First Team Real Estate v. Lewandowski CA4/3

Filed 11/10/26 First Team Real Estate v. Lewandowski CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE FIRST TEAM REAL ESTATE- ORANGE COUNTY, G064440 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2017- v. 00959242) DEBRA LEWANDOWSKI et al., OPINION Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sheila O. Recio, Judge. Reversed. Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin Meadow, Hayley MacMillen, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 1  Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, Kevin P. Wagner, Martin Deniston, Kirsten L. Elstrand, and Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Calvin E. Davis, and Candice S. Nam, for Defendants and Respondents. * * * Time limits in civil trials are often utilized by trial courts to focus litigants and their attorneys on the most important evidence required to establish their claims and defenses, thereby minimizing the potential for wasting court time, the parties’ time, and the jurors’ time. And by promoting judicial economy, time limits also create greater access to justice by making the courtroom available for other litigants. Time limits, however, must be reasonable. They must be formulated by the court with substantial input from the attorneys considering the number of parties and the nature of the claims to be tried. And for time limits to be fair and effective, courts must be proactive in monitoring the trial’s progress to ensure the case proceeds smoothly. Ultimately, it is the court’s responsibility to ensure all parties have a full and fair opportunity to present their claims and defenses. That did not occur here. In this case, the trial court set an unrealistic and rigid time limit, which forced First Team Real Estate - Orange County (First Team) to rest before it could present its full case. The court then granted a directed verdict in favor of Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell Banker), Debra Lewandowski, Farshid Karamzadeh, and Alan Kleindienst (collectively defendants) without giving First Team the full time it had been allotted. First Team appealed, arguing it presented substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Alternatively, the lack of evidence was the result of the court’s prejudicial error in limiting the time of trial. We conclude the court abused its discretion in setting and enforcing an 2 unrealistic time limit for trial, which deprived First Team of its right to a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse. STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Complaints On December 4, 2017, First Team filed a complaint against Lewandowski and Karamzadeh, alleging a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Lewandowski and claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the duty of loyalty, trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference with contractual relations, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against both. The complaint alleges that Lewandowski, the former branch manager of First Team’s Newport Beach office used First Team’s trade secrets to solicit highly performing First Team agents and employees to join Coldwell Banker. The complaint alleged that Lewandowski successfully solicited Karamzadeh, the former branch manager of First Team’s Huntington Beach office, who in turn, used First Team’s trade secrets to solicit other First Team agents. On March 5, 2018, First Team filed a first amended complaint that did not substantively alter the allegations of the complaint. Before the parties engaged in any discovery, on March 13, Lewandowski and Karamzadeh filed a case management statement, in which they estimated trial on the complaint would take six to eight days. In its case management statement, First Team estimated 10 to 14 days for trial. At the March 28 case management conference, the trial court estimated trial would take seven days. On September 5, First Team filed a second amended complaint (SAC), adding Kleindienst as a named defendant. The SAC alleged that Lewandowski successfully solicited Kleindienst, the former branch manager 3 of First Team’s Mission Viejo office to join Coldwell Banker and that he used First Team’s trade secrets to solicit other First Team employees. It alleged causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against Kleindienst. On March 13, 2019, First Team filed its third amended complaint (TAC), the operative complaint in this case. The TAC added Coldwell Banker as a named defendant and alleged causes of action against Coldwell Banker for aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, inducing breach of contract, and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The TAC alleged that Jamie Duran, then President of Coldwell Banker’s Orange County and San Diego companies, Brad Pearson, Regional Vice President of Coldwell Southern California, and Lewandowski used First Team’s trade secrets to solicit high-performing First Team agents and employees to join Coldwell Banker. After joining, the agents would work with their clients to convert their listings from First Team to Coldwell Banker. Defendants filed answers, generally denying all allegations and raising numerous