Lazo v. Sun Gir CA2/7

Filed 10/29/26 Lazo v. Sun Gir CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN NYDIA DEL SOCORRO LAZO, B343372 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23STCV10863) v. SUN GIR INC., Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Bradley S. Phillips, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. Caskey & Holzman, N. Cory Barari, Daniel M. Holzman and Marshall A. Caskey for Plaintiff and Appellant. McMillion & Hirtensteiner, Sylvia Havens and Evelina M. Serafini for Defendant and Respondent. ________________________  INTRODUCTION Nydia Del Socorro Lazo was a dedicated cashier who worked at the same fast food restaurant location for 34 years with no prior disciplinary record. Her former employer, Sun Gir Incorporated (SGI) fired her based on three allegedly mishandled transactions. Lazo sued alleging age discrimination and various wage and hour claims arising from alleged meal and rest break violations. The trial court granted summary judgment for SGI on all causes of action. SGI’s firing of Lazo based on three allegedly mishandled transactions, presumably out of thousands, may seem unwarranted. But to proceed to trial Lazo’s burden on summary judgment was to adduce evidence the firing was motivated by age discrimination, and we conclude she has not met her burden of raising a triable issue of fact on that claim. We determine, however, that Lazo raised a triable issue of fact regarding her wage and hour claims for meal and rest break violations, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay unpaid wages, failure to produce wage records, and unfair or unlawful business practices. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment, affirm summary adjudication as to the age discrimination claim and reverse summary adjudication as to Lazo’s remaining claims. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Lazo, the party opposing summary judgment. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 844-845 (Aguilar).) 2 A. Lazo’s Employment With and Termination By SGI Lazo began working at a Carl’s Jr. restaurant (Store 7400) in Canoga Park in 1989, when she was 42 years old. Lazo remained working at this location for over 34 years. In 2000, SGI acquired this franchise location and continued to employ the existing workers, including Lazo. Until her termination at the age of 76, Lazo “had never been written up, reprimanded, or disciplined for any work-related issues over the course of her 34- year career” at Carl’s Jr. During the last four years of her employment with SGI, Lazo was employed as a “crew member” on the overnight or “graveyard” shift from 12:00 a.m. to 8 a.m. Her duties included “work[ing] the counter and drive-thru window, tak[ing] customer orders, operat[ing] the cash register and process[ing] payment, distribut[ing] food to customers, and clean[ing] the restaurant.” Lazo did not handle food or do any food preparation as a cashier, and she did not “have the training or expertise” to work as a cook, including cooking food and maintaining the kitchen. The cooks Lazo worked with “did not handle the register or customer transactions.” In her time working at Carl’s Jr., Lazo had previously worked as a shift leader for a period of four years, but she was “demoted” from this position about 10 years before the time she was fired. During Lazo’s overnight shifts, “there would be only two people scheduled to work”: Lazo and a cook. Lazo “was not able to take and did not take 10-minute rest breaks free of work or 30- minute meal breaks free of work, because [she] always needed to be available when a customer came through the drive-thru and there was no one to cover for [her]. The cook did not take breaks 3 for the same reason. The cook did not cover for [Lazo] and could not, because he/she has a different job, does not know how to use the register, and cannot take orders while cooking at the same time. [Lazo] was not free to leave the restaurant during the graveyard shift and [she] always had to be available at a moment’s notice, even if there were gaps in time between orders. When customers were not at the drive-thru window and [Lazo] was not handling cash or orders, [she] would be busy cleaning the restaurant.” Lazo’s managers created these work schedules and were aware that Lazo was “the only non-cook employee helping customers during the graveyard shift,” and that she was “working more than 5 hours without a break.” There was “sometimes” or “usually” a “lull” during the overnight shift “when there are no cars coming through” that could “last anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour.” Lazo’s managers assigned her to clean the restaurant overnight and she would clean during lulls in customers. Lazo was not told she could not take meal and rest breaks, nor did she report to SGI that she was unable to take her breaks. Lazo testified that she did not “punch out” for meal breaks during the “last years” of her employment. In January 2023, SGI commissioned an independent loss prevention audit of certain restaurants, including the one where Lazo worked, “in an effort to resolve or limit loss of inventory due to