Full Opinion

Filed 7/30/26 Modified and Certified for Pub. 8/28/26 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN CITY OF LOS ANGELES, B336981 c/w B340065 (Los Angeles County Super. Petitioner and Appellant; Ct. No. 22STCP03070) INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 18, Real Party in Interest and Appellant, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES et al., Real Party in Interest and Respondent; CITY OF LOS ANGELES EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed and remanded. Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard, David W. Tyra and Alec D. Tyra for Petitioner and Appellant. Schwartz, Steinsapir, Dohrmann & Sommers and Daniel E. Curry for Real Party in Interest and Appellant. Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Hannah Weinstein and Julia Harumi Mass for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. _________________________ Beginning in 1980 the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) and the City of Los Angeles (City) maintained a reciprocal retirement benefits arrangement (Reciprocity or the Reciprocal Arrangement). This arrangement allowed employees transferring between DWP and the City to carry their pension service credits between the two retirement systems. In 2010, DWP decided to withdraw from Reciprocity. In 2013 the City then adopted Ordinance No. 182824 (the 2013 Ordinance), which suspended the Reciprocal Arrangement. City employees and their unions1 (collectively the Coalition) filed an unfair labor relations practice claim before the 1 The Coalition of City of Los Angeles Unions, which represents current and former City employees whose retirement benefits are administered by the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System, consists of: American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, District Council 36 and its Local Unions 741, 901, 2006, 2626, 3090, and 3672; Service Employees International Union, Local 721; Laborer’s 2 Los Angeles Employees Relations Board (ERB). The Coalition alleged the City failed to bargain or meet and confer with the Coalition over the suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement. The ERB agreed the City violated its duty to engage in “effects bargaining” regarding possible ways to mitigate the effects of the suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement. The ERB ordered the City to bargain with the Coalition and to make whole Coalition- represented employees who sustained losses, including reduced pension or other benefits, resulting from the City’s unilateral implementation of the suspension, until the City had satisfied its obligation to bargain. The trial court then denied the City’s petition for writ of mandate challenging the ERB’s order and granted the Coalition’s petition seeking to enforce it. The City does not dispute that it had a duty to bargain over the effects of ending Reciprocity. Instead, it challenges only the remedy ordered by the ERB. It argues the ERB lacked authority to order make-whole relief and, even if it possessed that authority, fashioned an improper remedy that failed to restore the parties to the status quo existing when the City’s bargaining obligation arose. The City further contends the ERB’s order is vague and overbroad, and violates separation-of-powers principles. Finally, it challenges the trial court’s postjudgment award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. We affirm. International Union of North America, Local 777; Los Angeles and Orange County Building & Construction Trades Council; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 501; and Teamsters Union, Local 911. 3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Different Los Angeles City Retirement Plans and the Reciprocal Arrangement The City provides retirement benefits to its employees through different retirement systems, two of which are relevant here. One is the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System (LACERS), for most City officers and employees. (Los Angeles City Charter, §§ 500, 1102, subd. (a), 1150.)2 The Los Angeles City Council (City Council) has authority to establish or modify LACERS benefits under the procedures set forth in the Charter. (Charter, § 1168.) The terms of the LACERS plan are codified in the Los Angeles Administrative Code.3 (Charter, § 1150, subd. (b).) The DWP provides retirement benefits through the Water and Power Employees’ Retirement Plan (WPERP). (Charter, § 603.) WPERP operates autonomously, with an independent source of funding and a separate budget. (Charter § 603.) Like the City with respect to LACERS, DWP has authority to modify WPERP benefits, and the WPERP Board of Administration manages and administers the plan and its funds. (Charter, §§ 1102, subd. (c), 1104, subd. (c), 1106, 1186.) Beginning around 1980, LACERS and WPERP entered into an arrangement governing the transfer of retirement benefits between the two systems. In January 1980, the City Council enacted former section 4.1060 to implement the arrangement between LACERS and WPERP. This code section was later 2 Charter references are to the Los Angeles City Charter. 