Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 In re N.B. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE In re N.B., A Person Coming Under B345872 the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. AND FAMILY SERVICES, 20CCJP05018) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.B., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over N.B. (Minor), removed him from the care of his mother, C.B. (Mother), and placed him with his father, C.H. (Father). Prior to a six-month review hearing, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) reported Mother suffered a stroke that left her unable to communicate. At that review hearing, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and issued an exit order awarding Father sole legal and physical custody of Minor and limiting Mother to monitored visitation. We consider whether proceeding with the hearing in the absence of appointing a guardian ad litem for Mother was error. I. BACKGROUND A. Jurisdiction and Disposition Minor was born in November 2020. He was living with Mother when the family came to the attention of the Department in March 2024. Specifically, Minor entered a liquor store by himself and police officers later observed unsafe and unsanitary conditions in the family home. Minor also tested positive for cocaine. The Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging there existed a substantial risk Minor would suffer serious physical harm based on Mother’s failure to provide adequate care and supervision, her creation of a detrimental and endangering situation in which Minor was exposed to cocaine, her history of substance abuse and current abuse of marijuana, and the unsafe and unsanitary conditions in Mother’s home. In August 2024, after DNA testing determined C.H. is Minor’s father, the Department filed a first amended petition. Among other things, the Department added allegations that 2 Father knew or reasonably should have known about Mother’s substance abuse, Father also has a history of substance abuse (which resulted in the termination of Father’s family reunification services as to Minor’s half-sibling), and Father has a history of engaging in violent altercations in the presence of Minor’s half-sibling. The juvenile court found Father to be Minor’s presumed father in December 2024. At the jurisdiction hearing held the same day, the juvenile court sustained dependency allegations concerning Mother’s failure to provide adequate care and supervision and Mother’s substance abuse. The juvenile court also sustained the allegations concerning Father’s substance abuse. In April 2025, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing and ordered Minor removed from Mother and placed with Father under the Department’s supervision. Mother’s case plan required her to submit to random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing, to participate in parent-child interactive therapy, to take all prescribed psychotropic medication, and to participate in individual counseling to address case issues. Mother was granted nine hours of monitored visitation per week. B. Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction and Exit Order In a report dated October 2025, the Department informed the juvenile court that Mother was hospitalized in June 2025 “after suffering a severe medical emergency.” She “remain[ed] hospitalized” with “no set discharge date” because “her medical condition [wa]s not stable and [wa]s delicate.” A nurse explained to a Department social worker that Mother was “‘bed bound’” and 3 will “‘need around-the-clock care as she is incapable of physically caring for herself. [She] cannot make decisions on her own and cannot carry out a meaningful conversation.’” The Department nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court terminate dependency jurisdiction over Minor, grant the child’s father sole physical and legal custody, and order that Mother’s “family time [i.e., visitation with Minor in the hospital] . . . remain supervised.” The juvenile court held a six-month review hearing at the end of October 2025. The juvenile court opened the hearing by noting the Department’s recommendation to terminate jurisdiction with sole custody to Father and monitored visitation for Mother. The Department “happily submitt[ed] on the recommendation.” Mother’s attorney reminded the court that Mother had “suffered a debilitating stroke” and stated he had “not been able to speak with her.” Mother’s attorney indicated, however, that he knew Mother “very well” and suggested that, “if she were [at the hearing], she would be asking the court for split legal and split physical custody.” Alternatively, “she would be asking for unmonitored visits.” Mother’s attorney also argued that if the juvenile court were not inclined to grant Mother unmonitored visitation, it should still approve “some monitors”—including C.G., a former caregiver for Mother’s adult daughter, or “anyone that [Father] approves of”—because Mother’s counsel did “not believe [Mother] would have any means to pay for a professional monitor.” The juvenile court remarked it was “very unfortunate that [Mother] has suffered a medical condition” and proceeded to “terminate jurisdiction,” “clos[ing] the case with sole physical and 4 sole legal custody to Father . . . .” The juvenile court ordered Mother’s visits for nine hours per week could be “monitored by either [C.G.] or [L.S.] or any other agreed upon monitor between Mother and Father. If none of that works out, [Mother] will have to pay for a professional monitor.” In making these orders, the court emphasized Mother was “not in compliance with her case plan prior to her medical condition” and stated that “[i]n order for her to go to family court, she would have to comply with this court’s orders in order to get unmonitored visits . . . .” Specifically, Mother would “have to complete 26 sessions of individual counseling to address all case issues,” “comply with all criminal court orders,” “take all prescribed psychotropic medications,” and participate in 12 sessions of a “developmentally appropriate parenting program.” The juvenile court stayed its order terminating jurisdiction pending receipt of a custody order, which it signed later the same day. Among other things, the custody order indicates Mother is limited to supervised visitation because she “has not completed . . . 12 developmentally appropriate parenting classes[ and] 26 individual counseling sessions . . . .” II. DISCUSSION In these consolidated appeals from the jurisdiction findings, the disposition order, and the exit order, Mother principally argues the juvenile court should have appointed a guardian ad litem at the six-month review hearing. That is right, and the error was prejudicial because, at a minimum, a guardian ad litem might well have identified additional monitors for visitation between Mother and Minor. We shall therefore vacate the order terminating jurisdiction and the accompanying exit order, and we 5 will remand to hold a new review hearing in which the juvenile court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for Mother unless it finds, based on current information, that her condition has improved such that a guardian ad litem is no longer necessary.1 A. Legal Framework Governing Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem “When . . . a person who lacks legal capacity to make decisions . . . is a party, that person shall appear either by a guardian or conservator of the estate or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, or by a judge thereof, in each case.