In re Miguel J.

Filed 8/3/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT In re Miguel J., a Person Coming B339932 Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 24PSJP00031A) AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.J., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed. Rita Himes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________________  INTRODUCTION E.J. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order, declaring his minor child, Miguel J., a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,1 subdivisions (a) and (b), and removing the child from Father’s custody. As to the jurisdictional findings, Father argues the juvenile court erred in exercising jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a), based on the parents’ domestic violence because that subdivision does not apply to accidental harm that is inflicted on a child during a physical altercation between the parents. Father also asserts the language of the sustained section 300 petition does not accurately reflect that his physical contact with Miguel during a domestic violence incident with the child’s mother was accidental. As to the dispositional order removing Miguel from his custody, Father contends there was no substantial evidence that the child was at risk of serious physical harm if returned to Father’s care. In our original opinion filed on September 22, 2025, we affirmed the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order. We concluded the evidence was sufficient to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a), and the language in the sustained petition adequately reflected the juvenile court’s factual findings. We further concluded there was substantial evidence to support the order removing the child from Father. Following the issuance of our original opinion, we granted Father’s petition for rehearing and invited supplemental briefing on the proper interpretation of the mental state required for a 1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (a). After considering the supplemental briefing and oral argument of the parties, we hold that section 300, subdivision (a), may apply to domestic violence between a child’s parents where one parent intentionally engages in an act of violence against the other parent in the child’s presence, and the child’s exposure to such violence either inflicts serious physical harm upon the child or places the child at risk of serious physical harm. We further hold that the juvenile court properly asserted jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a), based on Father’s intentional acts of domestic violence against Miguel’s mother while she was pregnant with Miguel or holding the child in her arms. We accordingly affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. Section 300 petition Father and Maria O. (Mother) are the married parents of Miguel, a boy born in November 2023. On March 10, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging that the police were called to the family’s home due to a domestic violence incident. According to the reporting party, after Father arrived home that morning highly intoxicated, Mother confronted him about his drinking. During a physical altercation between the parents, Father accidentally struck Miguel in the face while Mother was holding the child in her arms. Miguel did not sustain any injuries. As the parents continued to argue, Mother cut her foot on a glass object that fell to the floor. She also suffered a laceration to her lip when Father slapped her. After the police arrived, Mother was granted an emergency protective order, but she did not want Father to leave the home because she relied on him to pay rent. 3 Father was arrested for domestic violence and child endangerment. In her statement to the police, Mother reported that Father used his hands to pull her, push her, and hit her approximately five times in the face, and that at some point during the altercation, he accidentally slapped the child. In a March 19, 2024 interview with DCFS about the domestic violence incident, Mother indicated that she was upset because Father had been out drinking, which he often did on weekends. According to Mother, when Father came home, they began arguing in the bedroom while she was holding Miguel. Father slapped Mother in the face. Father also accidentally hit Miguel in the face with an open hand when he hit Mother, but he did not injure the child. After Mother placed Miguel on the bed, she and Father continued fighting. Father struck Mother in the face, head, and other parts of her body, and she fought back to defend herself. At one point, Mother tried to call the police, but Father took away her cell phone. She also attempted to open the window coverings to call outside for help, but Father kept her from doing so. Mother sustained a cut on her foot when she stepped on a broken ceramic mug. She then ran out of the home, and upon seeing Mother, the apartment manager called the police. After receiving medical treatment, Mother stayed at a shelter with Miguel and obtained a seven-day protective order. The following week, both Mother and Father returned to the family’s home. In her initial interview with DCFS, Mother also described prior acts of domestic violence perpetrated by Father. She recounted that, on December 24, 2023, Father slapped her multiple times in the face with an open hand while she sat on the bed breastfeeding Miguel. On that occasion, Father was drunk 4 and upset that Mother did not prepare a holiday dinner. Mother also reported that Father slapped her several times when she was pregnant with Miguel. Mother did not believe, however, that Father would hurt her after their most recent altercation because he started to attend church and promised not to drink again. In describing the domestic violence between her and Father, Mother did not claim that Father ever targeted Miguel when he hit her. In a