3 Undesignated section references are to the Los Angeles Administrative Code. 4 renumbered without substantive change as section 4.1095. Under this arrangement, employees transferring between DWP and any City department (in either direction) could transfer their employee pension contributions and interest on those contributions to the new retirement system. The receiving retirement system treated the transferring employees as if they had spent their entire City career under that retirement system. Both LACERS and WPERP are defined-benefit plans that calculate retirement benefits based on an employee’s years of service, compensation, and a multiplier. (§§ 4.1005, 4.1007, 4.1080.7.) As a result, the number of years of credited service directly affects the amount of an employee’s pension. Reciprocity allowed the employee to transfer credit for years of employment from one system to another, thereby increasing the employee’s pension. The Reciprocal Arrangement contemplated that both LACERS and WPERP would participate. Specifically, section 4.1095, subdivision (k), reads: “Reciprocity of Benefit Provisions and Conditions Affecting this Section. It is the intent and purpose of this section to provide, or help to provide, portability between the LACERS and the WPERP. The achievement of complete portability of benefits is dependent upon appropriate action by the governing body of the WPERP. Should the implementation of any provisions of this section be possible only if some specific action is taken by the WPERP, then, and as to such provisions only, the effect of this section shall be suspended until appropriate action has been taken by the WPERP.” 5 B. WPERP’s Suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement and the 2013 Ordinance In 2010 the WPERP Board commissioned a study of Reciprocity that determined more employees transferred from the City to DWP than in the opposite direction, increasing WPERP’s unfunded liability by approximately $183 million. The WPERP Board voted to suspend Reciprocity. The City Council voted to veto WPERP’s changes, which led to litigation about whether WPERP needed the approval of the City Council to change this aspect of its retirement plan. (Romero, et al. v. City Council of the City of Los Angeles, etc., et al., LASC Case No. BC449834 (Romero).) The Coalition was not a party to the Romero litigation. Only the City, the DWP, and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 18 (Local 18), the union representing employees who receive their retirement benefits from WPERP, were parties to the Romero litigation. That litigation ultimately resulted in a settlement that was finalized on November 18, 2013. The City agreed to suspend Reciprocity so that “each retirement plan (WPERP and LACERS) will be fiscally responsible only for the years of service and final average salary the member earned while a member of that retirement plan.” The City would continue to recognize WPERP service only to determine retirement eligibility, consistent with Internal Revenue Service regulations. In October and November 2013 the City Attorney sent to the City Council drafts of an ordinance to amend the provisions of the Administrative Code governing LACERS “to suspend reciprocity … and to make related changes.” The City Attorney advised that the proposed ordinance “changes retirement benefits.” The amendments provided that retirement benefits 6 would be calculated based only on service in LACERS-covered positions, while WPERP service would count only for the purpose of determining an employee’s eligibility to retire. On November 7, 2013, the Coalition notified the City’s Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) that, under state law and the City’s Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO; § 4.800 et seq.), the City was required to bargain over the suspension of Reciprocity. The next day the City Council directed the CAO to meet with the Coalition. The CAO took the position that the City would provide information and answer questions but had no duty to formally meet and confer. (In the later proceedings before the ERB, the City conceded its duty to bargain arose no later than November 7, 2013, when the proposed ordinance was introduced and the Coalition demanded bargaining.) On December 9, 2013, the Coalition sent a follow-up letter identifying what it understood to be the effects of suspending Reciprocity on its members. On December 10, 2013, the City Council adopted the 2013 Ordinance, effective January 1, 2014, “to suspend reciprocity between the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System and Water and Power Employees’ Retirement Plan, and to make related changes.” Under the Ordinance, LACERS no longer credited prior WPERP service when calculating retirement benefits, except to determine retirement eligibility (i.e., that employees have worked enough years to qualify for retirement). The 2013 Ordinance allows employees moving from a WPERP-covered position to a LACERS-covered position to “purchase” their WPERP service for LACERS purposes, so that their retirement benefits are based on the aggregate of their LACERS-covered and WPERP-covered service. (See § 4.1020.1.) To do so, the employee must pay both the employee and employer 7 contributions that would have been made to LACERS during the period of WPERP employment. (Ibid.) For example, an employee earning $100,000 annually who seeks to purchase two years of WPERP service would have to pay LACERS $60,000. (Ibid.) The City stipulated that a Senior Clerk Typist who worked 15 years in a LACERS-covered position, transferred to a WPERP-covered position for 15 years, and then retired would receive $16,195.16 less annually under the 2013 Ordinance than under Reciprocity, and $12,426.71 less than if the