factors such as employee theft and cashier error. An audit addresses transactions which appear to involve questionable or unusual activity and include inspection for evidence of cash shortages, improper discounts, refunds, voids, receipts not matching what was delivered and similar mishandling, all of which would be indications of potential theft.” “The auditor 4 checked activity such as excessive refunds, voids, and discounts, and reviewed accounting records, videotapes and sales tickets, looking for indications of suspicious activity. The auditor reviewed all cash transactions, going back at least two weeks.” The auditor did not focus on any particular employee and did not know employee names but rather focused on potentially questionable transactions, especially cash transactions. “Once evidence of suspicious activity was found, the auditor would complete his/her notes, save a picture of the suspect, and send his/her findings to the appropriate management personnel.” SGI conducted these audits of its restaurants on a monthly basis. As relevant here, one “pattern of suspicious activity was the use of voiding (X-ing out) one or more items of an order, even though the item(s) was actually sold and delivered.” However, voiding or X-ing out items could also simply reflect that the order was canceled. Giving away food for free was against SGI policy, warranting “immediate termination,” and the record of transactions needed to “reflect exactly what was given to the customer and what the customer paid.” The 2023 audit “produced evidence that led [SGI] to believe that at least ten [] employees mishandled at least 21 transactions,” including Lazo. The auditor reviewed video footage of Lazo’s mishandled transactions. SGI subsequently terminated seven of these employees, including Lazo, while the other three “chose to voluntarily quit in lieu of being terminated after they were confronted with the evidence of their misconduct.” At that time, the employees who resigned were 19, 20, and 39 years old, and the terminated employees were ages 22, 22, 24, 39, 50, 50, and 76 (Lazo). 5  On March 24, 2023, Lazo was suspended without pay pending an investigation with a notice that she had violated company policies because “[m]anipulation of register transactions appear to reflect cash theft.” Lazo disputed the allegations of theft. Lazo was terminated for theft on March 29. Her termination notice reflected the following three theft incidents: On 2/9/2023, at 1:34 a.m., Order #340492 was taken as a cash transaction. A large drink was served that was not on the ticket. A bag of food was handed to [the] customer that was also not on the ticket. The ticket was thrown in the trash. At 1:39 a.m., [Lazo] opened the register, took cash then walked away. It was discovered that a fake ticket was created, and the customer was still charged the full amount for the items given. On 2/12/2023, at 2:55 a.m., Order #340898 was taken as a cash transaction. A drink was served which was Xed-out on ticket. The register was then open and closed. Cash was left on the countertop. A large bag of food was given to the customer. On 2/19/2023, at 2:08 a.m., Order #341724 was taken as a cash transaction for 6-7 spicy chicken sandwiches which were Xed-out of the system. The cash register was used to charge only 1 spicy chicken sandwich at a total of $1.08. The register was then open and closed again. 6  Management did not tell Lazo that she was being terminated because of her age. During her employment, Lazo only recalled one “inappropriate comment[] . . . concerning her age” 14 years before her termination, when a manager told Lazo she was “ ‘already old.’ ” After Lazo’s termination, she learned SGI “had hired 2 new employees approximately 1 month before [her] employment ended and who were women . . . 19-20 years old.” SGI filled Lazo’s former overnight shift with three existing employees: Kimberly, Ariel, and Blanca. Kimberly was born in 2002 and hired by SGI in February 2023; Ariel was born in 2004 and hired in December 2022; Blanca was born in 2003 and hired in March 2023. Between September 2022 and July 2023, SGI hired approximately 24 new employees at Store 7400 for various positions, including cashier. Birthdates were available for most, but not all, of these employees. No new hires during this period for whom birthdates were available were over 40 years old. According to SGI’s general manager, following Lazo’s termination, “most” applicants for the cashier position were between 40 and 60 years old. On April 3, 2023, Lazo’s counsel requested Lazo’s “personnel file” from SGI, including “pay stubs, wage stubs and time records,” and “[a]ny and all other records that relate to [her] compensation, [and] time scheduled or worked.” In “spreadsheet format,” SGI provided Lazo with a “computer-generated record” of her wage statements and paystubs reflecting her “compensation, [and] time scheduled or worked.” As relevant here, the spreadsheet documented the date of each paycheck, as 7 well as regular and overtime hours, gross pay, and net pay for each paycheck. B. Legal Proceedings In May 2023, Lazo sued SGI, alleging causes of action for age