Full Opinion

Filed 10/26/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TRONA TEACHERS ASSOCATION D087158 et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2407412) v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE TRONA JOINT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Joseph T. Ortiz, Judge. Reversed with directions. California Teachers Association, Richa Amar, and Bryan Lopez for Plaintiffs and Appellants. McDougal, Boehmer, Foley, Lyon, Mitchell & Erickson, Steven E. Boehmer, and Matthew A. Thurmer for Defendant and Respondent. Education Code section 45028, subdivision (a)(1) 1 contains a “[u]niformity [r]equirement” pertaining to the salaries of certificated public- 1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Education Code. school teachers. (Adair v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1444 (Adair).) The law mandates that “when teacher salary schedules operate on the basis of education and experience, they must be wholly uniform.” (Ibid.) A school district and an organization representing certificated teachers in a collective bargaining process, however, may “mutually agree to a salary schedule based on criteria other than a uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience.” (§ 45028, subd. (a)(1).) In this case, plaintiff Trona Teachers Association CTA/NEA (TTA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement, the 2022-2024 Trona Joint Unified Certificated Agreement (“CBA” or “2022-2024 CBA”), with the Trona Joint Unified School District (District). Although the District approved the CBA in August 2023, the CBA expressly provides that it is “to run retroactive from July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2024.” The CBA also provides it “shall remain in full force and effect from July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2024.” Article 20 of the CBA contains several retroactive provisions pertaining to compensation for certificated employees and refers to salary schedules contained in an appendix to the CBA. The appendix contains two salary schedules based on years of experience and educational levels, one “effective 7/1/2022,” and a second “effective 1/1/2023.” Both schedules also state, “Earned Masters: $2,000 stipend.” After approving the CBA in August 2023, the District refused to make retroactive payments provided for in the CBA to six former District certificated teachers: plaintiffs Michael Lane, Valerie Gennrich, Yesenia Goins, Tyson LoPresti, Cindy Winks, and Joseph Wolfe (Former Teachers). Although the Former Teachers worked for the District the entire period between July 1, 2022 and June 30, 2023, they each resigned before 2 the District’s August 2023 approval of the CBA. If applied to the Former Teachers retroactively, the CBA would have resulted in additional pay for each of the Former Teachers in amounts ranging from about $5,000 to $9,000. Plaintiffs (i.e. the TTA and the Former Teachers) filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the District to provide the Former Teachers with the retroactive payments. Plaintiffs argued that the District’s decision to provide retroactive payments solely to those teachers who remained employed by the District as of August 2023 violated the uniform salary requirement of section 45028. Plaintiffs further contended that the District and the TTA had not mutually agreed to a salary schedule based on any criteria other than a uniform allowance for training and experience. After briefing and argument, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ writ petition. On appeal, plaintiffs reiterate their contention that the District failed to pay the Former Teachers in accordance with the uniformity requirement of section 45028. They maintain that the District’s refusal to pay the Former Teachers according to the salary schedule for the 2022-2023 period in which they worked created unequal pay for equally qualified teachers who performed the same work. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s decision improperly created an “unbargained ‘continuing’ employee condition absent from the statute or CBA.” (Some capitalization and boldface omitted.) We conclude that the CBA does not contain any language restricting the retroactive increases to employees who remained employed with the District at the time the CBA was approved in August 2023 and that the District’s refusal to pay the Former Teachers the retroactive payments violated section 45028, subdivision (a)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the 3 judgment and direct the trial court to issue a writ of mandate compelling the District to make the retroactive payments to the Former Teachers. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In March 2024, plaintiffs filed a verified petition for writ of mandate against the District. The petition contained a single cause of action contending that the District had violated section 45028 by failing to pay the Former Teachers the retroactive payments provided for in the CBA. Along with their petition, plaintiffs lodged several exhibits, including relevant portions of the CBA and documents demonstrating the dispute between the plaintiffs and the District. Plaintiffs filed a supporting brief in April 2025, in which they argued that section 45028 requires strict uniformity in pay for teachers with equivalent training and experience, unless other criteria are negotiated and mutually agreed upon through the collective bargaining process. Plaintiffs argued that since no alternative criteria were discussed, negotiated, or agreed upon by the TTA and the District with respect to the CBA, the default rule of uniformity applied. Plaintiffs further argued that all the Former Teachers were covered by the CBA since the CBA expressly applied retroactively to the period during which they worked. Thus, plaintiffs argued that the Former Teachers were entitled to the retroactive payments as provided for in the CBA along with payment of all applicable retirement contributions on such increases. Plaintiffs supported their brief with several supporting declarations and exhibits. The District filed an opposition brief in which it contended the Former Teachers “are not covered by the terms and provisions of the CBA,” and that the CBA only “cover[s] current employees and former employees who are laid off or retired, but not former employees who resign from their employment.” 