March 22, 2024 interview with DCFS, Father stated that, the night before the domestic violence incident, he drank several beers and used a small amount of methamphetamine. He slept on the floor, and then tried to crawl into the bed with Mother and Miguel the next morning. In response, Mother began to kick Father and yell at him for coming home late. She also scratched Father, ripped his shirt, and attempted to pull the blinds from the bedroom window. Mother cut her foot when she broke a ceramic item and stepped on the broken pieces. Father initially denied hitting Mother during the incident. However, when DCFS referenced the police report documenting that Mother was seen bleeding from her lip, Father admitted that he slapped her. In response to DCFS’s inquiry about whether he struck Miguel while slapping Mother, Father said that he had no recollection of hitting the child. Father further denied any prior incidents of domestic violence. During the interview, Father agreed to submit to an on-demand drug test, which was negative for drugs and alcohol. On April 2, 2024, DCFS filed a dependency petition for Miguel. As later amended, the petition alleged Miguel was at substantial risk of harm under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), based on the parents’ history of violent altercations in the child’s presence. It also alleged Miguel was at substantial risk of 5 harm under section 300, subdivision (b), based on Father’s abuse of methamphetamine and alcohol. On April 17, 2024, the juvenile court held a detention hearing for Miguel. At the request of Father’s counsel, the court admitted into evidence a letter showing that Father enrolled in a domestic violence program two days earlier. The court detained Miguel from Father and released the child to Mother. The court also ordered monitored visitation for Father to take place outside the family’s home. The court set an adjudication hearing on the section 300 petition. 2. Jurisdictional and dispositional report For its jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS conducted additional interviews with Father and Mother about the allegations in the petition. In his interview, Father again indicated that Mother was the aggressor in the March 2024 domestic violence incident. As described by Father, Mother kicked him out of the bed because she was upset that he drank alcohol the night before. She later grabbed him by his shirt, scratched his back, and threw a ceramic mug onto the floor. Mother also pulled down the window curtains, and Father had to cover Miguel so that the curtains did not hit him. Father admitted that he slapped Mother during their altercation, but stated that “it wasn’t much.” He maintained that he did not hit Miguel. He further denied that there were any other incidents of domestic violence between him and Mother. However, Father later stated that sometimes he would “move her to the side” when Mother hit him, but he could not recall when this occurred. While Father acknowledged that he used to drink alcohol and use methamphetamine, he asserted he was always sober when he 6 arrived home. He claimed that he had not used alcohol or drugs since the March 2024 incident. In her interview, Mother stated that, during the March 2024 incident, she argued with Father because he stayed out all night and then arrived home smelling of alcohol. She admitted that she kicked Father out of the bed and hit him on his back in anger. She also admitted that she threw a cup onto the floor and cut her foot on the broken pieces. Mother asserted that she and Father each slapped the other during the altercation, but she denied that he ever hit Miguel. She claimed that she lied to the police when she told them that Father accidentally hit Miguel because she was afraid they would take the child away. Mother further denied that they previously engaged in domestic violence, and asserted that she lied to the social worker about any prior altercations because she was angry at Father. Mother indicated that she knew Father drank alcohol, but was not aware that he used drugs. While Mother planned to continue the relationship, she acknowledged that Father needed to remain sober in order to return to the family’s home. DCFS also spoke with a maternal uncle and a paternal uncle who resided in the home. Neither relative was aware of any domestic violence between the parents prior to the March 2024 incident. In its report, DCFS noted that both Father and Mother were participating in domestic violence programs, and that Father continued to test negative for drugs and alcohol. Father was appropriate and attentive to Miguel during his monitored visits, but he was not consistent in his visitation. DCFS further noted that, despite Mother’s recent denials, she disclosed that Father accidentally hit Miguel during the March 2024 incident in her prior statements to law enforcement, the 7 hospital social worker, and the medical hub clinic that examined the child. The hospital social worker also reported that, on the day of the incident, Miguel’s face appeared to be red from being hit, and that Mother admitted this was not the first time Father hit her while she was holding the child. DCFS recommended that the juvenile court sustain the petition, remove Miguel from Father, and order services for both parents. 3. Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing On June 12, 2024, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Counsel for DCFS and counsel for Miguel joined in asking the court to sustain the domestic violence counts in the petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and the substance abuse count under subdivision (b). As to the domestic violence counts, counsel for DCFS argued that the child was within a zone of danger during the parents’ physical altercations because Father actually hit Miguel during the March 2024 incident, and Mother disclosed there were other occasions when Father hit her while she was holding the child in her arms. As to the substance abuse count, counsel for DCFS asserted that Father admitted to using alcohol and methamphetamine the night before the March 2024 incident, and that Mother disclosed the domestic violence occurred when Father was under the influence of alcohol. Mother’s counsel requested that the court dismiss the domestic violence counts in the petition because Mother’s most recent statements to DCFS showed that the March 2024 incident was an isolated occurrence, that Miguel was never hit or placed within a zone of danger, and that Mother acted appropriately by calling the police and taking the child with her to a shelter. Father’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the petition in its 8 entirety. As to the domestic violence counts, Father’s counsel argued that Mother admitted she lied when she initially claimed that Father hit Miguel during the March 2024 incident and engaged in other acts of domestic violence against her. Father’s counsel also asserted that, while both parents admitted to slapping one another during the March 2024 incident, Mother instigated the altercation because she was angry at Father for staying out all night. As to the substance abuse counts, Father’s counsel argued that there was no nexus between Father’s drug use and a risk of harm to Miguel because Father never cared for the child while he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. After hearing the argument of counsel, the juvenile court sustained the domestic violence counts in the section 300 petition under subdivisions (a) and (b) of the statute, and the substance abuse count under subdivision (b). The court found Mother’s initial description of the March 2024 altercation, including her statement that Father accidentally slapped Miguel when he slapped her, to be “extremely credible.” The court also credited Mother’s initial account that Father committed other acts of domestic violence against her when she was pregnant with Miguel and later when she was breastfeeding the child. In addition, the court found that Father’s use of alcohol and methamphetamine was a “direct link to the abuse that was caused in this case” because Father was under the influence of those substances when he engaged in the March 2024 altercation with Mother. Turning to disposition, the juvenile court declared Miguel a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), removed the child from Father’s custody, and released him to Mother under the supervision of DCFS. The court ordered family 9 maintenance services for Mother and enhancement services for Father. Father’s case plan included drug and alcohol testing, a 52-week domestic violence program, parenting education, and individual counseling to address case issues. On August 12, 2024, Father filed an appeal from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order. 4. Postappeal orders Father requests this court take judicial notice of various documents that he asserts are related to whether his appeal is moot. We grant Father’s request for judicial notice of the juvenile court’s December 13, 2024, and March 14, 2025 minute orders in this case, but deny the request as to the remaining documents because they are not relevant to the mootness issue. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) These orders reflect that, at a six-month review hearing held on December 13, 2024, the juvenile court returned Miguel to both parents under the continued jurisdiction of the court. Then, on March 14, 2025, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction over Miguel with the child remaining in the custody of both parents. DISCUSSION On appeal, Father challenges the jurisdictional findings based on his domestic violence with Mother and the order removing Miguel from his custody. Father argues the domestic violence count under section 300, subdivision (a), must be set aside because accidental harm inflicted on a child during an altercation between the parents does not support jurisdiction under subdivision (a) of the statute. Father further asserts the sustained domestic violence counts under both subdivisions (a) and (b) of the statute must be modified because they do not adequately reflect that his contact with Miguel during the 10 March 2024 altercation with Mother was accidental. In addition, Father contends the removal order was not supported by substantial evidence that showed a high probability that Miguel was at risk of serious harm if returned to Father’s care. We conclude that none of Father’s claims has merit. 1. Mootness of Father’s appeal We first address Father’s argument that his appeal is not moot. “A case becomes moot when subsequent events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) While an order terminating jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from a prior order in a dependency proceeding moot, “ ‘dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic.’ ” (In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 214.) Rather, a reviewing court must “ ‘ “decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (In re D.P., at p. 276.) Even where a case is moot, the court has discretion to reach the merits if the challenged order “ ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 285.) Here, the juvenile court made jurisdictional findings that Father does not challenge on appeal. Moreover, the court has since returned Miguel to Father’s custody and terminated its jurisdiction over the child. Father nevertheless contends his appeal is not moot because (1) the challenged findings could permit a bypass of reunification services if Miguel or another 11 child of Father is removed for physical abuse in a future dependency case; and (2) DCFS likely will refer Father for inclusion in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) based on the challenged findings in this case. As the California Supreme Court recently held, a