discrimination (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)); failure to provide meal and rest breaks (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7, 512, subd. (a)); failure to provide accurate wage statements (Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (a)); failure to pay unpaid wages at discharge (Lab. Code, §§ 201, 202); failure to produce personnel and wage records (Lab. Code, §§ 226, subd. (c), 1198.5); and unfair or unlawful business practices under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). Lazo requested damages, including punitive damages, and injunctive relief. SGI denied the allegations in the complaint. In July 2024, SGI moved for summary judgment, or summary adjudication in the alternative, on all Lazo’s causes of action. As relevant here, SGI argued Lazo’s age discrimination claim failed because it terminated her for a “legitimate, non- discriminatory reason,” i.e., the three thefts uncovered by the loss prevention audit. SGI further argued Lazo could not establish pretext by showing only that “a younger employee replaced her.” As to Lazo’s meal break claim, SGI argued Lazo received a “reasonable opportunity to take compliant breaks” pursuant to SGI’s meal and rest break policy, Lazo was “told she was supposed to take her breaks,” and Lazo could take breaks during “long lulls” overnight or by asking the other employee to “cover.” SGI further argued it did not knowingly or intentionally fail to provide accurate wage statements or to pay unpaid wages, and that there was no predicate act of unfair business practices. 8 Finally, as to the personnel and wage records claim, SGI argued it produced Lazo’s complete file within nine days of her request, it provided a “computer-generated record” of Lazo’s wages, and any missing documents, including new hire documents and performance reviews, were not available. Lazo opposed summary judgment. Lazo argued SGI’s motion violated Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1),1 and rule 3.1350(d)(1)(B) of the California Rules of Court, because it “combin[ed] multiple facts and arguments into one ‘undisputed material fact’ and then cit[ed] to a large group of evidence, without any clarification as to which evidence supports which facts/arguments.” Lazo also argued summary judgment was improper under section 437c, subdivision (h), because four days before her opposition was due, SGI had produced discovery of certain “email chains evidencing some of the discussions between [SGI’s] decisionmakers prior to [Lazo’s] termination,” but had “incriminatingly redacted” certain portions of the emails on the basis of attorney-client privilege. Lazo asserted “the[se] redacted portions will reveal . . . discussions of Lazo’s age.” Lazo separately filed motions to compel further discovery and to receive unredacted copies of these emails. Lazo’s counsel also filed a declaration attesting that SGI’s assertion of attorney- client privilege was “prejudicing [Lazo’s] ability to present all ‘facts essential to justify opposition’ ” to the motion for summary judgment. As to age discrimination, Lazo argued her termination for theft was pretextual because SGI had changed its allegations of 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 9 wrongdoing regarding the February 9, 2023 theft incident. Lazo also asserted pretext because SGI “treated younger employees in the audit more favorably” and she was replaced by three new hires under 22 years old. As to the wage and hour claims, Lazo identified evidence that she and the cook on her shift “worked through breaks, could not leave the restaurant, and could not cover for one another,” and that “the gaps between customers . . . do not qualify as breaks, since [she] could be called upon at any moment.” Lazo also argued SGI’s knowledge that Lazo and the cook were not taking meal and rest breaks established willful violations of the related statutory claims for unpaid wages, inaccurate wage statements, and the UCL violation. As to the failure to produce personnel and wage records, Lazo argued SGI did not provide her with “signed payroll reports and paystubs.” Following Lazo’s summary judgment opposition, on July 23, 2024, SGI moved for leave to file a first amended answer including three additional affirmative defenses. SGI argued that “a class action settlement [was] reached in a different case” (the Monroe action) “which became effective on or after May 30, 2024.” The Monroe settlement addressed wage and hour claims on behalf of all persons employed by SGI from January 18, 2014 through December 21, 2022, and SGI asserted Lazo was a member of this class and did not opt out of the settlement. Based on this settlement, SGI’s proposed amended answer pleaded defenses of settlement and release, claim or issue preclusion, and accord and satisfaction, which would apply to Lazo’s wage and hour claims falling under the class period. 