In re C.M.

Filed 10/22/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Glenn & Tehama) In re C.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C105277 Law. (Glenn County Super. Ct. No. COUNTY OF MARIPOSA, 23JQ00777) Appellant, v. COUNTY OF GLENN, Respondent. In re C.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C105322 Law. (Tehama County Super. Ct. COUNTY OF MARIPOSA, No. 25JU000119) Appellant, v. COUNTY OF TEHAMA, Respondent. APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Courts of Glenn and Tehama Counties, Alicia R. Ekland, Judge (Glenn) and Matthew C. McGlynn, Judge (Tehama). Reversed. Renne Public Law Group, Daniel C. Cederborg and Rubin E. Cruse Jr., for Appellant. Prentice Long, Margaret E. Long and Christopher D. Roske for Respondents. 1  These consolidated appeals concern intercounty transfers of juvenile delinquency cases pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 750.1 Respondents Tehama County and Glenn County filed a juvenile wardship petition and notice of probation violation against C.M., then age 17, in the juvenile courts of Tehama and Glenn Counties in August 2025. (§§ 602, subd. (a), 777.) The petition and notice were sustained in part in October 2025, and both juvenile courts granted motions to transfer the cases to the juvenile court for Mariposa County based on evidence that one or both of C.M.’s parents resided there. By then, C.M. was 18 years old. Appellant Mariposa County appeals from both transfer-out orders, arguing the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts erred in determining that Mariposa County was C.M.’s county of residence for purposes of section 750. Mariposa County also argues the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts failed to consider whether the transfers were in C.M.’s best interest, as ostensibly required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.610(e).2 We agree with the first of these arguments and reverse the transfer-out orders. I. BACKGROUND C.M. was born in September 2007. He has a long history of juvenile delinquency, the details of which need not be recounted here. On January 8, 2024, C.M. was declared a ward of the Glenn County Superior Court and committed to a secure youth treatment facility in Tehama County. (§ 602.) He was later placed in a less restrictive facility, from which he absconded in April 2025. While out of custody, C.M. participated in a residential burglary in June 2025, which included an assault with a deadly weapon (a firearm). He was apprehended and 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Undesignated references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 2 placed in the temporary custody of the Tehama County Probation Department in August 2025. A. Tehama County Superior Court Proceedings and Transfer Out to Mariposa County Superior Court (C105322) The district attorney for Tehama County filed a juvenile wardship petition against C.M. on August 13, 2025. (§ 602, subd. (a).) The petition charged C.M. with attempted murder and burglary with special allegations for using a firearm and causing great bodily injury. The petition indicated that C.M.’s residence was in Orland, and his parents resided in Catheys Valley. We take judicial notice on our own motion of the fact that Orland is a city in Glenn County, and Catheys Valley is a census-designated place in Mariposa County. (U.S. Geological Survey, Geographic Names Information System, Summary Report for Orland <https://edits.nationalmap.gov/apps/gaz- domestic/public/search/names/1659315> [as of Oct. 19, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/ZRG8-3CSD>, and id., Summary Report for Catheys Valley <https://edits.nationalmap.gov/apps/gaz-domestic/public/search/names/2582968> [as of Oct. 19, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/JTV6-RPNS>.)3 The Tehama County Superior Court conducted a jurisdiction hearing on the morning of October 14, 2025. The Tehama County Superior Court dismissed the attempted murder and burglary charges, as well as the related special allegations. C.M., who was present in custody, admitted one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. The Tehama County Superior Court accepted the admission and sustained the petition. The Tehama County Superior Court also found that C.M. “resides in Mariposa County.” On the afternoon of October 14, 2025 (after the jurisdiction hearing described above), the district attorney for Tehama County filed a Judicial Council form JV-548 3 We also grant the parties’ unopposed requests for judicial notice in both cases. 3 motion to transfer the case against C.M. to the Mariposa County Superior Court pursuant to section 750. The motion asserted the proposed transfer was in C.M.’s best interests because: “The minor’s parents reside in Mariposa County at [street address], Cathy’s Valley [sic], CA[,] 95306. Due to the juvenile jurisdiction of this case, the minor’s case must be transferred to the county of parental residence for disposition.” The Tehama County Superior Court granted the motion to transfer out by Judicial Council form JV-550 order, on October 15, 2025. The Tehama Superior Court determined C.M.’s legal residence was the same as his father, who resides in Catheys Valley and “has the legal right to physical custody” of C.M. Accordingly, the Tehama County Superior Court ordered the matter transferred to the Mariposa County Superior Court for disposition. The Mariposa County Superior Court accepted the transfer and Mariposa County timely appealed the transfer-out order. B. Glenn County Superior Court Proceedings and Transfer Out to Mariposa County Superior Court (C105277) The Glenn County Probation Department initiated violation of probation proceedings against C.M. on or about August 13, 2025. (§ 777.) We have not been provided with a copy of the notice of probation violation; however, the Glenn County Probation Department’s contemporaneous detention report lists C.M.’s residence as the Tehama County Juvenile Hall, and the residence of C.M.’s parents as “transient.” On October 22, 2025, the Glenn County Probation Department filed a Judicial Council form JV-548 motion for transfer out to Mariposa County Superior Court pursuant to section 750. The motion asserted C.M.’s parents now lived in Catheys Valley and the proposed transfer was in C.M’s best interest because: “The minor’s [sic] parents have moved to Mariposa County.”4 4 By the time of the motion, C.M. was no longer a minor. 