Tessier v. Keagle CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketD087030
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 Tessier v. Keagle CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ELIZABET TESSIER, as Executor, etc., D087030
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2203867)
v.
LINDA KEAGLE,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Charlie L. Hill, Jr., Judge. Reversed with instructions.
Lobb & Plewe, Tim Plewe and Michael J. DeSantis for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Resnick & Louis and Robert A. Hufnagel for Defendant and
Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Linda Keagle (Linda) and her late husband Charles Keagle
(Charles) took out a loan for $250,000 from MLA Capital, LLC (MLA
Capital), and executed a promissory note with a maturity date of
December 31, 2012.1 The following year, the Keagles took out another loan
for $200,000 from Encarnacion Alvarez (Encarnacion) and her husband
Frank Alvarez (Frank), and executed a promissory note with a maturity date
of May 15, 2013.
In 2022, MLA Capital and the Alvarezes sued Linda for allegedly
failing to satisfy her payment obligations under the promissory notes. While
this lawsuit was pending, Frank passed away. Elizabet Tessier (Elizabet),
the Alvarezes’ daughter and Frank’s personal representative, was substituted
as a plaintiff into the case in Frank’s place. Thereafter, the trial court found
the lawsuit was untimely, as a matter of law, and entered summary
judgment for Linda.
Elizabet appeals the judgment in favor of Linda. She contends the trial
court erroneously granted summary judgment because there is a triable issue
of material fact concerning whether Linda authorized partial loan payments
to the Alvarezes after the maturity dates of the loans, thereby restarting the
applicable limitations period. We agree. Therefore, we reverse the judgment
and instruct the trial court to vacate the order granting the motion for
summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion for summary
judgment.
1 We refer to the individual parties by their first names for the sake of
clarity. No disrespect is intended.
2
II
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On November 30, 2007, the Keagles executed a promissory note with
MLA Capital in the amount of $250,000, plus interest, in exchange for a loan
in the same amount. The promissory note obligated the Keagles to make
interest-only monthly loan repayments beginning December 31, 2007, until
December 31, 2012, at which time all outstanding interest and principal
would become due and payable. This promissory note will hereafter be
referred to as Note One.2
On May 15, 2008, the Keagles executed a second promissory note with
the Alvarezes, in the amount of $200,000, plus interest, in exchange for a
loan in the same amount. The promissory note required the Keagles to make
annual interest payments starting May 15, 2009, and repay the loan by
May 15, 2013. This promissory note will hereafter be referred to as Note
Two. The Keagles took out both loans to finance a restaurant venture in
Corona.
The Keagles did not repay the loans by their respective maturity dates
of December 31, 2012 (Note One) and May 15, 2013 (Note Two). In fact, there
is no indication in the record that the Keagles made any interest or principal
payments on the loans before their maturity dates.
On or about December 22, 2016, MLA Capital received a letter from
Charles. The letter stated, “First let me apologize for taking so long to
address the issue of the loan to Linda and myself in the amount of $250,000.”
2 The parties later modified Note One to alter the interest rate of the
loan, but all other terms and conditions of the loan remained the same.
3
It explained that the Keagles had incurred legal costs and were paying a
settlement to a former business partner concerning an unrelated matter.
However, the letter further stated, “We can begin payments of a minimum of
$2,000.00 per month to MLA Capital by December 2018.” The letter was
typed on the letterhead of the C&C Organization, a company related to the
Keagles and their restaurant businesses. At all relevant times, Linda had an
ownership interest in the C&C Organization.
On or about August 21, 2018, MLA Capital and the Alvarezes began
receiving monthly checks from the C&C Organization. Each check to the
Alvarezes was in the amount of $1,000 and signed by someone from the C&C
Organization named Brody Main. With one exception, the checks to MLA
Capital were each in the amount of $1,250 and also signed by Main. The one
exception was a check to MLA Capital, dated March 26, 2019, in the amount
of $20,000. Charles signed the $20,000 check, which included the following
notation on it, “Note principal reduction.”
Charles passed away on September 18, 2019. After Charles’ death,
MLA Capital and the Alvarezes continued receiving monthly checks from the
C&C Corporation until March 2020.
