Holtz v. Moreles

Filed 9/23/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT BRIAN HOLTZ et al., H053842 (Santa Clara County Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 25CV472881) v. MATT MORELES, as Registrar of Voters, etc., Defendant and Respondent; SANTA CLARA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents. In this appeal, we consider the application of the California Constitution,1 article XIII C’s “cases of emergency” clause to the decision of a county board of supervisors to seek voter approval of a general tax increase by special—rather than general—election. Section 2 of article XIII C, added by Proposition 218 in 1996, generally requires local governments to submit any general tax increase to the 1 All further unspecified references to “article” are to the California Constitution. electorate for approval at a regularly scheduled general election. Section 2 contains an exception under which voter approval can be secured by special election for “cases of emergency declared by a unanimous vote of the governing body.” (See art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).) In August 2025, real party in interest Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (Board of Supervisors or Board) invoked this emergency provision. The Board’s resolution declared an emergency related to the provision of county healthcare and safety net services resulting from federal funding cuts due to Congress’s passage of H.R. 1 (signed into law in July 2025). The Board resolved to place Measure A—proposing a five-year, five- eighths cent (0.625 percent) general sales tax—on the county’s November 4, 2025 special election ballot. Appellants2 filed in the trial court a preelection complaint and petition for writ of mandate challenging under article XIII C, section 2 and Proposition 218 the validity of the emergency declaration and special election authorization. Appellants also argued the language of the ballot question and the impartial analysis prepared by the county counsel violated Elections Code requirements for impartial, nonargumentative, and accurate ballot materials. After expedited briefing and a three-day hearing on the merits, the trial court issued an order on the writ petition and entered judgment. The court found the emergency declaration valid and denied the petition for writ of mandate on that ground. As to the other claims, the order directed modifications to the ballot measure and impartial analysis language. In a 2 Appellants Brian Holtz, Dawn R. Davis, John Inks, and Christopher Robell (appellants) are individuals and electors in Santa Clara County. 2 November 2025 special election, Santa Clara County voters approved Measure A. On appeal from the order on the writ petition and judgment, appellants contend the trial court erred in interpreting the “cases of emergency” clause in article XIII C, section 2. Appellants maintain the court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of materials promulgated by the Board of Supervisors in support of the emergency declaration and contend the declaration was legally insufficient and invalid. In addition, appellants argue that, although technically moot, this court should independently review the language of the Measure A ballot question and impartial analysis for consistency with Elections Code requirements. We conclude that the trial court did not err in construing the phrase “cases of emergency” under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b), any abuse of discretion in relation to the court’s judicial notice rulings was not prejudicial, and the county’s declaration of emergency was not invalid. We decline to exercise our discretion to review the fact- and context-specific issues raised by appellants’ Elections Code claims. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order and judgment. 3  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 A. Special Meeting of the Board of Supervisors On August 7, 2025,4 the Board of Supervisors held a special meeting (August 7 board meeting) to discuss the anticipated impact on Santa Clara 3 We draw the facts recited herein from the materials filed in the trial court’s expedited proceedings on the writ petition, of which the court took judicial notice upon stipulation of the parties. To the extent appellants challenge on appeal the court’s consideration of the contents of the noticed materials for the truth of the matter therein, we address appellants’ arguments in our discussion, post (pt. II.D.). We separately grant respondents’ unopposed request for judicial notice of exhibits A through E, filed in this court on April 24, 2026, comprising the certificate of election for Measure A and official final summary of results of the November 4, 2025 special election; verified complaint in Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Sup. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 26CV483689), a related action discussed post; petition for writ of mandate in this matter filed in this court on September 10, 2026, and this court’s September 12, 2025 order denying the writ petition; and the County Voter Information Guide for the November 4, 2025 special election. We also grant appellants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of exhibits 25 and 26, filed in this court on May 14, 2026, comprising the endorsed-filed first amended complaint in the Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 26CV483689), and the Charter of Santa Clara County, revised August 30, 2017. Each of these documents satisfies criteria for judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code, sections 452, subdivisions (b), (d), or (h), and 459, subdivision (a). We deny appellants’ second request for judicial notice of exhibit 27, filed in this court shortly before oral argument on September 8, 2026. Appellants’ second request for judicial notice contains the text of a ballot question, Measure ER, published by the Los Angeles County Registrar- Recorder as appearing on the statewide direct primary election on June 2, 2026. The text of Measure ER is relevant only to appellants’ effort to show that language similar to that of Measure A has appeared in proposed measures in other jurisdictions, such that whether that language complies with governing law is an issue of significant public interest and likely to recur. However, as explained post (pt. II.A.), we decline to exercise our discretion to decide the Elections Code issues presented in this case, and the 4 County of H.R. 1 and to consider recommendations related to proposed Measure A. The agenda packet described Measure A as “a sales tax measure for voter consideration to protect local services.” The action items stated in the agenda packet for the August 7 board meeting were: (1) receive a report from the Office of the County Executive “relating to the impacts of H.R. 1 and a potential sales tax ballot measure”; (2) adopt a resolution for an emergency declaration authorizing a special election on the proposed sales tax and consolidating the election with the office of the assessor special election, already set for November 4; and (3) adopt “an urgency ordinance implementing a five-year general retail transactions (sales) and use tax in Santa Clara County at the rate of five- eighths of one cent, and setting an approval measure on the ballot for the November 4[] special election.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Included in the agenda packet for the August 7 board meeting were recommendations of the county executive and a memorandum submitted by the County Budget Director on the fiscal impacts of H.R. 1. The county budget director reported that, following the county’s adoption of its fiscal year 2025–2026 budget, the effects of H.R. 1 (compounded by additional state level impacts) created “extraordinary and severe financial challenges in the next five years” beginning “immediately with the current fiscal year (FY 2025– 2026)” and expanding annually “to nearly $1.4 billion by FY 2029–2030,” absent ameliorative action. The county executive’s report described the impact of H.R. 1 on county funding for services, including cuts to Medicaid (known in California as Medi- material presented in appellants’ second request for judicial notice is otherwise not relevant to any aspect of our decision. 4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2025. 5 Cal) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (known in California as CalFresh), elimination and reduction of funding for the county’s public health and hospital system (comprising four county hospitals and 15 health centers), and fiscal impacts due to, inter alia, changes in eligibility for Medicaid and other programs. The County Executive recommended a three- pronged strategy to address the “more than $1 billion” in lost annual funding, including seeking additional support from the state, reducing the county budget while trying to minimize service cuts, and requesting community help via a ballot measure proposing a local sales tax. B. Resolution, Proposed Ballot Question, and Impartial Analysis Following public comment, at the August 7 board meeting the Board of Supervisors approved Resolution No. BOS-2025-79 (resolution) and Urgency Ordinance No. NS-7.23 (ordinance) to place Measure A on the November 4 special election ballot. Titled “Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Clara Declaring an Emergency Under Proposition 218 and Authorizing a Special Election,” the resolution set forth findings concerning, inter alia, the county’s taxation authority, its provision of safety net and health care services, the anticipated impacts of H.R. 1 on funding for those services, and the determination of the Board of Supervisors that it was in the public interest not to await the next regularly scheduled election but to implement the proposed sales tax “effective beginning April 1, 2026 and lasting for a period of five years.” As part of the resolution, the Board declared an emergency under article XIII C and called for a special election, stating: “BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Supervisors . . . finds facts constituting an emergency under section 2 of article XIII C of the California Constitution, including but not 6 limited to the facts reflected in the recitals above and those findings recited in section 1 of the urgency ordinance . . ., considered concurrently with this resolution, as well as the legislative file and materials presented by county administration at the August 7 [board meeting] to consider adoption of this resolution; . . . [¶] BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that due to the present emergency the Board calls and orders a special election” (hereafter, the emergency declaration). (Some capitalization & boldface omitted.) As part of the resolution, the Board