Full Opinion

Filed 6/29/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Tehama) DAVID GARST, as Trustee, etc., C103356 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23CI000079) v. TEHAMA COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tehama County, Bradley L. Boeckman, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Margaret E. Long, County Counsel, Daniel B. Klausner, Deputy County Counsel (Tehama); Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono and Matthew W. McAleer for Defendant and Appellant. Swanson Law Office, Mark D. Norcross, Jeffery J. Swanson and Adam M. Pressman for Plaintiff and Respondent. Best Best & Krieger and Lutfi Kharuf for League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties, and California Special Districts Association as Amici Curiae. This appeal concerns the validity of a groundwater well registration charge (well registration charge) adopted by the Tehama County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (District) and imposed on every parcel of land in the County of Tehama (County) regardless of whether the property uses groundwater or has a 1 groundwater well. 1 The trial court granted David Garst’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the well registration charge was an unlawful tax and mandating the District to, among other things, refund all collected charges to the taxpayers in the County. The District appeals. The District 2 asserts the well registration charge is a valid regulatory fee (and thus not a tax) under California Constitution 3 article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(3) (article XIII C, section 1(e)(3)). It further raises a myriad of affirmative defenses, the majority of which are premised on the District’s assertion that it adopted the well registration charge under Water Code4 section 10730, subdivision (a) (section 10730(a)) within the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (§ 10720 et seq.) (the Act). In the alternative, the District argues refunds are procedurally and substantively barred and are not required as a matter of due process. We initially reject the District’s affirmative defenses against Garst’s claims, concluding, in part, the District failed to show that the well registration charge comports with section 10730(a). Next, assuming but not deciding that the District appropriately 1 As explained post, the District’s Resolution No. 9-2022 imposed the well registration charge on every parcel of land in the County. The parties agree, however, that the District at some point decided to collect the charge only on parcels that are larger than five acres. The parties do not refer us to anything in the record showing the District took that action. Because the purported modification as to the District’s collection of the well registration charge is largely immaterial to the arguments presented on appeal and given the record before us, we analyze the arguments based on the District’s resolution imposing the well registration charge on all parcels within the County. 2 The League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties, and California Special Districts Association (collectively amici) filed an amici curiae brief in support of the District’s appeal. 3 Undesignated article references are to the California Constitution. 4 Undesignated section references are to the Water Code. 2 adopted the well registration charge under alternate delegated authority, we consider the constitutionality of the charge. In that regard, we decline to address the parties’ dispute as to whether the analytical framework in article XIII C, as amended by Proposition 26, or article XIII D, added by Proposition 218, applies because resolution of the question is immaterial to the disposition of this appeal. The parties agree that the well registration charge does not fall within the property-related service fee exception in article XIII D, section 3, subdivision (a)(4), and we conclude the District has failed to show that the well registration charge is a regulatory fee within the meaning of article XIII C, section 1(e)(3). As such, we conclude the charge constitutes an unconstitutional tax. We, however, modify the judgment to strike the provision mandating the District to refund the well registration charge because Garst did not comply with the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). BACKGROUND I The Act The Legislature adopted the Act to regulate “California’s groundwater by identifying its most impacted basins, mandating local agencies govern those basins, requiring those agencies to submit sustainable use plans for state approval, and allowing for state intervention if needed.” (State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 734, 750.) The goals of the Act are, among other things, to “establish[] minimum standards for sustainable groundwater management, giv[e] local groundwater authorities the power and support to sustainably manage groundwater, and creat[e] a more efficient and cost-effective groundwater adjudication process that protects water rights, ensures due process, and prevents unnecessary delay.” (Mojave Pistachios, LLC v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 605, 616 (Mojave Pistachios), citing § 10720.1.) 