B. Procedural Background
MLA Capital and the Alvarezes filed the present lawsuit against Linda
on February 16, 2022, alleging she failed to satisfy her payment obligations
under the promissory notes. The operative first amended complaint asserted:
(1) claims for breach of the promissory notes (counts 1 and 5); (2) common
counts for money had and received (counts 2 and 6); (3) common counts for
open book account (counts 3 and 7); and (4) common counts for account stated
4
(counts 4 and 8).3 Counts 1 through 4 pertain to Note One, while counts 5
through 8 relate to Note Two.
On August 6, 2024, Frank passed away.
On August 12, 2024, Linda moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication, on the ground that the complaint was
untimely as a matter of law. Linda claimed the causes of action for breach of
note, open book account, and account stated were subject to the four-year
statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 337, and the
causes of action for money had and received were subject to the two-year
statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 339.
According to Linda, the complaint was untimely because it was not filed until
approximately nine and ten years after the maturity dates of the loans.
Linda also claimed the monthly checks that the C&C Organization sent
to MLA Capital and the Alvarezes starting in August 2018 did not give rise to
a triable issue of material fact that the limitations period was tolled and
restarted under Code of Civil Procedure section 360. She argued the
limitations period expired before the C&C Organization sent the payments
(assuming a two-year or four-year statute of limitations applied) and, in any
event, the checks were not an acknowledgement on her part of her
outstanding debts. In particular, she highlighted that the checks were issued
3 “ ‘A common count is not a specific cause of action …. [R]ather, it is a
simplified form of pleading normally used to aver the existence of various
forms of monetary indebtedness, including that arising from an alleged duty
to make restitution under an assumpsit theory. [Citations.] When a common
count is used as an alternative way of seeking the same recovery demanded
in a specific cause of action, and is based on the same facts, the common
count is demurrable if the cause of action is demurrable.’ ” (Berryman v.
Merit Property Management, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1559–1560.)
5
by the C&C Organization (not her personally), they did not reference the
promissory notes, and they were not personally signed by her.
Together with her motion for summary judgment, Linda filed a
declaration from her trial counsel and exhibits including the promissory
notes, copies of the checks and check stubs that the C&C Organization sent to
MLA Capital and the Alvarezes, and excerpts from the depositions of
Encarnacion as well as Elizabet, who is the Alvarezes’ daughter and MLA
Capital’s managing member. Linda also filed a declaration averring that she
did not authorize or instruct the C&C Organization to send payments to MLA
Capital and the Alvarezes, and she did not know why the C&C Organization
had sent the checks to them.
On December 16, 2024, MLA Capital and Encarnacion opposed the
motion and claimed there was a triable issue concerning the timeliness of the
complaint. They argued the causes of action were subject to the six-year
statute of limitations set forth in California Uniform Commercial Code
section 3118, and they received checks from the C&C Organization within six
years of the maturity dates of the loans. According to MLA Capital and
Encarnacion, there was a triable issue of material fact concerning whether
the checks constituted partial loan repayments that extended and restarted
the statute of limitations. They emphasized that Charles had sent MLA
Capital a letter on C&C Organization letterhead stating that loan
repayments could begin by December 2018, Linda had an ownership interest
in the C&C Organization, and MLA Capital and the Alvarezes continued
receiving checks even after Charles passed away and left Linda as the sole
debtor. Because the lawsuit was filed within six years of the date of the last
check they received from the C&C Organization, they argued there was a
triable issue of material fact concerning the timeliness of the lawsuit.
6
Together with their opposition brief, MLA Capital and Encarnacion
filed declarations from their trial counsel, Tessier, and Encarnacion, as well
as exhibits including Linda’s written discovery responses, excerpts from their
depositions, the promissory notes, the checks and check stubs they received
from the C&C Organization starting on August 21, 2018, and the letter
Charles sent to MLA Capital on or about December 22, 2016.
On December 27, 2024, Linda filed a reply in support of her motion for
summary judgment, which principally argued that there was not a triable
issue concerning the timeliness of the complaint because there was no
evidence Linda personally issued or signed the checks that the C&C
Organization sent to MLA Capital and the Alvarezes, and there was no
admissible evidence showing the purpose of the checks.
On January 3, 2025, the trial court held a hearing and granted the
summary judgment motion as to MLA Capital and Encarnacion. The court
did not specify the applicable limitations period for each cause of action.