10  Lazo opposed, arguing she would be prejudiced by the amended answer. Lazo asserted SGI “deliberately did not disclose any defenses or facts relating to the settlement throughout this case, undoubtedly so that [Lazo] would not be put on notice to object to, opt out of, or learn of relevant facts and witnesses in the class actions.” According to Lazo, the Monroe class action had “been pending since 2018 and 2021 and a settlement was reached on or around December 15, 2021 . . . . Between December 15, 2021 and March 21, 2024, the class settlement was pending . . . with an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement being filed as early as February 27, 2023.” After a hearing, the trial court granted SGI leave to amend its answer in October 2024. A transcript of the hearing proceedings is not included in the appellate record. In December 2024, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SGI. On the age discrimination claim, the court determined SGI met its initial burden to show Lazo “was not performing competently in her position and that the adverse employment action was due to a non-discriminatory motive.” The court determined Lazo had not met her burden of demonstrating a triable issue of fact that these reasons were pretextual and that SGI acted with discriminatory animus because she did not “present admissible evidence that [SGI] favored younger employees or that age was a factor in her termination.” As to the meal and rest breaks claim, the court concluded SGI “presented facts negating that it had knowledge that [Lazo] was not taking proper breaks or that [SGI] was undermining its meal and rest break policies.” The court ruled that Lazo had not established a triable issue because she did not present “any 11 evidence that [SGI] impeded or discouraged her from taking meal and rest breaks in compliance with [SGI’s] policies,” Lazo did “not assert that she was required to clean during her breaks,” and “there is no duty for employers to prevent employees from undertaking voluntary work during meal periods.” The court granted summary judgment on the related wage and hour claims and UCL claim, concluding that SGI met its burden to show it did not violate the Labor Code meal and rest break requirements and was not obligated to pay meal and rest break penalties. Finally, as to the personnel and wage records claim, the court observed SGI “asserts that it timely produced [Lazo’s] complete file when requested, and that it otherwise does not possess the items” Lazo identified as missing. The court determined Lazo did not “provide any statutory authority suggesting that the wage statements provided were inadequate; nor does she present facts showing that she was injured by [SGI’s] alleged failure to provide signed payroll reports and paystubs.” The court further denied Lazo’s motions to compel further discovery responses as moot. Lazo timely appealed. DISCUSSION Lazo first challenges the trial court’s grant of leave to file an amended answer. Lazo next argues the court erred by granting summary judgment because she demonstrated triable issues of material fact regarding her causes of action. Lazo further argues the court should not have granted summary judgment given her pending discovery motions and because SGI’s 12 separate statement did not conform to the statutory requirements.2 A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Granting SGI’s Motion To Amend Its Answer Lazo argues the court erred by permitting SGI to file an amended answer pleading defenses based on the Monroe class action settlement. Section 473 permits amendments to pleadings in the furtherance of justice, subject to the trial court’s discretion. (§ 473, subd. (a).) “Ordinarily, courts should ‘exercise liberality’ in permitting amendments at any stage of the proceeding. [Citations.] In particular, liberality should be displayed in allowing amendments to answers, for a defendant denied leave to amend is permanently deprived of a defense.” (Hulsey v. Koehler (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1159; accord, Morgan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530 [“it is a rare case in which ‘a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case’ ”].) “It is well established that leave to amend . . . is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and ‘ “ ‘[t]he exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.’ ” ’ ” (Garcia v. Roberts (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 900, 909; accord, Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 488 (Hong Sang Market).) “ ‘[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party, the rule of great 2 Lazo’s opening brief also argued the trial court erred by awarding costs to SGI, but she abandoned this argument in her reply brief. 13 liberality in allowing amendment of pleadings will prevail.’ ” (Hong Sang Market, at p. 488.) Lazo contends that SGI failed to disclose the Monroe class action during discovery to prevent her from objecting to or opting out of the settlement. While Lazo did request discovery regarding any other civil employment actions filed against SGI within the past 10 years, including class action lawsuits, SGI objected to this discovery request as overly broad, and Lazo did not challenge these objections or move to compel discovery responses on this issue. Lazo further argues that permitting the additional defenses in the amended answer caused her prejudice through “ ‘legal gamesmanship’ ” and by costing her “resources spent on litigation, the []ability to timely address defenses during discovery, risk evaluation before trial, and probable delay.” We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting SGI leave to file the amended answer. Here, SGI requested leave to amend approximately seven weeks after the Monroe settlement was finalized and enforceable. SGI’s new defenses seeking to apply the Monroe settlement against Lazo presented only legal issues and did not require any additional discovery in this case beyond the fact of the settlement. (See Hong Sang Market, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 487-488 [trial court did not abuse discretion by allowing defendant to amend answer with a res judicata defense; although plaintiff asserted defendant’s “extreme lack of diligence” and prejudice from “address[ing] a new and complex defense ‘without the benefit of either research or pretrial discovery,’ ” plaintiff was not “prejudiced by any delay” because “[t]he issue was purely legal in nature,” it was “unclear what, if any, discovery [plaintiff] might 14 have conducted that would bear upon a res judicata defense,” and plaintiff had “opportunity to respond to the res judicata defense”].) Lazo relies on Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686 (Green), but that case is distinguishable. There, the defendant mortgage broker moved to amend its answer with a new affirmative defense sounding in negligence. (Id. at p. 691.) The court denied leave to amend, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the “amendment would have both contradicted the mortgage broker’s previous verified pleading” which asserted its diligence “and required further discovery, requiring the [plaintiffs] to substantially redo their trial strategy.” (Id. at p. 693.) The court further observed the defendant’s decision to delay its negligence defense was “obviously deliberate and strategic, not a mere product of inadvertence.” (Id. at p. 693, fn. 3.) Even if, as Lazo avers, SGI employed “deliberate and strategic” timing by disclosing the Monroe action after the binding settlement, Lazo did not suffer prejudice akin to the plaintiffs in Green. (Green, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 693, fn. 3.) Unlike Green, SGI’s new defenses did not raise any new factual issues or require further factual discovery but simply presented a new legal issue: whether a portion of Lazo’s wage and hour claims may be precluded by the class action settlement. And while Lazo argues SGI’s timing compromised her use of litigation resources and her trial strategy, Lazo does not argue that she could not respond to SGI’s newly pleaded defenses on their merits. (Cf. Mac v. Minassian (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 510, 519 [“ ‘ “California courts have ‘a policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to 15 dispose of cases upon their substantial merits where the authorization does not prejudice the substantial rights of others.’ ” ’ ”].) B. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Adjudication on Lazo’s Age Discrimination Claim 1. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review Summary judgment or summary adjudication are appropriate “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c); see id., subd. (f) [summary adjudication].) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “ ‘bears the burden of showing the court that the plaintiff “has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case.” ’ ” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 274 (Lyle).) The moving party “bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) A triable issue of material fact exists “ ‘if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ ” (Doe v. Salesian Society (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 474, 478; see Padron v. Osoy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 677, 689.) “ ‘On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment [or summary adjudication], we examine the record de 16 novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment [or summary adjudication] and resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 274.) “To analyze the issues, ‘we follow the traditional three-step analysis. “We first identify the issues framed by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond. Secondly, we determine whether the moving party has established facts which negate the opponents’ claim and justify a judgment in the movant’s favor. Finally, if the summary judgment [or summary adjudication] motion prima facie justifies a judgment, we determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” ’ ” (Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 213; accord, Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 975.) 2. Fair Employment and Housing Act California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) forbids age discrimination in employment. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) “Any employee making a claim of age discrimination ultimately bears the burden of proving that the challenged adverse employment action was based on the employee’s age.” (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1116; accord, Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002 (Hersant).) For claims of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, “California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. 17 (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354. (Guz).) The employee plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (ibid.) by “present[ing] evidence that the plaintiff (1) is over the age of 40; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; (3) was performing satisfactorily at the time of the adverse action; and (4) suffered the adverse action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., evidence that the plaintiff was replaced by someone significantly younger than the plaintiff.” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 321; accord, Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “a presumption of discrimination arises.” (Guz, at p. 355.) The burden then “shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to ‘raise[] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355- 356.) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears. [Citations.] The plaintiff must then have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Id. at p. 356.) This burden-shifting framework is “ ‘ “slightly modifie[d]” ’ ” when a defendant employer moves for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 160 (Wills); accord, Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097 (Kelly).) If the employer’s motion “relies in whole or in part on a showing of nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge, the employer 18 satisfies its burden as moving party if it presents evidence of such nondiscriminatory reasons that would permit a trier of fact to find, more likely than not, that they were the basis for the termination.” (Kelly, at pp. 1097-1098; accord, Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1182 (Husman); Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1005 (Scotch).) “To defeat the motion, the employee then must adduce or point to evidence raising a triable issue, that would permit a trier of fact to find by a preponderance that intentional discrimination occurred.” (Kelly, at p. 1098; accord, Scotch, at p. 1005.) The employee may do so by offering “substantial evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.” (Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005; accord, Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 806-807 (Horn).) However, “[i]t is not enough for the employee simply to raise triable issues of fact concerning whether the employer’s reasons for taking the adverse action were sound. What the employee has brought is not an action for general unfairness but for age discrimination.” (Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005; accord, Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 [“ ‘ “The [employee] cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” ’ ”].) Rather, the employee’s “ ‘ “[c]ircumstantial evidence of ‘ “pretense” must 19 be “specific” and “substantial” in order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to discriminate’ on an improper basis.” ’ ” (Husman, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1182; accord, Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69.) “[S]ummary judgment [or summary adjudication] for the employer may [] be appropriate where, given the strength of the employer’s showing of innocent reasons, any countervailing circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive, even if it may technically constitute a prima facie case [of discrimination], is too weak to raise a rational inference that discrimination occurred.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 362.) 3. SGI Met Its Burden To Show It Terminated Lazo for a Nondiscriminatory Reason, and Lazo Did Not Demonstrate a Triable Issue of Fact That Her Termination Was Motivated by Age Discrimination Lazo concedes that SGI offered a nondiscriminatory reason for her termination: that she mishandled transactions. We agree that SGI met its initial burden to show it terminated Lazo for a nondiscriminatory reason. SGI introduced evidence that an independent loss prevention auditor determined Lazo and nine other employees mishandled cash register transactions against company policy under circumstances suggesting theft. Three of these employees chose to voluntarily resign, while the six others (including Lazo) disputed the accusations and were terminated. Lazo argues she met her burden to show that SGI’s justification for her termination was “a pretext to disguise illegal [age] discrimination.” She first argues that SGI advanced “shifting” and “factually baseless” reasons for her termination. 