employee had remained in a LACERS-covered position. C. The Coalition Files Unfair Employee Relations Practice Charges Against the City Before the ERB In the City of Los Angeles, the ERO, section 4.800 et seq. of the Los Angeles Administrative Code, governs labor relations between the City and its employees. The ERO requires the City to meet and confer with employee organizations over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and makes it an unfair employee relations practice to fail to do so. (See §§ 4.830, subd. (a), 4.860, subd (a)(3).) The ERO also established the ERB, the City administrative agency responsible for resolving labor disputes. (See § 4.810(a).) Section 4.810, subdivision (f), of the ERO identifies the ERB’s “powers and duties.” The list contains nine subdivisions. Relevant here, subdivision (f)(4) states one of the ERB’s powers is “[t]o investigate and determine the validity of charges of unfair employee relations practices, to make findings, and to issue orders to cease and desist which are not in conflict with other provisions of law.” Subdivision (f)(12) states the ERB also has the power “[t]o perform such other duties as may be necessary to carry out the Board’s responsibilities under the provisions of this chapter.” 8 On November 21, 2013, the Coalition filed unfair employee relations practice charges against the City before the ERB based on the City’s refusal to bargain over the suspension of Reciprocity. The Coalition alleged the City “violated its duty to negotiate in good faith” with the Coalition “before taking unilateral action to implement changes in reciprocity, retirement benefits, retiree medical benefits, and transfer and promotion rights.” It alleged these actions violated sections 4.830, subdivision (a), 4.857, and 4.860, subdivisions (a)(1) and (3), and constituted unfair employee relations practices. As remedies, the Coalition sought: “an order directing that the City (a) cease and desist from its refusal to meet and confer with the Coalitions Unions concerning matters within the scope of representation, including reciprocity between the LACERS and WPERP and the benefits resulting from reciprocity; (b) cease and desist from its implementation of, and immediately rescind and give no effect to, any other unilateral changes in retirement and retiree medical benefits and/or transfer and promotion rights of the employee classifications represented by the Coalitions Unions; (c) cease and desist from any other efforts to modify retirement benefits and/or transfer rights for represented classifications without meeting and conferring with the Coalition Unions; (d) cease and desist from interfering with, denying or violating rights protected by the ERO; (e) make whole any employee for losses resulting from the City’s unlawful actions as alleged herein; and (f) post notices stating that the City has violated the ERO.” D. The Hearing Officer’s Findings An ERB-appointed hearing officer conducted a series of evidentiary hearings culminating in three reports. The hearing officer concluded the City violated the ERO by failing to meet and 9 confer and bargain over the effects of ending Reciprocity, but not the decisions to withdraw its opposition to WPERP’s suspension of Reciprocity in the Romero litigation and to end Reciprocity by adopting the 2013 Ordinance.4 He found the City had some discretion over how the suspension of Reciprocity would be implemented and was obligated to negotiate with the affected employees on these issues. For instance, the end of Reciprocity affected not only WPERP service credit, but also related issues such as retiree health subsidies and protected leave. With respect to the remedy, the hearing officer concluded that “restoring the status quo ante” was not appropriate because “such an order would require the City to do more than the City was ever required to do,” and WPERP was not a party to the proceedings and could not be compelled to participate. Although a complete restoration of the pre-Romero system was therefore impracticable, the hearing officer concluded the City’s “blatant disregard” of its bargaining obligation required a remedy that would “empower the Coalition to bargain for benefits that are equivalent to what existed prior to the mess that followed WPERP’s decision to end the statutory reciprocity scheme.” He stated, “Here, that means a bargaining order and a make-whole remedy for any employee who can show a loss of income, pension, or other benefits as a consequence of the City’s violation of its bargaining obligation.” At the same time, he “reject[ed] the 4 He also noted the City had an independent obligation to bargain with the Coalition Unions over the implementation of the terms of the settlement agreement in the Romero litigation because the Coalition’s memorandum of understanding had a requirement that the City bargain over changes in pension benefits. 