However, the court ruled the evidence did not give rise to a triable issue that
Linda had agreed to bear responsibility for the loans after they matured;
therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled or restarted. In particular,
the court opined that there was no evidence showing Linda knew about the
payments from the C&C Organization or instructed the company to make
such payments. Under the court’s logic, the absence of a material dispute
regarding the tolling and restarting of the limitations period rendered the
complaint untimely as a matter of law. The court entered judgment in favor
of Linda and against MLA Capital and Encarnacion. MLA Capital and
Encarnacion appealed the judgment to this court (D086592).
On May 29, 2025, Elizabet moved to substitute into the case as the
personal representative of Frank, who had passed away shortly before Linda
7
moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and substituted
Elizabet as plaintiff in place of Frank.
On June 11, 2025, Elizabet opposed Linda’s motion for summary
judgment. In Elizabet’s opposition brief, she presented the same arguments
that MLA Capital and Encarnacion had raised in their opposition to Linda’s
summary judgment motion. Elizabet also filed the same supporting
declarations and evidence that were filed with MLA Capital and
Encarnacion’s opposition brief.
On June 16, 2025, Linda filed a reply in support of her summary
judgment motion.
On June 18, 2025, the trial court held a hearing and entered summary
judgment for Linda. In doing so, the court again found the lawsuit was time-
barred as a matter of law. The court entered judgment in favor of Linda and
against Elizabet. Elizabet filed a timely notice of appeal.
III
DISCUSSION
Elizabet challenges the summary judgment ruling that the complaint is
untimely as a matter of law. She argues the complaint is subject to a six-year
statute of limitations and there is a triable issue of material fact concerning
whether the Alvarezes’ receipt of payments from the C&C Organization tolled
and restarted the statute of limitations, thereby rendering the complaint
timely. By contrast, Linda claims the complaint is untimely, as a matter of
law, because it is subject to a shorter statute of limitations that expired
before the Alvarezes received payments from the C&C Organization and, in
any event, the payments did not restart the limitations period.
In MLA Capital, LLC v. Keagle (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 732 (MLA
Capital), we concluded that triable issues of material fact precluded summary
8
judgment against MLA Capital and Encarnacion. Therefore, we reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to those plaintiffs. For the same
reasons set forth in that opinion, we now conclude that triable issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment against Elizabet.
A. Legal Standards
“The summary judgment procedure is directed at whether there is
evidence that requires the fact-weighing procedure of a trial. ‘ “[T]he trial
court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine
whether such issues of fact exist, and not to decide the merits of the issues
themselves.” [Citation.] The trial judge determines whether triable issues of
fact exist by reviewing the affidavits and evidence before him or her and the
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts.’ [Citation.]
However, a material issue of fact may not be resolved based on inferences if
contradicted by other inferences or evidence.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181
Cal.App.4th 102, 109 (Truong).)
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a defendant must show
one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established or
there is a complete defense to that cause of action. [Citation.] The evidence
of the moving party is strictly construed and that of the opponent liberally
construed, and any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion are to be
resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. [Citation.] The trial court
does not weigh the evidence and inferences, but instead merely determines
whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the party opposing the
motion, and must deny the motion when there is some evidence that, if
believed, would support judgment in favor of the nonmoving party.
[Citation.] Consequently, summary judgment should be granted only when a
9
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Truong, supra,
181 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.)
“Because a motion for summary judgment raises only questions of law,
we independently review the parties’ supporting and opposing papers and
apply the same standard as the trial court to determine whether there exists
a triable issue of material fact. [Citations.] In practical effect, we assume the
role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards governing a trial
court’s determination of a motion for summary judgment. [Citation.] We
liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment [citation], and assess whether the evidence would, if credited,
permit the trier of fact to find in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment under the applicable legal standards.” (Truong, supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at pp. 109–110.)
B. The Statute of Limitations is Six Years
Our first task is to identify the statute of limitations applicable to the
causes of action. We begin with the claims for breach of the promissory notes
(counts 1 and 5). Linda contends these claims are subject to the four-year
statute of limitations governing claims for breach of a written contract. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. (a).) In response, Elizabet argues the claims are
subject to the six-year statute of limitations governing actions to enforce
obligations to pay a note payable at a definite time. (Cal. U. Com. Code,
§ 3118, subd. (a)). Elizabet is correct.
As discussed in MLA Capital, “Code of Civil Procedure section 337
provides a general four-year statute of limitations for an action based on a
written contract. It states that, except as otherwise provided, a four-year
statute of limitations governs ‘[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 337,
10
subd. (a).) Because the promissory notes are written contracts, the four-year
statute of limitations, by its terms alone, would seemingly apply to the claims
for breach of the promissory notes.” (MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at
p. 741.)