4  On October 27, 2025, the Glenn County Superior Court held a hearing on the probation violation and transfer-out motion. C.M. admitted the violation of probation. The Glenn County Superior Court accepted the admission and found: “Minor’s residence is in Mariposa County.” The Glenn County Superior Court granted the motion to transfer out by Judicial Council form order that same day. The order recites that C.M.’s legal residence was with both parents, who reside in Catheys Valley and have “the legal right to physical custody” of C.M. Accordingly, the Glenn County Superior Court ordered the matter transferred to Mariposa County Superior Court for disposition. The Mariposa County Superior Court accepted the transfer and Mariposa County timely appealed the transfer-out order. II. DISCUSSION Mariposa County challenges both the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts’ transfer-out orders. Mariposa County argues the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts failed to consider C.M.’s best interests in making the orders. Mariposa County also argues the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts erred in determining that Mariposa County was C.M.’s county of residence. We will take these arguments in reverse order. A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review “Section 750 specifies the circumstances under which the juvenile court of one county is permitted to transfer a juvenile wardship proceeding to another county.” (In re Judson W. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 838, 843.) Section 750 provides: “Whenever a petition is filed in the juvenile court of a county other than the residence of the person named in the petition, or whenever, subsequent to the filing of a petition in the juvenile court of the county where such minor resides, the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of such minor were it not for the existence of a court order issued pursuant to this chapter is changed to another county, the entire case may be transferred to the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides at any 5 time after the court has made a finding of the facts upon which it has exercised its jurisdiction over such minor, and the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides shall take jurisdiction of the case upon the receipt and filing with it of such finding of the facts and an order transferring the case.” Rule 5.610 implements section 750 and sets forth procedures for determining a child’s county of residence, conducting the transfer-out hearing, and effectuating the transfer. (See rule 5.610(a)-(i).) Rule 5.610(a) establishes a “special rule” for determining the child’s residence for purposes of intercounty transfers in delinquency and dependency proceedings. (See generally § 375 [establishing procedures for transferring dependency cases].)5 Specifically, rule 5.610(a)(1) provides: “[T]he residence of the child is the residence of the person who has the legal right to physical custody of the child according to prior court order,” such as custody orders (§ 361.2) or orders appointing guardians. Rule 5.610(a)(2) further provides: “If there is no order determining custody, both parents are deemed to have physical custody.” However, “residency is simply one factor determining whether to transfer the case for disposition.” (In re Carlos B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 50, 55.) Rule 5.610(e)(2) provides: “After the court determines the identity and residence of the child’s custodian, the court must consider whether transfer of the case would be in the child’s best interest. The court may not transfer the case unless it determines that the transfer will protect or further the child’s best interest.” (See In re R.D. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 679, 687 [“At a transfer- out hearing, the transferring court is required to make findings not only as to the child’s residence, but also whether the transfer is in the child’s best interests”].) We review transfer orders for abuse of discretion. (Maribel M. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1469, 1478; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 321.) We 5 Section 750 (delinquency) and section 375, subdivision (a) (dependency) are identical. 6 will uphold such orders so long as they are supported by substantial evidence and do not exceed the bounds of reason. (See In re Jon N. