I.D. v. A.L. CA3

Filed 10/27/26 I.D. v. A.L. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Yolo) I.D., a Minor, etc., et al., C105053 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. FL2023-1160) v. A.L., Defendant and Respondent. “Due process allows state courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who were served with process elsewhere only if those defendants have such minimum contacts with the state to ensure that such an assertion of jurisdiction will not violate ‘ “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568 (Aquila).) And our Supreme Court has held that California courts may constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on a cause of action that arose out of the defendant’s activities in the state at a time when he or she was domiciled here. (Owens v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 822, 830, 832.) The plaintiff in this case appeals an order granting the defendant’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction and a related order finding the plaintiff’s request for need-based attorney fees is thus no longer an issue. We reverse, because the 1 cause of action asserted against the defendant arises out of his activities in California while he was domiciled here. BACKGROUND Procedurally, the background is complicated. It involves two prior appeals (one of which this court dismissed because the orders appealed from were nonappealable [case No. C101903], and the other of which was dismissed as premature [case No. C104289]), and three prior petitions for writ of mandate (one of which was dismissed as moot when the superior court complied with our alternative writ of mandate [case No. C102154], one of which was denied because it challenged a proposed or tentative decision that was not yet final [case No. C104352], and one of which was denied because petitioner had an adequate remedy by appeal [case No. 105051]). Here, we focus on the background that is relevant to our resolution of this appeal, which involves only the trial court’s decision regarding the defendant’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s motion for need-based attorney fees. I. The Underlying Parentage Action In September 2023, nine-year-old plaintiff I.D. (hereafter “the child”) filed a petition pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.) seeking a declaration that defendant A.L. is his father, and an order that A.L. pay child support. The child’s mother, N.D., filed a declaration in support of the petition stating the following (and because this declaration is important to the motion to quash, we discuss it in some detail): N.D. was born in Belarus. She and A.L. married in 2007 and they moved to California in 2008. She had a child from a prior marriage and had no intention of having more children because of severe health issues. A.L. was adamant that he wanted a child, however, and after five unsuccessful attempts to have a child by surrogacy, he encouraged N.D. to return to Belarus to adopt a child. 2  In May 2014, N.D. returned to Belarus to adopt a child. While in Belarus, she visited an orphanage where she met the child, who was 10 months old at the time. She shared photos of the child with A.L., and A.L. was very excited and asked her to move forward with an adoption, which she did. The child began living with N.D. in September 2014, while the adoption process was underway. A.L. asked her to change the child’s name, which she did. A.L. visited Belarus for a week in December 2014, “spent all his time with [the child],” “regarded him as his son,” and “called his parents and introduced [the child] to them as his son.” A.L. gave N.D. money to pay legal fees for the adoption process, and he signed a power of attorney that stated, “I permit all actions in regard to child adoption, including collecting and signing and filing on my behalf all necessary documents … in connection with this assignment.” The adoption was finalized in February 2015, and the Belarusian court ordered that N.D. be considered the child’s mother and A.L. be recorded in the birth records as the child’s father. Even though the adoption was finalized, the child could not legally enter the United States until he had resided with one of his parents for two years, and N.D. thus stayed in Belarus for two years with the child. During this time, A.L. asked about the child often and supported N.D. and the child financially. After the two-year period was up, the child’s entry into the United States was further delayed by a significant processing backlog, and N.D. was not able to return to the United States with the child until December 2018. In the meantime, in December 2016, two years before N.D. and the child returned to the United States, A.L. filed for divorce in Santa Clara County Superior Court. During the divorce proceeding, A.L. refused to recognize the child as his and did not want to pay child support. In August 2020, the court entered a judgment of dissolution pursuant to a marital settlement agreement that contained the following provision: “Wife represents that while she was married to Husband and living in Belarus, she alone adopted a minor 3 child (‘Wife’s minor child’) in Belarus and caused the child’s vital records to the reflect the child’s name … . The parties agree and the Court orders that Husband is not a parent of Wife’s minor child and has no rights or obligations related to the child. … The parties acknowledge and confirm, and the Court orders, that Husband has no responsibilities whatsoever for Wife’s … adopted child[] and Wife’s child[] [is] not able to derive any benefits from Husband.” In the UPA petition, the child acknowledged the marital settlement agreement was binding on N.D. and A.L., but, citing Family Code section 7632, he claimed it was not binding on him, and he had his own right to establish a parental relationship and obtain child support. Section 7632, which is part of the UPA, provides, “Regardless of its terms, an agreement between an alleged