In re N.B. CA2/5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB345872
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 In re N.B. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re N.B., A Person Coming Under B345872
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 20CCJP05018)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Senior Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over
N.B. (Minor), removed him from the care of his mother, C.B.
(Mother), and placed him with his father, C.H. (Father). Prior to
a six-month review hearing, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (the Department) reported
Mother suffered a stroke that left her unable to communicate. At
that review hearing, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
and issued an exit order awarding Father sole legal and physical
custody of Minor and limiting Mother to monitored visitation.
We consider whether proceeding with the hearing in the absence
of appointing a guardian ad litem for Mother was error.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jurisdiction and Disposition
Minor was born in November 2020. He was living with
Mother when the family came to the attention of the Department
in March 2024. Specifically, Minor entered a liquor store by
himself and police officers later observed unsafe and unsanitary
conditions in the family home. Minor also tested positive for
cocaine.
The Department filed a juvenile dependency petition
alleging there existed a substantial risk Minor would suffer
serious physical harm based on Mother’s failure to provide
adequate care and supervision, her creation of a detrimental and
endangering situation in which Minor was exposed to cocaine,
her history of substance abuse and current abuse of marijuana,
and the unsafe and unsanitary conditions in Mother’s home.
In August 2024, after DNA testing determined C.H. is
Minor’s father, the Department filed a first amended petition.
Among other things, the Department added allegations that
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Father knew or reasonably should have known about Mother’s
substance abuse, Father also has a history of substance abuse
(which resulted in the termination of Father’s family
reunification services as to Minor’s half-sibling), and Father has
a history of engaging in violent altercations in the presence of
Minor’s half-sibling.
The juvenile court found Father to be Minor’s presumed
father in December 2024. At the jurisdiction hearing held the
same day, the juvenile court sustained dependency allegations
concerning Mother’s failure to provide adequate care and
supervision and Mother’s substance abuse. The juvenile court
also sustained the allegations concerning Father’s substance
abuse.
In April 2025, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing
and ordered Minor removed from Mother and placed with Father
under the Department’s supervision. Mother’s case plan required
her to submit to random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing,
to participate in parent-child interactive therapy, to take all
prescribed psychotropic medication, and to participate in
individual counseling to address case issues. Mother was granted
nine hours of monitored visitation per week.
B. Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction and Exit
Order
In a report dated October 2025, the Department informed
the juvenile court that Mother was hospitalized in June 2025
“after suffering a severe medical emergency.” She “remain[ed]
hospitalized” with “no set discharge date” because “her medical
condition [wa]s not stable and [wa]s delicate.” A nurse explained
to a Department social worker that Mother was “‘bed bound’” and
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will “‘need around-the-clock care as she is incapable of physically
caring for herself. [She] cannot make decisions on her own and
cannot carry out a meaningful conversation.’” The Department
nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court terminate
dependency jurisdiction over Minor, grant the child’s father sole
physical and legal custody, and order that Mother’s “family time
[i.e., visitation with Minor in the hospital] . . . remain
supervised.”
The juvenile court held a six-month review hearing at the
end of October 2025. The juvenile court opened the hearing by
noting the Department’s recommendation to terminate
jurisdiction with sole custody to Father and monitored visitation
for Mother. The Department “happily submitt[ed] on the
recommendation.”
Mother’s attorney reminded the court that Mother had
“suffered a debilitating stroke” and stated he had “not been able
to speak with her.” Mother’s attorney indicated, however, that he
knew Mother “very well” and suggested that, “if she were [at the
hearing], she would be asking the court for split legal and split
physical custody.” Alternatively, “she would be asking for
unmonitored visits.” Mother’s attorney also argued that if the
juvenile court were not inclined to grant Mother unmonitored
visitation, it should still approve “some monitors”—including
C.G., a former caregiver for Mother’s adult daughter, or “anyone
that [Father] approves of”—because Mother’s counsel did “not
believe [Mother] would have any means to pay for a professional
monitor.”