20 Lazo broadly asserts that SGI’s proffered reason for her firing was pretext for age discrimination. She argues SGI did not have a reasonable belief that she was stealing because she had no record of wrongdoing during her previous years of employment, and SGI did not properly investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged theft. Lazo also asserts that SGI management dismissed objections from other employees about her termination based on her lack of previous misconduct. As stated, however, it is not enough to show the employer’s proffered reason for termination was wrong or mistaken. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358; Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160; Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) Consistent with FEHA, an “ ‘employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason. . . . “While an employer’s judgment or course of action may seem poor or erroneous to outsiders, the relevant question is . . . whether the given reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination.” ’ ” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344.) Indeed, Lazo’s burden is to demonstrate the firing was motivated by an unlawful purpose. Lazo also argues that SGI’s justification was pretextual because it changed its characterization of Lazo’s February 9, 2023 transaction from giving away a bag of food and a drink to overcharging for a side order of jalapeños. “[E]vidence of pretext requires ‘ “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions . . . that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [citation], and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for the [asserted] non- discriminatory reasons.’ ” ’ ” (Martin v. Trustees of California 21 State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 163 (Martin).) But here, SGI consistently maintained that Lazo was fired because the audit revealed she “mishandl[ed]” transactions, indicating “potential theft.” (See Reeves v. MV Transportation, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 666, 680 [plaintiff did not establish triable issue regarding employer’s alleged age discrimination by identifying “slight[]” “inconsistencies in defendant’s position” which were “not the kind of ‘ “fundamentally different justifications” ’ . . . for an employment decision that created triable issues”]; accord, Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 364 [same, where employer first stated employee’s termination was “to reduce costs” and later because of a “ ‘downturn in [] workload’ ”]; Horn, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 813, 815 [affirming summary judgment on age discrimination claim where employer’s reasons for terminating plaintiff “contain the same central theme”].) Although there may be differences between giving away SGI’s product (food and drink) and mischarging for a different product (jalapeños), Lazo does not argue that SGI changed its characterization of the other two alleged mishandled transactions, which separately served to justify her termination.3 For these reasons, a reasonable factfinder could not infer from SGI’s different description of the February 9, 2023 transaction that SGI did not fire Lazo for mishandling transactions. Even if we accept Lazo’s assertion that SGI’s theft accusations lacked a factual basis, “an inference of intentional discrimination cannot be drawn solely from evidence, if any, that 3 Lazo’s declaration submitted in opposition to summary judgment conceded that she had no recollection of and could not explain the February 19, 2023 allegation that she gave a customer six or seven sandwiches but only charged for one. 22 the company lied about its reasons [for termination]. . . . Proof that the employer’s proffered reasons are unworthy of credence may ‘considerably assist’ a circumstantial case of discrimination, because it suggests the employer had cause to hide its true reasons. [Citation.] Still, there must be evidence supporting a rational inference that intentional discrimination, on grounds prohibited by the statute, was the true cause of the employer’s actions.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361.) Lazo contends she introduced such evidence showing SGI’s discriminatory motive behind her termination. She argues: “while it was pursuing its pretextual termination of Lazo, SGI was replacing Lazo with 18-to-21-year-old employees, solely hiring young employees in its restaurant, favoring other younger employees in its audit while removing other aging employees, and later lying about its knowledge of Lazo’s age and other dubious details during depositions.” We determine Lazo’s circumstantial evidence of age discrimination does not create a triable issue of fact in light of SGI’s “strong contrary showing” of a nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. (Guz, at p. 367.) Lazo argues that “fifty percent of the employees who lost their jobs as a result of SGI’s audit were over 40 years old or about to be 40 years old.” “ ‘ “ ‘[T]o create an inference of intentional discrimination, statistics must demonstrate a significant disparity and must eliminate nondiscriminatory reasons for the apparent disparity.’ ” ’ ” (Martin, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 168; accord, Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1009.) Here, SGI produced evidence that an independent auditor reviewed transactions without access to employee i