4 The District further argued that “[a]t no time during the negotiations, mediation, or post-mediation conferences did TTA communicate that the benefits at issue would be applied retroactively to employees who resigned from their employment before the District’s School Board approved the retroactive benefits.” The District maintained that the “disparity in pay . . . based on whether the teachers returned to work” was permissible under California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Hilmar Unified School Dist. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 183 (Hilmar). The District supported its opposition with a series of declarations and exhibits, and it filed an accompanying request for judicial notice. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a reply, along with a supporting declaration and exhibits. In their reply, plaintiffs argued that the District failed “to cite or even acknowledge . . . section 45028” in its opposition. Plaintiffs reiterated their argument that section 45028 mandates salary uniformity unless the parties negotiate an alternative criterion and that no such criterion was either proposed by the parties to the collective bargaining process or ratified in the CBA. Thus, plaintiffs argued this case was distinguishable from Hilmar, since, in that case, the payment at issue “expressly conditioned a one-time payment on teachers either returning to work the following year or retiring,” while in this case “no provision of the CBA exclude[d] [the Former Teachers] from the salary schedule or retroactive application.” Plaintiffs contended further that the District’s argument that it had not been expressly told “that the retroactive pay would, in fact, be retroactive” was not a basis for failing to apply the terms of the CBA. 5 In June 2025, the trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the petition. 2 The trial court concluded that the CBA was “an agreement between the District and the [TTA] which expressly includes ‘certificated employees’ but does not expressly include former employees in its general coverage.” The court observed that it was undisputed that the Former Teachers “were paid the same as their peers while employed with the District” and the court concluded that “the District and the [TTA] did not agree in the 2022-24 CBA to pay teachers with the same level of training and years of experience differently.” (Italics omitted.) Instead, the court concluded that the District and the TTA had “agreed that active ‘certificated employees’ (as opposed to former employees) would receive a retroactive salary increase based on a newly changed salary schedule for purposes of calculation.” After hearing oral argument, the court adopted the tentative ruling and entered an order denying the petition. Plaintiffs timely appealed. 3 2 Although not material to the issues on appeal, the court also ruled on both the District’s request for judicial notice and various evidentiary objections that the parties had filed. 3 Although the record on appeal does not indicate that a formal judgment denying the petition was ever entered, in order “to promote judicial economy, to preserve [plaintiffs’] right to appeal, and to permit appellate review on the merits,” we deem the trial court’s order denying the petition to be a judgment since that ruling is “sufficiently final to constitute the one judgment in the case.” (Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, 654.) 6 DISCUSSION Section 45028 mandates that the District pay the Former Teachers uniformly with the District’s teachers who remained employed with District since the District and the TTA did not mutually agree on a salary schedule or additional compensation based on criteria other than training and experience Plaintiffs maintain that the District’s decision that the Former Teachers were ineligible for the CBA’s 2022–2023 retroactive salary adjustments and master’s degree stipends and associated retirement contributions provided to other teachers violated the uniformity requirement of section 45028. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their petition for writ of mandate to compel the District to make the retroactive payments provided for in the CBA. 1. Writ relief and standard of review “ ‘A writ of mandate “may be issued by any court [to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person,] to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . .” ’ [Citations.] To prevail, a petitioner must show a ‘ “ ‘a clear, present . . . ministerial duty on the part of the respondent’ ” . . . [and] a correlative “ ‘clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Jessica M. v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 54, 69– 70 (Jessica M.).) A writ of mandate may be issued to compel a school district to comply with section 45028. (See, e.g., George v. Susanville Elementary School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 349, 361–362 (George) [directing the trial court “to issue a writ compelling [a school district] to place [a teacher] on its salary schedule in compliance with . . . section 45028 as construed herein”]; Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 [affirming trial court’s judgment 7 granting mandamus relief to teachers on ground that a school district’s “implementation of the salary schedule violated the uniformity requirement of section 45028”].) “ ‘In reviewing a judgment granting or denying a writ of mandate petition, . . . [o]n questions of law. . . the appellate court applies a de novo review and makes its own independent determination.’ ” (Jessica M., supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.) And, “ ‘ “ ‘[w]here the issue is one of statutory construction or contract interpretation, and the evidence is not in dispute, the de novo standard of review applies [citation].’ ” ’ ” (City of Oakland v. Department of Finance (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 431, 444 [reviewing a judgment denying a writ petition].) Applying these principles here, whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate to compel the District to comply with section 45028 and pay the Former Teachers the contested retroactive payments raises questions of statutory and contractual interpretation based upon undisputed material facts that we review de novo. 2. Governing law Section 45028, subdivision (a)(1) provides in relevant part: “[E]ach person employed by a school district in a position requiring certification qualifications, except a person employed in a position requiring administrative or supervisory credentials, shall be classified on the salary schedule on the basis of uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience, except if a public school employer and the exclusive representative negotiate and mutually agree to a salary schedule based on criteria other than a uniform allowance for years of training and years of 8 experience pursuant to Chapter 10.7 (commencing with Section 3540) of the Government Code.” In Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1436, the Court of Appeal summarized the historical background of the regulation of teachers’ salaries in California. (Id. at pp. 1442–1443.) The Adair court noted that, in the 1960s, under Education Code section 45028’s statutory predecessor, school districts had been “empowered . . . to adopt any salary schedule based on ‘reasonable classifications.’ ” (Adair, at p. 1442.) After an amendment in 1969, the statute was interpreted “ ‘to mean “that years of education and years of experience . . . were the only criteria that could be used in setting teachers’ salaries.” ’ ” (Adair, at p. 1443; see Palos Verdes Faculty Ass’n v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 661 (Palos Verdes) [section 45028’s statutory predecessor “had the twofold purpose of (1) requiring that teachers be classified for salary purposes, and (2) establishing that such classification proceed wholly on a uniform basis of years of training and years of experience”].) The Legislature, in turn, subsequently amended both Education Code section 45028 and added subdivisions (d) and (e) to Government Code section 3543.2 4 to allow school 4 Government Code section 3543.2, which contains various provisions governing the collective bargaining process pertaining to employment in public education, provides in relevant part: “(d) Notwithstanding [Education Code] [s]ection 45028 . . ., the public school employer and the exclusive representative shall, upon request of either party, meet and negotiate regarding the payment of additional compensation based upon criteria other than years of training and years of experience. If the public school employer and the exclusive representative do not reach mutual agreement, [s]ection 45028 . . . shall apply. (e) Pursuant to [s]ection 45028 . . ., the public school employer and the exclusive representative shall, upon the request of either party, meet and negotiate a salary schedule based on criteria other than a uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience. If the public 9 districts and teachers’ unions to agree, through the collective bargaining process, to criteria other than training and experience for the payment of additional compensation or the setting of salary schedules. (Adair, at pp. 1443–1444.) Turning to section 45028 as presently constituted, 5 the Adair court explained that the statute’s uniformity rule, where applicable, continues to “forbid[] disparate treatment of groups of teachers with the same level of training and years of experience.” (Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444.) As the Adair court summarized, “A ‘uniform’ salary schedule means that teachers will be compensated invariably according to their seniority and education.” (Ibid.) The Adair court applied the uniformity requirement by ruling that a school district had violated Education Code section 45028 by placing “some teachers but not others into step levels [in a salary schedule] below their years of experience.” (Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1447.) The Adair court also concluded that the “other criteria” exception contained in Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (e) did not apply in that case because the parties had not entered into a “negotiated agreement [that] provides that some criterion other than experience or training shall result in school employer and the exclusive representative do not reach mutual agreement, the provisions of [s]ection 45028 . . . requiring a salary schedule based upon a uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience shall apply. A salary schedule established pursuant to this subdivision shall not result in the reduction of the salary of a teacher.” 5 The statute has not been materially amended since the Adair court’s interpretation. 10 a different salary for those teachers who satisfy it.” (Adair, at p. 1448.) 6 The court also rejected the school district’s contention that its “goal of encouraging teacher recruitment and retention” permitted it to implement “a policy of allowing newer teachers to ascend the salary ladder faster than more experienced ones.