The juvenile court remarked it was “very unfortunate that
[Mother] has suffered a medical condition” and proceeded to
“terminate jurisdiction,” “clos[ing] the case with sole physical and
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sole legal custody to Father . . . .” The juvenile court ordered
Mother’s visits for nine hours per week could be “monitored by
either [C.G.] or [L.S.] or any other agreed upon monitor between
Mother and Father. If none of that works out, [Mother] will have
to pay for a professional monitor.” In making these orders, the
court emphasized Mother was “not in compliance with her case
plan prior to her medical condition” and stated that “[i]n order for
her to go to family court, she would have to comply with this
court’s orders in order to get unmonitored visits . . . .”
Specifically, Mother would “have to complete 26 sessions of
individual counseling to address all case issues,” “comply with all
criminal court orders,” “take all prescribed psychotropic
medications,” and participate in 12 sessions of a “developmentally
appropriate parenting program.”
The juvenile court stayed its order terminating jurisdiction
pending receipt of a custody order, which it signed later the same
day. Among other things, the custody order indicates Mother is
limited to supervised visitation because she “has not
completed . . . 12 developmentally appropriate parenting
classes[ and] 26 individual counseling sessions . . . .”
II. DISCUSSION
In these consolidated appeals from the jurisdiction findings,
the disposition order, and the exit order, Mother principally
argues the juvenile court should have appointed a guardian ad
litem at the six-month review hearing. That is right, and the
error was prejudicial because, at a minimum, a guardian ad litem
might well have identified additional monitors for visitation
between Mother and Minor. We shall therefore vacate the order
terminating jurisdiction and the accompanying exit order, and we
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will remand to hold a new review hearing in which the juvenile
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for Mother unless it finds,
based on current information, that her condition has improved
such that a guardian ad litem is no longer necessary.1
A. Legal Framework Governing Appointment of a
Guardian Ad Litem
“When . . . a person who lacks legal capacity to make
decisions . . . is a party, that person shall appear either by a
guardian or conservator of the estate or by a guardian ad litem
appointed by the court in which the action or proceeding is
pending, or by a judge thereof, in each case.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 372 (Section 372), subd. (a)(1).) “In a dependency case, a parent
who is mentally incompetent must appear through a guardian ad
litem, to whom the parent yields management and control of the
litigation.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 904.) “The test
is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature
or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in
preparing the case.” (Id. at 910.) “When a dependency court has
knowledge of a party’s . . . incompetence under [S]ection 372, the
dependency court has an obligation to appoint a [guardian ad
litem] sua sponte.” (In re A.C. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146, 155.)
A party does not forfeit a challenge to the juvenile court’s
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem by failing to raise the issue
1
Because we are vacating the exit order, we need not reach
Mother’s alternative argument that the exit order incorrectly
implies (in conflict with the juvenile court’s oral ruling) Mother
failed to complete previously ordered parenting classes.
The jurisdiction findings and disposition order are
unchallenged and will be affirmed.
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in the juvenile court. (See, e.g., In re M.F. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th
673, 682 [reasoning that a party requiring a guardian ad litem is
“‘hardly in a position to recognize[ ] and independently protest’
the failure to appoint her one”].) The juvenile court’s failure to
appoint a guardian ad litem is not a jurisdictional defect that is
reversible per se, however. (Ibid.) Reversal is required only if
the error is prejudicial. (Ibid.)
B. The Juvenile Court’s Failure to Appoint a Guardian
Ad Litem Was Prejudicial Error
The Department does not dispute the juvenile court was
required to appoint a guardian ad litem for Mother at the six-
month review hearing when her debilitating stroke prevented her
from participating in the proceedings. The Department does,
however, contend the error was harmless.
The harmless error standard in such cases is unsettled.