also approved the text of the Measure A ballot question and directed the Registrar of Voters to print it on the sample ballot for the November 4 special election, as follows: “To help protect our community from severe federal cuts enacted by President Trump and Congress; support critical local services such as trauma, emergency room, mental health, burn, and cancer care; and reduce the risk of hospital closures at Santa Clara Valley Healthcare and other service cuts—shall the County of Santa Clara adopt a five-eighth cent general sales tax for 5 years, providing $330 million annually that cannot be taken by the federal government and is subject to independent audits/oversight?” (proposed ballot question). The Board concurrently approved the ordinance, titled “An Urgency Ordinance Implementing a Five-Year General Retail Transactions (Sales) and Use Tax in Santa Clara County at the Rate of Five-Eighths of One Cent” (boldface & some capitalization omitted). Among the findings set forth therein, the Board found that the county “serves as the social safety net for the [county’s] approximately 1.9 million residents” and that the county’s “current property taxes and other revenue sources cannot offset the expected reductions in federal and State revenues and these deficits will result in cuts to vital public services.” The Board also found that placing the proposed 7 sales tax on the November 4 ballot “is needed as an action to immediately preserve public health and safety because failure to enable voters to consider this tax in 2025 will result in a delay of up to two years in implementing any tax to be approved by voters and during that time, the [c]ounty’s budget deficit will require severe cuts to the services needed to protect public health, safety, and other services.” Subsequently, on or about August 19, the county made available on the Registrar of Voters’ website the county counsel’s impartial analysis of Measure A (impartial analysis),5 authored by real parties in interest Tony LoPresti and Nick DeFiesta. The impartial analysis explained that the Board of Supervisors “placed Measure A on the ballot after declaring a fiscal emergency by unanimous vote.” It stated that funds generated by Measure A “would partially offset” the loss of federal funding due to H.R. 1. The impartial analysis further stated that Measure A was “a general tax, meaning the [c]ounty could use the funds to support Santa Clara Valley Healthcare hospitals and clinics, provide social services, or for any other legitimate governmental purposes.” C. Petition for Writ of Mandate On August 21, four days after filing their initial complaint and petition for writ of mandate in the trial court to challenge the proposed Measure A, appellants filed the operative, verified first amended complaint and petition 5 Under Elections Code section 9160, if a county measure qualifies for the ballot, “[t]he county counsel or district attorney shall prepare an impartial analysis of the measure showing the effect of the measure on the existing law and the operation of the measure.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) A copy of the impartial analysis shall be made “available for public examination . . . for a period of 10 calendar days immediately following the deadline for submission of those materials.” (Id., § 9190, subd. (a).) 8 for writ of mandate seeking declaratory, mandatory, and injunctive relief (petition).6 The petition asserted in the first cause of action that the Board’s emergency declaration was not legally sufficient under Proposition 218 and article XIII C to authorize a special election, the declared “emergency” did not meet any related constitutional or statutory definitions of emergency, and the trial court should issue a peremptory writ ordering respondents to remove Measure A from the November 4 ballot. In the second through sixth causes of action, the petition challenged the wording of the ballot question as “untrue, partial, argumentative, and/or prejudicial” in violation of Elections Code7 sections 9051, subdivision (e) and 13119, subdivision (c), and “false and/or misleading” under section 9190 and McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1169. In the seventh cause of action, the petition challenged the wording of the impartial analysis under sections 9160 and 9190 as “false, misleading, and not impartial.” The trial court found the petition had priority over all other civil matters (§ 13314, subd. (a)(3)), ordered expedited briefing, and set a hearing schedule. The parties filed written briefing, respective requests for judicial notice, and supplemental briefs on the disputed issue of the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration. 6 The petition named county elections official, Santa Clara County Registrar Matt Moreles (Moreles) as respondent and further identified the county (as sponsor of Measure A) and Board of Supervisors (as authors of Measure A) (together, county parties) as real parties in interest. The petition further identified County Counsel Tony LoPresti and Deputy County Counsel Nick DeFiesta (as authors of the impartial analysis) as real parties in interest. For convenience, we refer to the named respondent and real parties in interest, together, as respondents. 