3 To meet these goals, the Legislature authorized the creation of groundwater sustainability agencies to develop and create groundwater sustainability plans (§§ 10723- 10724), and granted those agencies several powers, including the power to “require registration of a groundwater extraction facility within the management area of the groundwater sustainability agency” (§ 10725.6). A “[g]roundwater extraction facility” is “a device or method for extracting groundwater from within a basin.” (§ 10721, subd. (h).) II The District as a Groundwater Sustainability Agency A substantial portion of land within the County overlays 11 groundwater subbasins. In 2015, the District became the groundwater sustainability agency for those subbasins. The District thereafter entered into a memorandum of understanding with the County in which the District assumed the responsibility to “perform all groundwater monitoring, regulation setting, and groundwater extraction registration programs” and “pay all costs and recover such costs for its monitoring, regulating, and registration activities.” The District agreed to “either perform or contract for the performance of all groundwater extraction facility registration and groundwater monitoring activities as required under any applicable groundwater sustainability management program.” III The District’s Resolutions and the Litigation In June 2022, the District adopted Resolution No. 9-2022. The resolution states section 10725.6 permits groundwater sustainability agencies to require registration of groundwater extraction facilities within their management areas and the District will incur actual and reasonable costs to receive and process such registrations. The resolution further states section 10730(a) “provides that a groundwater sustainability agency may impose fees for regulated activities to fund the cost of the groundwater sustainability program including but not limited to ‘investigations, inspections, 4 compliance assistance, enforcement, and program administration.’ ” The District resolved that it required groundwater extraction facilities in the County to be registered and imposed an annual charge of $0.29 per acre on each legal parcel of land within the County for three years to pay the administrative costs of a well registration program. The charge would be added to the tax rolls and collected like ordinary ad valorem taxes. The District found the amounts of the well registration charge to be “reasonably necessary to recover the costs of providing the services described [in the resolution], and that the costs imposed by such [charges were] fairly apportioned so that charges allocated to any payor w[ould] bear a fair and reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on or benefits from the services performed by the [District].” The District further found that the well registration charge was being imposed “for a specific government service provided directly to the payor that [wa]s not provided to those not charged, and d[id] not exceed the reasonable costs to the County of providing the service.” 5 Garst sued the District on April 3, 2023, for declaratory relief and a writ of mandate and, in the alternative, a writ of administrative mandate (complaint). Garst alleged, among other things, that the District violated Propositions 218 and 26 in adopting the well registration charge. In his prayer for relief, Garst requested, among other things, a peremptory writ of mandate or, in the alternative, administrative mandate directing the District to set aside, vacate, or rescind the well registration charge; refund Garst for any payment of the charge; and refrain from charging Garst a well registration charge absent the District complying with its legal obligations. Garst also requested a judicial declaration of the foregoing. 5 This language tracks the exception in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(2). The District does not argue that the exception in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(2) applies to the well registration charge. It argues the regulatory fee exception in article XIII C, section 1(e)(3) applies instead. 5 In June 2023, the District adopted Resolution No. 3-2023. The resolution states that Resolution No. 9-2022 initiated the District’s well registration program (program) and imposed a charge on property owners to pay the costs of that program. The resolution identified two goals of the program as: (1) “to develop information necessary to calculate a groundwater fee to support the program of monitoring the groundwater throughout Tehama County” and (2) “to develop information necessary to ensure groundwater sustainability and quality throughout Tehama County.” The resolution further states that compliance with the program “will help to support the fairness and equity of any groundwater fee ultimately imposed by the District” and “help to ensure programs for protecting the water supply and quality of the aquifers throughout Tehama County.” The resolution sets forth the minimum requirements for a property to be deemed in compliance with the program and the District’s finding that the elimination of the fee in years subsequent to a compliance determination may encourage greater cooperation and serve “a greater public purpose than is served by collecting the fee.” In Resolution No. 3-2023, the District resolved that its board would receive a list of parcels meeting the compliance criteria outlined in the resolution by May 31 of a given year and would determine whether to waive the subsequent