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 156, 158, fn. 1; In re Stephanie M., supra, at pp. 318-319.) However, we independently review the juvenile court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions. (In re R.D., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 684.) B. Interpretation of Section 750 Mariposa County argues the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts erred in determining that Mariposa County was C.M.’s county of residence for purposes of section 750. Mariposa County emphasizes that section 750 authorizes intercounty transfers where “the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of such minor … is changed to another county,” but C.M. was not a minor at the time of the transfer-out hearings, and thus neither parent could have been legally entitled to custody of him. That being so, Mariposa County argues the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts were wrong to suppose that C.M.’s county of residence could be properly derived from that of his parents. We agree.6 6 We note, however, that section 750 ties the transfer request to the filing of a petition. (§ 750.) Probation violation proceedings under section 777 were initiated with the filing of a supplemental petition when section 750 was enacted and last amended. (Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, p. 3490, amended by Stats. 1968, ch. 1082, § 1, p. 2087 and Stats. 1971, ch. 606, § 1, p. 1210; see also In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 489 [“Between section 777’s enactment in 1961, and Proposition 21’s approval in 2000, the statute contemplated a ‘supplemental petition’ alleging that the prior disposition was not ‘effective’ in reforming or protecting the section 602 ward or probationer”].) That procedure changed with the passage of Proposition 21. “When the voters enacted Proposition 21 in 2000, they replaced the supplemental petition procedure formerly used under section 777 with a notice provision. [Citation.] Thus, a probation violation procedure is initiated under section 777 by the filing of a notice, not a petition.” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 405.) The parties appear to assume section 750 continues to apply to probation violation proceedings, notwithstanding Proposition 21’s change in procedure and terminology. We will accept that assumption for the sake of argument. 7  Section 750 consists of two independent clauses, separated by the disjunctive “or.” The first clause authorizes the transfer of a delinquency case where the petition is filed in a county other than that in which “the person named in the petition” resides. (Ibid.) The second clause authorizes the transfer where, subsequent to the filing of the petition, the residence of the person “legally entitled to the custody of such minor” is changed to another county. (Ibid.; see In re Ramona S. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 945, 950 (Ramona S.).)7 Nothing in the record suggests C.M. resided in Mariposa County at the time the petition and notice were filed, and neither Tehama County nor Glenn County appears to argue as much. They instead point to the county of residence of C.M.’s parents, noting one or both moved to Mariposa County between August and September 2025. We can therefore assume that Tehama County and Glenn County rely on section 750’s second independent clause, which authorizes a transfer “whenever, subsequent to the filing of a petition in the juvenile court of the county where such minor resides, the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of such minor … is changed to another county.” To decide whether C.M.’s cases could be properly transferred to Mariposa County under the second independent clause, we must determine whether C.M. was a “minor,” such that one or both parents would have been legally entitled to custody in Mariposa County but for the existence of another court order. Rule 5.610 offers only limited guidance. Again, rule 5.610(a)(1)-(2) instructs that, for purposes of an intercounty transfer, “the residence of the child is the residence of the person who has the legal right to physical custody of the child according to prior court 7 Ramona S. describes the first circumstance as “where the petition is filed in a county other than that in which the minor resides.” (Ramona S., supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 950, italics added.) However, section 750 uses the word “person” to describe the first circumstance, and “minor” to describe the second. This difference will become important later. 8 order” or both parents, in the absence of any such order. Rule 5.610(a) thus essentially brings us back to where we started, facing the question whether C.M. was a “child” (or “minor”) over whom one or both parents had “the legal right to physical custody” (or were “legally entitled to custody”). The Welfare and Institutions Code does not define the terms “minor” or “custody.” (See In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130 (Austin P.).) Other courts have looked to the Family Code to interpret terms and phrases in the Welfare and Institutions Code. (See, e.g., In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1022 (Jeffrey M.) [relying on Family Code’s definition of “minor” to interpret § 730.7, which imposes joint and several parental liability for restitution orders in delinquency cases]; see also Austin P., supra, at p. 1130 [“In determining what the Legislature meant in [§ 361.2, subd. (a)] by ‘custody,’ ‘placement,’ and ‘place,’ we look to the Welfare and Institutions Code, the Family Code, the California Code of Regulations, and Black’s Law Dictionary”].) “The Family Code defines ‘minor’ as traditionally understood, anyone under the age of 18.” (Jeffrey M., supra, at p. 1022, citing Fam. Code, § 6500 [defining minor as “an individual who is under 18 years of age”].) “The Family Code does not define ‘custody,’ but does define joint custody, joint legal custody, joint physical custody, sole legal custody, and sole physical custody. (Fam. Code, §§ 3002, 3003, 3004, 3006, 3007.) Each definition describes the right of a parent to have physical possession of and/or the right to make decisions about the child. Implicit in the definitions is that the parent has the right to exclude all others when making decisions pertaining to his or her child. Similarly, the California Code of Regulations states that a custody determination means ‘a judgment, decree or order of a court providing for the custody of a child.’ (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 110184.) Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) page 390, column 1 defines custody as ‘2. The care, control, and maintenance of a child awarded by a court’ and states ‘custody’ is also a synonym for ‘legal custody.’ Custody, therefore, connotes that the parent has the right to 9 make decisions pertaining to the child, and has legal possession of the child.” (Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1130; see also Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1384, col. 2 [defining “physical custody” to mean “[t]he right to have a child live with the person awarded custody by the court”] and Random House Unabridged Dict. (2d ed. 1993) p. 494, col. 1 [defining “custody” as “the right of determining the residence, protection, care, and education of a minor child or children”].) A common thread running through these definitions is the shifting relationship between parent and child. While parents have legally protected interests in retaining custody of their children under the age of 18, those interests are “eliminated entirely” when such children reach the age of majority. (In re J.C. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493; cf. In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, 640 [dependency statutes “[do] not allow a parent to reunify with a dependent child who has turned 18 because a parent cannot have physical custody of an adult”]; see Edwards v. Edwards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 136, 143 [An adult “is not in the custody of either parent”]; In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, 594 [“Visitation is a form of custody … and thus … the court had no authority to issue a visitation order regarding [the child] after he reached the age of majority”].) Thus, C.M.’s parents could have been legally entitled to custody of C.M. at the time of the offenses and petition and notice (in June and August 2025), but not at the time of the hearings on the motions to transfer out (in October 2025). That brings us to the central question before us: What are the operative dates for determining whether C.M. was a minor for purposes of section 750, such that his county of residence could be determined by that of his parents? (Cf. Jeffrey M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022 [“The issue in this case becomes … at what time must the person in question be a ‘minor’ for purposes of section 730.7—at the time of the offense, the date of the dispositional hearing, the date of the restitution order or some other time?”].) 10  “Section 602 sets the time for determining whether a person falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile delinquency law as one who is under the age of 18 at the time he or she violates the law of the state.” (Jeffrey M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.) C.M. was undisputedly a minor for jurisdictional purposes under section 602, but that does not mean he was a minor for purposes of determining whether the cases against him could be properly transferred to his parents’ county of residence under section 750. (Compare In re Jesse V. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1619, 1622-1623 (Jesse V.) [construing the term “minor” “in the traditional sense, i.e., a person under 18 years of age” for purposes of §§ 902 and 903, which authorize counties to seek reimbursement from parents for costs expended for support and maintenance of wards placed outside the home] with Jeffrey M., supra, at pp. 1023-1025 [construing the term “minor” to mean any person under the age of 18 at the time of the offense for purposes of imposing joint and several parental liability for restitution orders entered in delinquency proceedings under § 730.7, while recognizing the same definition would be “ludicrous” in the context of other provisions, such as §§ 633 and 634, which address the right to counsel in delinquency proceedings].) No case appears to have addressed this question in the context of section 750, which raises an issue of statutory interpretation. “The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. To accomplish that objective, courts must look first to the words of the statute, giving effect to their plain meaning.” (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1437.) However, “the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) This is sometimes easier said than done. The Welfare and Institutions Code “uses various words throughout to describe persons subject to delinquency jurisdiction and the orders of the juvenile court. ‘Ward,’ ‘dependent child,’ ‘person,’ and ‘minor’ are all used, alone and in combination.” (Jeffrey M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.) Section 750 uses the term “person” in the first 11 independent clause, and “minor” in the second. (§ 750 [“Whenever a petition is filed in the juvenile court of a county other than the residence of the person named in the petition, or whenever, subsequent to the filing of a petition in the juvenile court of the county where such minor resides, the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of such minor … is changed to another county”], italics added.) Despite their overlap, we assume the Legislature made a deliberate choice to use different terms to describe the scenarios in which intercounty transfers may be made. (County of Alameda v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 278, 284-285 [“We must assume … that the Legislature’s choice of words was not an idle act”].) Doing so leads to the conclusion that the transferor court’s choice of transferee county depends on the age of majority status of the individual named in the petition. Thus, an intercounty transfer may either occur where the petition is filed in one county and “the person named in the petition,” whether or not a minor, resides in another, or where the petition is filed “in the juvenile court of the county where such minor resides,” and “the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of such minor” subsequently changes.8 (§ 750.) That the statute distinguishes between “persons” and “minors” in this way indicates the relevant time for determining age of majority status is something other than the time of the offense, since all persons under the age of 18 are “minors” for purposes of juvenile delinquency jurisdiction under section 602. (Jeffrey M., supra, at pp. 1024-1025.) Tehama County and Glenn County argue the operative time for determining C.M.’s age of majority status for purposes of section 750 was August 2025, when the petition and notice were filed. That argument is only half right. Again, section 750’s first independent clause authorizes an intercounty transfer “[w]henever a petition is filed 8 Again, Tehama County and Glenn County rely on the second scenario. 12 in the juvenile court of a county other than the residence of the person named in the petition.” All minors are persons, so a “person” on the date of the petition will still be a “person” on the date of the transfer-out hearing. But the converse is not necessarily true. Not all persons are minors, and a minor at the time of the petition may reach the age of majority by the time of the transfer-out hearing, as happened here. In that circumstance, it makes sense to push the age of majority determination to a later date, after the filing of the petition. The statute’s second independent clause does exactly that. Section 750’s second independent clause expressly becomes operative “subsequent to the filing of a petition in the juvenile court of the county where such minor resides.” (§ 750, italics added.) Section 750 thus requires that age of majority status be determined after the petition has been filed. Other aspects of section 750 support this conclusion. Again, the second independent clause authorizes an intercounty transfer “whenever … the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of such minor … is changed to another county.” (§ 750.)9 When that condition has been met, “the entire case may be transferred to the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides at any time after the court has made a finding of the facts upon which it has exercised its jurisdiction over such minor, and the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides shall take jurisdiction of the case.” (Ibid.) As relevant here, the statute twice speaks in terms of “the county wherein such person then resides,” indicating the relevant circumstances are those existing at the time of the contemplated transfer out, rather than the time of the petition. (Ibid., italics added.) “Moreover, section 750 does not allow for transfer until ‘after the court has made a 9 This language suggests the delinquency case could not have been transferred to Mariposa County, even assuming C.M. was a minor at the relevant time, because C.M.’s parents were alleged to have been residents of Mariposa County at the time the section 602 petition was filed, rather than subsequent to the filing of the petition. 13 finding of the facts upon which it has exercised its jurisdiction over such minor. ’ ” (Steven R. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 812, 820.) This would ordinarily occur at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, not the time of the petition. (Ibid. [“In order to exercise jurisdiction over the minor, the juvenile court must conclude that a crime has been committed”].) Here, for example, the delinquency petition in Tehama County was filed on August 13, 2025, the Tehama County Superior Court made jurisdiction findings on October 14, 2025, and the transfer out to Mariposa County Superior Court was ordered the next day. It would make little sense to set the time for determining C.M.’s county of residence as the time of the petition in August, wait two months until jurisdiction findings could be made, and then rely on stale information in deciding whether to transfer the case in October. Rule 5.610 also supports our conclusion. As previously discussed, rule 5.610 establishes procedures for determining and verifying a child’s county of residence, conducting the transfer-out hearing, and effectuating the transfer. (See rule 5.610(a)-(i).) Rule 5.610(e)(2), entitled “Conduct of hearing,” provides: “After the court determines the identity and residence of the child’s custodian, the court must consider whether transfer of the case would be in the child’s best interest. The court may not transfer the case unless it determines that the transfer will protect or further the child’s best interest.” The title and text of rule 5.610(e) and (e)(2) suggest these inquiries should be made sequentially, at a single hearing. Here again, it would make little sense to determine the residence of the child’s custodian from months-old information and then determine whether the contemplated transfer would be in the child’s best interest. Common sense 14 dictates that the best interest inquiry should be based on conditions at the time of the transfer-out hearing, rather than conditions that may have existed at some earlier time.10 Tehama County and Glenn County argue “section 750 is silent as to designating the