Marriage of Y.C. and D.C. CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketD087811
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 Marriage of Y.C. and D.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of Y.C. and D.C.
Y.C., D087811
Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. D550621)
D.C.,
Appellant;
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT OF
CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Adam Wertheimer, Commissioner. Affirmed.
D.C., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent Y.C. or Respondent County of San Diego
Department of Child Support Services.
D.C. (Father) filed a request for order to change child support.
Although the court awarded Father child support, it did so in an amount
below the guideline calculation. The clerk of the court served Father with a
copy of the order after the hearing, but the clerk did not mail him a copy, nor
did any other party serve Father with a copy. One hundred and eighty days
later, Father filed a notice of intention to move to set aside or vacate the
order under Code of Civil Procedure section 663. The court denied the
motion, finding it was untimely and, in the alternative, there was “not a basis
for the set-aside.”
We conclude, under section 663a as written, Father’s motion was
timely. Given the Legislature’s recent amendment of the previously
identically worded deadline for new trial motions in Code of Civil Procedure
section 659, however, we question whether that is the desired outcome. And,
if not, we urge the Legislature to consider amending section 663a in the same
manner as section 659: to have the deadline run from service of the order by
the clerk of the court rather than the clerk’s mailing of the order.
We also determine the court did not err in ruling that Father failed to
provide a proper basis to set aside and vacate the order.
We accordingly affirm.
I.
A.
In November 2023, Father filed a request for order to change child
support. At the time, he was paying Y.C. (Mother) $726 per month in child
support. In September 2023, however, the court significantly increased
Father’s visitation on a step-up basis.
During a February 7, 2025 hearing on the request, the court
extensively reviewed both Father’s and Mother’s income and expenses. The
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court then calculated guideline child support, including, for September 1,
2024 onward, support totaling $4,619 per month—$2,887 for the younger
child and $1,732 for the elder—payable from Mother to Father.
The court found, however, “that application of [the] guideline formula
would be unjust and inappropriate” because Mother spends an “extraordinary
amount of money” on the children, in particular for the eldest child’s
extracurricular activities. Accordingly, the court decided to “deviate from
guidelines” by setting child support at $2,000 per month—$1,250 for the
younger child and $750 for the elder—payable from Mother to Father.
Father did not object to this downward departure during the hearing.
At the end of the hearing, the court indicated it would “get [the parties]
a copy of these orders i[n] just a couple minutes.” The same day, the
courtroom clerk e-mailed Father, indicating that she “made a correction to
the last two paragraphs of the minute order, see attached,” that “were small
errors, a typo or two.” She asked him to “[p]lease disregard the prior minute
order,” referring to the one Father received in court.
The file-stamped, corrected order indicated by checked box that “[t]he
court finds application of the guideline formula is unjust and inappropriate
and that it is in the best interests of the minor child(ren) to deviate from
guidelines and sets child support at $2000 per month” effective September 1.
The court further found that, effective August 1, guideline support was
“unjust and inappropriate due to the extraordinary amount mother is paying
for extracurricular activities and other expenses.” The court therefore
ordered Mother to pay monthly child support to Father at the same below-
guideline rate of $2,000 for that month.
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B.
On August 6, 2025—precisely 180 days after the February 7 order was
entered and served—Father filed a request for order “to Set Aside and Vacate
Order In Part And Enter Another And Different Order In Part.” In his
supporting memorandum of points and authorities, Father argued, as he does
on appeal, that the trial court erred in entering its judgment because
(1) Father was denied due process when the trial court deviated from
guideline child support without Mother first requesting such relief, (2) the
court failed to state its reasons for deviating from guideline support, and
(3) the court failed to state the reasons why deviating from guideline support
was in the best interests of the children. Father asked the court to vacate the
order to the extent it deviated from guideline support and enter a new order
awarding him guideline child support.