well registration charges for those parcels. The resolution also provides a process for a property owner to request a waiver when the owner’s property is not included on the compliance list submitted to the board. In July 2023, the District adopted Resolution No. 4-2023. Therein, the District stated that its board had received two lists of parcels—one identifying parcels meeting the compliance requirements for a waiver as outlined in Resolution No. 3-2023 and another identifying parcels for which the well registration charge would be added to the tax rolls. The District made various findings and resolved that it waived the well registration charge for those parcels identified on the compliance list and adopted the well registration charge for the parcels identified on the noncompliant list. The District 6 waived the well registration charge for Garst’s parcels for the second and third years of the program. In 2024, Garst filed his opening brief in the trial court, arguing Resolution No. 9- 2022 did not comply with section 10730 and was invalid under the California Constitution. Garst filed a declaration in support of his brief stating that he and his wife are trustees of a trust owning 40 parcels within the County. All of the parcels are subject to a recorded conservation easement. Garst has three groundwater wells on two parcels that are used for domestic and residential irrigation purposes; he does not have groundwater wells on any other parcels. 6 In November 2022, Garst received tax bills for all of the parcels for the fiscal year running from July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023. After paying the tax bills out of the trust’s account, Garst noticed that the taxes for the properties had increased by approximately $4,000, which he then learned was for a well registration program. In its opposition to Garst’s brief, the District argued, among other things, Garst’s challenge was barred because: (1) he failed to “pay first, litigate later”; (2) he failed to comply with the Government Claims Act; (3) he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under section 10726.6, subdivision (d) (section 10726.6(d)); and (4) he did not 6 Several of the District’s statements regarding Garst’s purported water use are not supported by the record. First, the District states Garst “admits his own water use is significant” based on his declaration and the conservation easement attached to his declaration. There is no such statement in Garst’s declaration and merely because the conservation easement permits Garst to use his property in certain ways does not mean he does use the property for such purposes. Second, the District asserts that Garst’s “cattle operation excludes him from” being a de minimis groundwater extractor (i.e., a person who extracts two acre-feet or less of groundwater per year for domestic use), without any citation to the record. Nothing in Garst’s declaration indicates that he runs a cattle operation. Finally, the District asserts, citing Garst’s declaration, that Garst uses groundwater for livestock. Again, nothing in Garst’s declaration supports that assertion. Garst declared he uses the groundwater wells for “residential use and residential irrigation.” 7 file the action within the 180-day statute of limitations provided in section 10726.6, subdivision (c) (section 10726.6(c)). The District further argued the well registration charge was a valid regulatory fee because both section 10730(a) and article XIII C, section 1(e)(3) allow the imposition of fees for investigations, and the District otherwise complied with Proposition 26’s requirements. The District filed two consultant declarations in support of its opposition.7 Greg Clumpner, a consultant to public agencies for the purpose of ratemaking, declared that, in his opinion, the District’s estimated budget of $360,000 per year was reasonable and the well registration charge was “generally justifiable given the District was using the best available data at the time.” He further declared it was reasonable to use the well registration charge as “a downpayment” to be credited against a later “updated fee” that would provide “a more nuanced allocation of costs” and a more equitable allocation of the burden of the program based on the data to be obtained. The second declaration was submitted by Eddy Teasdale, a hydrologist, who declared, among other things, parcels without groundwater wells receive a benefit from a countywide sustainability groundwater program due to the hydrological connection between surface water and groundwater and countywide water resource management is crucial to ensuring sustainable water resources are available. In the bench trial, the trial court ruled against the District on its affirmative defenses and found: (1) the District acted in good faith in establishing the well registration charge; (2) the District imposed the well registration charge for a legitimate purpose; (3) the District can impose proper, valid regulatory fees regardless of whether a property overlays a subbasin; (4) the charge identified in Resolution No. 9-2022 was reasonable; (5) however small the charge, the well registration charge was not related to 7 The District refers to its consultants as experts. The District does not, however, provide a record citation indicating the trial court designated its consultants as such. 8 the property; (6) the “burden created by the property on the government is not in any way related to a service provided by the government or a benefit provided by the government to the property owner”; and (7) the well registration charge imposed by Resolution No. 9- 2022 was a tax. The trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the District to rescind the tax imposed under Resolution No. 9-2022, refund all sums collected from taxpayers under that resolution, and to cease and desist any further tax collection efforts related to Resolution No. 9-2022. The trial court further awarded Garst attorney fees and recoverable costs. The District appeals. 