Castillo Zamora v. Art's Labor Service
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB345212
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
YUNUEN S. CASTILLO 2d Civ. No. B345212
ZAMORA, (Super. Ct. No.
2024CUOE032406)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
ART’S LABOR SERVICE et
al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
An employer may require its employees to arbitrate claims
arising out of or relating to their employment. But the
arbitration agreement is subject to ordinary rules of
unconscionability. Here we hold that an arbitration provision
extending the preclusive effect of the arbitrator’s award to
employment claims that “could have been raised” is
unconscionable. The provision would bar claims involving
distinct primary rights simply because the employee could have
asserted them in arbitration.
Appellants Art’s Labor Service and Glass House Camarillo
Cultivation, LLC (collectively Appellants) appeal from the trial
court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration. We
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Art’s Labor Service (Art’s) is a staffing agency and Glass
House is one of their clients. Glass House operates a cannabis
business and owns several cannabis farms in Southern
California. Respondent Yunuen S. Castillo Zamora was hired by
Art’s and staffed at Glass House’s Camarillo location as a
nonexempt employee from around April 2024 to September 2024.
Art’s requires all new hires to sign an arbitration
agreement (the Agreement) as a condition of employment. The
Agreement required “[a]ny and all disputes, controversies or
claims . . . arising out of or relating to this employment
handbook, [the employee’s] employment or the termination of . . .
employment shall be settled by binding arbitration . . . unless
otherwise prohibited by applicable law.”
Castillo attended a new hire orientation. She was provided
a packet containing English and Spanish versions of various
onboarding documents, including the Agreement. Art’s human
resources manager spoke in Spanish and discussed some of the
documents in Spanish. Castillo was allowed to take the
onboarding documents home to review.
In October 2024, Castillo filed a complaint “on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated,” alleging various wage and
hour claims. Castillo also submitted a notice to the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency regarding potential claims under
the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA)
(Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) based on the same Labor Code
violations alleged in her complaint. Her complaint did not allege
a PAGA cause of action.
2
Appellants moved to compel arbitration of Castillo’s claims.
Castillo did not dispute she signed the Agreement, but contended
the Agreement was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.
The trial court denied the motion to compel. It found the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) controls, but
found the Agreement was unenforceable and “permeated with
unconscionability” because of provisions regarding the
arbitrator’s award, prevailing attorney fees, and the PAGA
waiver.
DISCUSSION
“Federal and California law treat valid arbitration
agreements like any other contract and favor their enforcement.”
(Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478,
492 (Ramirez).) “A written agreement to submit a controversy to
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, ‘save upon such
grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.’ (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1281.) Unconscionability provides such grounds.”
(Ramirez, at p. 492.) A contract is unconscionable if “ ‘one of the
parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree
and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable
to the other party.’ ” (Ibid.)
Unconscionability includes procedural and substantive
elements. “Procedural unconscionability ‘addresses the
circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on
oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power.’
[Citation.] This element is generally established by showing the
agreement is a contract of adhesion, i.e., a ‘standardized contract
which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity
3
to adhere to the contract or reject it.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 492.) “[A]lthough adhesion alone generally indicates
only a low degree of procedural unconscionability, the potential
for overreaching in the employment context warrants close
scrutiny of the contract’s terms.” (Id. at p. 494.)
“Substantive unconscionability looks beyond the
circumstances of contract formation and considers ‘the fairness of
an agreement’s actual terms.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 493.) “ ‘This analysis “ensures that contracts, particularly
contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been
variously described as ‘ “ ‘overly harsh’ ” ’ [citation], ‘ “unduly
oppressive” ’ [citation], ‘ “so one-sided as to ‘shock the
conscience’ ” ’ [citation], or ‘unfairly one-sided.’ [Citation.] All of
these formulations point to the central idea that the
unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple
old-fashioned bad bargain’ [citation], but with terms that are
‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.’ ” ’ ” (Stoker
v. Blue Origin, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 91, 106–107 (Stoker).)
“Both procedural and substantive elements must be
present to conclude a term is unconscionable, but these required
elements need not be present to the same degree. [Citation.]
Courts apply a sliding scale analysis under which ‘the more
substantively oppressive [a] term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the
term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 493.) Because the evidence here regarding
unconscionability is undisputed, we review the Agreement’s
validity de novo. (Ibid.)
Procedural unconscionability
It is undisputed the Agreement is a contract of adhesion
4
because Art’s requires its employees to sign it as a condition of
employment. But as the trial court found, adhesion establishes a
low degree of procedural unconscionability. (Ramirez, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 494.)
