Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Conservatorship of W.W. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR Conservatorship of the Person of B351160 W.W. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. ZE042265) PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent, v. W.W., Objector and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert S. Harrison, Judge. Reversed. B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent. ______________________________________________ W.W. appeals from a judgment reappointing the Public Guardian of Los Angeles (Public Guardian) as her conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (See Welf & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 She contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that she is gravely disabled. The only witness who testified at her trial, a stipulated expert, relied exclusively upon statements in W.W.’s residential chart to form her opinions. Neither the chart, nor any statements made in the chart, were admitted into evidence. Because the expert’s opinion was based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support, we reverse. BACKGROUND The trial court established a conservatorship for 54-year-old W.W. in October 2017 and reestablished it annually over the next seven years. In August 2025, the Public Guardian filed another reestablishment petition. At a hearing in September 2025, stand-in counsel for W.W. stated that her “[f]acility logged on and advised us that she refused. She also advised our paralegal she is not on conservatorship and she does not have a conservator.” Counsel asked to “set it for a refusal 1 Unspecified references to statutes are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 court trial/jury trial setting.” The court set the matter for “[p]otential refusal court trial” and ordered a report on W.W.’s current mental status. (See § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); Evid. Code, § 730.) On November 12, 2025, before calling the matter for trial, an unidentified employee at W.W.’s residential facility told the court that W.W. was “refusing to attend.” The employee reported that she had informed W.W. that her refusal would likely result in continued conservatorship, to which W.W. “denied having [one] in the first place.” The employee clarified that she had no conversation with W.W. about conservatorship itself, only about appearing in court. After these statements, the court “call[ed] the case” for W.W. and her appointed counsel stipulated to proceed in her absence. The parties stipulated that Marion Arom, a forensic psychologist at W.W.’s residential facility, could testify as an expert. Arom was the only testifying witness. Arom testified that for the “third year in a row,” W.W. refused to speak with her. After reviewing W.W.’s residential chart, Arom determined that she suffered from schizoaffective disorder. When counsel for the Public Guardian asked Arom to provide factual support for this diagnosis, W.W.’s appointed counsel interposed a hearsay objection. The court sustained the objection. Arom was then asked if she believed W.W. met the criteria for a grave disability. She replied: “I have only information from the chart. I never testify from the chart because it’s hearsay. But I don’t have anything else to testify from.” The court told Arom she could rely on collateral information and the chart so long as she did not reveal “what the chart says.” Arom testified 3 she did not “have anything” beyond the statements in W.W.’s chart. The court replied: “We don’t want anything from the charts [because] we don’t have them, but your opinion can be based on first-hand observations that you obtained in the charts.” The court overruled additional hearsay, foundation, and People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) objections. “From the notes” made in W.W.’s chart, Arom believed she was gravely disabled. The court overruled additional hearsay objections and declined appointed counsel’s request to continue the matter to procure the declarants who made notations in the chart. The court credited Arom’s expert opinion and informed the parties, as before, that it did not “want to hear anything from the charts and that’s why I stopped and struck” testimony purporting to relay such information.2 The court granted the reestablishment petition, noting its own “benefit of Dr. Arom’s experience and knowledge of the procedures at [W.W.’s residential facility] and also of the medical records regarding [W.W.], specifically the direct observations of her treatment team.” The court had “little doubt on this. Actually, no doubt” that she remained gravely disabled. W.W. appealed. 2 The court struck Arom’s testimony concerning “specific information” appearing in W.W.’s chart, including: “[F]irst-hand information from a person who is a licensed mental health professional. First hand, [W.W.] doesn’t believe she has a mental illness, she refuses blood draws, she doesn’t believe she has a conservator, she doesn’t believe that she needs medication.” 4 DISCUSSION A. Overview of the LPS Act “The LPS Act has many purposes, including ‘end[ing] the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of persons with mental health disorders’ (§ 5001, subd. (a)), ‘provid[ing] prompt evaluation and treatment’ (id., subd. (b)), and ‘provid[ing] individualized treatment, supervision, and placement services by a conservatorship program’ (id., subd. (e)).” (Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 706 (K.P.).) The LPS Act authorizes conservatorships for those who are gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. (§ 5350.)3 It defines “‘gravely disabled’” as a “condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, . . . is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); see § 5350, subd. (e).) The LPS conservatorship process begins with a “professional recommendation to initiate conservatorship proceedings.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If this recommendation aligns with the opinion of the conservatorship investigation officer of the county of residence of the proposed conservatee, the officer must petition the superior court for conservatorship. (§ 5352.) The officer investigates “available alternatives to conservatorship, examining ‘all relevant aspects of the person’s medical, psychological, financial, family, vocational, and social condition, and information obtained from the person’s family members, close friends, social worker, or principal 3 “Because this case involves only mental disorders,” we dispense mention of chronic alcoholism as a qualifying condition. (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 703, fn. 2; see §§ 5001, subd. (a), 5350.) 