8 DISCUSSION We commence the analysis by addressing the District’s affirmative defenses to Garst’s claims and find none of them persuasive. We next consider whether the well registration charge passes constitutional muster, concluding it does not. Finally, we hold the trial court erred in mandating the District to refund the unconstitutional tax because Garst did not comply with the Government Claims Act. I The District’s Affirmative Defenses to Garst’s Claims Lack Merit A. Further Legal Background As noted ante, groundwater sustainability agencies have the power, among others, to impose fees. (§ 10730, subd. (a).) The Legislature, however, placed a caveat on this financial authority—a groundwater sustainability agency “shall not impose” any such fee “on a de minimis extractor unless the agency has regulated the users pursuant to [the Act].” (Ibid.) A de minimis extractor “means a person who extracts, for domestic purposes, two acre-feet or less per year.” (§ 10721, subd. (e).) Any fee adopted under 8 The District does not appeal the trial court’s award of attorney fees and recoverable costs. 9 section 10730(a) may be collected in the same manner as ordinary municipal ad valorem taxes. (§ 10730, subd. (d).) A fee levied under section 10730 “shall be due and payable to the groundwater sustainability agency by each owner or operator on a day established by the groundwater sustainability agency.” (§ 10730.6, subd. (a).) The term “[o]perator” is defined as “a person operating a groundwater extraction facility,” and the term “[o]wner” is defined as “a person owning a groundwater extraction facility or an interest in a groundwater extraction facility other than a lien to secure the payment of a debt or other obligation.” (§ 10721, subds. (o), (p).) “If an owner or operator knowingly fails to pay a groundwater fee within 30 days of it becoming due” (§ 10730.6, subd. (b)), the owner or operator is liable for penalties and interest on the delinquent amount (ibid.), and the groundwater sustainability agency may sue the owner or operator to recover any delinquent fees, interest, or penalties (id., subd. (c)) and may order the owner or operator to cease all groundwater extraction until the delinquent fees are paid (id., subd. (e)). A person may challenge a groundwater sustainability agency’s resolution imposing a new fee or increasing an existing fee under section 10730(a) in court if the action is filed within 180 days following the adoption of the resolution. (§ 10726.6, subd. (c).) To do so, however, the person challenging the fee must pay it before bringing an action for a refund. (Mojave Pistachios, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 631, citing § 10726.6, subd. (d).) The person seeking a refund must further bring the action in accordance with “the manner provided for the payment of taxes under protest and actions for refund of that payment in Article 2 (commencing with Section 5140) of Chapter 5 of Part 9 of Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, as applicable.” (§ 10726.6, subd. (d).) 10 B. The Statute of Limitations Under Section 10726.6(c) Does Not Apply Section 10726.6(c) provides that “[a]ny judicial action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the ordinance or resolution imposing a new, or increasing an existing, fee imposed pursuant to Section 10730 … shall be commenced within 180 days following the adoption of the ordinance or resolution.” The District argues Garst’s challenge to the well registration charge is barred because the charge was adopted under section 10730(a) and Garst filed suit more than 180 days after the District adopted Resolution No. 9-2022. Garst disagrees, asserting section 10726.6(c) is inapplicable because the charge was not imposed pursuant to section 10730. Garst contends a charge under section 10730 can only be imposed for regulated activities and, here, the charge was imposed “on all parcel owners in the County ‘regardless of use,’ ” including landowners who extract no groundwater or qualify as de minimis extractors. We agree with Garst that the District failed to show it adopted the charge under section 10730(a), and thus section 10726.6(c) does not apply. “An affirmative defense, the statute of limitations exists to promote the diligent assertion of claims, ensure defendants the opportunity to collect evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from dilatory suits once excess time has passed. [Citations.] The duration of the limitations period marks the legislatively selected point at which, for a given claim, these considerations surmount the otherwise compelling interest in adjudicating on their merits valid claims.