Substantive unconscionability
The trial court found the Agreement’s following three
provisions substantively unconscionable: (1) the arbitrator’s final
and binding award and decision, (2) attorney fees related to
enforcing arbitration, and (3) the PAGA waiver. We agree these
provisions are substantively unconscionable.
1. Arbitrator’s award and decision finality
The Agreement states: “Any decision and award or order of
the arbitrator shall be in writing and shall be final and binding
between the parties as to all claims, which were or could have
been raised in connection with the dispute to the fullest extent
permitted by law. The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and
subject to judicial review only as provided by the California
Arbitration Act.” (Italics added.)
Castillo contends this language broadly extinguishes “all
claims” between the parties, and the language “tracks language
of a general release.” The trial court found this language
“suggests that an employee waives claims it fails to arbitrate, and
this is not an appropriate condition of arbitration, nor is this
waiver of rights clearly articulated.”
We employ ordinary rules of contract interpretation to
interpret the Agreement with the goal of giving effect to the
mutual intention of the parties at the time of contract formation.
(Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Co. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 59,
65.) We first examine the contract’s plain language, giving words
their usual and ordinary meaning. (Ibid.) And we interpret the
5
contract as a whole to give effect to every part, if reasonably
practicable, with each clause helping to interpret the other. (Civ.
Code, § 1641.)
“When interpreting the provisions in an arbitration
agreement covered by the FAA, due regard must be given to the
federal policy favoring arbitration and, as a result, ambiguities as
to the scope of the arbitration clause should be resolved in favor
of arbitration.” (Ford v. The Silver F, Inc. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
553, 566.) But “ ‘[w]e do not override the clear intent of the
parties, or reach a result inconsistent with the plain text of the
contract, simply because the policy favoring arbitration is
implicated.’ ” (Ibid.)
Appellants contend the provision at issue is not
unconscionable because it merely reflects ordinary res judicata
principles.1 Res judicata “prevents relitigation of the same cause
of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in
privity with them.” (Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.)
Because the provision does not “encompass all claims that could
be raised on any issue,” Appellants contend, the Agreement only
encompasses claims that “arise from the same ‘cause of action’ or
injury.” (Italics omitted.)
But relevant to res judicata is the “primary rights theory.”
The invasion of a primary right gives rise to a single cause of
action, even though there may be different legal theories or
remedies. Because a cause of action is based on the harm
1 The term “res judicata” has been used to refer to both
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Here, we use “res
judicata” only to refer to claim preclusion. (Mycogen Corp. v.
Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897, fn. 7 (Mycogen).)
6
suffered, and not a particular legal theory (Mycogen, supra, 28
Cal.4th at p. 904), “all claims based on the same cause of action
must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may
not be raised at a later date.” (Id. at p. 897.)
We conclude the language regarding the arbitrator’s award
does not merely encompass res judicata principles. According to
the Agreement, the “disputes” must “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to
the] employment handbook, [the employee’s] employment or the
termination of . . . employment.” The plain language of the
phrase “all claims, which . . . could have been raised in connection
with the dispute” broadly encompasses more claims than what is
permitted under res judicata because it implies an intent to
include claims in connection with the employment dispute that
were not raised. (Cf. Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 562, 587–589 [the phrase “ ‘all claims’ ” includes
“ ‘claims that are not expressly enumerated in the release’ ” and
constituted a general release of all claims between the parties
before the settlement agreement’s effective date].)
The clause “in connection with the dispute” also
encompasses a broad scope of claims which supports our
conclusion the Agreement contravenes the primary rights theory.
(Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186 (Rice) [“ ‘A
“broad” clause includes those using language such as “any claim
arising from or related to this agreement” ’ [citation] or ‘ “arising
in connection with” the [a]greement’ ”].) Because the arbitrator’s
award here would bar employment claims that “could have been
raised,” it purports to extinguish distinct primary rights.
(Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681 [“the primary
right is simply the plaintiff’s right to be free from the particular
injury suffered”].) Two claims which merely relate to or arise
7
from the same set of operative facts, including an employment
relationship, may not necessarily trigger application of res
judicata because they do not involve the same primary right.
(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 954 (Agarwal),
disapproved on other grounds by White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 563.)
For example, an employment discrimination claim under
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.