father or a presumed parent and the other parent or child does not bar an action under this chapter.” He also claimed that A.L. should be recognized as his parent “under the loco parentis and/or estoppel theories.” To support his claim, he cited case law that holds (1) “a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship, without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption, does stand in loco parentis, and the rights, duties and liabilities of such person are the same as those of the lawful parent” (Loomis v. State (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 820, 823), and (2) a putative parent who “accepts [a] child into his family, publicly acknowledges the child as his own and treats the child as” his own may be estopped to deny parentage (Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 662). II. The Motion to Quash A.L. responded to the UPA petition by filing a motion to quash on the ground the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Citing Family Code section 7636, he also moved to quash on the ground the prior judgment of dissolution had already determined he was not the child’s parent. Section 7636, which is part of the UPA, provides, “The judgment or order of the court determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent 4 and child relationship is determinative for all purposes.” “In parentage proceedings, this statute embodies the common law doctrine of res judicata.” (In re J.P. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 229, 241.) Although the res judicata issue was addressed in some of the court’s orders and was the basis of some of the prior appeals and petitions for writ of mandate, it is not relevant to this appeal, and we thus do not discuss it. In support of his motion to quash, A.L. submitted a declaration stating he currently lived in the State of Washington and had not lived in California since August 2019, and he did not consent to the court’s jurisdiction over him. He also stated N.D. adopted the child without his knowledge or consent, he did not adopt the child or take any overt steps to facilitate the adoption, he never signed paperwork consenting to the adoption, he never held the child out as his own, he only met the child once for approximately a week in 2015, he never supported the child financially, he never claimed the child as a dependent on his taxes, and he did not direct that the child be brought to California. He believed N.D. made numerous misrepresentations to the Belarusian authorities in order to adopt the child, including failing to disclose she was a United States citizen married to another United States citizen, and instead representing she was adopting the child as a Belarusian citizen and lived in Belarus. She also put on the child’s birth certificate that she was an unmarried mother and the child’s father was a Belarusian national. A.L. acknowledged he and N.D. had tried to have a child together, but reiterated he never consented to N.D.’s adoption of the child, never adopted the child, and never held the child out as his own. A.L. stated he filed for divorce in Santa Clara County Superior Court in December 2016, and during that proceeding, N.D. sought a determination that the child was a child of the marriage. The issue was extensively litigated before the parties ultimately reached a settlement, which included language confirming he was not the child’s parent. A.L. provided the trial court with a copy of the judgment of dissolution entered by the Santa Clara County Superior Court on August 25, 2020, which the trial court judicially noticed. The judgment states the dissolution proceeding was heard by “Agreement in court” on 5 November 13, 2019, and the court ordered A.L. “is not a parent of [the child].” The parties’ settlement agreement was attached to the judgment and incorporated into it. It contains the provision—quoted above—that N.D. alone adopted the child and A.L. is not the child’s parent and has no obligations related to the child. The child opposed the motion to quash, arguing the court had jurisdiction over A.L. because he was a California resident at the time of the events surrounding the adoption. Based on N.D.’s declaration, the child also argued the court had jurisdiction pursuant to Family Code section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(5), which provides that in a proceeding to determine parentage, the court has jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if “the child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual.” The child acknowledged that A.L. disputed N.D.’s version of events, and he argued that if the court decided to consider A.L.’s declaration or if it required him to prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence, he must be given the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery and to have an evidentiary hearing. Both parties filed supplemental papers in support of and opposition to the motion to quash. In his supplemental papers, A.L. argued the court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to Family Code section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(5) because his declaration disputed many of the jurisdictional facts in N.D.’s declaration. He also argued the court did not have general jurisdiction over him because at the time the UPA proceeding was commenced, he had been a resident of Washington for almost four years, and he had “no ongoing, frequent and continuing contact with California.” The child filed a second declaration from N.D. that authenticated several photos showing A.L. holding the child. N.D. stated she took the photos when A.L. visited Belarus in December 2014. N.D. also attached to her declaration a copy of a power of attorney signed by A.L. Pursuant to the power of attorney, A.L. authorized N.D. to take numerous actions on his behalf. Most of the actions concern properties, monies, securities, inheritances, and the like. The last paragraph states, “I permit all actions in 6 regard to child adoption, including collecting and signing and filing on my behalf of all necessary documents in all organizations and agencies in the Republic of Belarus in connection with this assignment.” A.L. signed the power of attorney in July 2014 and it was notarized in Santa Clara County. The child argued the court had jurisdiction over A.L. based on the power of attorney and the stipulated judgment, both of which were contacts with California that were related to the controversy at issue. III. The Child’s Motion for Attorney Fees In the meantime, in October 2023, shortly after the motion to quash was filed, the child filed a motion for need-based attorney fees and costs pursuant to Family Code sections 7640 and 7605. 