affirmative defenses. B. Reassignment and Summary Judgment Motion Effective January 2023, the case was reassigned to the current trial judge. Subsequently, defendants jointly moved for summary judgment and/or adjudication. On October 20, the trial court denied the motion. C. Estimated Trial Times and Proposed Trial Witnesses and Exhibits On January 8, 2024, First Team submitted what it asserted was the joint exhibit list, and the parties submitted a joint witness list. The joint 4 lists showed thousands of exhibits and 100 witnesses. On January 10, the parties summited an amended joint witness list, reducing the number of witnesses to 81. At the January 11 pretrial conference, the trial court and the parties discussed the estimated time for trial and number of witnesses. First Team estimated 20 to 25 days, but indicated that time “could be cut down considerably” if there were stipulations to admissibility of exhibits. Coldwell Banker estimated 15 days, but suggested that rather than trial days, each side would have a certain number of trial hours. Lewandowski, Karamzadeh and Kleindienst (the individual defendants) estimated 20 days. After ruling on numerous motions in limine filed by the parties, the trial court ordered that the parties file no further motions, including motions in limine, during trial without prior court permission. The court also ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the trial exhibits. Finally, it ordered the parties to meet and confer to pare down the list of witnesses, stating “75 people is still way too [many witnesses] for this trial.” In response, the parties submitted a second amended joint witness list and a joint stipulation re exhibits. The second amended witness list listed 63 witnesses, with estimated times for direct examination and cross-examination. For example, it was estimated Cameron Merage, the founder and owner of First Team, would require 8 hours of direct examination and 4.5 hours of cross-examination. The parties estimated the individual defendants would take a total of 24 hours; Duran and Pearson, Coldwell Banker’s employees, 15 hours; and Mark Clews, First Team’s forensic computer expert, 3 hours. First Team also expected to call 10 former or current agents, most of whom would take less than 1 hour of trial time each. 5  In the joint trial exhibits, the parties stipulated to the admissibility of the vast majority of exhibits. However, they disagreed on whether documents would be admissible absent use with a witness. Defendants argued documents should be admitted only when used with a witness, whereas First Team argued the documents should be admitted en masse to streamline proceedings and shorten the length of trial. At the pretrial conference, January 16, the parties agreed that exhibits would be admitted when used with a witness. The parties and the court then went over the witness list and expected testimony. The court noted the trial “was first scheduled as a seven-day trial,” but the parties stated “much higher amounts.” It also noted the witness list had been pared down to 63 witnesses, but that number was “still too many witnesses for this trial.” During the ensuing discussion, counsel for Coldwell Banker argued calling former First Team agents to testify about why they left First Team was “critical testimony that goes to the heart of the case.” After discussing various witnesses and their expected testimony, the court set a trial time of 10 to 12 court days, including jury selection, but excluding jury deliberations and punitive damages phase, if any. The court ordered the parties to keep track of the time used each day. “The time will be allotted equally to both sides.” Each trial day would start at 9:00 a.m., and end at 4:15 p.m., with two 15-minute breaks and a lunch break. However, “sidebars and discussions and late witnesses, anything like that or simply breaks that take much longer, that will eat into that [time].” After further discussion with the parties, the court noted that it would revisit the time estimate during the trial as needed. On January 17, before jury selection started, First Team asked the court to reconsider the 10 to 12 day trial time limit. Counsel argued that when the prior judge gave the seven-day estimate, Coldwell Banker had not 6 been added as a defendant, 40 depositions had not been taken and 100,000 documents had not been exchanged. Thus, “the idea of being able to get all of that in 10 to 12 days, including jury selection and opening, it’s a monumental, if not impossible task for the plaintiff[] because we do have the burden . . . and defendants . . . deny everything.” The court stated its belief trial could be done in 10 to 12 days, but reiterated that it would revisit the issue if needed. D. Jury Selection and Opening Statements The trial court estimated jury selection would take one day. However, jury selection took almost two days, ending in the late afternoon of the second day (January 18). Outside of the presence of the jury, the court advised the parties it would not count the second day toward its estimate because “that’s simply not fair.” The court then gave some preliminary instructions to the jury before dismissing it for the day. The next trial day, opening statements