“The statute of limitations on which [Elizabet] rel[ies], California
Uniform Commercial Code section 3118, subdivision (a), is codified in
Chapter 1 (‘General Provisions and Definitions’) of Division 3 (‘Negotiable
Instruments’) of the California Uniform Commercial Code. It provides that,
subject to an exception not relevant here, ‘an action to enforce the obligation
of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time shall be commenced within
six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is
accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date.’ ” (MLA Capital,
supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.)
There is no dispute between the parties that the promissory notes at
issue are negotiable instruments and notes payable at a definite time.4
“Indeed, Note One required the Keagles to pay ‘all outstanding interest and
principal’ to MLA Capital on or before December 31, 2012, while Note Two
required the Keagles to pay the Alvarezes in full on or before May 15, 2013.
4 Subject to exceptions not pertinent here, a “ ‘negotiable instrument’
means an unconditional promise … to pay a fixed amount of money, with or
without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it is all
of the following: [¶] (1) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued
or first comes into possession of a holder. [¶] (2) Is payable on demand or at a
definite time. [¶] (3) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by
the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the
payment of money.” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3104, subd. (a).)
A promise “is ‘payable at a definite time’ if it is payable … at a fixed
date or dates or at a time or times readily ascertainable at the time the
promise or order is issued.” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3108, subd. (b).)
11
Thus, California Uniform Commercial Code section 3118, subdivision (a), also
applies, by its plain terms, to the claims for breach of the promissory notes.”
(MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.)
“Because both statutes of limitation seemingly apply to [Elizabet’s]
claims, and thus conflict with one another, we must turn to the ‘well-settled
principle that a more recent and more specific statute controls over an earlier
and more general one.’ (David M. v. Beverly Hospital (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
1272, 1279.) ‘ “ ‘Under settled rules of statutory construction, “a general
provision is controlled by one that is special, the latter being treated as an
exception to the former. A specific provision relating to a particular subject
will govern in respect to that subject, as against a general provision, although
the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to
which the more particular provision relates.” [Citation.] This rule applies to
statutes of limitations and consequently a specific statute must take
precedence over general statutes of limitation.’ ” ’ (Krieger v. Nick Alexander
Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 214; see Malaga County Water Dist.
v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 447, 470 [‘where
two potential limitation periods conflict, the more recent and more specific
limitation period will generally control’].)” (MLA Capital, supra, 123
Cal.App.5th at pp. 741–742.)
“Here, the six-year statute of limitations set forth in California Uniform
Commercial Code section 3118, subdivision (a), is unquestionably more
specific than the general four-year statute of limitations provided by Code of
Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (a), as the former applies only to an
action to enforce a particular type of contract—a note payable at a definite
time. The six-year statute of limitations is also the more recent of the two
enactments. The four-year statute of limitations has existed since the first
12
legislative session in 1850 (Stats. 1850, ch. 127, § 17, p. 44), and it was first
codified when the Legislature adopted the Code of Civil Procedure in 1872
(Code Civ. Proc., § 337, as enacted by Code Civ. Proc. of 1872). Meanwhile, it
appears the Legislature first enacted the six-year statute of limitations in
California Uniform Commercial Code section 3118, subdivision (a), when it
adopted a revised version of division 3 of the California Uniform Commercial
Code (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3101 et seq.) in 1992. (Stats. 1992, ch. 914, § 6,
p. 4346.)” (MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)
“Because the six-year statute of limitations is more specific and recent
than the four-year statute of limitations, the six-year statute of limitations
takes precedence. (See LBF Travel Management Corp. v. DeRosa (S.D.Cal.,
Mar. 26, 2024, No. 20-cv-2404-MMA-SBC) 2024 U.S. Dist. Lexis 54341, *22,
fn. 6 [applying Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3118 to claim for breach of promissory
note because it was ‘newer and more specific’ than Code Civ. Proc., § 337];
Oropeza v. State Farm Bank (N.D. Cal., Jan. 31, 2018, No. 17-cv-06920-SK)
2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 248795, *12 [applying Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3118 to
claim for breach of credit agreement, rather than Code Civ. Proc., § 337];
43 Cal. Jur.3d (2026) Limitation of Actions, § 37 [describing Cal. U. Com.
Code § 3118 as an exception to Code Civ. Proc., § 337]; 5 Miller & Starr, Cal.