1 A.L. opposed the motion, arguing the court should defer ruling on it until after it ruled on the motion to quash because any fee order “would be void” if the court ultimately determined it lacked jurisdiction over him. The child disagreed and noted the court had jurisdiction to determine whether it had personal jurisdiction over A.L., and although the child acknowledged there was no case law directly on point, he argued the court also had jurisdiction to order a specially appearing defendant to pay attorney fees incurred to resolve the personal jurisdiction issue. 1 Family Code section 7640, which is part of the UPA, provides the court “may order reasonable fees of counsel … to be paid by the parties … in proportions and at times determined by the court,” and “may apply the standards set forth in Section[] … 7605 in making this determination.” Family Code section 7605 provides, “(a) … [T]he court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party … to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding. [¶] (b) When a request for attorney’s fees and costs is made under this section, the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” 7  IV. The Court’s Ruling The court held a lengthy hearing on the motion to quash in April 2025, and at the conclusion of the hearing, it took the matter under submission. Several months later, it issued a proposed statement of decision finding it did not have personal jurisdiction over A.L. on any of the grounds urged by the child. The court first determined jurisdiction was not established pursuant to Family Code section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(5) because it found, “[N.D.] brought [the child] to California in December 2018 of her own accord in the midst of the[] divorce proceedings which began on December 12, 2016,” and the child thus did not reside in this state as a result of A.L.’s acts or directives. It also found the power of attorney did not demonstrate A.L. authorized N.D. to adopt the child on his behalf and bring the child to California. Instead, it found the “primary focus” of the power of attorney was to allow N.D. to conduct “business matters” on A.L.’s behalf, and the only portion of the document that evidenced A.L.’s “knowledge of a child adoption by [N.D.] in Belarus” was “the last short paragraph added, seemingly as an afterthought,” that authorized N.D. to take “ ‘all actions in regard to child adoption’ ” on his behalf. The court noted A.L. “denies he ever signed any paperwork consenting to the adoption, strongly suggesting that the Power of Attorney is a fake.” It also found that even if the power of attorney was “valid, it is devoid of any directives or actions on [A.L.’s] part to bring [the child] to California.” The court then considered whether A.L. had “sufficient minimum contacts” with California to subject him to personal jurisdiction here. Before it actually addressed minimum contacts, however, it first found, “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are offended by the exercise of personal jurisdiction … should it be determined that [A.L.] has sufficient minimum contacts” with the state. The court noted the child argued A.L.’s contacts with California must be assessed “when the cause of action arose rather than when the complaint was filed or served,” but it found the United States Supreme Court “has never directly addressed the issue of the 8 timing of minimum contacts,” and because “there are no clear principles upon which to ground decisions about the timing of minimum contacts, … this Court chooses not to make a definitive finding based on unsettled case law on when minimum contacts must arise.” It then found, “the cause of action arguably arose when the parties entered into their [marital settlement agreement] and the Santa [Clara County] Superior Court entered its judgment on August 25, 2020. This stipulated judgment is at the heart of [the] UPA action, and triggered the dispute. But for this stipulated judgment, the cause of action would not have arisen. On the date of the stipulated judgment, [A.L.] was not a California resident and had no minimum contacts in California.” The court found it did not have general jurisdiction over A.L. because he had moved to Washington before the UPA action was filed. It rejected the child’s argument that general jurisdiction existed because A.L was domiciled in California when all of the events surrounding the adoption took place because, as just noted, it found the UPA action arose when the parties entered into the marital settlement agreement and the Santa Clara County Superior Court entered the judgment of dissolution, by which time A.L. was no longer domiciled here. It also found that, even if it considered A.L.’s contacts with the state “when the adoption took place,” “it cannot be concluded that [A.L’s] contacts with California were substantial, continuous, systematic, and wide-ranging. True, he lived and worked in California at the time, but the pleadings do not reflect that [he] had any meaningful substantial, continuous, systematic, wide-ranging business presence in California, as the cited case law requires.” 