county of residence of a youth who reaches the age of eighteen to be the county in which jurisdiction over the youth is commenced.” We disagree. Again, section 750 contains two independent clauses, describing two scenarios in which intercounty transfers may be appropriate. We have up to now concentrated on the second scenario, on which the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts appear to have relied. We now take another look at the first scenario. Because C.M. was no longer a minor at the time of the transfer-out hearing, we focus our analysis on the statute’s first independent clause, which can be streamlined to read: “Whenever a petition is filed in the juvenile court of a county other than the residence of the person named in the petition, … the entire case may be transferred to the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides.” (§ 750.) The Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts should have applied this clause to determine C.M.’s county of residence for purposes of the motions to transfer out.11 Had they done so, the motions could not have been granted. 10 We also note that rule 5.610 speaks in terms of the child’s residence and the child’s best interest, suggesting both inquiries are addressed to minors, rather than persons over the age of 18. (See, e.g., rule 5.610(a)(1), (c)-(e), (i).) We will say more about this in a moment. 11 Tehama County and Glenn County invite us to apply section 17.1 to determine C.M.’s county of residence. We decline to do so. Section 17.1 establishes rules for determining the residences of minors and nonminor dependents. Generally speaking, “nonminor dependents” are persons who have reached the age of majority over whom the juvenile court maintains dependency jurisdiction. (In re Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 285, fn. 2.) That is not the situation here. 15  In the delinquency case, the petition was filed in Tehama County Superior Court and alleged that C.M.’s county of residence was Glenn County. Applying section 750 as interpreted above, we conclude “the entire case” could have been transferred to Glenn County Superior Court after jurisdiction findings were made, but there was no statutory basis for transferring the case to Mariposa County Superior Court. Nothing in the record suggests C.M. was a resident of Mariposa County at the time the petition was filed, and nothing suggests his parents in Mariposa County would have been legally entitled to custody of him at the time of the transfer-out hearing or any other relevant time. That being so, we conclude the Tehama County Superior Court erred in granting the motion to transfer the case to Mariposa County Superior Court. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the probation violation case. As mentioned, our record does not include a copy of the notice. However, the record elsewhere indicates that C.M. was detained in Tehama County Juvenile Hall at the time of the notice, and C.M.’s parents had no fixed address. As before, nothing suggests C.M. was a resident of Mariposa County at the time of the notice, and nothing suggests he would have been subject to parental custody in Mariposa County at any relevant time thereafter. We therefore conclude the order granting the motion to transfer the probation violation case from Glenn County Superior Court to Mariposa County Superior Court was also error. C. Best Interest Inquiry Mariposa County also argues the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts failed to consider C.M.’s best interests in ordering the cases transferred to the Mariposa County Superior Court. Mariposa County may be right, but we do not think it matters in the circumstances of this case. Again, rule 5.610(e)(2) provides: “After the court determines the identity and residence of the child’s custodian, the court must consider whether transfer of the case would be in the child’s best interest. The court may not transfer the case unless it 16 determines that the transfer will protect or further the child’s best interest.” The record does not show either the Tehama County or Glenn County Superior Courts considered C.M.’s best interests in transferring the cases to Mariposa County Superior Court. (Rule 5.610(e)(2).) That said, we question whether the best interest inquiry was required given our conclusion that C.M. was not “a minor” for purposes of section 750. If C.M. was not “a minor” for purposes of section 750, he can hardly have been “a child” for purposes of rule 5.610. Regardless, rule 5.610(e)(2) requires that the transferor court first determine the identity and residence of the child’s custodian (if any) and then consider the child’s best interests. We have concluded the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts went wrong at the first step of the analysis, by failing to properly determine C.M.’s county of residence. That conclusion requires reversal. (See Ramona S., supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 952 [“Of course, it is proper for the juvenile court of one county to ‘place’ a minor ward of the court in another county when such placement is found to be in the best interest of the minor. [Citation.] But it is patently contrary to sound policy and the relevant statutes to permit one county to shift the administrative and financial burden of a juvenile court wardship to another county”].) In light of our disposition, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the Tehama County and Glenn County Superior Courts failed a mandatory duty to consider whether the proposed transfers served C.M.’s best interest. 17  III. DISPOSITION The transfer orders are reversed. /S/ RENNER, Acting P. J. We concur: /S/ KRAUSE, J. /S/ FEINBERG, J. 18