(M.F., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at 681 [holding the juvenile court’s
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem under the circumstances
“[could not] be deemed harmless under any standard”]; James F.,
supra, 42 Cal.4th at 911, fn. 1 [“Because we did not grant review
on the appropriate harmless error standard [for erroneous
appointment of a guardian ad litem] and the parties have not
briefed it, we do not address that issue here”]; but see In re A.C.
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146, 157 [holding the failure to appoint a
guardian ad litem did not warrant “set[ting] aside the judgment
unless a different result would have been probable had the error
not occurred”].) We need not settle the issue here because the
juvenile court’s failure was prejudicial under any standard.
In M.F., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 673, the Court of Appeal
held the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad
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litem for a mother who was herself a minor.2 (Id. at 679.)
Reversing an order terminating the mother’s parental rights, the
Court of Appeal determined the error was prejudicial
notwithstanding the fact that the mother was represented by
counsel throughout the proceedings. (Id. at 679-680.) In
examining “the duties of a guardian ad litem in dependency
proceedings,” the Court of Appeal emphasized a guardian ad
litem’s “‘role is more than an attorney’s but less than a party’s’”
insofar as “‘[t]he guardian may make tactical and even
fundamental decisions affecting the litigation but always with
the interest of the guardian’s charge in mind. Specifically, the
guardian may not compromise fundamental rights, including the
right to trial, without some countervailing and significant
benefit.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at 680.)
The juvenile court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem
in M.F. was prejudicial because, among other things, “[a]
guardian ad litem would have been required to contest
jurisdiction, whereas [the mother] waived her right to a contested
hearing,” “a guardian ad litem might have urged the court to
place the infant with [the mother]” as a non-custodial parent, a
guardian ad litem “presumably[ ] would have notified counsel and
the court” that visits were not occurring, and a guardian ad litem
could have raised arguments the mother’s attorney did not raise
concerning the need for additional family reunification services.
(M.F., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at 681.)
2
The Legislature subsequently amended Section 372 to
provide that “a minor may appear in court without a guardian ad
litem . . . if the minor is a parent of the child who is the subject
of” dependency proceedings. (§ 372, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
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Here, as in M.F., a guardian ad litem might have remedied
factual oversights and raised arguments the juvenile court did
not consider. A guardian ad litem could have reminded the
juvenile court that one of the two approved monitors named in
the exit order “resides in Ohio and is unable to monitor any
family time.” A guardian ad litem could also have requested the
juvenile court to consider naming other potential monitors—
including, for instance, S.W., a friend of Mother who told the
Department in June 2024 that she was willing to monitor visits
and asked the Department to follow up the next month.3 (In re
Reyna R. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 486, 494 [“Although DCFS
would not have any involvement in visitation after jurisdiction
was terminated, the agency could have potentially identified an
unpaid monitor for the juvenile court’s consideration. This
person or persons could even be identified by name in the exit
order”].)
The Department contends “an additional monitor
necessarily would not render the ultimate outcome necessarily
different or more favorable, as the monitored nature of the visits
and the potential to add monitors remained with or without a
guardian ad litem appointed.” The suggestion that Mother can
seamlessly “add monitors” in the future lacks merit. Under the
terms of the exit order, any new non-professional monitor must
be approved by Father. In the event Father’s approval of a
suitable monitor is not forthcoming, Mother would need to seek
modification of the order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 302, subd. (d),
362.4, subd. (b).)
3
The appellate record does not reflect any attempt by the
Department to follow up with S.W.
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Because we hold there was prejudicial error, the juvenile
court must appoint a guardian ad litem for Mother. After giving
the appointed guardian sufficient time to prepare and consult
with Mother’s appointed counsel, the court must then hold a new
six-month status review hearing.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction findings and disposition order are
affirmed. The juvenile court’s order terminating dependency
jurisdiction and the associated exit order are vacated. The cause
is remanded with directions to appoint a guardian ad litem for
Mother (unless the court finds her condition has improved to the
extent a guardian is no longer necessary because she is capable of
proceeding with appointed counsel on her own) and to then hold a
new review hearing consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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