Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Lamb CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E082846 v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1700595) ANDREW CHARLES LAMB, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Vincent P. LaPietra and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1 I. INTRODUCTION This appeal is before us for the second time. In our first opinion we affirmed the order of the Riverside County Superior Court denying defendant and appellant Andrew Charles Lamb’s request for a resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75 of the Penal Code.1 (People v. Lamb (May 14, 2025, E082846) [nonpub. opn.] (Lamb I).) The California Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review and deferred his case pending consideration and disposition of People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57 (Espino), which was also awaiting decision by that court in its case No. S286987.2 After issuing its opinion Espino, the Supreme Court transferred defendant’s matter back to this court with directions to vacate our opinion in Lamb I, and to reconsider the cause in light of Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th 57. In keeping with the Supreme Court’s instructions, we vacated our opinion in Lamb I and invited the parties to file supplemental briefs and they did not do so pursuant to California Rules Court, rule 8.200(b). Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Espino, we will reverse the trial court’s order finding defendant is ineligible for resentencing relief and remand the matter with instructions that defendant be afforded a resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (d). 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 The Supreme Court initially held defendant’s case pending disposition of People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius II) but, after it issued its opinion in that case, the court deferred defendant’s cause again pending disposition of Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th 57. 2 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In July 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to residential burglary (§ 459) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). Defendant also admitted to having suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A)), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In return, defendant was promised a stipulated term of 15 years in state prison, dismissal of the remaining charges, and that punishment for the prison prior would be stricken. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years in state prison, dismissed the remaining charges, and struck the one-year punishment for the prison prior. As of January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), to eliminate sentence enhancements for prior prison terms unless the prior terms were for sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Ca1.App.5th 562, 567.) Two years later, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) added section 1172.75 (formerly § 1171.1) to provide a resentencing procedure that extends the elimination of prior prison term enhancements (other than for sexually violent offenses) to all persons currently incarcerated in jail or prison. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) The resentencing procedure, set forth in section 1172.75, subdivision (d), requires the trial court to impose “a lesser sentence than 3 the one originally imposed” unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that doing so would endanger public safety. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1), (2).) After being notified by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that defendant’s sentence included section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, on November 8, 2023, the trial court purportedly recalled defendant’s sentence pursuant to newly enacted section 1172.75. On December 21, 2023, with defendant present via video conference, the court conducted a section 1172.75 hearing. The court denied defendant’s request for a full resentencing hearing, finding defendant to be ineligible on the ground that the punishment for the prison prior had been struck at his original sentencing. In so doing, the trial court incorporated the reasoning of this court in People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 45 (Rhodius I), reversed by Rhodius II, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1068. The court ordered an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the section 667.5, subdivision (b), prison prior enhancement was struck. Defendant then appealed. In Lamb I, we adhered to our opinion in Rhodius I, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38 and found defendant was not entitled to section 1172.75 resentencing relief because the punishment for his prison prior had been stricken, not imposed and executed. As noted ante, defendant’s petition for review by the California Supreme Court was granted and his cause deferred pending that court’s decision in Espino I. The Supreme Court recently issued its Espino II opinion, which holds that a sentence is “imposed” for the purposes of section 1172.75 even if the sentencing court struck the punishment for the prison prior 4 enhancement. (Espino II, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 60.) The Supreme Court thereafter transferred defendant’s matter back to this court with directions to vacate our opinion in Lamb I, and to reconsider the cause in light of Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th 57. III. DISCUSSION In 2019, the Legislature amended subdivision (b) of section 667.5 (amended § 667.5(b)) to eliminate prior prison term enhancements unless the prior prison term was for specific sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) The amendment was retroactive as to any case in which the judgment was not final on January 1, 2020. (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341-342.) In 2022, section 1172.75 became effective.3 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) Subdivision (a) of that provision declares legally invalid any prison prior sentence enhancement defined in amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020 (often referred to herein as a qualifying prison prior). (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) To ensure defendants serving sentences that include a qualifying prison prior would receive timely relief, section 1172.75 directed the CDCR to identify persons serving sentences that include a qualifying prison prior and provide those persons’ names, birthdates, and docket numbers to the sentencing court, which would in turn determine 3 At the time of its enactment in January 2021, section 1172.75 was numbered to section 1171.1, but was renumbered effective June 30, 2022, with no substantive changes to the statute (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12). 5 whether the person was entitled to section 1172.75 resentencing relief. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b) & (c).) Following the passage of section 1172.75, a dispute arose in the Courts of Appeal with respect to whether the word “imposed” in subdivision (a) was intended to limit the provision’s resentencing relief to defendants whose qualifying prison prior was imposed and executed, or if resentencing was also available in cases like the present one in which the sentence was imposed but stricken. This court held “imposed” meant “imposed and executed.” (Rhodius I, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 45, reversed by Rhodius II, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1068.) As noted, ante, the Supreme Court recently issued its Espino decision, which holds that a sentence is “imposed” for the purposes of section 1172.75 even if the sentencing court struck the punishment for the prison prior enhancement. (Espino II, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 60.) In keeping with Supreme Court’s order directing us to do so, we have reconsidered defendant’s matter in light of Espino II and find that, because his sentence includes a qualifying prison prior that was imposed and stricken, he is entitled to a section 1172.75, subdivision (d) resentencing hearing. IV. DISPOSITION The trial court’s finding that defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 is reversed and the matter is remanded with instructions to strike 6 defendant’s section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement in its entirety and to hold a resentencing hearing in accordance with section 1172.75, subdivision (d). We express no opinion on whether defendant would be entitled to any additional relief at the resentencing hearing. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. RAPHAEL J. 7