Real Estate (4th ed. 2025) Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, § 13:111 [‘The
statute of limitations on a written instrument is ordinarily four years, but the
statute of limitations for a claim on a promissory note is six years’].)
Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the promissory notes are subject to
13
a six-year statute of limitations.”5 (MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at
p. 742.)
“The common counts for money had and received (counts 2 and 6), open
book account (counts 3 and 7), and account stated (counts 4 and 8) are subject
to the same six-year statute of limitations. ‘ “To determine the statute of
limitations which applies to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the
nature of the cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action.
[Citations.] ‘[T]he nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action
nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of
limitations under our code.’ ” ’ (Gutierrez v. Tostado (2025) 18 Cal.5th 222,
231; see Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
958, 968 [‘It is the substance of the action, rather than the form of the
pleading or the labels employed, that governs.’].) Therefore, where ‘common
counts (e.g., “account stated,” “open book account,” “services rendered,”
“money had and received,” etc.) are merely pleading devices, … the suit is
subject to whatever statute of limitations governs the underlying claim.’
(Banke & Segal, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, Statute of
Limitations (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 2:5.1.)” (MLA Capital, supra, 123
Cal.App.5th at p. 743.)
5 Without explanation or citation to the appellate record, Linda argues
the six-year statute of limitations does not apply because “this matter does
not concern a commercial transaction,” and “there is very little illustrative
case law” applying California Uniform Commercial Code section 3118.
However, she provides no analysis or support for these cursory assertions.
She also does not respond to Elizabet’s well-founded contention that, in the
case of conflicting statutes of limitations, the newer and more specific statute
generally takes precedence over the older and more general statute.
14
“In the present case, the gravamen of all the common counts is the
underlying claim that Linda breached her payment obligations under the
promissory notes, which were notes payable at a definite time. In short, the
common counts are derivative of, and ancillary to, the claims for breach of the
promissory notes. Thus, the common counts are subject to the same six-year
statute of limitations governing the claims for breach of the promissory notes.
(See Creditors Collection Service v. Castaldi (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1043
[analyzing nature of claim to identify statute of limitations governing
common count for money had and received]; First Nationwide Savings v.
Perry (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, 1670 [same]; Holtzendorff v. Housing
Authority of Los Angeles (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 596, 635–636 [same];
Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 967–
971 [same, for common counts of open book account and account stated].)”
(MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at p. 743.)
“Having determined that six years is the limitations period for
[Elizabet’s] claims, we now address the timeliness of those claims under the
facts presented. As noted, the statute of limitations provides that claims
within the purview of the statute must ‘be commenced within six years after
the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within
six years after the accelerated due date.’ (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3118,
subd. (a).) There is no indication in the record that the due dates of the
promissory notes were accelerated. Therefore, unless the six-year statute of
limitation was tolled or restarted, [Elizabet, acting through the decedent,
Frank, was] required to assert [her] claims related to Note One within six
years of the loan’s maturity date of December 31, 2012—i.e., on or before
December 31, 2018. And [she was] required to bring [her] claims related to
Note Two within six years of that loan’s maturity date of May 15, 2013—i.e.,
15
on or before May 15, 2019.” (MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 743–744.)
However, the present lawsuit was not filed until February 16, 2022.
Therefore, the complaint would be untimely as a matter of law—unless there
is a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the statute of limitations was
tolled and/or restarted before it expired.
C. There is a Triable Issue of Fact Concerning Whether the Alvarezes’
Receipt of Monthly Payments Tolled and Restarted the Statute of
Limitations
Elizabet claims there is a triable issue as to whether the Alvarezes’
receipt of monthly checks from the C&C Organization between August 2018
and March 2020 constituted partial loan repayments that tolled and
restarted the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 360.
We agree.
Code of Civil Procedure section 360 provides, “No acknowledgment or
promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, by which to
take the case out of the operation of this title, unless the same is contained in
some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby, provided that any
payment on account of principal or interest due on a promissory note made by
the party to be charged shall be deemed a sufficient acknowledgment or
promise of a continuing contract to stop, from time to time as any such
payment is made, the running of the time within which an action may be
commenced upon the principal sum or upon any installment of principal or
interest due on such note, and to start the running of a new period of time,
but no such payment of itself shall revive a cause of action once barred.”