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.) The defendant bears the initial burden of proving the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Id. at p. 1197; Evid. Code, § 500 [defendants bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense].) Thereafter, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the plaintiff’s claims survive based on one or more nonstatutory exceptions to the basic limitations period, if applicable. (Aryeh, at p. 1197.) “The application of the statute of limitations 11 on undisputed facts is a purely legal question [citation]; accordingly, we review the [trial court’s] rulings de novo.” (Id. at p. 1191.) The District asserts the charge “is what it appears to be—an exercise of authority granted by [the Act] and therefore subject to [the Act’s] statute of limitations” because the District “is the groundwater regulatory agency for the whole County” and it recited the language of section 10730(a) in Resolution No. 9-2022. But merely reciting the language of a statute and saying it applies does not make it so. After reading provisions of the Act together, the District exceeded the scope of its statutory authority under section 10730(a) by imposing the well registration charge on all landowners within the County. 9 The words in statutes are to be construed in context and “statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844.) Accordingly, statutes are construed together if they stand in pari materia. (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 124, fn. 4.) “ ‘Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of person[s] [or] things, or have the same purpose or object.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, harmonizing the statutes within chapter eight of the Act and reading them together, we conclude a groundwater fee adopted under section 10730(a) may only be imposed on owners or operators of groundwater extraction facilities. 9 We reject the District’s assertion in its reply brief that it imposed the well registration charge only on those landowners who “do or might use groundwater.” (Boldface omitted.) The District provides no citation to the record for the statement. (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 947 [“Statements of fact that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by the reviewing court”].) We further find no basis in the District’s consultant’s report, cited by the District, for the apparent contention that the District considered existing and potential groundwater use when it imposed the well registration charge. 12 Section 10730(a), which authorizes the adoption of a groundwater fee, and section 10730.6, which addresses collection of a groundwater fee and remedies for nonpayment, relate to the same persons (i.e., fee payor) and thing (i.e., a groundwater fee), and have the same purpose or object (i.e., a groundwater sustainability agency’s financial authority to fund the costs of a groundwater sustainability program). The statutes are located together in chapter eight of the Act. Although section 10730(a) is silent as to the identity of the fee payor (except to exempt a de minimis extractor not regulated under the Act), section 10730.6 is not. Section 10730.6 expressly states that the payor of a groundwater fee adopted under section 10730(a) is “each owner or operator.” (§ 10730.6, subd. (a).) Thus, a groundwater fee adopted under section 10730(a) pertains to properties with groundwater extraction facilities, unless the de minimis extractor exemption applies. Here, the District imposed the well registration charge on all landowners within the County regardless of whether a device or method for extracting groundwater from a basin exists on the respective parcels. 10 The District thus exceeded the scope of its delegated authority under section 10730(a) and its act of adopting the well registration charge pursuant to that statute is void. (Benton v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1467, 1480 [“[a]n administrative agency may not, under the guise of rulemaking, abridge or enlarge its authority or exceed the powers given to it by the statute—the source of its power”]; Water Replenishment Dist. of Southern California v. City of Cerritos (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1072 [“[a]n agency that exceeds the scope 10 In light of this conclusion, we do not address the District’s arguments that the well registration charge complied with the de minimis extractor limitation in section 10730(a). We note, however, the District cites no evidence for the assertion that the 5.02-acre minimum serves to exempt de minimis extractors from paying the charge (Villacorta v. Cemex Cement, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433 [argument of counsel is not evidence]), and its consultant wrote County personnel told him “[d]e minimis parcels (i.e., those less than 5.02 acres) were excluded because the costs of collecting these fees would outweigh the revenues.” 