10 Coalition’s request that the Board declare various provisions in the Administrative Code void and unenforceable.” E. The ERB’s Final Decision and Order In June 2022, the ERB issued its final decision and order. With limited exceptions, the ERB adopted the hearing officer’s “factual findings, reasoning, and legal conclusions.” It agreed the City had no duty to bargain over the City’s decision to withdraw its opposition to WPERP’s decision to suspend Reciprocity. It also concluded “the City was obligated under … [s]ection 4.1095, as it existed prior to January 1, 2014, to stop counting employees’ prior WPERP service for LACERS benefit purposes when WPERP suspended reciprocity,” but the City still had a duty to bargain the effects of the end of Reciprocity. In adopting the hearing officer’s reasoning and recommendations regarding a make-whole remedy, the ERB emphasized a make-whole remedy in an effects bargaining case like this one should be of limited duration, with the make-whole remedy ending when the bargaining process ends. The ERB ordered the City to: • “meet and confer in good faith with the Coalition about the effects of WPERP’s suspension of reciprocity,” including: o “Whether and, if so, how WPERP service should be counted by LACERS in determining eligibility for disability retirement and the amount of disability allowance;” o “Whether and, if so, how prior WPERP years of service should be recognized by LACERS for Benefits purposes;” 11 o “How the LACERS retiree health subsidy should be treated for individuals transferring from LACERS to WPERP covered positions;” o “How long employees in WPERP positions who are on protected leave from LACERS positions should have to decide on returning to LACERS positions;” and o “Whether and how the end of reciprocity impacted transfers.” • “make whole Coalition-represented employees who have sustained any losses (including a reduced pension or other benefits) due to unilateral changes implemented on or after January 1, 2014 to the manner in which WPERP years of service are treated or who sustain any such losses in the future ... from the date any impacted employee began to experience harm (i.e., January 1, 2014) until the earliest of: o the date the Parties have ceased negotiating because they have reached agreement as part of complying with this Order; o the date the Parties have reached impasse and exhausted any post-impasse procedures that may be required or agreed upon; or o failure by the Coalition to request bargaining or to bargain in good faith as a part of complying with this Order;” and • “cease and desist from enforcing or otherwise applying against Coalition-represented employees the Los Angeles Administrative Code provisions that address, for any purpose, how to treat periods of service with WPERP for employees who move from a WPERP- 12 covered position to a LACERS-covered position on or after January 1, 2014 until the earliest occurrence of” the conditions described regarding the parties’ bargaining obligations above. F. The Trial Court Proceedings In August 2022 the City filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The City did not challenge the ERB’s determination that it violated the ERO by failing to bargain over the effects of ending Reciprocity. Instead, it challenged only the ERB’s remedial order, arguing the ERB lacked authority to order make-whole relief and that the directive the City cease and desist from enforcing provisions of the Administrative Code exceeded the ERB’s authority, was unsupported by its findings, and was impermissibly overbroad. The Coalition filed a cross-petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, seeking an order requiring the City to comply with the ERB’s order.5 In November 2023 the trial court denied the City’s petition and granted the Coalition’s. The court concluded that section 4.810, subdivision (f)(12), of the ERO—which authorizes the ERB to “perform such other duties as may be necessary to carry out [its] responsibilities”—empowered the ERB to order make-whole relief. It further determined make-whole relief was an appropriate remedy for an effects-bargaining violation. The 5 Local 18 also filed a cross-petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, making many of the same arguments as the City in challenging the ERB’s decision. On appeal, Local 18 joins in the City’s arguments and otherwise does not advance any of its own arguments. 13 court rejected the City’s separation-of-powers challenge, reasoning the ERB’s order did not compel legislative action and that section 4.1095, subdivision (k), did not “expressly restrict the City’s ability to credit WPERP service” going forward. Finally, the court determined the ERB’s cease-and-desist order was not overbroad or vague. The court also granted the Coalition’s motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The City timely appealed both the judgment denying its writ petition and the order awarding attorney fees. DISCUSSION A. Effects Bargaining and the ERB’s Exclusive Authority over Alleged Labor Law Violations by the City The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3500 et seq., governs collective bargaining for local government employees in California. (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 915-916 (County of Los Angeles); Singletary v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 18 (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 34, 41 (Singletary).) “[T]he MMBA imposes ‘mandatory bargaining requirements’ for employer actions within the ‘scope of representation,’ i.e., with ‘significant effect on the “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” of the bargaining-unit employees.’ [Citations.] This duty to bargain requires the public employer ‘ “to refrain from making unilateral changes in wages and working conditions until the employer and employee association have bargained to impasse.” ’ ” (Los Angeles County Prof. Peace Officers Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (2026) 14 119 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1098-1099 (Los Angeles County Prof. Peace Officers).) “Employers are also required to bargain over the effects and implementation of changes that fall outside the scope of representation but have reasonably foreseeable impacts on issues within the scope of representation.” (Trustees of California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90, 103; accord, Los Angeles County Prof. Peace Officers, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096, fn. 1 [“ ‘Effects bargaining’ refers to an employer’s duty under the [MMBA] to ‘bargain regarding the “effects of a decision that has a foreseeable effect on matters within the scope of representation, even where the decision itself is not negotiable.” ’ ”]; see International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 276-277; Stationary Engineers Local 39 v. City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2351-M, p. 47 [even for employer actions not within the scope of representation, employer has a duty to bargain “before implementing a new or changed policy” that will “hav[e] a foreseeable effect on matters within the scope of representation”].) In this event, “the employer must provide notice and an opportunity to meet and confer after it has reached a firm decision but before the decision is implemented.” (Trustees, at p. 104.) “[M]atters deemed subject to effects bargaining include severance pay, vacation pay, seniority, and pensions.” (Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623, 634.) As stated, the City does not challenge the ERB’s determination that it violated its obligation to bargain with the Coalition regarding the effects of the suspension of Reciprocity. 15 In most parts of California, unions bring labor law violations under the MMBA, such as violations of the obligation to bargain, before the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (b)), and PERB is “ ‘vested with the authority to interpret … the MMBA’ ” (Singletary, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 42, fn. 6). However, the MMBA carves out an exception for the City: “the employee relations commissions established by, and in effect for … the City of Los Angeles pursuant to [Government Code] Section 3507,” i.e., the ERB, has “the power and responsibility to take actions on … all unfair practices [committed by the City], and to issue determinations and orders as [the ERB] deem[s] necessary, consistent with and pursuant to the policies of” the MMBA. (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d); see Singletary, at p. 40, fn. 4.)6 Accordingly, the ERB, not PERB, has jurisdiction over the City’s labor law violations, but, as the City acknowledges, the ERB’s 6 “Section 3507, subdivision (a) [of the Government Code] authorizes public agencies to adopt rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the MMBA, and in 1971, the City adopted [the ERO] for this purpose.” (Singletary, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.) As discussed, the ERO created the ERB and authorized it to, among other things, determine the validity of charges of unfair employee relations practices. (ERO, § 4.800; City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Bd. (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 159-160.) In 1968 Los Angeles County created its own employee relations commissions called the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) that has the exclusive authority to implement the MMBA for Los Angeles County agencies. (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d); City of Los Angeles, at p. 159.) Thus, the MMBA carves out exceptions for both the City and the County of Los Angeles. (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d); Singletary, at p. 43.) 16 orders must be consistent with the policies of the MMBA as interpreted and administered by PERB. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 917 [discussing parallel exception for ERCOM in Los Angeles County].) “ ‘The MMBA deals with a matter of statewide concern, and its standards may not be undercut by contradictory rules or procedures that would frustrate its purposes. [Citations.] Local regulation is permitted only if “consistent with the purposes of the MMBA.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 923-925.) B. Standard of Review “ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s judgment on a petition for writ of mandate, the appellate court is required to exercise independent judgment on legal issues.’ ” (Los Angeles County Prof. Peace Officers, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.) “A court exercises its independent judgment reviewing an agency’s interpretation of the law, applying any appropriate deference to the agency’s legal interpretation.” (Shear Development Co., LLC v. California Coastal Com. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 334, 350.) “Although ‘courts retain final authority to “ ‘state the true meaning of [any] statute,’ ” ’ they ‘ “generally defer to PERB’s construction of labor law provisions within its jurisdiction,” ’ ” including the MMBA. (Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 725, 743; accord, Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 911-912 (Boling I); see Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 982, 997, fn. 5 [“PERB is ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and 17 therefore must respect.’