“Under this statute, ‘ “part payment of a debt or obligation is sufficient
to extend the bar of the statute. The theory on which this is based is that the
16
payment is an acknowledgment of the existence of the indebtedness which
raises an implied promise to continue the obligation and to pay the balance.” ’
(Young v. Sorenson (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 911, 914, quoting Martindell v.
Bodrero (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 56, 59 (Martindell); see Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45
Cal.2d 66, 73 (Eilke) [‘The acknowledgment of a debt before the statute has
run … merely continues the original obligation through a new statutory
period.’].)” (MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.)
“When Code of Civil Procedure section 360 applies, it not only ‘stop[s]
… the running of the time within which an action may be commenced,’ it also
‘start[s] the running of a new [limitations] period.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 360;
see Amen v. Merced County Title Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 528, 533 [Code Civ.
Proc., § 360 ‘start[s] the statute [of limitations] running anew’]; Schriber v.
Alameda County-East Bay Title Ins. Co. (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 700, 704
[‘Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 360 [a] payment start[s] the running
of the statute [of limitations] afresh’]; see Banke & Segal, Cal. Practice
Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, Statute of Limitations, supra, ¶ 1:155 [if
the limitations period has not expired, ‘payment of principal or interest on a
promissory note stops the running of the statute on any past-due installment
and starts the running of a new statutory period of time’].)” (MLA Capital,
supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at pp. 744–745.)
In response to Elizabet’s argument that the Alvarezes’ receipt of
payments tolled and restarted the statute of limitations, Linda contends
Elizabet cannot rely on Code of Civil Procedure section 360 because the
statute of limitations and the tolling statute are set forth in different codes.
Without providing any cogent analysis or legal support for her assertion,
Linda states that the “Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the
17
Commercial Code,” and the two codes “do not work in coordination with one
another.”
We rejected this argument in MLA Capital, where we applied Code of
Civil Procedure section 360 to restart the statute of limitations provided by
California Uniform Commercial Code section 3118. As we explained in MLA
Capital, “The comments to the Uniform Commercial Code (on which the
California Uniform Commercial Code is based) state that ‘the only purpose’ of
section 3118 (the model Uniform Commercial Code analogue to California
Uniform Commercial Code section 3118) is ‘to define the time within which
an action to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under Article 3 must
be commenced.’ (Official Comments on U. Com. Code, Deering’s Ann. Cal. U.
Com. Code (2017 ed.) foll. § 3118, p. 388; see Cal. U. Com. Code, foll. § 3118,
com. 1.) It adds that the provision ‘does not attempt to state all rules with
respect to a statute of limitations,’ and specifically notes that ‘the
circumstances under which the running of a limitations period may be tolled
is left to other law’ pursuant to section 1103 (the model Uniform Commercial
Code analogue to California U. Com. Code § 1103).6 (Ibid.) California
Uniform Commercial Code section 1103, in turn, states that existing
‘principles of law and equity’ continue to ‘supplement’ the California Uniform
Commercial Code, ‘[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions’ of the code.
(Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).)” (MLA Capital, supra, 123
Cal.App.5th at p. 745.)
6 Official Comments on the model Uniform Commercial Code are
persuasive when the Legislature adopts the code section in question as
written. (See Zengen, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (2007) 41 Cal.4th 239, 248.)
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“Considered together, these authorities illustrate that, in the absence of
statutory language suggesting otherwise, traditional principles of law and
equity governing tolling—like those codified in the partial debt payment
tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 360—apply to the
statutes of limitation set forth in the California Uniform Commercial Code.
(See Cadle Co. v. World Wide Hospitality Furniture, Inc. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 504, 514, fn. 8 [applying tolling provision set forth in Code of
Civil Procedure section 360.5 to action for breach of agreement subject to six-
year statute of limitations set forth in California Uniform Commercial Code
section 3118].) For her part, Linda presents us with no reasoned argument or
legal authority suggesting otherwise, nor does she provide us with any
reasoned and legally supported argument that the California Uniform
Commercial Code contains any relevant limitations on the application of
tolling statutes such as Code of Civil Procedure section 360.” (MLA Capital,
supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.)