13 of its statutory authority acts ultra vires and the act is void”]; California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 11 [“[a]dministrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations”].) The statute of limitations under section 10726.6(c) accordingly does not apply. The District urges section 10726.6(c) applies if we read section 10730(a) in congruence with: (1) section 10725.2, subdivision (a), which provides “[a] groundwater sustainability agency may perform any act necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this part”; and (2) section 10725.4, which vests the District with investigatory power “to prepare and adopt a groundwater sustainability plan” and “to propose and update fees.” But neither statute addresses the identity of the fee payors or contradicts the foregoing interpretation. The cases upon which the District relies are also not persuasive. We do not read the appellate court’s statement in Mojave Pistachios, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at page 632, footnote 20, that section 10726.6(c) “is the statute of limitations applicable to any action challenging a groundwater fee ordinance, including a fee refund action under section 10726.6(d),” to mean the statute of limitations applies “to any facial challenge to a groundwater fee,” (boldface added) as the District asserts. Nothing in that case relieves the District of the burden to prove the charge was adopted pursuant to section 10730(a). (§ 10726.6, subd. (c) [statute of limitations only applies to a “fee imposed pursuant to Section 10730, 10730.2, or 10730.4”].) Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 494 is likewise not helpful because it is distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate water rates under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (b). (Campana, at p. 499.) The water district argued the 120-day limitations period under Public Utilities Code section 14402 barred the plaintiffs’ claims; the appellate court agreed. (Campana, at pp. 499-500, 507.) There was no question as to whether the water rates were adopted 14 in compliance with the Public Utilities Code. The case is thus inapposite. (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1081, fn. 3 [cases are not authority for propositions not considered]; cf. KCSFV I, LLC v. Florin County Water Dist. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1031-1033 [statute of limitations under Gov. Code, § 66022, subd. (a) did not apply because water district failed to prove the rate increase constituted a service charge within the meaning of that statute].) Finally, the District argues that, if it must prove the well registration charge was imposed under section 10730(a) to invoke the statute of limitations under section 10726.6(c), it would effectively require “the District to win on the merits before the statute of limitations applies.” We disagree. The District merely needs to show that it adopted a groundwater fee in accordance with its delegated statutory authority and followed the prescribed procedures. (See Padilla v. City of San Jose (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1078-1079 [analyzing whether a charge was “ ‘fixed pursuant to’ ” Health & Saf. Code, div. 5, art. 4 to determine whether the mandatory prefiling procedure in Health & Saf. Code, § 5472 applied to bar the plaintiffs’ claims]; KCSFV I, LLC v. Florin County Water Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1031-1033 [water district had to prove the rate increase constituted a service charge within the meaning of Gov. Code, § 66022 in order for the statute of limitations under subd. (a) of that statute to apply].) Such a requirement does not render the 180-day limitation meaningless or allow a petitioner to circumvent the statute of limitations simply by alleging a fee violates section 10730(a), as the District contends. The requirement merely places the burden of proof where it lies—with the defendant asserting an affirmative defense. A petitioner’s allegation that a local government violated section 10730(a) does not allow a petitioner to circumvent section 10726.6(c), if it applies. In sum, we conclude that, because the District’s act of adopting the well registration charge under section 10730(a) exceeded the scope of its authority and is void, section 10726.6(c) does not apply. We nevertheless consider post whether the well 15 registration charge passes constitutional muster because the District argues, and Garst does not appear to dispute, that the District also had authority under its principal act 11 (i.e., the legislation under which the District was formed) 12 and the memorandum of understanding with the County to impose the well registration charge. We will assume without deciding that the District adopted the well registration charge under such delegated authority. C. Garst Complied with the “Pay First, Litigate Later” Provision in Article XIII, Section 32 and Did Not Have to Exhaust Any Other Administrative Remedy The District argues Garst’s suit is barred because: (1) he did not establish that, prior to filing litigation, he first paid the charge as required by article XIII, section 32, or paid the charge under protest as required by section 10726.6(d); and (2) he did not file an administrative claim as required by section 10726.6(d). We find no merit in these contentions. As explained ante, the District failed to prove that the provisions of section 10726.6 apply because the District’s act of adopting the well registration charge under section 10730(a) is void. Garst has further shown that he complied with the “pay first, litigate later” requirement under article XIII, section 32. (State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 773-774 [when a petitioner attacks a charge as an invalid tax, it triggers the protection of art. XIII, § 32].) That provision requires a taxpayer to pay the contested tax in full before initiating a suit. (Water Replenishment Dist. of Southern California v. City of Cerritos (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1465.) 