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372 (Section 372), subd. (a)(1).) “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear through a guardian ad litem, to whom the parent yields management and control of the litigation.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 904.) “The test is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case.” (Id. at 910.) “When a dependency court has knowledge of a party’s . . . incompetence under [S]ection 372, the dependency court has an obligation to appoint a [guardian ad litem] sua sponte.” (In re A.C. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146, 155.) A party does not forfeit a challenge to the juvenile court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem by failing to raise the issue 1 Because we are vacating the exit order, we need not reach Mother’s alternative argument that the exit order incorrectly implies (in conflict with the juvenile court’s oral ruling) Mother failed to complete previously ordered parenting classes. The jurisdiction findings and disposition order are unchallenged and will be affirmed. 6 in the juvenile court. (See, e.g., In re M.F. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 673, 682 [reasoning that a party requiring a guardian ad litem is “‘hardly in a position to recognize[ ] and independently protest’ the failure to appoint her one”].) The juvenile court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem is not a jurisdictional defect that is reversible per se, however. (Ibid.) Reversal is required only if the error is prejudicial. (Ibid.) B. The Juvenile Court’s Failure to Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem Was Prejudicial Error The Department does not dispute the juvenile court was required to appoint a guardian ad litem for Mother at the six- month review hearing when her debilitating stroke prevented her from participating in the proceedings. The Department does, however, contend the error was harmless. The harmless error standard in such cases is unsettled. (M.F., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at 681 [holding the juvenile court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem under the circumstances “[could not] be deemed harmless under any standard”]; James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at 911, fn. 1 [“Because we did not grant review on the appropriate harmless error standard [for erroneous appointment of a guardian ad litem] and the parties have not briefed it, we do not address that issue here”]; but see In re A.C. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146, 157 [holding the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem did not warrant “set[ting] aside the judgment unless a different result would have been probable had the error not occurred”].) We need not settle the issue here because the juvenile court’s failure was prejudicial under any standard. In M.F., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 673, the Court of Appeal held the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad 7 litem for a mother who was herself a minor.2 (Id. at 679.) Reversing an order terminating the mother’s parental rights, the Court of Appeal determined the error was prejudicial notwithstanding the fact that the mother was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. (Id. at 679-680.) In examining “the duties of a guardian ad litem in dependency proceedings,” the Court of Appeal emphasized a guardian ad litem’s “‘role is more than an attorney’s but less than a party’s’” insofar as “‘[t]he guardian may make tactical and even fundamental decisions affecting the litigation but always with the interest of the guardian’s charge in mind. Specifically, the guardian may not compromise fundamental rights, including the right to trial, without some countervailing and significant benefit.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at 680.) The juvenile court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem in M.F. was prejudicial because, among other things, “[a] guardian ad litem would have been required to contest jurisdiction, whereas [the mother] waived her right to a contested hearing,” “a guardian ad litem might have urged the court to place the infant with [the mother]” as a non-custodial parent, a guardian ad litem “presumably[ ] would have notified counsel and the court” that visits were not occurring, and a guardian ad litem could have raised arguments the mother’s attorney did not raise concerning the need for additional family reunification services. (M.F., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at 681.) 2 The Legislature subsequently amended Section 372 to provide that “a minor may appear in court without a guardian ad litem . . . if the minor is a parent of the child who is the subject of” dependency proceedings. (§ 372, subd. (c)(1)(B).) 8 Here, as in M.F., a guardian ad litem might have remedied factual oversights and raised arguments the juvenile court did not consider. A guardian ad litem could have reminded the juvenile court that one of the two approved monitors named in the exit order “resides in Ohio and is unable to monitor any family time.” A guardian ad litem could also have requested the juvenile court to consider naming other potential monitors— including, for instance, S.W., a friend of Mother who told the Department in June 2024 that she was willing to monitor visits and asked the Department to follow up the next month.3 (In re Reyna R. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 486, 494 [“Although DCFS would not have any involvement in visitation after jurisdiction was terminated, the agency could have potentially identified an unpaid monitor for the juvenile court’s consideration. This person or persons could even be identified by name in the exit order”].) The Department contends “an additional monitor necessarily would not render the ultimate outcome necessarily different or more favorable, as the monitored nature of the visits and the potential to add monitors remained with or without a guardian ad litem appointed.” The suggestion that Mother can seamlessly “add monitors” in the future lacks merit. Under the terms of the exit order, any new non-professional monitor must be approved by Father. In the event Father’s approval of a suitable monitor is not forthcoming, Mother would need to seek modification of the order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 302, subd. (d), 362.4, subd. (b).) 3 The appellate record does not reflect any attempt by the Department to follow up with S.W. 9 Because we hold there was prejudicial error, the juvenile court must appoint a guardian ad litem for Mother. After giving the appointed guardian sufficient time to prepare and consult with Mother’s appointed counsel, the court must then hold a new six-month status review hearing. DISPOSITION The jurisdiction findings and disposition order are affirmed. The juvenile court’s order terminating dependency jurisdiction and the associated exit order are vacated. The cause is remanded with directions to appoint a guardian ad litem for Mother (unless the court finds her condition has improved to the extent a guardian is no longer necessary because she is capable of proceeding with appointed counsel on her own) and to then hold a new review hearing consistent with this opinion. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS BAKER, J. We concur: HOFFSTADT, P. J. KIM (D.), J. 10