Code, § 12900 et seq.) does not implicate the same primary right
as claims for unpaid wages even if the latter arose from the same
employment relationship because they do not implicate the same
“harm suffered.” (Agarwal, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 954.) Thus, the
phrase “which . . . could have been raised in connection with the
dispute” includes claims not limited to those sharing the same
primary right as the specific cause of action a party raised in
arbitration. It may include claims that “ ‘ “touch matters” ’ ”
upon the dispute relating to or arising from the employment
relationship but which implicate a distinct primary right. (Rice,
supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.)
Had the parties here intended to adopt the principles of res
judicata, they could have employed limiting language that only
encompassed claims arising from the same cause of action or
injury. We conclude the provision is substantively
unconscionable. And as our Third District colleagues concluded
in Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. etc. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
1041, 1062 (Hasty), the phrase “extent permitted by law” does not
negate unconscionability because there is no evidence here that
an employee would have knowledge about what this savings
clause permits.
8
2. Attorney fees
The Agreement provides: “If any litigation is necessary to
enforce the terms of this Arbitration Agreement, or if any legal
action, even though prohibited, is brought with regard to this
Employment Handbook, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees in addition to any other relief to which
it may be entitled.” The trial court found that this language
“could discourage a plaintiff from raising legitimate issues as to
the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.” We agree.
Our high court in Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pages 507
to 512, held that a similar attorney fees provision was
substantively unconscionable. The provision required a “ ‘party
resisting arbitration’ ” “ ‘to pay to the other party all costs, fees
and expenses that they incur in compelling arbitration, including,
without limitation, reasonable attorneys’ fees’ ” if “ ‘any judicial
action or proceeding is commenced’ ” to compel arbitration and
arbitration is compelled. (Id. at p. 491.)
The plaintiff in Ramirez brought claims under FEHA.
(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 490.) In a FEHA matter, a trial
court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney fees and
costs to the prevailing defendant, but only if the action was
“ ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’ ” (Ramirez, at p. 507.)
The legislative intent behind this “asymmetric rule” is to not
“ ‘undercut the Legislature’s intent to promote vigorous
enforcement of our civil rights laws.’ ” (Id. at p. 508.)
And “ ‘[w]hen an employer imposes mandatory arbitration
as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or
arbitration process cannot generally require the employee to bear
any type of expense that the employee would not be required to
bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.’ ”
9
(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 508, citing to Armendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83,
110–111 (Armendariz).) This rule “ ‘ensure[s] that employees
bringing FEHA claims will not be deterred by costs greater than
the usual costs incurred during litigation.’ ” (Ramirez, at p. 508.)
Thus, “an arbitration agreement imposed as a condition of
employment cannot require an employee to pay attorney fees to
the employer in the arbitration of a statutory claim, unless the
arbitrator finds that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless when brought, or that the employee continued to
litigate after it clearly became so.” (Ibid.)
Because the provision in Ramirez “create[d] a potential
obligation to pay costs only in an arbitral setting” and “would also
undermine the public policy embodied in FEHA’s asymmetric
rule,” “the clause [was] unconscionable.” (Ramirez, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 508.) As in Ramirez, the Agreement here could
potentially result in an unlawful award of attorney fees. The
provision creates a potential obligation for an employee to pay
attorney fees in arbitration—an obligation that would not exist if
the action was litigated in superior court. And because the
Agreement also requires an employee to pay prevailing party
attorney fees in “any legal action” regarding the “Employment
Handbook,” the attorney fees provision could undercut or conflict
with rules regarding attorney fees in FEHA matters and other
claims under the Labor Code. (See e.g., Lab. Code, § 218.5.) We
agree the potential obligation to pay prevailing party attorney
fees could deter a plaintiff from bringing a legitimate lawsuit.
(Ramirez, at p. 508.) The attorney fees provision is substantively
unconscionable.
10
3. PAGA waiver
The Agreement also includes the following class action and
PAGA waiver: “Employees are expressly precluded from filing
any joint, class, representative or collective claims addressing
their wages, hours or other terms or conditions of their
employment against the employer in any forum, whether arbitral
or judicial. This voluntary waiver includes claims under [PAGA]
to the extent permitted by law.”
The trial court found the provision unconscionable because
a PAGA waiver “is not permitted by law.” The court also found
that “provisions that purport to waive rights ‘to the extent
permitted by law’ raise unconscionability concerns because
employees are unlikely to know what is permitted by law and
what is not.” We agree.
A waiver of representative PAGA actions is unenforceable
and violates public policy. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1117.) Several of our sister courts have
held that an arbitration provision waiving an employee’s right to
bring a representative PAGA action is substantively
unconscionable. (See Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 871, 882–883; Hasty, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1063; Subcontracting Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melo (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 201, 213–214; Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 482, 494–495 (Alberto); Stoker, supra, 120
Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–112.) We agree with these cases.