from the three parties took all of the morning and some of the afternoon session. E. Testimony of Cameron Merage Merage, First Team’s founder and owner, began testifying at 2:16 p.m. on the third day of trial, before court was adjourned at 4:14 p.m., with a 25-minute break in the middle of his testimony. Merage resumed testimony at 11:03 a.m. the following day. He also was the sole witness on the fifth and sixth day of trial, and testified along with Mark Clews, First Team’s forensic expert, on the seventh day. In total, Merage testified for 16 hours, 58 minutes, consisting of: 6 hours, 43 minutes on direct examination; 7 hours, 20 7 minutes on cross-examination; 2 hours, 53 minutes on redirect examination; 1 and 2 minutes on re-cross-examination. Merage testified about his founding of First Team and history with the company, its structure and size over the years, its confidential training materials and trade secrets, including how it splits commissions with its agents, and its loss in profitability after losing 200 top-producing agents to Coldwell Banker. He also provided context for numerous documents, such as explaining whether certain employees would have permission or reason to access confidential information, and whether certain Coldwell Banker training documents were copies of First Team’s training documents except with First Team’s name being replaced by Coldwell Banker. Merage also testified about the individual defendants and his history with them, including when he first learned they had recruited other agents to join them at Coldwell Banker. On redirect examination, he testified about their employment contracts and nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements with First Team. At no time during the direct examination or redirect examination did the trial court advise First Team it was wasting time. Defendants did make a narrative objection one time, but the court found Merage had not provided a narrative. The court also did not advise or admonish defendants about wasting time cross-examining Merage. 1 We calculated the time based on the minute orders, excluding any sidebar and technical interruptions. 8 F. Testimony of Mark Clews Clews, First Team’s forensic expert, testified for 5 hours, 54 minutes over three trial days, consisting of: 3 hours, 40 minutes on direct examination; 1 hour, 54 minutes on cross-examination; and 20 minutes on redirect examination. Clews testified numerous documents on the individual defendants’ laptops were deleted before the laptops were returned to First Team. He also testified external hard drives belonging to Lewandowski and Karamzadeh showed high levels of activity of certain dates, indicating copying of numerous files, and they contained First Team documents. G. Conference on Trial Time Limit During a break in Clews’ direct examination on the eighth day of trial, Coldwell Banker raised the issue of the timing of how trial was proceeding. This was the first time anyone raised the issue since the discussion held at the end of voir dire. The court noted it was “a bit concerned,” but stated the 10 to12 day estimate remained a “good estimate, even based on what I’m hearing, in terms of what the issues are.” Asked about its plan for the remaining time, First Team replied that critical witnesses remained, including Karamzadeh and Kleindienst, Coldwell Banker’s Duran and Pearson, and some relatively small collateral witnesses. Coldwell Banker argued First Team had used more than an additional day of trial time , and expressed concern that First Team was monopolizing the trial time. First Team responded that the parties had used the same amount of trial hours, excluding Clews’s time because defendants had not yet cross- examined him. The trial court noted it had stated trial time would be allotted equally. It stated, “I think we did not need as much time as we used for Mr. 9 Merage,” and “[e]ven for Mr. Clews, there was a bit of repetition, at least in the beginning.” Nevertheless, the court “still expect[ed] this trial to be presented to the jury, at least phase 1, within 10 to 12 court days.” H. Testimony of Debra Lewandowski Lewandowski began testifying on the ninth and 10th days of trial. She testified a total of 10 hours, 26 minutes, consisting of: 5 hours, 59 minutes on direct examination; 4 hours, 7 minutes on cross-examination; 19 minutes of redirect examination; and 1 minute on re-cross examination. She testified about her employment history with Coldwell Banker and First Team, her duties and obligations to First Team, and her recruitment by Coldwell Banker. She also was questioned about whether she solicited First Team agents and employees to leave with her and go to Coldwell Banker, and whether she downloaded First Team documents on her laptop to a personal hard drive to take with her before leaving First Team. I. Second Conference on Trial Timing During a break in Lewandowski’s direct examination on the tenth day of trial, Coldwell Banker again raised the issue of timing of trial, noting it only had about two hours of trial time this week. At the subsequent conference on this issue after the jury was excused that same day, Coldwell Banker sought to limit First Team to two hours for the last week of trial to equalize trial