“Further, numerous courts from other states have applied state tolling
provisions like Code of Civil Procedure 360—i.e., tolling provisions that
extend and restart statutes of limitations based on partial debt payments—to
claims governed by those states’ versions of the model Uniform Commercial
Code. (See Dale K. Barker Co. PC CPA Profit Sharing Plan v. Turner (2021)
500 P.3d 940, 945 [‘Utah Code section 70A-3-118 … is indeed subject to and
supplemented by our tolling provision for partial payments’]; Zelby Holdings,
Inc. v. VideogeniX, Inc. (2017) 92 Mass.App.Ct. 86, 87 [‘the common-law
partial payment rule applies to actions subject to the six-year statute of
limitations’ in the Uniform Commercial Code]; Hughes v. Hughes (2013) 370
Mont. 499, 504 [‘Nothing in the language of [the partial debt payment tolling
provision] precludes its application to contracts made pursuant to the
19
Uniform Commercial Code, to specific types of debts, or to a promissory
note.’]; Keota Mills & Elevator v. Gamble (2010) 243 P.3d 1156, 1161
[Oklahoma’s tolling provision, ‘which provides that partial payment extends
or revives the statute of limitations … applies to the UCC’]; Skaneateles
Savings Bank v. Modi Associates (N.Y.App.Div. 1998) 239 A.D.2d 40, 43 [‘The
adoption of the UCC does not alter the effect of a payment of principal or
interest’]; accord JSA Financial Corp. v. Quality Kitchen Corp. (2009) 113
Conn.App. 52, 55–60 [debtor’s partial debt payment extended statute of
limitations for bringing claim against guarantor for nonpayment on note].)”
(MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.)
“Consistent with these persuasive out-of-state authorities, we [again]
hold that the partial debt payment provisions of Code of Civil Procedure
section 360 apply to causes of action governed by California Uniform
Commercial Code section 3118. (See Turbinator, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 443, 450, fn. 4 [‘It is generally recognized that
uniformity in construction of the [Uniform Commercial] Code provisions in
the various states is highly desirable, and that decisions from other states
constitute strong persuasive authority.’].) Therefore, we turn now to the
question of whether, on the summary judgment record pending before us,
there is a triable issue of fact that the payments the C&C Organization sent
to the [Alvarezes] constituted partial payments on the Keagles’ outstanding
debts, thus extending and restarting the statute of limitations applicable to
[Elizabet’s] claims.” (MLA Capital, supra, 123 Cal.App.5th at pp. 746–747.)
Linda argues these payments did not extend or restart the statute of
limitations because the payments were not accompanied by a signed written
acknowledgement of her debt obligations or a written promise to pay off the
balance of the debt. In support of this claim, Linda relies on the first portion
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of the statute, which states, “No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient
evidence of a new or continuing contract, by which to take the case out of the
operation of this title, unless the same is contained in some writing, signed by
the party to be charged thereby.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 360.)
“However, Linda’s argument ignores the entire second part of the
statute, which provides an exception to this general rule for partial debt
payments. It states ‘that any payment on account of principal or interest due
on a promissory note made by the party to be charged shall be deemed a
sufficient acknowledgment or promise of a continuing contract to stop, from
time to time as any such payment is made, the running of the time within
which an action may be commenced upon the principal sum or upon any
installment of principal or interest due on such note, and to start the running
of a new period of time.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 360.) Under this part of the
statute, a partial payment of debt under a promissory note, made within the
specified timeframe, is a sufficient acknowledgement of the debt without a
separate signed writing. (Eilke, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 72–73 [the 1947
amendments to Code Civ. Proc., § 360 ‘reject[ed] the requirement of a writing
to prove an acknowledgment by part payment’].) Because a separate signed
writing is unnecessary in such cases, we reject Linda’s claim that the lack of
a signed writing in this case automatically brings the case outside the scope
of Code of Civil Procedure section 360.” (MLA Capital, supra, 123
Cal.App.5th at p. 747.)
Relying on the trial court’s summary judgment ruling, Linda also
claims the evidence does not reasonably permit a trier of fact to conclude that
she sent or authorized the checks to the Alvarezes as partial payments on the
promissory notes. In particular, she notes that the C&C Organization sent
the checks to the Alvarezes (not her in her individual capacity), there is no
21
direct evidence she instructed the C&C Organization to send the checks on
her behalf, and there is no direct evidence that the purpose of the checks was
to pay down her debt obligations.
“The partial payment tolling statute applies whenever a qualifying
partial debt payment is made ‘by the party to be charged.’ (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 360.) Our courts have interpreted this language to allow tolling when a
partial payment is made by the debtor or a third party agent authorized to
act on the debtor’s beha