11 See Government Code section 56065. 12 The District’s principal act is located in Stats. 1957, ch. 1280, § 1, p. 2581 et seq. (See Deering’s Ann. Wat.—Uncod. Acts (2025) Act 1360, § 1 et seq.) 16 Garst filed a declaration with supporting documentation showing he paid the well registration charge in the first year (which the District does not dispute). The District concedes that it waived the well registration charge for Garst in the second and third years of the program based on his compliance with certain requirements and has identified no well registration charge that remains outstanding and due for Garst to maintain his lawsuit. Accordingly, the District has not shown that Garst failed to comply with article XIII, section 32. II The Well Registration Charge Is Unconstitutional The parties disagree as to whether the analytical framework of article XIII D (Proposition 218) or article XIII C (Proposition 26) governs to determine the validity of the well registration charge, assuming without deciding it was authorized under the District’s principal act or the memorandum of understanding with the County. As we can best surmise, the District argues the well registration charge must be analyzed under the regulatory fee exception to a tax in article XIII C, section 1(e)(3) because it is not a fee or charge for property-related service subject to Proposition 218. Garst, in contrast, argues the well registration charge is unconstitutional under Proposition 218 because it was imposed “as an incident of property ownership,” does not fall within the four exceptions identified in article XIII D, section 3, subdivision (a), and was not appropriately submitted to a vote, as required in article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c). We need not and thus do not resolve the parties’ disagreement as to the application of articles XIII C or XIII D because, irrespective of which article applies, the well registration charge was unconstitutionally imposed. 13 At bottom, for the well registration charge to pass constitutional muster, it must either be a property-related service fee that 13 We note article XIII C incorporates the property-related service fee exception under article XIII D, section 6, as an exception to a tax. (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)(7).) 17 meets the requirements under article XIII D, section 6, or a regulatory fee within the meaning of article XIII C, section 1(e)(3). The well registration charge qualifies as neither. A. Further Legal Background “Under the California Constitution, as amended by a series of voter initiatives, local government taxes, fees, charges, and other exactions are subject to several requirements and restrictions.” (City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1199 (City of San Buenaventura).) The first of these initiatives was Proposition 13, passed by the voters in 1978, which added article XIII A to the California Constitution. “Proposition 13 generally (1) limited the rate of any ad valorem tax on real property to 1 percent; (2) limited increases in the assessed value of real property to 2 percent annually absent a change in ownership; (3) required that ‘ “any changes in State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto whether by increased rates or changes in methods of computation” ’ must be approved by two-thirds of the Legislature; and (4) required that special taxes imposed by cities, counties and special districts must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the electors.” (Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1317.) “ ‘To prevent local governments from subverting its limitations, Proposition 13 also prohibited counties, cities, and special districts from enacting any special tax without a two-thirds vote of the electorate.’ ” (Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 836.) “Courts uniformly held, however, that article XIII A … did not restrict local governments’ ability to impose ‘legitimate special assessments’—that is, charges levied on owners of real property directly benefited by a local improvement to defray its costs. [Citation.] In part to close this perceived loophole, voters in 1996 passed Proposition 218, which, among other things, ‘ “buttresse[d] Proposition 13’s limitations on ad valorem property taxes and special taxes by placing analogous restrictions on 18 assessments, fees, and charges.” ’ ” (City of San Buenaventura, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1199-1200.) Proposition 218 added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution. Under article XIII D, section 3, only four types of local property taxes, assessments, fees, or charges are allowed if they are assessed “upon any parcel of property or upon any person as an incident of property ownership” and meet specified substantive and procedural restrictions: (1) an ad valorem property tax imposed under article XIII and article XIII A; (2) a special tax receiving a two-thirds vote under section 4 of article XIII A; (3) an assessment imposed under Proposition 218; and (4) a property- related service fee or charge imposed under Proposition 218. (Art. XIII D, §§ 3, subd. (a), 4 [procedures and requirements pertaining to assessm