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal explained that to permit such action would allow “the [school district’s] rationale or motivation for adopting a nonuniform schedule” to govern, which is “is not a ‘criterion’ upon which such a schedule is based.” (Ibid.) In George, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 349, the Court of Appeal also concluded that a school district had violated the uniformity requirement of Education Code section 45028 — this time by failing to provide a rehired teacher with the same out-of-district experience credit that it provided to other teachers. The George court rejected the school district’s argument that its action was permissible on the ground that the applicable “collective bargaining agreement [did] not permit the crediting of out-of-district experience once a teacher has already been a member of the union.” (George, at p. 359.) The George court explained that “[u]niformity can be waived . . . only through the setting of a salary schedule pursuant to Government Code section 3543.2, subdivisions (d) through (e), which permits a salary schedule based on factors other than experience and training.” (Ibid.) Since the school district had not argued that it had entered into any such agreement and the applicable salary schedule was based solely on experience and training, the absence of a provision in the collective bargaining agreement authorizing 6 The Adair court also explained that the exception to the uniformity rule for “additional compensation” in Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (d) did not apply because the case did not involve the provision of additional compensation. (Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444, fn. 5.) 11 such credit was irrelevant to the question of whether the school district had violated section 45028. (George, at p. 359.) In Hilmar, in contrast, the agreement in question did expressly provide for a criterion for compensation other than training and experience. (Hilmar, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 188–189.) Specifically, the agreement provided that, in order to receive the payment at issue, “[a] recipient was required to be a ‘current unit member[] who served in paid status during the 1997–1998 school year’ or an ‘employee[] who retired at the conclusion of the 1997–1998 school year.’ ” (Id. at p. 188.) The Hilmar court concluded that such language could only be reasonably interpreted as providing that “teachers who taught during the 1997–1998 school year but (1) were not ‘current unit members’ at the time the [agreement] was approved or (2) did not retire after the 1997–1998 school year failed to satisfy the conditions imposed” for the compensation provided for in the agreement. (Id. at p. 189.) Under these circumstances, the Hilmar court concluded that the conditions for receipt of the payment “satisfied the ‘other criteria’ prong of Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (d),[ 7] and, as a result, [Education Code] section 45028 was not violated.” (Id. at p. 197.) 3. Application As summarized in the introduction to this opinion, the CBA provides that it “shall remain in full force and effect from July 1, 2022 through 7 The Hilmar court concluded that the compensation at issue was “ ‘additional compensation’ and not ‘salary’ or part of a ‘salary schedule.’ ” (Hilmar, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 194.) As noted in footnote 4, ante, notwithstanding Education Code section 45028, Government Code section 3543.2 authorizes agreements based upon negotiated criteria other than years of training and years of experience, with subdivision (d) governing “additional compensation,” and subdivision (e) governing “salary schedule[s].” 12 June 30, 2024,” and it states that is “to run retroactive from July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2024.” Article 20.1 of the CBA contains several provisions pertaining to compensation for certificated employees, including the following: “Effective July 1, 2022, a 5% on schedule increase shall be made to the Certificated Salary Schedule. Effective January 1, 2023, an additional 5% on schedule increase shall be added to the Certificated Salary Schedule.” Article 20.2 refers to a “base salary schedule effective July 1, 2022,” and states that “[t]he newly agreed upon salary amount will be retroactive to July 1 of that year.” Article 20.3 provides, “Unit Members covered by the certificated salary schedule shall be placed in the appropriate column and step according to years of service and educational preparation.” “Unit Member” is defined in article 3.22 of the CBA as “[a] certificated person for whom the [TTA] is recognized as the exclusive representative and is covered by the terms and provisions in this Agreement.” (Underlining omitted.) Two salary schedules are contained in Appendix A to the CBA, one “effective 7/1/2022,” and a second “effective 1/1/2023.” The schedules consist of tables of salaries premised on years of experience and educational attainment. Both schedules also state, “Earned Masters: $2,000 stipend.” There is no language in the CBA conditioning the applicability of the retroactive payments provided for in the CBA on a teacher’s continued employment with the District as of the time of the CBA’s approval. Nor is there any evidence in the record that the TTA or the District ever conducted any negotiations concerning any provision making the retroactive payments contingent on continued employment with the District. 13 It is undisputed that the Former Teachers worked as certificated teachers for the District during the entire period between July 1, 2022 and June 30, 2023, a period during which the parties expressly agreed the CBA would be “in full force and effect” and the retroactive salary schedules would be “effective.” It is also undisputed that the District never paid the Former Teachers the retroactive payments provided for in the CBA or made retirement contributions on such increases on their behalf. 