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[c]ourts generally defer to PERB’s construction of labor law provisions within its jurisdiction.’ ”].) We follow PERB’s statutory interpretation “ ‘unless it is clearly erroneous.’ ” (Boling I, at p. 911; accord, People ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters, etc. v. City of Palo Alto (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 602, 617 (Internat. Assn. of Firefighters).) Decisions from PERB interpreting the MMBA are highly persuasive on legal matters within PERB’s area of expertise. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, at p. 996; County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 917.) Although Boling I addresses deference owed to PERB’s construction of labor laws, not the ERB’s, the ERB is the agency for the City of Los Angeles with a specialized field of knowledge with respect to implementing the ERO. Because interpretation of the ERO falls squarely within the ERB’s “ ‘ “legislatively designated field of expertise” ’ ” (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 912), we defer to the ERB’s interpretation of the ERO unless it is clearly erroneous (see Boling I, at p. 904). However, we “retain final authority to ‘ “state the true meaning of the [ordinance].” ’ ” (Id. at p. 912.) C. The ERB’s Conclusion It Was Empowered To Order a Make- whole Remedy Was Not Clearly Erroneous The ERB ordered the City to “make whole Coalition- represented employees who have sustained any losses (including a reduced pension or other benefits) due to unilateral changes implemented on or after January 1, 2014 to the manner in which WPERP years of service are treated or who sustain any such losses in the future ... from the date any impacted employee began to experience harm (i.e., January 1, 2014) until the earliest of” the date the parties reached agreement or impasse (unless the 18 Coalition failed to request bargaining or to bargain in good faith). The ERB adopted the hearing officer’s reasoning, consistent with the ERB’s past precedent, that the ERB had authority to order such affirmative relief and determined a make-whole remedy was appropriate for the violation found. (See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Los Angeles Police Dept. and the City of Los Angeles (1988) ERB Dec. No. U-74, at p. 6 [concluding the ERB “has broad power under the ERO to rectify the unfair employee relations practices found herein, up to and including restoration of the status quo ante”].) Contrary to the City’s contention, the ERB’s interpretation of its remedial powers was not clearly erroneous. 1. The ERO does not limit the ERB’s remedial powers to prospective cease and desist orders The City contends the “ERB’s ‘make-whole’ remedy exceeded its authority and jurisdiction” and that the ERB is limited to “issuing prospective relief that the City cease committing such violations in the future.” The ERB’s contrary interpretation of its powers under the ERO and the MMBA was not clearly erroneous. “Our review of local regulations is guided by the same established rules we use for statutory construction.” (Berkeley Hills Watershed Coalition v. City of Berkeley (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 880, 897.) In interpreting an ordinance like the ERO, “ ‘ “our fundamental task is to ‘ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the’ ” ’ ” ordinance. (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) “We consider first the words of [an ordinance], as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 19 1037.) In arguing the ERO limits the ERB’s remedies to prospective cease-and-desist orders, the City relies on ERO section 4.810, subdivision (f)(4). That provision states the ERB shall have the power and duty “[t]o investigate and determine the validity of charges of unfair employee relations practices, to make findings, and to issue orders to cease and desist which are not in conflict with other provisions of law.” (§ 4.810, subd. (f)(4), italics added.) However, subdivision (f)(12) of section 4.810 additionally grants the ERB authority “[t]o perform such other duties as may be necessary to carry out the [ERB’s] responsibilities under the provisions of this chapter,” including adjudicating unfair employee relations practices claims. (See §§ 4.810, subd. (f)(12); 4.860, subd. (c).) The Coalition contends this provision empowers the ERB to impose additional remedies such as make-whole relief when the ERB finds the City committed an unfair labor practice. The Coalition’s interpretation of ERO section 4.810, subdivision (f)(12), is reasonable because the ERO must be harmonized with the MMBA. (See State Dept. of Pub. Health v. Superior Ct. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 955 [“ ‘ “A court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize statutes, reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force and effect to all of their provisions.” ’ ”].) As discussed, the City adopted the ERO to implement the provisions of the MMBA. (See Singletary, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.) “[L]ocal rules [such as the ERO] cannot conflict with the MMBA. ‘The MMBA deals with a matter of statewide concern, and its standards may not be undercut by contradictory rules or procedures that would frustrate its purposes. [Citations.] Local regulation is permitted only if “consistent with the purposes of the MMBA.” ’ ” (County of 20 Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 925; accord, Pacifica Firefighters Assn. v. City