time. First Team responded it was impossible because they had two additional witnesses, plus the two named defendants. The trial court stated the “problem here is that we spent . . . four or five days on Mr. Merage alone, and I just don’t see why that occurred given the 10 to 12 day time estimate.” Additionally, the court also did not see why Clews took “multiple days.” The court asked First Team when it planned to rest, and First Team responded by noting the remaining witnesses it intended to call but stated it 10 had not yet “plotted” out when it would rest. The court criticized First Team, stating, “If you had plotted it out, perhaps you wouldn’t have taken four to five days on the first witness alone.” The court advised it may have to cut off First Team’s time to “make sure it’s fair to the other side.” The court stated: “So I told you what the time estimate was before. That’s what it was. I don’t think that it needed to be changed. I think it could have and should have been tried within this time period.” J. First Team’s Motion for Reconsideration of Trial Time Limits On the morning of the 11th day of trial, before Lewandowski completed her testimony, the parties and the court again discussed timing issues. Coldwell Banker noted that based on its calculation, First Team only had 10 minutes left and had not yet produced a damages expert. It indicated it would file for nonsuit. First Team responded by reiterating its consistent position that the trial time limit was unrealistic. Noting the trial court’s standing order not to file motions without preapproval, First Team asked the court’s permission to file a nine-page 2 motion for reconsideration of the court’s trial time limit. The court denied permission to file the motion, but noted First Team was essentially arguing an oral motion for reconsideration. The court stated it originally thought “it was going to be a seven-to-eight-day jury trial. I gave it 10 to 12 in light of everything I heard, I still think that it was a fair estimate. The fact we took longer on some things doesn’t mean that that was not an appropriate time 2 In the motion, which was lodged with the trial court but not filed, First Team requested the court “add an additional five court days to the presentation of evidence.” We note this would take the trial time limit to 15 to 17 court days, which would be within the time estimate originally proposed by the defendants. The requested number shows First Team was cognizant of not wasting trial time. 11 estimate.” It noted that it had originally given First Team until 2:00 p.m., but would give First Team the rest of the day. “And at that time I expect to see the plaintiff rest.” K. Testimony of Robert Magnotta Robert Magnotta, a First Team broker associate who left for Coldwell Banker before returning, testified for 1 hour, 17 minutes, consisting of: 43 minutes on direct examination; and 34 minutes on cross-examination. His testimony was interrupted by technical issues. Magnotta testified that Coldwell Banker’s Duran recruited him in August 2015. During the recruitment, she told him what his commission split would be. He also testified that while still employed by First Team, Lewandowski told [him] he “should absolutely make the move [to Coldwell Banker]. [Lewandowski] said everyone was going to be gone when it was all over, and it wouldn’t be good for [Magnotta’s] career to stay.” L. Testimony of Jamie Troxel Jamie Troxel, First Team’s financial analyst, testified for a total of 54 minutes on direct examination, on the 11th and 12th day of trial. First Team attempted to get exhibit 6157, which showed production figures for First Team’s agents who had left the company, admitted through Troxel’s testimony, but the trial court eventually sustained defendants’ objections based on hearsay and relevance, and excluded the exhibit. M. Close of First Team’s Cases-in-Chief On the 12th day of trial, after Troxel’s testimony concluded, at 11:36 a.m., the trial court ordered First Team to disclose its remaining witnesses and offers of proof before involuntarily resting its case. The court gave First Team “five minutes.” First Team disclosed several witnesses and 12 offers of proof, and at 11:56 p.m., the court declared First Team’s case-in-chief closed. N. Defendants’ Motions for Nonsuit and Directed Verdict The afternoon of the 12th day of trial, defendants moved for nonsuit on the grounds of lack of damages and the statute of limitations, as well as lack of evidence as to Karamzadeh and Kleindienst. After First Team opposed and sought to reopen the case, defendants withdrew their nonsuit motion to prevent reopening, rested and moved for directed verdict based on the same grounds. Before addressing the motion for directed verdict, the trial court stated that it did not believe First Team was entitled to reopen the case based on the trial time limit. The court stated that the addition of Coldwell Banker did not convert the case into a complex case. The court found “days and days were days passed and we were still on the first witness, whose testimony amounted to lengthy and repetitive narratives that dragged on way too long without aiding the jury much. It went beyond the original time estimate that even the plaintiff provided in