5 therapist.’ (§ 5354, subd. (a).) After this investigation, the [officer] is empowered to ‘recommend conservatorship to the court only if no suitable alternatives are available.’ (Ibid.)” (K.P., at p. 709.) Because LPS proceedings threaten “significant” liberty interests, the Legislature and courts have “built several layers of important safeguards into conservatorship procedure.” (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 540.) Following a “carefully calibrated series of temporary detentions for evaluation and treatment” (id. at p. 541), court proceedings may be initiated to determine whether a proposed conservatee should be involuntarily confined for up to one year. (§§ 5350, subd. (d), 5361, subds. (a)–(b).) Various safeguards attend these court proceedings, including the right to receive a copy of the conservatorship investigation report (§ 5354, subd. (a)); the right to a timely hearing on the conservatorship petition and jury or court trial, if demanded (§§ 5350, subd. (d)(1), 5365); the right to counsel (§ 5365); and a requirement that any determination of grave disability “must be unanimous and upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 709.) At the conservatorship hearing, the court may receive “evidence both oral and written” (§ 5118, subd. (a)) and may “read and consider the contents” of the conservatorship investigation report in rendering judgment (§ 5354, subd. (a)). The proposed conservatee may waive presence at this hearing. (§ 5365.1.) “If the proposed conservatee chooses to go forward with the hearing [they] may agree to be bound by the court’s decision at such hearing by not contesting the petition or thereafter demanding a trial.” (Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 651 (Manton).) If, however, the proposed conservatee (or their 6 appointed counsel) demands one, the court must hold a trial at which it may not admit the conservatorship investigation report “to the extent it contain[s] inadmissible hearsay.” (Id. at pp. 652– 653.) If grave disability is found at the hearing and any contested trial, the court appoints a conservator (§ 5350), imposes restrictions on the conservatee as needed, for example, to prevent the conservatee from driving or refusing medical treatment (§ 5357), and determines the least restrictive appropriate placement (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A)). A conservatorship automatically ends after one year and may be reestablished by a new petition, subject to the same jury trial rights and proceedings. (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 709–710; see §§ 5350, subd. (d), 5361, subds. (a)–(b); Conservatorship of Deidre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312.) The reestablishment petition “must include the opinion of two physicians, or other described professionals, ‘that the conservatee is still gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder . . . .’” (K.P., at p. 710, quoting § 5361, subd. (b).) B. Insufficient Evidence of Grave Disability W.W. contends the Public Guardian failed to present substantial evidence that she suffers from grave disability. We agree. “‘In order to establish that a person is gravely disabled, the evidence must support an objective finding that the person, due to [a] mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.’ [Citation.] ‘On review, we apply the substantial evidence test to 7 determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability. [Citation.] The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.’ [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of M.B. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 98, 106.) Substantial evidence also “includes circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” (Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577.) The sole witness in this case was a stipulated expert. Expert witnesses are given greater latitude when testifying than lay witnesses, who may only testify to matters within their personal knowledge. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) “In addition to matters within their own personal knowledge, experts may relate information acquired through their training and experience, even though that information may have been derived from conversations with others, lectures, study of learned treatises, etc. This latitude is a matter of practicality. A physician is not required to personally replicate all medical experiments dating back to the time of Galen in order to relate generally accepted medical knowledge that will assist the jury in deciding the case at hand.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 675.) “When giving such testimony, the expert often relates relevant principles or generalized information rather than reciting specific statements made by others.” (Ibid.) This latitude is, however, limited. If an expert testifies to “case-specific out-of-court statements to explain” the bases for their opinion, the statements, presented for their truth, constitute hearsay. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 684.) “Like any other hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted through an applicable hearsay exception. Alternatively, the evidence can be admitted through an appropriate witness and the 8 expert may assume its truth in a properly worded hypothetical question in the traditional manner.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “What an expert cannot do is relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Id. at p. 686.) In Sanchez, a gang expert testified both to his knowledge concerning the motivations and actions of gangs generally and to case-specific facts involving the defendant, including his past interactions with local law enforcement. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 672–673.) The expert was not present for the past interactions and derived knowledge of them from police reports, which were not admitted into evidence and were not part of the appellate record. (Id. at pp. 673, 694.) Our Supreme Court found these police reports contained case-specific hearsay. (Id. at p. 694.) Absent independent proof or an applicable hearsay exception, the expert could not relay the past law enforcement interactions and treat the content of those statements as “true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, . . .” (Id. at p. 686.) LPS Act cases similarly prohibit expert witnesses from relaying “‘case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a statutory exception.’” (Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1274, 1283, quoting Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685–686.) One such exception permits hearsay “from medical records that qualif[y] for admission under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” (Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 448; see Evid. Code, § 1561.) Another permits statements in medical records reflecting a proposed conservatee’s “symptoms or behavior stemming from a mental health disorder” if, after considering certain factors, the court makes a 9 preliminary determination that the statements are sufficiently reliable. (§ 5122, subd. (a), enacted by Stats. 