8 Given the CBA’s text, and the absence of any evidence that the District and the TTA “mutually agree[d] to a salary schedule based on criteria other than a uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience,” we conclude that section 45028 mandated that the District pay the teachers it employed during the period in which the CBA was in effect the “uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience” provided for in the CBA. (§ 45028, subd. (a)(1); see Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444 [the statute’s uniformity rule, where applicable, continues to “forbid[] disparate treatment of groups of teachers with the same level of training and years of experience.”].) Because it is undisputed that the District failed to pay the Former Teachers pursuant to the salary schedules in the CBA and make the related retirement contributions, we further conclude that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate to compel the District to do so. 8 We grant plaintiffs’ unopposed December 18, 2025 request to take judicial notice of a memorandum issued by the California State Teachers Retirement System entitled, “Employer Directive 2022-06: Contribution and Interest Rates and Present Value Factor for Fiscal Year 2022–23.” (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c) [permitting the taking of judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the . . . executive . . . department[] of . . . any state of the United States”], 459 [“reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in [Evid. Code] [s]ection 452”.]) 14 The District resists these straightforward conclusions with several unpersuasive arguments. First, focusing on the CBA, the District notes that Article 20.3 of the CBA provides that only “Unit Members” shall be “covered by the certificated salary schedule” and it contends that the Former Teachers are not “Unit Member[s]” as defined by Article 3.22 of the CBA. (Underlining omitted.) Turning to the first part of the definition of “Unit Member” in Article 3.22, the District argues that the Former Teachers are not certificated persons “for whom [the TTA] is recognized as the exclusive representative” because the TTA does not represent the Former Teachers. 9 Yet, in presenting this argument, the District merely proves the uncontested point that the Former Teachers were not represented by the TTA after their employment ended with the District. The District fails to demonstrate that the Former Teachers were not Unit Members during the retroactive period in which the salary increases and stipends were applicable under the CBA. Next, the District contends that the Former Teachers “are not ‘Unit Members,’ under the CBA because they are not covered by its terms and provisions.” (Underlining and some capitalization omitted.) In support of this contention, the District cites various provisions in the CBA addressing topics such as the provision of “fringe benefits” and the “length of the workday” and it argues that, since these provisions apply only to “current employees,” there must be “no terms or provisions in the CBA . . . confer[ring] 9 In presenting this argument, the District states in a footnote that the TTA “lacks standing to sue on behalf of the [Former Teachers].” This cursory statement does not support affirmance. The District has not established that the TTA lacks a beneficial interest in having the CBA applied properly. Moreover, the Former Teachers are individual plaintiffs in this case and thus any lack of standing on behalf of the TTA would not be a basis for denying the Former Teachers relief. 15 employment benefits to the [Former Teachers].” Even assuming the CBA contains provisions that apply only to current employees, 10 this does not mean that the District was free to disregard section 45028’s uniformity mandate with respect to the retroactive salary and stipend provisions of the CBA at issue in this case. (See George, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 359 [absence of a provision in collective bargaining agreement authorizing credit for out-of-district experience was irrelevant to the question whether school district had violated section 45028].) In sum, the District’s arguments in support of its contention that the former teachers are not Unit Members under Article 3.22 of the CBA for purpose of determining their entitlement to the retroactive payments at issue are unpersuasive. 11 Turning next to section 45028, the District asserts that “[t]he plain meaning of the statutory language [in section 45028, subdivision (a)(1)] is that, unless agreed otherwise, a school district must pay its current certificated employees uniformly.” (Italics added.) By “current” the District 10 The District acknowledges that plaintiffs “have not alleged these benefits to be at issue” in this case. Thus, we have no occasion to decide, and do not decide, how such provisions might be applied to the Former Teachers. 11 In presenting this argument, the District again improperly presents a cursory argument in a footnote, stating, “Alternatively, [plaintiffs] are required to submit this dispute to arbitration pursuant to article 10.3.4 of the CBA. [Citations.]” The District, however, fails to describe what Article 10.3.4 states and why plaintiffs’ statutory claim is purportedly subject to that provision. The District also fails to discuss, or even mention, a related Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) proceeding documented in the record in this case in which PERB alleged that the District had refused to arbitrate a related claim. Under these circumstances, we conclude the District forfeited the contention that plaintiffs were required to arbitrate this dispute. (See Sabi, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 947 [arguments cursorily presented in a footnote may be deemed forfeited].) 