the last amended joint list of witnesses. Then, thereafter, again, days and days were spent on the second witness, Mr. Clews, and again similarly the same thing.” “And, of course, there is an obligation to ensure that questions are rapid, distinct, and effective, and I don’t think that often occurred. I should state that often I think it did not occur.” The court also noted that it had given First Team “more time and more time and some more time” to address any prejudice to First Team. The trial court then granted directed verdict “as to all of the causes of action for much of the reasons stated by the defendants.” It stated: 13 “I don’t think there is substantial evidence supporting the claims,” noting that “a large part of it has to do with damages and causation.” On May 24, 2024, judgment was entered on the TAC against First Team. First Team timely appealed. DISCUSSION First Team contends the judgment should be reversed because: (1) it presented sufficient evidence for a jury to consider its claims, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the parties to complete their cases in just 10 to 12 days (or 53 to 63 hours based on the court’s proposed daily pace). We address the second argument first, as it would be dispositive of this appeal. I. RELEVANT LAW ON TRIAL TIME LIMITS A trial court has inherent and statutory authority to set and enforce time limits on the presentation of evidence as long as the limits are “reasonable” and the court remains “mindful that each party is entitled to a full and fair opportunity to present its case.” (California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 12, 21 (Crane); accord, People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 51, 150 (ConAgra).) In Crane, the appellate court proposed a set of procedures a trial court should follow when setting trial time limits. “For those cases in which the trial judge believes time limits should be set, the court should first elicit estimates from the parties,” and then “independently evaluate” those estimates “based on the arguments of the parties, the state of the pleadings, the legal and factual issues presented, the number of witnesses likely to testify, the court’s trial schedule and hours, and the 14 court’s experience in trying similar cases.” (Crane, at p. 20; accord, ConAgra, at p. 149.) Although time limits may set in court days or court hours, the appellate court recommended using court hours because “the length of time that a court is in session on any given day may vary depending on unanticipated interruptions or delays (e.g., juror tardiness, matters taken up outside the presence of the jury, other court business that interrupts the trial, etc.).” (Crane, at p. 20.) “Regardless of whether court-imposed time limits are expressed in days or hours, any time limit order should be reasonable, mindful that each party is entitled to a full and fair opportunity to present its case. Trials are a dynamic process without the benefit of a dress rehearsal, which makes forecasting the length of a trial less than precise.” (Id. at p. 21.) “Trial time management is an ongoing responsibility of the trial judge, regardless of the case’s complexity, the number of witnesses called or whether specific time limits have been imposed.” (Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 30.) “Judges need to be proactive from the start in both assessing what a reasonable trial time estimate is and in monitoring the trial’s progress so that the case proceeds smoothly without delay.” (Id. at p. 20.) We review the time limits a court imposes and enforces for an abuse of discretion. (McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 922 (McMillin).) A court abuses its discretion among other ways by making a decision that exceeds the bounds of reasons, all of the circumstances considered. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566; Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, 329.) 15  II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AND ENFORCED AN UNREASONABLE TRIAL TIME LIMIT Here, the trial court set a 10 to 12 day trial time limit, which was lower than any party’s time estimate. (Cf. ConAgra, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 147 [“Plaintiff’s time estimate was within the court’s 30-hour allotment”].) Coldwell Banker had estimated 15 days, the individual defendants 20 days, and First Team 20 to 25 days. Although the court was not bound by those estimates, it failed to provide a rational basis for selecting a figure lower than any suggested by a party. Its rationale for the lower figure was that given the original trial judge’s seven-day trial estimate, the addition of Coldwell Banker and the new causes of action did not make the case complex, warranting more than 3 to 5 days of trial time. The original trial estimate was based on a party’s 6 to 8 day estimate, suggesting the reasonableness of that party’s time estimate. That party (now part of the individual defendants) suggested a 20 day trial time limit, significantly more days than the court set. The court did not explain why it rejected the time estimate of a party 3 whose prior estimate was considered reasonable. Additionally, it is unclear why the new defendants and causes of action