Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Marriage of Y.C. and D.C. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re the Marriage of Y.C. and D.C. Y.C., D087811 Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. D550621) D.C., Appellant; COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Respondent. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Adam Wertheimer, Commissioner. Affirmed. D.C., in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent Y.C. or Respondent County of San Diego Department of Child Support Services. D.C. (Father) filed a request for order to change child support. Although the court awarded Father child support, it did so in an amount below the guideline calculation. The clerk of the court served Father with a copy of the order after the hearing, but the clerk did not mail him a copy, nor did any other party serve Father with a copy. One hundred and eighty days later, Father filed a notice of intention to move to set aside or vacate the order under Code of Civil Procedure section 663. The court denied the motion, finding it was untimely and, in the alternative, there was “not a basis for the set-aside.” We conclude, under section 663a as written, Father’s motion was timely. Given the Legislature’s recent amendment of the previously identically worded deadline for new trial motions in Code of Civil Procedure section 659, however, we question whether that is the desired outcome. And, if not, we urge the Legislature to consider amending section 663a in the same manner as section 659: to have the deadline run from service of the order by the clerk of the court rather than the clerk’s mailing of the order. We also determine the court did not err in ruling that Father failed to provide a proper basis to set aside and vacate the order. We accordingly affirm. I. A. In November 2023, Father filed a request for order to change child support. At the time, he was paying Y.C. (Mother) $726 per month in child support. In September 2023, however, the court significantly increased Father’s visitation on a step-up basis. During a February 7, 2025 hearing on the request, the court extensively reviewed both Father’s and Mother’s income and expenses. The 2 court then calculated guideline child support, including, for September 1, 2024 onward, support totaling $4,619 per month—$2,887 for the younger child and $1,732 for the elder—payable from Mother to Father. The court found, however, “that application of [the] guideline formula would be unjust and inappropriate” because Mother spends an “extraordinary amount of money” on the children, in particular for the eldest child’s extracurricular activities. Accordingly, the court decided to “deviate from guidelines” by setting child support at $2,000 per month—$1,250 for the younger child and $750 for the elder—payable from Mother to Father. Father did not object to this downward departure during the hearing. At the end of the hearing, the court indicated it would “get [the parties] a copy of these orders i[n] just a couple minutes.” The same day, the courtroom clerk e-mailed Father, indicating that she “made a correction to the last two paragraphs of the minute order, see attached,” that “were small errors, a typo or two.” She asked him to “[p]lease disregard the prior minute order,” referring to the one Father received in court. The file-stamped, corrected order indicated by checked box that “[t]he court finds application of the guideline formula is unjust and inappropriate and that it is in the best interests of the minor child(ren) to deviate from guidelines and sets child support at $2000 per month” effective September 1. The court further found that, effective August 1, guideline support was “unjust and inappropriate due to the extraordinary amount mother is paying for extracurricular activities and other expenses.” The court therefore ordered Mother to pay monthly child support to Father at the same below- guideline rate of $2,000 for that month. 3 B. On August 6, 2025—precisely 180 days after the February 7 order was entered and served—Father filed a request for order “to Set Aside and Vacate Order In Part And Enter Another And Different Order In Part.” In his supporting memorandum of points and authorities, Father argued, as he does on appeal, that the trial court erred in entering its judgment because (1) Father was denied due process when the trial court deviated from guideline child support without Mother first requesting such relief, (2) the court failed to state its reasons for deviating from guideline support, and (3) the court failed to state the reasons why deviating from guideline support was in the best interests of the children. Father asked the court to vacate the order to the extent it deviated from guideline support and enter a new order awarding him guideline child support. The County of San Diego Department of Child Support Services filed a responsive declaration. It argued (1) Father “cited no legal authority to support his request to set aside” such that he “failed to present a prima facie case for this relief,” (2) the evidence did not support the request, and (3) the request was untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) (which governs motions for reconsideration). Mother’s responsive declaration detailed her extensive medical expenses. On October 8, the court heard argument on Father’s request. The court’s tentative ruling was that the request was untimely and the court “d[id]n’t see a basis” for the requested relief. In finding the request untimely, the court noted Father “was provided with the judgment on the day of the hearing, February 7th, and he waited six months to file” his motion, but he “had 15 days” to challenge the order. Alternatively, the court concluded that it “held a long-cause hearing, made its decision, and that has been enforced 4 for the last six months. The [c]ourt does not believe that it was incorrect or erroneous. And, therefore, . . . there’s not a basis for the set-aside.” The written order issued the same day denied the request for the same reasons provided orally. C. On December 8, Father filed his notice of appeal from the orders entered on both February 7 and October 8, 2025. In April 2026, we requested a letter from Father explaining why his appeal from the February 7, 2025 order should not be dismissed as untimely. In response, Father “respectfully withdr[e]w [his] appeal from the February 7, 2025[] ruling” and elected to “continue [his] appeal of the October 8, 2025[] ruling.” Neither the Agency nor Mother responded to Father’s opening brief. II. A. We first address the timeliness of Father’s request to set aside and vacate the February 7, 2025 order. Because “[t]he time period to file a motion to vacate is jurisdictional and cannot be extended due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” (Conservatorship of Townsend (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 691, 702), if Father’s request was untimely, the trial court correctly denied the motion. Father urges us to review this issue de novo. We conclude that, under any standard of review, Father’s motion was timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 663a. Under section 663a, subdivision (a), a party may seek to set aside and vacate a judgment under section 663 by filing a notice of intention to so move either (1) “[a]fter the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment” or (2) “[w]ithin 15 days of the date of mailing of notice of entry of judgment by 5 the clerk of the court pursuant to [s]ection 664.5, or service upon [the moving party] by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest.” Here, the clerk of the court mailed no notice of entry of judgment, nor did any other party—Mother or the Agency—serve Father with such notice. Accordingly, Father had 180 days after the entry of the February 7, 2025 order in which to move to set aside and vacate it. Father filed his notice of intention to move to set aside and vacate the judgment on August 6, exactly 180 days later. The motion, therefore, was timely. We note, however, that the Legislature recently amended the new trial motion deadline. Specifically, effective January 1, 2025, section 659, subdivision (a)(2) now provides that a party must file a notice of intention to move for a new trial, among other options, “[w]ithin 15 days of the date of serving notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to [s]ection 664.5.” (Italics added.) As the Assembly Committee on Judiciary noted, the amendment “would clarify that the timeline for a motion for a new trial begins fifteen days after the date of serving notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court and not the mailing of the notice as these documents are rarely mailed in the electronic records era.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3281 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) April 5, 2024, p. 6, italics added.) The same logic applies to motions to set aside and vacate a judgment. If the Legislature understandably overlooked the lesser utilized section 663a in modernizing posttrial motion deadlines, we urge it similarly to update the deadline to move to set aside and vacate a judgment. On this record and under such an amendment, it appears Father’s request may have been untimely and the trial court’s reasoning would have 6 been correct. The clerk served Father with the order on February 7, 2025, after the hearing. The clerk then served a file-stamped and amended, but substantively unchanged, copy of the order the same day. That service could have started the clock running for filing a notice of intention to set aside or vacate the judgment, making Father’s motion due February 24, well before he filed it on August 6. (§ 12a.) In short, section 663a as written compels us to find Father’s motion timely, but in light of the Legislature’s recent amendment of section 659, we question whether that is the Legislature’s desired result. B. Nonetheless, we conclude under any standard of review that the trial court did not err when it denied Father’s motion to set aside the judgment. Under section 663, “[a] judgment . . . , when based upon a decision by the court, . . . may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered,” if, as relevant here, there was an “[i]ncorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts.” Such a motion “‘lies only where a “different judgment” is compelled by the facts found.’” (Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 477.) Specifically, “[a] motion to vacate under section 663 is a remedy to be used when a trial court draws incorrect conclusions of law or renders an erroneous judgment on the basis of uncontroverted evidence.” (Simac Design, Inc. v. Alciati (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 146, 153.) Importantly, “[i]n ruling on a motion to vacate the judgment[,] the court cannot ‘“in any way change any finding of fact.”’” (Glen Hill Farm, LLC v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.) 7 These principles establish that a section 663 motion is not the proper vehicle to raise Father’s procedural challenges to the February 7, 2025 order. As to Father’s first challenge, Father fails to explain how a party’s failure to request an order to deviate from guideline child support or file a declaration supporting a request for below-guideline support in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 5.260(b)(1) bears on the court’s authority to, “[i]n its discretion, for good cause shown, . . . deviate from the amount of guideline support” under California Rules of Court, rule 5.260(b)(2). California Rules of Court, rule 5.260(b)(3), concerning stipulated agreements for support, appears to operate independently of subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), undermining Father’s implicit argument that subdivision (b)(1) cabins the court’s discretion under subdivision (b)(2). Thus, the uncontroverted fact Mother did not move for below-guideline support, standing alone, does not appear to have precluded the court from awarding such support. (See In re Marriage of Rodriguez (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 625, 636 [noting “trial court has ‘broad discretion’ to determine when special circumstances” meriting departure from guideline support apply].) Father accordingly fails to meet his burden to establish the facts compel a different judgment. As to the second and third challenges, Father’s argument that Family Code section 4056, subdivision (a) requires the court, when awarding support in a non-guideline amount, to articulate the reasons why the amount differs and is in the best interests of the children may have merit were he directly appealing the court’s February 7, 2025 order. (See Rojas v. Mitchell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1451 [failure to articulate supporting reasons reversible error where “missing reasons cannot be implied in the court’s express findings and we cannot conclude that the missing information would necessarily have been adverse to appellant”].) But Father abandoned his 8 untimely appeal of the court’s February 7, 2025 ruling and, most importantly, fails to convince us a section 663 motion is the proper means to remedy these shortcomings in the order. (See Y.R. v. A.F. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 974, 985 [“[T]he court’s failure to comply with [section 4056, subdivision (a)]’s procedural requirements, standing alone, constitutes ground for reversal of a child support order and remand for compliance.”], italics added; Stop C-19, LLC v. Tooling Express, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 803, 811 [“Courts have long interpreted section 663 to require that when a court grants a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment, it must contemporaneously enter a new judgment.”) Here, vacating the court’s judgment and entering a new judgment awarding guideline support would be directly contrary to the court’s express findings that guideline support was unjust and inappropriate and that deviation was in the children’s best interests. (See Guardianship of Daniels (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 376, 377 [best interests of child finding “an issue of fact”].) A section 663 motion is accordingly not the proper means by which to challenge the court’s failure to articulate the requisite section 4056, subdivision (a) supporting reasons. The trial court thus properly found there was no basis to grant Father’s motion to set aside and vacate its February 7, 2025 order. We decline to (1) opine on whether a different motion may have been a more appropriate vehicle for Father’s challenges or (2) construe Father’s motion “to be an entirely different motion” than the one he “expressly identified.” (Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1608.) 9 III. We affirm. Y.C. and the Department are entitled to their costs on appeal, if any, from D.C. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).) CASTILLO, J. WE CONCUR: MCCONNELL, P. J. BUCHANAN, J. 10