7 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Elections Code. 9  Appellants’ request for judicial notice identified 19 items. Among the requested items, appellants sought judicial notice of the agenda packet for the August 7 board meeting (RJN 1, or August 7 agenda packet), the official “ ‘[s]ummary of [p]roceedings’ ” for the August 7 board meeting (RJN 2, or August 7 summary of proceedings), a copy of the August 19 impartial analysis for the November 4 special election on Measure A (RJN 15, or impartial analysis), a copy of the “ ‘Detailed Description of the Sales & Use Tax Rate’ ” information from the website of the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (RJN 18, or California Department of Tax summary of sales tax rate), and a copy of the California Legislative Analyst Office (LAO)’s report titled “ ‘Understanding California’s Sales Tax’ (2015)” from the LAO’s website (RJN 19, or LAO report). Respondents’ request for judicial notice consisted of five items. Among these was a copy of the resolution, adopted by the Board of Supervisors at the August 7 board meeting, and a copy of the Voter Information Guide for the 1996 General Election. The county parties also submitted a video recording of the August 7 board meeting, published on the county website, and an automatically generated transcript included “for the court’s convenience.” D. Expedited Hearing On August 27, shortly after setting the expedited schedule, the trial court held the first of three, consecutive, full-day merits hearings. The court asked the parties to discuss possible areas of agreement related to the matters submitted for judicial notice and offered informal feedback on issues in dispute related to the ballot question and impartial analysis. The parties ultimately agreed to several changes in the wording of the ballot question, which the court memorialized in its order. 10  As to judicial notice, the parties stipulated that there was no objection to the trial court taking judicial notice of several of the matters submitted. These included the resolution, the August 7 agenda packet and summary of proceedings, and the video recording of the August 7 board meeting. With respect to the August 7 agenda packet and summary of proceedings, respondents specified that they had no objection to the court taking judicial notice as to both the “existence and contents” of the documents. Counsel for appellants later questioned the propriety of the trial court taking judicial notice of the “contents” of the August 7 agenda packet and raised a hearsay objection. Appellants asserted that they had not intended their agreement regarding judicial notice to extend to the truth of statements contained therein. Appellants argued that treating the contents of the judicially noticed documents as true would improperly allow the court to consider a “trojan horse, . . . laden with hearsay.” Respondents countered that the parties had “collectively stipulated to the admission of these documents for all purposes, including for the truth of the matter.” Respondents additionally maintained that the documents were properly considered for their truth because they reflected a legislative determination of the Board of Supervisors, and courts generally defer to the determination of a legislative body based on legislative facts. The trial court declined to “retread territory that’s already been determined” and pointed out that the contents appellants contested were submitted as part of their own request for judicial notice. After further review, the trial court confirmed that appellants’ RJN 1 and 2 “came in, without objection, . . . offered by [appellants], coming in for content, as well as . . . the existence.” Ultimately, the court recognized that it was not entirely clear during the expedited proceedings whether the matters 11 submitted by appellants for judicial notice constituted legislative or adjudicative facts and that appellants had raised objections “very late.” On the merits of the petition, appellants asserted that there was no precedent for a fiscal emergency to constitute an emergency under Proposition 218 and the Board of Supervisors’ declaration was invalid. They maintained that an “emergency” for purposes of the “cases of emergency” clause must be founded on something apart from the conclusory declaration of five members of the governing body, especially given the express direction in section 5 of Proposition 218 to liberally construe its provisions to, “when in doubt, limit local government revenue.” The hearings concluded on the August 29 deadline requested by the Registrar of Voters. E. Order and Judgment On August 29, the trial court filed its order and judgment (August 29 order). The August 29 order largely resolved the remaining contested issues in favor of respondents by denying the writ petition, though the order directed respondents to amend certain language in the ballot question and impartial analysis. The August 29 order addressed each request for judicial notice. The trial court explained that “[i]t was not entirely clear throughout the course of the writ proceedings what specific information derived from the RJN documents that [appellants] wished to have the [c]ourt consider for the truth of the matter asserted, and/or whether certain documents were merely intended to provide “legislative facts” (e.g., for background, context, policy, etc.) versus “adjudicative facts” directly relating to the disputed matters herein.” As to appellants’ RJN 1 and 2, the court found that the parties had stipulated to judicial notice “without objection” and had stipulated that the 12 court “may consider the substance of this document for evidentiary purposes.” (Italics omitted.) Regarding appellants’ RJN 18 and 19, the trial court took judicial notice of the publication of the California Department of Tax summary of sales tax rate document on the department website but not of the truth of the matters stated therein. The court similarly took judicial notice of the publication of the “ ‘Understanding California’s Sales Tax’ (2015)” report on the LAO website but not of the truth of the matters stated therein. The court rejected appellants’ RJN 20 and 21 to take judicial notice of two statutes (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6051.15, 6051.2), stating the items were “late- identified” and not included among appellants’ initial requests for judicial notice or cited in the petition or supporting briefs. On the merits, the August 29 order rejected appellants’ contention that the Board of Supervisors did not declare a valid emergency within the meaning of article XIII C, section 2 and Proposition 218. As neither Proposition 218 nor its implementing legislation (Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act; Gov. Code, § 53750 et seq.) defined the term “emergency,” the trial court looked to its ordinary definition as recognized in case authority. It adopted the definition set forth in Sonoma County Organization etc. Employees v. County of Sonoma (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 267 (Sonoma County), “long . . . accepted in California as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action” (id. at p. 276). The trial court found that the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration met this legal standard, judged by the facts set forth in the resolution’s recitals, ordinance, and materials presented by county administration at the August 7 board meeting. The court reasoned that appellants had “stipulate[ed] to every single fact cited” by agreeing to judicial 13 notice of the existence and “truth of the matters contained” in their RJN 1. It concluded that the findings of the Board “reasonably reflected an ‘unforeseen situation calling for immediate action.’ ([Sonoma County], supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 276.)” The trial court further observed that appellants had provided no reason to depart from the presumption of validity afforded to a local government enactment. Finding no basis to invalidate the Board of Supervisors’ unanimous decision to declare an emergency on the facts presented, the court denied the writ and declaratory and injunctive relief on appellants’ first cause of action. As to the remaining causes of action, the August 29 order summarized the modifications to the ballot question sought by appellants in the second and third causes of action. The trial court described several agreed-upon changes, which the parties reached without waiving or conceding any legal arguments. The court found that appellants had not met their burden to demonstrate that the other phrases and terms challenged in the ballot question were untrue, partial, argumentative, and/or prejudicial in favor of Measure A. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the phrase “ ‘cannot be taken by the federal government’ ” did display partiality. The court’s tentative ruling on this point led the parties to agree (without waiving any legal arguments) to modify the phrase to state, “ ‘is not available to the federal government.’ ” Lastly, as to the seventh cause of action, the court summarized the parties’ agreed-upon changes to certain words and phrases in the impartial analysis and rejected appellants’ claim that the other words and phrases were partial, false, and/or misleading. 14  Applying these rulings, the August 29 order denied appellants’ writ as to the second through seventh causes of action but mandated the “voluntary modifications to the language of” Measure A. F. Measure A Approval and Third-party Reverse Validation Action The ballot question put to the voters at the November 4 special election incorporated the changes set forth in the August 29 order. By majority vote, Santa Clara County voters approved Measure A. Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc. and other nonparties8 filed a reverse validation action in the trial court challenging the validity of Measure A (reverse validation action). The reverse validation action, Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Super. Ct. Santa Clara, No. 26CV483689), was designated a related action and remains pending in the trial court. II. DISCUSSION Appellants seek this court’s independent review of whether the Board’s actions fall under the “ ‘cases of emergency’ ” exception in article XIII C, section 2. They challenge the validity of the emergency declared by the Board of Supervisors and contend the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the truth of matters asserted in the documents submitted at the August 7 board meeting in support of the Board’s determination. Appellants maintain that, while the election has occurred and therefore the legal issue is moot, this court’s “articulation of the elements of a valid emergency declaration” under article XIII C, section 2 will help local governments implement the law and provide needed guidance in the pending reverse 8 Although Christopher Robell (a plaintiff and appellant in this action) was originally a named plaintiff in the reverse-validation action, the plaintiffs in that matter have since filed a first amended complaint that does not include Robell as a plaintiff. 