parent’s appeal from a jurisdictional finding is not moot where the parent shows that the allegation underlying the finding is subject to inclusion in the CACI, even if a CACI report has not yet been made. (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1048, 1053.) In this case, DCFS concedes Father’s appeal should not be dismissed as moot because a CACI report could be made in the future based on the sustained allegations in the current petition. Under these circumstances, we agree that Father’s appeal is not moot. 2. Jurisdictional findings based on the parents’ domestic violence In exercising jurisdiction over Miguel, the juvenile court sustained the following language in counts a-1 and b-1 of the section 300 petition: “[Mother and Father] have a history of engaging in violent altercations, in the child’s presence. On 03/10/2024, the father repeatedly struck the mother’s face with the father’s hand, pushed and pulled the mother and pulled the mother’s hair, while the mother held the child, resulting in the father striking the child’s face. The mother sustained a bleeding laceration to the mother’s lip. On 12/23/2023, the father repeatedly struck the mother’s face with the father’s hand. On prior occasions, the [father] struck the mother with the father’s hand, when the mother was pregnant with the child. On 03/10/2024, the mother pulled the father’s shirt, scratched and kicked the father, inflicting scratch marks to the father’s face and neck. The mother struck a dresser during the violent altercation, 12 causing a mug to fall to the ground and break, resulting in the mother stepping on the broken glass, inflicting an injury to the mother’s foot. On 03/10/2024, the father was arrested for Inflict Corporal Injury Spouse/Cohabitant/Dating Relationship and Child Abuse: Great Bodily Injury/Death. Such violent conduct on the part of the mother and the father endangers the child’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger.” 2.1 Governing law Section 300, subdivision (a), provides that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent.” (Ibid.) Under section 300, subdivision (b), the juvenile court may assert jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of … [¶] … [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent … to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(A).) “Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601–602 (Cole L.).) “ ‘A parent’s “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.” ’ ” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.) 13  We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) 2.2 Substantial evidence supported jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a) Father argues count a-1 in the sustained petition must be set aside because section 300, subdivision (a), requires the nonaccidental direct application of force upon the child by the parent, whereas Father’s only direct application of force against Miguel during the domestic violence incidents with Mother was accidental. DCFS asserts section 300, subdivision (a), does not require that the parent specifically intend the consequences of his or her violent acts, and Father’s act of striking Miguel during a violent attack on Mother was sufficient to support jurisdiction under subdivision (a) of the statute. We conclude section 300, subdivision (a), may apply to domestic violence between a child’s parents where one parent intentionally engages in an act of violence against the other parent in the child’s presence, and the child’s exposure to such violence either inflicts serious physical harm upon the child or places the child at risk of serious physical harm. We further conclude the evidence in this case was sufficient to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a), because the juvenile court reasonably could find that Father’s intentional acts of violence against Mother while she was 14 pregnant with Miguel and/or holding Miguel in her arms placed the child at risk of suffering serious physical harm. “ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task … is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 538–539 (N.R.).) Section 300, subdivision (a), authorizes jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (Ibid.) Neither section 300 nor any other provision within the statutory scheme for dependency proceedings defines the term “nonaccidentally” or “nonaccidental.” While the term does not appear in any of the leading dictionaries that we consulted, “accidental” is generally defined as “unintentional.” (See, e.g., American Heritage Dict. (5th ed. 2022) <https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q 15 =accidental> [as of July 20, 2026] [defining “accidental” as “[o]ccurring unexpectedly, unintentionally, or by chance”]; Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2026) <https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/accidental> [as of July 20, 2026] [defining “accidental” as “occurring unexpectedly or by chance” or “happening without intent or through carelessness and often with unfortunate results”]; Oxford English Dictionary (2026) <https://d oi.org/10.1093/OED/2445581469> [as of July 20, 2026] [defining “accidental” as “[t]hat happens by chance, unintentionally, or unexpectedly”]; Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) <https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifd1be683808411e4b391a0 bc737b01f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&context Data=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0> [as of July 20, 2026] [defining “accidental” as “[n]ot having occurred as a result of anyone’s purposeful act”].) It is thus reasonable to infer that the plain meaning of the term “nonaccidentally” is “intentionally.” Interpreting “nonaccidentally,” as used in section 300, subdivision (a), to mean “intentionally” is consistent with the California Supreme Court’s description of this provision