The County of San Diego Department of Child Support Services filed a
responsive declaration. It argued (1) Father “cited no legal authority to
support his request to set aside” such that he “failed to present a prima facie
case for this relief,” (2) the evidence did not support the request, and (3) the
request was untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008,
subdivision (a) (which governs motions for reconsideration). Mother’s
responsive declaration detailed her extensive medical expenses.
On October 8, the court heard argument on Father’s request. The
court’s tentative ruling was that the request was untimely and the court
“d[id]n’t see a basis” for the requested relief. In finding the request untimely,
the court noted Father “was provided with the judgment on the day of the
hearing, February 7th, and he waited six months to file” his motion, but he
“had 15 days” to challenge the order. Alternatively, the court concluded that
it “held a long-cause hearing, made its decision, and that has been enforced
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for the last six months. The [c]ourt does not believe that it was incorrect or
erroneous. And, therefore, . . . there’s not a basis for the set-aside.” The
written order issued the same day denied the request for the same reasons
provided orally.
C.
On December 8, Father filed his notice of appeal from the orders
entered on both February 7 and October 8, 2025.
In April 2026, we requested a letter from Father explaining why his
appeal from the February 7, 2025 order should not be dismissed as untimely.
In response, Father “respectfully withdr[e]w [his] appeal from the February
7, 2025[] ruling” and elected to “continue [his] appeal of the October 8, 2025[]
ruling.”
Neither the Agency nor Mother responded to Father’s opening brief.
II.
A.
We first address the timeliness of Father’s request to set aside and
vacate the February 7, 2025 order. Because “[t]he time period to file a motion
to vacate is jurisdictional and cannot be extended due to mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” (Conservatorship of Townsend
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 691, 702), if Father’s request was untimely, the trial
court correctly denied the motion. Father urges us to review this issue de
novo. We conclude that, under any standard of review, Father’s motion was
timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 663a.
Under section 663a, subdivision (a), a party may seek to set aside and
vacate a judgment under section 663 by filing a notice of intention to so move
either (1) “[a]fter the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment”
or (2) “[w]ithin 15 days of the date of mailing of notice of entry of judgment by
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the clerk of the court pursuant to [s]ection 664.5, or service upon [the moving
party] by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days
after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest.”
Here, the clerk of the court mailed no notice of entry of judgment, nor
did any other party—Mother or the Agency—serve Father with such notice.
Accordingly, Father had 180 days after the entry of the February 7, 2025
order in which to move to set aside and vacate it. Father filed his notice of
intention to move to set aside and vacate the judgment on August 6, exactly
180 days later. The motion, therefore, was timely.
We note, however, that the Legislature recently amended the new trial
motion deadline. Specifically, effective January 1, 2025, section 659,
subdivision (a)(2) now provides that a party must file a notice of intention to
move for a new trial, among other options, “[w]ithin 15 days of the date of
serving notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to
[s]ection 664.5.” (Italics added.) As the Assembly Committee on Judiciary
noted, the amendment “would clarify that the timeline for a motion for a new
trial begins fifteen days after the date of serving notice of entry of judgment
by the clerk of the court and not the mailing of the notice as these documents
are rarely mailed in the electronic records era.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary,
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3281 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) April 5, 2024, p. 6,
italics added.)
The same logic applies to motions to set aside and vacate a judgment.
If the Legislature understandably overlooked the lesser utilized section 663a
in modernizing posttrial motion deadlines, we urge it similarly to update the
deadline to move to set aside and vacate a judgment.
On this record and under such an amendment, it appears Father’s
request may have been untimely and the trial court’s reasoning would have
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been correct. The clerk served Father with the order on February 7, 2025,
after the hearing. The clerk then served a file-stamped and amended, but
substantively unchanged, copy of the order the same day. That service could
have started the clock running for filing a notice of intention to set aside or
vacate the judgment, making Father’s motion due February 24, well before
he filed it on August 6. (§ 12a.)
In short, section 663a as written compels us to find Father’s motion
timely, but in light of the Legislature’s recent amendment of section 659, we
question whether that is the Legislature’s desired result.
B.