15 validation action as to Measure A. Appellants also assert that the ballot question and impartial analysis issues under the Elections Code present important questions of continuing public interest that are likely to recur while evading timely review. Respondents disagree with appellants’ interpretation of the challenged constitutional provision and argue that because the November 4 special election has already occurred, this court can no longer grant relief and the appeal is moot. Nevertheless, respondents assert that the constitutional issue raised by appellants is of broad public interest and likely to recur. They agree with appellants that this court should address the meaning of “cases of ‘emergency’ ” under article XIII C, section 2 and the validity of the Board’s action. Respondents contend that the remainder of the appeal does not raise any exceptional issue warranting postelection review. We first address the parties’ arguments concerning mootness and this court’s exercise of discretion over the issues on appeal. A. Mootness The timing of this appeal raises questions of mootness and this court’s ability to grant effective relief to appellants. A court’s duty is “ ‘to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) Generally, an appeal “should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.” (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of 16 Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 (Cucamongans United), citing Eye Dog Foundation, at p. 541.) Nevertheless, courts recognize “three discretionary exceptions to the rules regarding mootness.” (Cucamongans United, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 479.) Applying these exceptions, “courts will generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s determination.’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282 (D.P.).) Both appellants and respondents suggest that this court should exercise its discretion to review the principal issue on appeal concerning what constitutes a legally sufficient “emergency” within the meaning of article XIII C, section 2. They argue that this portion of the appeal raises a question of broad public interest that has already recurred in subsequent litigation between the parties. We agree. Because a ruling on the merits interpreting the “cases of emergency” clause of article XIII C, section 2 involves an issue of broad public interest likely to recur and is likely to “ ‘affect future proceedings between the parties[,] or will have some precedential consequence in future litigation generally’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283), we will exercise our discretion to address it. Turning to the nonconstitutional questions raised by appellants, they contend that the ballot question does not conform with the statutory language of section 13119, subdivision (a), providing that “[t]he ballots used when voting upon a measure proposed by a local governing body . . . shall have printed on them the words ‘Shall the measure (stating the nature thereof) be adopted?’ ” 17  We decline to address this moot issue because it presents a specific question of compliance with a longstanding statute 9 that does not rise to the level of “ ‘an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur.’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) As to the remaining challenges to the ballot question and impartial analysis on grounds that the language of each violated the requirements of, inter alia, impartiality, truthfulness, and accuracy, we similarly decline to exercise our discretion to reach those issues. Determining whether the ballot question violated the legal standards demands a fact-specific inquiry tethered to its language and the Board’s findings in support of the emergency declaration. The same is true with respect to the impartial analysis. In contrast with cases like Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 110 and California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924 (California Cannabis), cited by appellants, the issues of alleged partiality and inaccuracies in the challenged statements do not raise questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation likely to recur, and resolving them would not address a question of continuing public interest. (See Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach 9 Apart from a one-word change that took place in 2017, the sentence formulating the language to be printed on the ballots has been the same since 1911 (though the statute has experienced numerous revisions, including in 1994 when the Legislature repealed the former Elections Code and reenacted it in a reorganized format). (See Stats. 1911, ex. Session, ch. 33, § 1 [providing that “The ballots used when voting upon said proposed ordinances shall have printed thereon the words ‘Shall the ordinance (stating the nature thereof) be adopted?”]; Stats. 1994, ch. 920, §§ 1, 2 [repealing, adding the Elections Code].) In 2017, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 195, amending certain provisions of section 13119, including, for subdivision (a), replacing the word “ordinance” with the word “measure.” (Stats. 2017, ch. 105, § 1.) 