in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 (R.T.). In R.T., the Supreme Court considered whether subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 required a finding that a parent was neglectful or otherwise blameworthy for the “ ‘failure or inability’ ” to adequately supervise or protect his or her child. (R.T., at p. 624.) In concluding that parental culpability was not required, the Supreme Court distinguished section 300, subdivision (b)(1) from surrounding provisions in the statute, explaining that “several provisions in section 300 require that a parent have acted intentionally or willfully to support a juvenile court’s dependency jurisdiction. (See § 300, subds. (a) [parent ‘inflicted nonaccidentally’ ‘serious physical harm’ on 16 child], (c) [child is suffering, or is at substantial risk of suffering, serious emotional damage ‘as a result of the conduct of the parent’], (d) [parent’s sexual abuse of child], (e) [child under five years old has suffered ‘severe physical abuse’ by parent], (i) [child subjected to act(s) of cruelty by parent].)” (R.T., at pp. 629–630, italics added.) Because section 300 did not define the statutory terms at issue, the Supreme Court also considered the common meaning of those terms as defined in the dictionary, recognizing that “[a]lthough not binding, it can be useful to refer to the dictionary definition of a word in attempting to ascertain the meaning of statutory language.” (R.T., at p. 627.) Here, considering the common meaning of the term “nonaccidentally,” as well as this guidance from the Supreme Court, we construe section 300, subdivision (a), as requiring an intentional act on the part of the parent. However, that does not end the analysis. While section 300, subdivision (a), requires that a parent act intentionally, acts of domestic violence are, of course, intentional. The question in this case is whether the parent’s intentional act of violence must be directed at the child, and not at the child’s other parent, to support jurisdiction under subdivision (a). None of the provisions in section 300 specifically identify domestic violence between a child’s parents as a basis for dependency jurisdiction. Rather, “ ‘[s]ection 300 defines jurisdiction in terms of serious harm suffered by a child or the substantial risk of such serious harm to a child. Although the harm or risk of harm to the child must generally be the result of an act, omission or inability of one of the parents or guardians, the central focus of dependency jurisdiction is clearly on the child rather than the parent.’ ” (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 626.) On appeal, Father 17 does not dispute that the juvenile court properly asserted jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), based on Father’s domestic violence against Mother. Father contends, however, that jurisdiction was not proper under section 300, subdivision (a), because the Legislature intended subdivision (a) to be limited to abuse, and subdivision (b) to more broadly apply to neglect. Section 300 was amended in 1987 to add subdivisions (a) through (j), setting forth 10 specific grounds for declaring a child a dependent of the juvenile court. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, §§ 4, 4.5, pp. 5603–5605.) “ ‘The purpose of this change was to limit court intervention to situations in which children are threatened with serious physical or emotional harm in an effort to ensure more uniform application of the law.’ ” (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 631.) As our Supreme Court explained, the amended language “was developed by a task force that had been charged by statute with reviewing the laws relating to child abuse reporting, dependent children, and child welfare services, and had been directed to ‘identify problem areas in the law’ and recommend ‘statutory revisions to strengthen and compliment the child welfare system in California.’ [Citation.] Among its findings, the task force determined that section 300, as it existed prior to 1987, provided ‘very little guidance to investigating and petitioning agencies, to judges, attorneys or to parents as to what actions or harms justify state intervention. …’ [Citation.] The Legislature hoped that legislation developed by the task force would ‘more clearly define the conditions under which a child could be removed from the family home.’ ” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 547.) The legislative history further reflects that in defining the type of harm that would justify intervention under section 300, 18 subdivision (a), the task force sought to distinguish “physical abuse” from “corporal punishment.” (See Sen. Select Com. on Children & Youth, SB 1195 Task Force Rep. on Child Abuse Reporting Laws, Juvenile Court Dependency Statutes, and Child Welfare Services (Jan. 1988) p. 6.) The task force explained that “[s]ection 300(a) specifies that in order for a court to assume jurisdiction, it must find that a child has been injured by a parent or that the child is at ‘substantial risk’ of injury,” and that “corporal punishment (‘spanking’) of a child is not, in and of itself, grounds for intervention.” (Ibid.) The task force did not, however, indicate that physical abuse was the only type of harm that was intended to be covered by subdivision (a). Nor did it address what subdivision applied where the harm to the child resulted from acts of domestic violence occurring in the child’s presence. As our Supreme Court observed, in amending section 300, “the Legislature sought to clarify the grounds for assertion of dependency jurisdiction … . But it is also evident that the Legislature implemented its intent in a manner that would ‘provide maximum protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to protect children who are at risk of that harm … .’ [Citation.] Insofar as some bases for dependency jurisdiction could be precisely specified without depriving children of this protection, they were. But as a matter of necessity, some grounds for jurisdiction had to be phrased in more general terms.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 548.) As a result, despite the Legislature’s intent to more clearly define the grounds for jurisdiction, no subdivision of section 300 speaks specifically to the risk of harm posed by domestic violence. 19  Although section 300 does not identify domestic violence as a ground for dependency jurisdiction, California appellate courts consistently have recognized that domestic violence that takes place in a child’s presence may serve as a valid basis for declaring the child a dependent of the juvenile court. (See, e.g., Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 602–603; In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 121–122; In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719–720 (M.M.); In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598–601 (Giovanni F.).) “Although many cases based on exposure to domestic violence are filed under section 300, subdivision (b) [citations], section 300, subdivision (a) may also apply” under certain circumstances. (Giovanni F., at p. 599; accord, Nathan E., at pp. 121–122; M.M., at p. 720.) In Giovanni F., for instance, the father’s violent conduct included punching and choking the child’s mother while he was driving a car and the child was in the backseat. (Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 600.) Once the parents arrived home, they physically struggled over the child’s car seat while the child was still in it. (Ibid.) On a prior occasion, the father also attacked the paternal grandmother while he was holding the child in his arms. (Id. at p. 599.) In concluding that jurisdiction was proper under section 300, subdivision (a), the Court of Appeal reasoned: “Domestic violence is nonaccidental. When it occurs in a moving vehicle, the potential for injury inherent in the violence is dramatically increased by the likelihood of a collision that could prove fatal. By driving with one hand on the steering wheel, and using his other hand to hit and choke [the mother], [the father] placed [the child], a passenger, at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. Any harm [the child] suffered would have resulted from [the father’s] 20 nonaccidental conduct. [The father’s] assertion that his behavior did not endanger [the child] is incorrect. His assertion that he did not intend to hurt [the child] is immaterial. [The father’]s violence in the car would have been sufficient, by itself, to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a).” (Giovanni F., at pp. 600–601.) Similarly, in M.M., the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the parents’ domestic violence placed their child at risk of serious harm under section 300, subdivision (a). (M.M., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 720–721.) In that case, the record showed that the child was not only present during a domestic violence incident between the parents, but that “he was ‘at their feet’ during most of the incident and that during some of the incident, father was actually holding [the child] while mother was hitting father and while father was choking mother.” (Id. at p. 720.) On another occasion, the father pushed the mother when she was pregnant with the child, causing her to fall to the floor. (Ibid.) Although none of the violent conduct was directed at the child, the Court of Appeal determined that there was “ample evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding there was a substantial risk [the child] will suffer serious physical harm ‘inflicted nonaccidentally’ by mother or father.” (Ibid.) In Cole L., the Court of Appeal also observed that, “[u]nder certain circumstances incidents of domestic violence between a child’s parents, if they occur in the child’s immediate presence, may support a jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (a).” (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.) As an example, the court explained that “if a father strikes an infant’s mother while she is holding the child or an older child intervenes during 21 a fight to protect her mother from her father’s abuse, the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as nonaccidental.” (Ibid.) But the court then appeared to draw a distinction between domestic violence that occurs in “the child’s immediate presence,” and domestic violence that occurs in “the presence of bystander children.” (Ibid.) The court stated that because “a finding under section 300, subdivision (a), requires evidence of a risk of physical injury ‘inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child[,]’ ” “[a]n unintended injury to a bystander child that results from an intentional act directed at another—for example, due to an object thrown by one parent at another during an argument— does not satisfy that statutory requirement.” (Ibid.) In drawing this distinction, the court criticized Giovanni F. and similar cases as “fail[ing] to recognize the fundamental difference between a failure to protect a child from the unintended consequences of intentional behavior and the deliberate (that is, ‘nonaccidental’) infliction of injuries upon the child … .” (Cole L., at p. 603, fn. 7.) However, under Cole L.’s analysis, it is unclear why a child at risk of being struck by a parent while being held in the other parent’s arms would fall under section 300, subdivision (a), while a child at risk of being struck by an object thrown by one parent at the other would fall under subdivision (b). In both cases, there is a risk of an unintended injury to the child that results from an intentional act directed by the parent at another, while the child is present in the room and close enough to the violent act to be at substantial risk of serious physical harm. We therefore disagree with Cole L. to the extent it holds that an unint