16 means those teachers who were employed by the District “[w]hen the 2022- 2024 CBA became operative.” We are not persuaded. Again, section 45028 provides in relevant part, “[E]ach person employed by a school district in a position requiring certification qualifications, . . . shall be classified on the salary schedule on the basis of uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience.” We see nothing in the Legislature’s generic reference to “[e]ach person employed by a school district,” as suggesting that it intended to require uniformity only among those persons employed by a school district as of the time a CBA becomes operative. Instead, the Legislature’s use of the phrase “[e]ach person employed by a school district,” is reflective of an intent for the uniformity mandate of section 45028 to apply to whatever employees are governed by the salary schedule at issue during the time period it covers. (Cf. Palos Verdes, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 665, fn. 9 [“We reject as unfounded District’s suggestion that the amended statute, in referring to ‘each person employed by a district,’ has reference only to persons who enter into an employment relationship with a district following the effective date of the amendment. The Legislature, had it wished to convey the latter meaning, would certainly have done so by appropriate language.”].) Therefore, if, as we have concluded in this case, a collective bargaining agreement contains a salary schedule that applies retroactively to those employed by a school district during a time before the operative date of the CBA, the text of section 45028 supports the conclusion that salaries must be uniform among all employees governed by that schedule, since there is no statutory language suggesting that the Legislature intended for its uniformity mandate to apply more narrowly to the subset of employees who remained employed with the school district as of the date the CBA is 17 approved. In construing a statute, we are not at liberty to “insert what has been omitted” or “omit what has been inserted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) Nor are we persuaded by the District’s argument that this case is “analogous” to Hilmar, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 183. As noted above, in Hilmar, the agreement expressly provided that the payment at issue “shall be paid only to all current unit members who served in paid status during the 1997-1998 school year, including those employees who retired at the conclusion of the 1997-1998 school year.” (Id. at p. 187, italics added.) The Hilmar court noted that “eight teachers [who] worked the entire 1997-1998 school year for the District but were not ‘current unit members’ in September 1998” when the agreement was adopted (id. at p. 188, italics added), were “unambiguously excluded from receiving the payment.” (ibid., boldface and capitalization omitted.) Unlike in Hilmar, in this case, as we have discussed above, there is no language in the CBA restricting the retroactive payments provided therein to Unit Members as of the date of the adoption of the CBA. Indeed, the District itself recognizes this distinction, noting that the “other criteria” for the compensation at issue in Hilmar was “expressed in the parties’ [agreement] limiting the retroactive payment to ‘current unit members.’ ” Thus, while the District contends that the CBA contains “a salary schedule that results in a disparity in pay between current and former teachers who rendered services during the same period of time,” it is only the District’s misapplication of the CBA that has resulted in this disparity, and not any provision in the CBA itself. (See Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448 [“A nonuniform salary structure is not permissible merely because one or both parties may be ‘motivated’ by some external reason to make it so”].) 18 Finally, citing Atchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 635 (Atchley), the District contends that granting the requested relief for the retroactive payment to the Former Teachers would constitute an unlawful gift of public funds. In Atchley, the Court of Appeal considered a challenge brought by several retired employees to the implementation of reporting requirements pertaining to a policy requiring the reduction of pension benefits of retirees who engaged in gainful occupation. (Id. at pp. 639–641.) In rejecting the retirees’ claim, the Court of Appeal stated that to fail to enforce the policy “would result in the distribution of retirement benefits in an amount in excess of the amounts to which the appellants are statutorily entitled” and would thereby constitute an impermissible gift of public funds. (Atchley, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 651.) While the District argues that granting plaintiffs their requested relief “would constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds” under Atchley “because the [Former Teachers] are not entitled to any retroactive benefits,” we have concluded above that the Former Teachers are statutorily entitled to the retroactive payment provisions. (Italics added.) Thus, the District has not demonstrated that granting the requested relief would result in an unlawful gift of public funds. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to issue a writ of mandate compelling the District to comply with section 45028 as interpreted in this opinion by paying the Former Teachers the 2022–2023 retroactive salary adjustments and master’s degree 19 stipends provided for in the CBA, together with any associated employer contributions and any other appropriate relief. On remand, the trial court may also conduct any necessary ancillary proceedings to determine the precise amounts to be paid and to formulate a judgment complying with the law and this opinion. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal. BUCHANAN, J. WE CONCUR: DO, Acting P. J. CASTILLO, J. 20