2 2 The court also stated, “As an aside, the case law cited provided no examples of what minimum contacts look like for a natural person. All of the cited cases involved corporate defendants.” As discussed below, however, it is well established that, “ ‘For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.’ ” (David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 366 (David L.).) 9  The court also found it did not have specific jurisdiction over A.L. because although “[t]here is no question that [A.L.] purposefully availed himself of the benefits of residing and working in California prior to moving to Washington in 2019[,] … he did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits of California at the time the cause of action arose,” and, as noted above, the court determined the cause of action arose on August 25, 2020, when the stipulated judgment was entered. Finally, the court rejected the child’s argument that jurisdiction was appropriate pursuant to a provision in the stipulated judgment that provided, “The Court shall retain jurisdiction to make orders and determinations that are necessary and/or appropriate to … resolve any dispute that may arise concerning the terms of the Parties’ stipulation.” The court found this provision only extended to disputes between A.L. and N.D., and did not extend to the present dispute between the child and A.L. Several days after the court issued its proposed statement of decision finding it did not have personal jurisdiction, it entered a minute order stating, “[The child’s] request for attorney’s fees and costs is no longer an issue, and the Court did not hold a hearing on this.” The child filed objections to the proposed statement of decision, but the court declined his request to modify it, and on November 7, 2025, it signed and entered an order adopting the proposed statement of decision as its final statement of decision and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The child filed a timely notice of appeal. 3 3 We note that although no judgment appears in the record, an appeal may be taken from “an order granting a motion to quash service of summons.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(3).) 10  DISCUSSION I. Relevant Law, Burden of Proof, and Standard of Review “In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child,” Family Code section 5700.201 identifies several bases for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, including if “the child resides in this state as a result of the [defendant’s] acts or directives.” (Fam. Code, § 5700.201, subd. (a)(5).) Section 5700.201 also contains a catchall provision authorizing personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on “any other basis consistent with the [due process clause of the] constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (Fam. Code, § 5700.201, subd. (a)(8).) The due process clause “ ‘constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.’ [Citation.] These limits to a state’s adjudicative power ‘principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.’ ” (David L., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 365.) As stated at the outset, “Due process allows state courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who were served with process elsewhere only if those defendants have such minimum contacts with the state to ensure that such an assertion of jurisdiction will not violate ‘ “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Aquila, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 568.) Contacts with the forum state that are “ ‘ “ ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ ” ’ ” are insufficient to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. (Ibid.) “ ‘The concept of minimum contacts embraces two types of jurisdiction—general and specific. General jurisdiction results where the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so “systematic and so continuous as to make it consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum, even where the cause of action is unrelated to the contacts.” ’ ” (Aquila, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 569.) “ ‘For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of 11 general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.’ ” (David L., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 366.) “A nonresident defendant lacking sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction ‘still may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum.’ [Citation.] Specific or ‘ “case- linked” ’ jurisdiction ‘ “focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” ’ ” (David L., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 366.) “There are three requirements for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits or purposefully directed activities at forum residents. Second, the controversy must relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (Ibid.) “The procedural rules that apply when a defendant moves to quash service of summons for lack of jurisdiction are … well settled. Although the defendant is the moving party, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of evidence justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in California.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110.) “The plaintiff must do more than merely allege jurisdictional facts. It must present evidence sufficient to justify a finding that California may properly exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.” (Ibid.) “This may be done through presentation of declarations, with opposing declarations received in response.” (Aquila, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 568; see also Automobile Antitrust Cases, at p. 110 [“The plaintiff must provide affidavits and other authenticated documents in order to demonstrate competent evidence of jurisdictional facts”].) “ ‘On review, the question of jurisdiction is, in essence, one of law. When the facts giving rise to jurisdiction are conflicting, the trial court’s factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Even then, we review independently the 12 trial court’s conclusions as to the legal significance of the facts. [Citations.] When the jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, the question of whether the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is purely a legal question that we review de novo. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The ultimate issue of whether an exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable is a legal determination subject to de novo review on appeal.” (Aquila, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 568.) Citing two Ninth Circuit cases, the child argues that, because the motion to quash was decided based solely on declarations and without an evidentiary hearing, he did not need to establish the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, he only needed to “make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts; the allegations in the petition and the declarations supporting them are taken as true; and conflicting assertions by the defendant, especially those raising credibility questions, are disregarded.” That does appear to be the law in the Ninth Circuit. (See Sher v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 [“The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that jurisdiction is appropriate, but in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts”]; Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc. (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 [when issue of personal jurisdiction is submitted based on conflicting affidavits, “a plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts … in order to avoid a defendant’s motion to dismiss”].) However, the child cites no California authority (and we are aware of none) that holds there are circumstances in which a plaintiff need only make a prima facie case in order to defeat a motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction, and as one California court has noted, “federal practice with respect to challenges to personal jurisdiction is very different from established California procedure.” (Roy v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 337, 343.) “When a California defendant moves to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] By contrast, when a defendant in federal court raises the 13 jurisdictional objection by motion, the plaintiff can defeat it with no more than a prima facie showing.” (Ibid.) This case is governed by California practice, not by federal practice, and in California, “It has long been settled that where a defendant properly moves to quash out- of-state service of process for lack of jurisdiction, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Felix v. Bomoro Kommanditgesellschaft (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 106, 110; see also Hardell v. Vanzyl (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 960, 967 [“ ‘the plaintiff bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to justify jurisdiction’ ”]; BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 421, 428 [“When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual basis justifying the exercise of jurisdiction”].) Moreover, motions to quash are frequently decided based on declarations, and, “ ‘ “[W]here there is a conflict in the declarations, resolution of the conflict by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the determination of that court is supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (Aquila, supra, 148 Cal.App.5th at p. 568; see also Kroopf v. Guffey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1356 [“ ‘ “the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence,” ’ ” “ ‘ “evidence of those facts … may be in the form of declarations,” ’ ” and “ ‘ “where there is a conflict in the declarations, resolution of the conflict by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the determination of that court is supported by substantial evidence” ’ ”]; Atkins, Kroll & Co. v. Broadway Lumber Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 646, 654 [“In considering an order made on affidavits involving the decision on a question of fact, the appellate court is bound by the same rule as where oral testimony is presented for review. [Citation.] Accordingly, where an issue is tried on affidavits, the rule on appeal is that … where there is a substantial conflict presented 14 by the affidavits, the determination of the controverted facts by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal”].) Although it was the child’s burden to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, and although the substantial evidence standard applies to the trial court’s findings of fact, we nonetheless conclude the trial court erred in determining it lacked personal jurisdiction over A.L. II. Analysis Both parties make numerous arguments about all aspects of the trial court’s decision, but we find the jurisdictional issue is more straightforward to resolve than their lengthy arguments suggest. As noted above, the child’s UPA action is based on case law that holds (1) “a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship, without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption, does stand in loco parentis, and the rights, duties and liabilities of such person are the same as those of the lawful parent” (Loomis v. State, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d at p. 823), and (2) a person who “accepts [a] child into his family, publicly acknowledges the child as his own and treats the child as” his own may be estopped to deny parentage (Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at p. 662). This claim thus arises out of actions A.L. took and/or things he said that would support a finding he treated or held the child out as his own or assumed the obligations of a parent. Based on the evidence before the trial court, all of those actions and statements would have occurred from around the time N.D. went to Belarus to adopt a child in 2014, through the adoption in 2015, and until A.L. filed for divorce in 2016 (or, at the very latest, until N.D. returned to California with the child in 2018, by which time the parties were already litigating the issue of parentage in the dissolution proceeding). And it is undisputed that A.L. was domiciled in California throughout this time period. For all the ink that the parties have spilled on this appeal, we think these facts are dispositive. 