Nonetheless, we conclude under any standard of review that the trial
court did not err when it denied Father’s motion to set aside the judgment.
Under section 663, “[a] judgment . . . , when based upon a decision by
the court, . . . may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and
vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered,” if,
as relevant here, there was an “[i]ncorrect or erroneous legal basis for the
decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts.”
Such a motion “‘lies only where a “different judgment” is compelled by
the facts found.’” (Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 477.)
Specifically, “[a] motion to vacate under section 663 is a remedy to be used
when a trial court draws incorrect conclusions of law or renders an erroneous
judgment on the basis of uncontroverted evidence.” (Simac Design, Inc. v.
Alciati (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 146, 153.) Importantly, “[i]n ruling on a motion
to vacate the judgment[,] the court cannot ‘“in any way change any finding of
fact.”’” (Glen Hill Farm, LLC v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.)
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These principles establish that a section 663 motion is not the proper
vehicle to raise Father’s procedural challenges to the February 7, 2025 order.
As to Father’s first challenge, Father fails to explain how a party’s
failure to request an order to deviate from guideline child support or file a
declaration supporting a request for below-guideline support in accordance
with California Rules of Court, rule 5.260(b)(1) bears on the court’s authority
to, “[i]n its discretion, for good cause shown, . . . deviate from the amount of
guideline support” under California Rules of Court, rule 5.260(b)(2).
California Rules of Court, rule 5.260(b)(3), concerning stipulated agreements
for support, appears to operate independently of subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2),
undermining Father’s implicit argument that subdivision (b)(1) cabins the
court’s discretion under subdivision (b)(2). Thus, the uncontroverted fact
Mother did not move for below-guideline support, standing alone, does not
appear to have precluded the court from awarding such support. (See In re
Marriage of Rodriguez (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 625, 636 [noting “trial court has
‘broad discretion’ to determine when special circumstances” meriting
departure from guideline support apply].) Father accordingly fails to meet
his burden to establish the facts compel a different judgment.
As to the second and third challenges, Father’s argument that Family
Code section 4056, subdivision (a) requires the court, when awarding support
in a non-guideline amount, to articulate the reasons why the amount differs
and is in the best interests of the children may have merit were he directly
appealing the court’s February 7, 2025 order. (See Rojas v. Mitchell (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1451 [failure to articulate supporting reasons reversible
error where “missing reasons cannot be implied in the court’s express
findings and we cannot conclude that the missing information would
necessarily have been adverse to appellant”].) But Father abandoned his
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untimely appeal of the court’s February 7, 2025 ruling and, most importantly,
fails to convince us a section 663 motion is the proper means to remedy these
shortcomings in the order. (See Y.R. v. A.F. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 974, 985
[“[T]he court’s failure to comply with [section 4056, subdivision (a)]’s
procedural requirements, standing alone, constitutes ground for reversal of a
child support order and remand for compliance.”], italics added; Stop C-19,
LLC v. Tooling Express, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 803, 811 [“Courts have
long interpreted section 663 to require that when a court grants a motion to
set aside and vacate the judgment, it must contemporaneously enter a new
judgment.”) Here, vacating the court’s judgment and entering a new
judgment awarding guideline support would be directly contrary to the
court’s express findings that guideline support was unjust and inappropriate
and that deviation was in the children’s best interests. (See Guardianship of
Daniels (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 376, 377 [best interests of child finding “an
issue of fact”].) A section 663 motion is accordingly not the proper means by
which to challenge the court’s failure to articulate the requisite section 4056,
subdivision (a) supporting reasons.
The trial court thus properly found there was no basis to grant Father’s
motion to set aside and vacate its February 7, 2025 order. We decline to
(1) opine on whether a different motion may have been a more appropriate
vehicle for Father’s challenges or (2) construe Father’s motion “to be an
entirely different motion” than the one he “expressly identified.” (Passavanti
v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1608.)
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III.
We affirm. Y.C. and the Department are entitled to their costs on
appeal, if any, from D.C. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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