours. Additionally, though Gursey contends the timing of Summers’s work is irrelevant to establishing vicarious liability, that goes too far. While the timing of the work is not alone sufficient to establish respondeat superior liability, it is certainly relevant to the inquiry. 13 generally foreseeable risk].) At a minimum, Summers’s employment as a CPA placed her in the position of being able to perform tax and accounting work without formally notifying Gursey.5 Such an occurrence was “‘not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.’” (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at 299.) While Gursey may not have officially known about Summers’s conduct, it may nevertheless be vicariously liable if a factfinder is ultimately convinced Summers was acting within the scope of her employment. Gursey’s principal argument to the contrary is that Gursey could not foresee Summers engaging in a “secret and hidden side job” getting personally paid to prepare taxes for a longtime friend. But that characterization is inapt. It is true Summers did not ensure plaintiffs went through Gursey’s formal client intake process. But Summers was not furtively performing work for plaintiffs and taking contemporaneous steps to hide that work. Rather, Summers openly brought plaintiffs into her office multiple times, used her Gursey email (which Gursey was authorized to monitor) to communicate with plaintiffs, had another Gursey employee delivering plaintiffs’ mail to her, and used her Gursey computer to prepare at least some of their tax paperwork. That Summers deleted some of the relevant files after plaintiffs discovered her failure to file their taxes and reported the issue to Gursey does not somehow make her 5 The record does not reveal whether Summers had any job duties other than providing certified public accountant services to Gursey clients, including whether her duties changed or expanded in 2013, when she was given the title “Tax Director.” 14 previously overt acts covert—it may simply show a motivation to destroy otherwise incriminating evidence. Gursey also relies on three cases finding an employee’s acts were purely personal and thus not within the scope of their employment to contend Summers’s acts were similarly not within the scope of her employment. But none of the cases upon which Gursey relies involve facts akin to those here. In Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 163, an employee of a winery used the winery’s equipment to pick up grapes for the purpose of making his own wine, outside of his working hours. In Marez v. Lyft, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 569, 573-574, a driver who rented a vehicle from Lyft through a program that allowed drivers to use a rented vehicle for both personal and work-related purposes, got into a car crash while driving home from a different job, on a day he neither worked for Lyft nor had any intention of doing so. And in Hoblitzell v. City of Ione (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 675, 678, 683, a law enforcement officer and a building inspector employed by the defendant city interfered with work at a job site outside the city’s jurisdiction and while in civilian clothing, and at the request of an individual instead of the city. None of these cases involves a situation analogous to the one at hand here, where the evidence presented at summary judgment established that Summers performed work of the type she performed for her employer, in her employer’s office, using her employer’s resources, at least partially during the workday and in the presence of other employees. While, as we discuss infra, there is some contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder could rely on to conclude Summers’s actions were not within the scope of her employment, the record does not demonstrate there are no triable issues of material fact on 15 respondeat superior liability, particularly since we must liberally construe the evidence in plaintiffs’ favor (with respect to Gursey’s motion for summary judgment). This same point, however, establishes the trial court was right to deny plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication because there is no undisputed evidence Summers was acting in the scope of her employment. To the contrary, her testimony as to whether plaintiffs were her clients or Gursey’s clients was inconsistent. She began providing accounting services to plaintiffs prior to becoming employed at Gursey. She did not ensure plaintiffs signed an engagement letter with Gursey. And Gursey was never paid for any of the work Summers did for plaintiffs. These facts could support a finding—at trial—that Summers was performing work for plaintiffs in her personal capacity rather than acting within the scope of her employment. So the bottom line is that a trial is necessary.6 A material dispute of fact exists as to the applicability of respondeat superior 6 To the extent Gursey contends that, in the alternative to affirmance of summary judgment, it is entitled to summary adjudication of the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action because it did not knowingly undertake a fiduciary obligation to plaintiffs, the argument is both legally incorrect (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 133 [suggesting defendants who owed no fiduciary duty to the plaintiff could still be liable “on the basis of a recognized theory of secondary liability, such as respondeat superior”]) and procedurally improper because Gursey did not separately assert a basis for summarily adjudicating the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action in its separate statement (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b)). 16 liability and we need not reach plaintiffs’ remaining arguments for reversal. (See, e.g., Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 163, fn. 7.) DISPOSITION The order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication is affirmed. The summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order denying Gursey’s motion for summary judgment and to hold further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs are awarded costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS BAKER, J. We concur: HOFFSTADT, P. J. KIM (D.), J. 17