15  Our Supreme Court has held that domicile carries with it “certain responsibilities arising out of [one’s] relationship to that state by reason of domicile, one of which [is] amenability to suit therein.” (Allen v. Superior Court (1953) 41 Cal.2d 306, 313.) And the United States Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. ‘Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable’ from the various incidences of state citizenship. [Citation.] The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state.” (Milliken v. Meyer (1940) 311 U.S. 457, 463-464.) Thus, “Domicile is itself a basis of jurisdiction.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure: Jurisdiction (6th ed. 2026) § 134.) And this is why, “ ‘For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.’ ” (David L., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 366; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (2017) 582 U.S. 255, 262 [same].) To use the language of minimum contacts, a person who is domiciled in a state necessarily has contacts with that state that are not “ ‘ “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” ’ ” (David L., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 372.) Similarly, a person who is domiciled in a state has, by virtue of that domicile, “ ‘purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits,’ ” and thus “ ‘has clear notice that [he or she] is subject to suit there.’ ” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) We acknowledge that domicile, standing alone, is not always sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In Owens v. Superior Court, supra, 52 Cal.2d 822, for example, our Supreme Court distinguished three situations involving domicile. First, it held, “the mere 16 fact of past domicile in the state would not subject [the defendant] to its jurisdiction indefinitely, for a past domicile having no relationship to the litigation at hand would not afford a reasonable basis for an assertion of jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 829.) Second, it held even domicile at the time the cause of action arose is not necessarily sufficient: “If, for example, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were presently domiciled here and the cause of action arose out of the defendant’s activities elsewhere, the fact standing alone that the defendant was domiciled here at the time the cause of action arose might be too tenuous a basis for asserting jurisdiction over him.” (Ibid.) Third, and finally, it held domicile at the time the cause of action arose, combined with the fact that “the cause of action arose out of defendant’s activities in this state,” “is sufficient under the due process clause to permit the courts of this state to assert personal jurisdiction over him.” (Id. at p. 830.) But, as the Owens court explained, “When, as in this case, the cause of action arose here out of an activity carried on here at a time when defendant was domiciled here, ‘the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure’ [citation] fully justifies subjecting defendant to the jurisdiction of our courts.” (Id. at p. 832.) So too here. The UPA cause of action before us arose out of actions A.L. took in California at a time when he was domiciled here, and this “is sufficient under the due process clause to permit the courts of this state to assert personal jurisdiction over him.” (Owens, at p. 830.) More recently, an appellate court, citing Owens, has held, “Admittedly, the former domicile of the defendant in the forum state would be insufficient by itself to confer jurisdiction if the domicile had no relation to the instant litigation. But domicile at the time the cause of action arose, in addition to allegations that the action is based on the defendant’s activities within the forum state, afford the state a constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] Thus, a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled in the state at the time the cause of action arose, but who left the forum before 17 commencement of the action or service of process.” (Kroopf v. Guffey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 1358.) We agree—and that is precisely the situation that exists here. The trial court reached a different conclusion based largely on its finding that the UPA action arose when the stipulated judgment was entered, by which time A.L. was no longer domiciled in California. This was error, because the UPA action does not arise out of the stipulated judgment. Again, the UPA action is based on things A.L. did and said surrounding and after the adoption that would support a finding he held the child out as his own. As the child notes, the UPA action “depends on what A.L. did in 2014 and 2015, not on what he and [N.D.] agreed in 2020. [The child] could have filed this action the day he arrived in California in December 2018, twenty months before the stipulated judgment was entered.” He’s right. And if he could have filed the UPA action before the stipulated judgment was entered, it stands to reason that the UPA action does not arise out of the stipulated judgment. If anything, the stipulated judgment is the basis of A.L.’s res judicata defense to the UPA action. (See JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1526 [res judicata “is an affirmative defense, which as a matter of procedure, bars the claim … whether the claim is meritorious or not”]; Estate of Armstrong (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 1, 6 [“It is settled by many decisions that res judic