Appellants assert that PAGA actions may be divided into
individual and nonindividual claims and that individual claims
are arbitrable. But the fact that PAGA actions may be divisible
does not mean a provision is not substantively unconscionable.
The Agreement here precludes “representative” claims “whether
11
arbitral or judicial,” and the “waiver includes claims under
[PAGA].” (Italics added.) This language waives PAGA actions,
whether individual or nonindividual. (Hasty, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 1063 [clear language of arbitration agreement
precluded claims in PAGA capacity, either as an individual or as
a nonindividual].) Such a “blanket PAGA waiver” is
unconscionable. (Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 494.)
Appellants also contend the phrase “to the extent permitted by
law” is a “savings clause” that avoids unconscionability. But in
our view, the phrase does not negate the unconscionability of the
blanket PAGA waiver. (Hasty, at p. 1062.)
Severability
The Agreement contains a severance clause. Appellants
contend the trial court erred when it found the Agreement was
“permeated” with unconscionability and could not be cured by
severing the unconscionable provisions. We are not persuaded.
We review the trial court’s severance decision for abuse of
discretion. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 513.) A trial court
has discretion to refuse to enforce the contract as a whole if it is
“ ‘permeated by . . . unconscionability.’ ” (Armendariz, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 122.) In determining whether severance is
appropriate, a court should consider the contract’s purposes. “If
the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then
the contract as a whole cannot be enforced. If the illegality is
collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal
provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of
severance or restriction, then such severance and restriction are
appropriate.” (Id. at p. 124.)
Our high court in Armendariz concluded two factors
weighed against severance. First, the agreement contained more
12
than one unlawful provision. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 124.) Second, an unlawful purpose permeates an arbitration
agreement when “there is no single provision a court can strike or
restrict in order to remove the unconscionable taint from the
agreement.” (Id. at pp. 124–125.) If reforming a contract would
require “augmenting it with additional terms,” a trial court
cannot cure it through severance and must void the entire
agreement. (Id. at p. 125.)
Here, the trial court could reasonably decline to sever the
Agreement’s unconscionable provisions because it found that the
binding arbitration provision encompassing claims beyond those
barred by res judicata principles was “central” to the Agreement’s
purpose. And like Armendariz, the trial court found there were
multiple provisions that were unconscionable, and the court
would have to, in effect, reform or “edit[]” the Agreement to make
it lawful. “[U]pholding this type of agreement with multiple
unconscionable terms would create an incentive for an employer
to draft a one-sided arbitration agreement in the hope employees
would not challenge the unlawful provisions, but if they do, the
court would simply modify the agreement to include the bilateral
terms the employer should have included in the first place.”
(Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
1035, 1045.) Under these circumstances, severance would not
further the “ ‘ “interests of justice.” ’ ” (Armendariz, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 124.) No abuse of discretion has been shown.
We also reject Appellant’s contention that the trial court
ignored the FAA. The court expressly acknowledged that “the
FAA controls.” And nothing in the trial court’s ruling regarding
unconscionability contravenes the FAA. “The FAA seeks to treat
interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements equally
13
with other contracts. Such treatment continues to recognize the
severance of unconscionable claims as an option for the court’s
consideration. . . . [I]t was not Congress’s intent to make
arbitration agreements more enforceable than other contracts.”
(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 518.)
Because we conclude the court did not err in declining to
enforce the Agreement based on its unconscionability, we do not
discuss the other grounds raised in Castillo’s brief.
Class waiver
Appellants contend the class action waiver should have
been severed from the Agreement and independently enforced.
We are not persuaded. The trial court correctly concluded the
Agreement was unconscionable and did not abuse its discretion
in declining to sever. And because the class waiver appeared in
the same sentences as the infirm representative claims/PAGA
waiver, the court could reasonably decline to enforce the class
action waiver. (See, e.g., Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc.
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1311, 1317, 1331–1332.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is
affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.
14
Ronda J. McKaig, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Seyfarth Shaw, Michele J. Beilke, Julia Y. Trankiem, Galit
Knotz and Steven A. Morphy for Defendant and Appellant Glass
House Camarillo Cultivation, LLC.
Ventura County Agricultural Association and Robert P. Roy
for Defendant and Appellant Art’s Labor Service.
Lavi & Ebrahimian, Joseph Lavi, Jordan D. Bello and Brett
Szmanda for Plaintiff and Respondent.