would only warrant an additional three to five days. For example, the trial court did not explain that the additional time was based on the court’s 3 We acknowledge counsel for individual defendants, but not counsel for Coldwell Banker, later stated “we” were agreeable with the 10 to 12 day trial limit. This statement, however, came after the trial court set the trial time limit. Thus, it may be influenced by considerations such as whether First Team would be more harmed by the time limit than the individual defendants would be harmed by the same time limit, and not purely by how much time it would reasonably take to present or defend a case. 16 experience with similar cases or claims. Indeed, this case showed the court itself was inaccurate about trial time estimates. It had estimated one court day for jury selection, but jury selection took two court days. Finally, in light of the fact that First Team was entitled to only half of the trial time, it is unreasonable to expect First Team to prove its case against four defendants on 15 causes of action in five to six days, which included jury selection, opening statement and sidebar discussions, even if there are common facts and some derivative claims. As an example, calling First Team agents who left for Coldwell Banker to explain the circumstances of their decisions to show causation and/or damages, a fact that Coldwell Banker opined went to the heart of this case, would consume more than one court day, even if only one hour was spent on each witness.4 When the time required to examine Merage, the individual defendants, and Coldwell Banker’s Duran and Pearson is included, even if maximally efficient, it is improbable that First Team could finish their cases-in-chief in that short of a time period. In sum, the trial court set an unreasonable trial time limit. Defendants fault First Team for having no plan for complying with the trial court’s 10 to 12 day estimate, noting First Team was aware of the time used on Merage and Clews because it had been ordered to keep track of trial time and it admitted having no plan on when to stop its case-in- chief when asked. Attorneys certainly have an obligation to try their case diligently. (Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 21.) However, we are not 4 Defendants suggest these witnesses would only take a “few minutes” each. In the second amended joint list of witnesses, however, the parties estimated between 45 minutes to 1.5 hours for each. This time estimate is supported by the actual trial testimony of Magnotta, a broker associate who left for Coldwell Banker, which took 1 hour, 17 minutes. 17 convinced there is any feasible plan to comply with unrealistic time limits, other than to present an abbreviated case devoid of evidence necessary to prove all the elements of the claims at issue. Stated differently, it would be unfair to require First Team to comply with unrealistic time limits. (See Civ. Code, § 3351 [“The law never requires impossibilities”]; cf. National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. State of California (2018) 5 Cal.5th 428, 433 [“Impossibility can occasionally excuse noncompliance with a statute”].) Besides setting an unrealistic trial time limit, the trial court also rigidly enforced that time limit despite changing circumstances and First Team’s repeated requests for reconsideration. The court stated it would revisit the trial time limits as needed. After jury selection took two days, it informed the parties it would not count the second day toward the time limit. However, the trial ended before the end of the 12th court day when accounting for the two days of jury selection, which was within the original time limit. The parties lost a court day because the time limit effectively went from 10 to 12 days to 10 to 11 days. The trial court also stated it had given First Team additional time, but even with that additional time, First Team was forced to rest at noon on the 12th day of the trial, which is within the original 10 to 12 day limit. More importantly, when the 10 to 12 day trial time limit is converted into court hours, First Team spent only 21 hours, 31 minutes on direct examination and redirect examination, less than half of the 53-to-63-hour trial time limit. (Cf. McMillin, supra,70 Cal.App.5th at p. 922 [“The trial court proceeded more than fairly, as it provided [appellant] an hour and half more time than what [they] had estimated to the court”].) At oral argument, defendants argued the trial court acted within its discretion because it provided First Team ongoing warnings about trial 18 timing before forcing First Team to rest. (See Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 20 [“Judges need to be proactive from the start in both assessing what a reasonable trial time estimate is and in monitoring the trial’s progress so that the case proceeds smoothly without delay”].) Defendants argued the court warned First Team about the trial time limit, citing two instances in the record. We disagree the court’s comments can be construed as warning First Team it was wasting time. In the first instance, during Merage’s redirect examination on the seventh day of trial, the court asked for a time estimate for remaining redirect