of Pacifica (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 758, 772.) The MMBA dictates that the ERB “shall have the power and responsibility to take actions on … all unfair practices, and to issue determinations and orders as [the ERB] deem[s] necessary, consistent with and pursuant to the policies of this chapter.” (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d); see Singletary, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 43-44 & fn. 4 [discussing the ERB’s powers under Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d)].) This MMBA provision bestows broad authority on the ERB to issue orders it deems necessary to carry out the policies of the MMBA. PERB has consistently recognized that retroactive make- whole relief serves MMBA’s policy objectives. Such relief “serve[s] the dual purposes of compensating for the harm a violation causes and deterring further violations,” as well as aims to provide “ ‘a restoration of the situation as nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the unfair labor practice.’ ” (Service Employees Internat. Union Local 521 v. County of Santa Clara (2024) PERB Dec. No. 2900-M, p. 25; accord Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 99 v. The Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Dec. No. 2855, at p. 16 (TAS); see San Diego Municipal Employees Assn. v. City of San Diego (2015) PERB Dec. No. 2464-M, at p. 41 [imposing make-whole relief “prevents the employer from gaining a one-sided and unfair advantage in negotiations,” “affirm[s] the principle of bilateralism in negotiations, which is the ‘centerpiece’ of the MMBA,” and “vindicate[s] the authority of the exclusive representative in the eyes of employees”].) Reading the ERO in harmony with the MMBA and PERB’s 21 longstanding recognition that make-whole relief serves core MMBA objectives, we defer to the ERB’s reasonable determination that section 4.810, subdivision (f)(12), gives it the authority to award retroactive make-whole relief when necessary to remedy an unfair employee relations practice. D. A Make-whole Remedy Is Appropriate for the Failure To Engage in Effects Bargaining As the hearing officer recognized, “PERB has made it clear that the failure to bargain over effects is just as serious as a failure to bargain over a mandatory subject of bargaining.” He cited PERB’s decision in Santa Clara County Correctional Peace Officers’ Assn. v. County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2321-M, at pages 23-24, which emphasized that “[t]he rule requiring effects bargaining arises from balancing the need of employers to make unfettered decision[s] about the direction of the enterprise with the rights of employees … to a voice in workplace matters related to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. In other words, effects bargaining is not a stepchild of decision bargaining. It is just as important as bargaining over a decision to alter the terms and conditions of employment.” “In remedying effects bargaining violations, PERB recognizes that they are equally harmful as decision bargaining violations, as both disrupt and destabilize employer-employee relations by creating an imbalance in the power between management and employee organizations.” (TAS, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2855, at p. 17.) Make-whole remedies are customary for effects bargaining violations, just as they are for decision bargaining violations. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 376, 389 (Boling II) [typical PERB remedy for 22 violation of duty to engage in effects bargaining is to order such bargaining and award back pay7 for the affected employees until bargaining results in an agreement or impasse].) As discussed, a make-whole remedy is designed to “ ‘restore[] ... the situation as nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the unfair labor practice.’ ” (Culver City Employees Assn. v. City of Culver City (2020) PERB Dec. No. 2731-M, at p. 50 (Culver City Employees Assn.); see Engineers and Architects Assn. v. City of Los Angeles et al. (2006) ERB Dec. No. U-185, at p. 2 [“the standard remedy for an unlawful unilateral change is restoration of the status quo ante prior to commencing negotiations”].) “The usual remedy for an employer’s violation of its effects bargaining obligation is an order to bargain … over the effects, with a limited backpay award to make employees whole for losses suffered and to mitigate as much as possible the imbalance in the parties’ bargaining positions resulting from the employer’s unlawful conduct.” (American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Local 3299 et al. v. Regents of the Univ. of California (2021) PERB Dec. No. 2783-H, pp. 31-32; accord, TAS, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2855, at p. 19 [if an employer violates its duty to bargain over effects, “full retroactive back pay may be necessary to provide adequate compensation, deterrence, and a level field for fair effects negotiations”]; Culver City Employees 7 The term “back pay,” as used by PERB, generally refers to all forms of make-whole relief, including relief from detrimental effects on medical or retirement benefits. (TAS, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2855, at p. 17 fn. 11; California School Employees Assn., Chapter 32 v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (2022) PERB Dec. No. 2544a, at pp. 33-34.) 23 Assn., at p. 50; Service Employees Interna