2023, ch. 637, § 3.)4 The latter exception was enacted to “abrogate Sanchez in the LPS Act context by allowing expert witnesses [to testify] . . . about information contained in a medical record without a hearsay bar.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 43 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 17, 2023, p. 21.) The Legislature sought to “prioritize the considerations of court efficiency and medical professionals’ time by allowing a medical expert to recount the observations and opinions of the proposed conservatee’s treating medical professionals wholesale, despite not being able to independently verify the medical conclusions being presented.” (Id. at p. 22.) The court’s required preliminary finding of reliability by the court was not, however, intended to be a rubber stamp. The Legislature recognized that the preliminary finding is significant because the proposed conservatee’s counsel has “no way to meaningfully question the medical opinions being presented to the court.” (Ibid.) “[I]f the file contained an error or faulty assumption, that material would be passed on as fact. Without any way to test the evidence supporting the state’s assertions of grave disability, there is a risk that LPS Act conservatorships could resemble the 4 This exception requires a preliminary fact determination that (1) the statements appear in “medical record[s]” and were made by “health practitioner[s],” as defined; (2) the statements were based on observations by the declarants; and (3) the time, content and circumstances of the statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability. (§ 5122, subds. (a), (d); see id., subd. (e) [“Nothing in this section affects” application of the multiple hearsay rule].) The trial court did not consider this hearsay exception. As such, we decline to consider W.W.’s arguments questioning Arom’s testimony under it. 10 ‘ceremonial rather than functional’ commitment hearings of the 1950s and 1960s.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Beyond considering the admissibility of an expert’s opinion, we must equally bear in mind the weight to be accorded to it. In assessing the evidentiary value of an expert’s opinion, “we are mindful that [the expert] ‘does not possess a cart blanche to express any opinion within the area of expertise.’ [Citation.] When an expert’s opinion is ‘based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support,’ or ‘on speculative or conjectural factors,’ it has ‘no evidentiary value.’ [Citation.]” (People v. G.A. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1138–1139 (G.A.); see Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117 [expert opinion is “‘worth no more than the reasons upon which it rests’”].) Applying these principles, we cannot conclude Arom’s opinion furnished substantial evidence that W.W. presently suffers from grave disability. Though Arom opined that W.W. suffered from schizoaffective disorder and was “still gravely disabled,” virtually no facts were admitted to support either opinion. The Public Guardian did not produce W.W.’s residential chart at trial. Nor did it offer the chart into evidence as a business record (Evid. Code, § 1561) or sufficiently reliable medical record (§ 5122). The court denied appointed counsel’s request to continue the matter to procure the declarants who made the notations in the chart. Without knowing how the notations in W.W.’s residential chart were recorded, much less what they said, the expert opinion derived from them does not constitute substantial evidence. (See G.A., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1130–1131, 1138–1139; accord, People v. Wright (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 537, 541–542, 546.) A judgment “based solely on an 11 expert opinion that relied on such assumptions and factors must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence.” (G.A., at p. 1139.)5 We must reverse the conservatorship judgment for insufficient evidence, but this reversal “does not mandate that any existing conservatorship be vacated. [W.W.’s] present status as conservatee, if applicable, would, of course, be pursuant to proceedings subsequent to those at issue here.” (Manton, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 652, fn. 5.) The conservatorship judgment in this appeal commenced in November 2025 for one year and expired on October 30, 2026. (§ 5361.) If a new reestablishment petition was filed, considered, and granted, our reversal will have no effect on the more recent judgment. (Conservatorship of K.Y. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 985, 988–989.) If the trial court has yet to consider or decide a subsequent reestablishment petition, our reversal does not bar a trial on that petition either. “[T]here is, of necessity, no bar to the public guardian filing a new petition” to reestablish a conservatorship whenever necessary. (Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, 550, disapproved on another ground in K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 717.) 5 More than two months after its respondent’s brief was due and briefing was submitted, the Public Guardian applied for relief from default. We denied the untimely application for lack of good cause. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2), (d).) The proposed brief argued that W.W.’s grave disability finding was supported by unsworn statements from stand-in counsel at the September 2025 hearing and the unidentified employee prior to the November 2025 trial. The Public Guardian provided no authority in which to admit such unsworn statements. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 281; In re B.S. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 246, 253.) 12 DISPOSITION The conservatorship judgment is reversed. If W.W.’s status as conservatee has already been reestablished by proceedings subsequent to those at issue here, this appeal is moot and shall have no effect. If it has not, our reversal is without prejudice to the Public Guardian filing a new reestablishment petition. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS MORI, Acting P. J. We concur: TAMZARIAN, J. DAUM, J. 13