examination. First Team’s counsel responded it would take less than 15 minutes. After redirect examination took 37 minutes, counsel apologized for the time spent. The court’s comment did not inform First Team it was wasting time, and counsel’s apology did not concede time was wasted. Rather, it was a concession that the time spent exceeded the original 15-minute estimate. The second instance occurred during the first conference on trial time limit on the eighth day of trial, which was precipitated by Coldwell Banker’s counsel, as noted above. During this conference, the court expressed a “bit” of concern about the trial timing, but concluded that the 10 to 12 day time limit remained a “good estimate” even with the time First Team had spent on Merage and was spending on Clews. It was only at the second conference on trial timing, held in the late afternoon on the 10th day of trial, when the trial court for the first time began criticizing First Team for spending “four or five days on Mr. Merage alone” and “multiple days” on Clews in light of the trial time limit. However, when the court made its comments, First Team had almost no trial time left, as the court had initially planned to cut First Time off at 2:00 p.m. the following day (the 11th trial day) before granting First Team additional time. 19 Even with that additional time, First Team spent less than 2 hours on three witnesses (cross-examining Lewandowski and examining Magnotta and Troxel) before being forced to rest. Thus, the record shows that by the time the court warned First Team, it was too late for First Team to salvage its case, if it was even possible to do so. Although the trial court criticized First Team for spending too much time on Merage and Clews during the second conference on trial timing, it never made any findings on how First Team was wasting time until after First Team was forced to rest. For example, it found that Merage had engaged in lengthy narrative in response to questioning, but at the time Merage was examined, the court rejected the only narrative objection. It also stated that many of First Team’s questions were not “rapid, distinct, and effective,” but it provided no example. Additionally, it never admonished First Team on the form of its inquiry during the direct or redirect examinations of Merage and Clews. The trial court faulted First Team for spending “days and days and days” and exceeding original time estimates on the first two witnesses, without acknowledging that defendants spent almost half of that time and also exceeded their original time estimates. As a panel of this court has noted, “adherence to a rigid get-it-over-within-your-original-time-estimate approach” can “encourage stalling at trial by any party who believes it can obtain an advantage by crowding the time available to its opponent.” (Abbott v. Mandiola (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 676, 680-681, fn. 5.) Finally, the trial court stated it had granted First Team additional time, but rather than considering the additional five court days First Team requested, it granted First Team one additional court day, which, as noted above, amounted to less than 2 hours of witness examination. (Cf. 20 ConAgra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148 [the court increased original time limit by 10 hours for each side and agreed to an additional hour for the defense near the end of the defense case].) On this record, we conclude the court abused its discretion in setting and enforcing an unreasonable and inflexible trial time limit which denied First Team its right to a full and fair opportunity to present its case against defendants. The trial court’s error constituted reversible error, without any need to show prejudice. (See Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 22-23 [“Denying a party the right to testify or offer evidence deprives him of a fair trial and constitutes reversible error”]; In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291 [“‘Denying a party the right to testify or to offer evidence is reversible per se’”].) Defendants contend the trial court’s error in setting or enforcing an unreasonable time limit is not structural error, but cites no legal authority for this contention. Defendants cite Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 370 for the proposition that “an abuse of discretion results in reversible error only if it is prejudicial,” but that quoted language comes from York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1190, which noted that “an abuse of discretion results in reversible error only when it results in the denial of a fair hearing or otherwise prejudices a party.” (Ibid.) Thus, the setting of a time limit that provides the litigant with a fair opportunity to present its case is subject to review for an abuse of discretion, and would require an appellant to demonstrate prejudice. The setting and enforcing of 21 the unrealistic trial time limit here, however, denied First Team its right to a 5 fair trial. Thus, the trial court’s error is reversible per se. Because we find reversible error, we need not address First Team’s alternative argument for reversal. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. First Team is entitled