18 (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 867–868 [declining to exercise discretion over moot issues related to voter approval of city’s amendments to the local coastal program].) Appellants furthermore have not shown the alleged, statutory violations based on the ballot question and impartial analysis language to be an issue likely to recur between the parties or of remaining relevance as a material question in the reverse-validation proceeding. (Cf. D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) The availability of a statutory remedy (pursuant to section 9190) for interested parties seeking expeditious, preelection review of deficient election materials also undercuts appellants’ argument that an exercise of discretion over the mooted ballot language claims is needed. We acknowledge appellants’ concern regarding the timing challenges for litigation seeking preelection review of ballot materials. Nevertheless, they have not shown that the deadlines applied in this case (i.e., the deadlines set by the Registrar of Voters) were improper or outside the scope of authority conferred by the Elections Code. (See § 9163.) We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to review the merits of appellants’ appeal concerning the format and text of the ballot question and text of the impartial analysis. We turn to the constitutionality of the county’s invocation of the “cases of emergency” clause of article XIII C, section 2 with respect to Measure A. B. Standard of Review The interpretation of a constitutional provision or statute is a question of law subject to this court’s independent review. (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934; California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698.) We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including rulings on requests for judicial notice, for abuse of discretion. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 19 281; Vo v. Technology Credit Union (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 632, 639.) A trial court abuses its discretion by action that is arbitrary or “ ‘that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law.’ ” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393.) The parties dispute the standard of review applicable to the Board’s emergency declaration based on the findings in its resolution recitals and accompanying ordinance. We examine this issue further post. C. “Cases of Emergency” Under Proposition 218 and Article XIII C Appellants challenge the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration as outside the purview of the “cases of emergency” clause and setting the Measure A vote for the November 4 special election as unconstitutional. They urge that the term “ ‘emergency’ ” in article XIII C, section 2 must be construed to effectuate Proposition 218’s local government revenue limiting purpose, which the Board’s emergency declaration contravened. 1. Legal Principles and Background on Proposition 218 “When, as here, the voters enacted the provision, their intent governs.” (Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 212 (Bighorn-Desert).) To ascertain intent, we analyze the text in its relevant context, “ascribing to words their ordinary meaning” and “taking account of related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.) “If the provisions’ intended purpose nonetheless remains opaque, we may consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative’s ballot materials.” (Id. at p. 934.) California voters passed Proposition 218 in 1996, as part of “a series of initiatives designed to limit the authority of state and local governments to impose taxes without voter approval.” (Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of 20 Redding (2018) 6 Cal.5th 1, 10 (REU Rates); see Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 578.) Known as the “ ‘ “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” ’ ” Proposition 218 “added articles XIII C and XIII D to the state Constitution.” (REU Rates, at p. 10.) Article XIII D sets out “the authority of local governments to assess taxes and other charges on real property” (REU Rates, at p. 10), while article XIII C limits “the other methods by which local governments can exact revenue using fees and taxes not based on real property value or ownership.” (REU Rates, at p. 10.) Article XIII C provides that “[a]ll taxes imposed by any local government shall be deemed to be either general taxes or special taxes.” (Id., § 2, subd. (a).) It specifies that “[l]ocal governments may not impose, increase, or extend: (1) any general tax, unless approved by a majority vote at a general election; or (2) any special tax, unless approved by a two-thirds vote.” (REU Rates, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 10–11, citing art. XIII C, § 2, subds. (b), (d).) Thus, it “requires the approval of either a majority or two- thirds of voters before new or increased local taxes take effect, depending on the type of tax.” (Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105, 1112 (Wilde).) “ ‘General tax’ ” is defined as “any tax imposed for general governmental purposes.” (Art. XIIIC, § 1, subd. (a).) “ ‘Special tax’ ” is defined as “any tax imposed for specific purposes, including a tax imposed for specific purposes, which is placed into a general fund.” (Id., subd. (d).) There is no dispute that the sales tax increase proposed by Measure A cons