Conservatorship of W.W. CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB351160
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Conservatorship of W.W. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
Conservatorship of the Person of B351160
W.W.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
ZE042265)
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
W.W.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert S. Harrison, Judge. Reversed.
B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.
______________________________________________
W.W. appeals from a judgment reappointing the Public
Guardian of Los Angeles (Public Guardian) as her conservator
under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (See Welf &
Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 She contends insufficient evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that she is gravely disabled.
The only witness who testified at her trial, a stipulated expert,
relied exclusively upon statements in W.W.’s residential chart to
form her opinions. Neither the chart, nor any statements made
in the chart, were admitted into evidence. Because the expert’s
opinion was based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary
support, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
The trial court established a conservatorship for
54-year-old W.W. in October 2017 and reestablished it annually
over the next seven years. In August 2025, the Public Guardian
filed another reestablishment petition. At a hearing in
September 2025, stand-in counsel for W.W. stated that her
“[f]acility logged on and advised us that she refused. She also
advised our paralegal she is not on conservatorship and she does
not have a conservator.” Counsel asked to “set it for a refusal
1 Unspecified references to statutes are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
court trial/jury trial setting.” The court set the matter for
“[p]otential refusal court trial” and ordered a report on W.W.’s
current mental status. (See § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); Evid. Code,
§ 730.)
On November 12, 2025, before calling the matter for trial,
an unidentified employee at W.W.’s residential facility told the
court that W.W. was “refusing to attend.” The employee reported
that she had informed W.W. that her refusal would likely result
in continued conservatorship, to which W.W. “denied having [one]
in the first place.” The employee clarified that she had no
conversation with W.W. about conservatorship itself, only about
appearing in court.
After these statements, the court “call[ed] the case” for
W.W. and her appointed counsel stipulated to proceed in her
absence. The parties stipulated that Marion Arom, a forensic
psychologist at W.W.’s residential facility, could testify as an
expert. Arom was the only testifying witness.
Arom testified that for the “third year in a row,” W.W.
refused to speak with her. After reviewing W.W.’s residential
chart, Arom determined that she suffered from schizoaffective
disorder. When counsel for the Public Guardian asked Arom to
provide factual support for this diagnosis, W.W.’s appointed
counsel interposed a hearsay objection. The court sustained the
objection.
Arom was then asked if she believed W.W. met the criteria
for a grave disability. She replied: “I have only information from
the chart. I never testify from the chart because it’s hearsay.
But I don’t have anything else to testify from.” The court told
Arom she could rely on collateral information and the chart so
long as she did not reveal “what the chart says.” Arom testified
3
she did not “have anything” beyond the statements in W.W.’s
chart. The court replied: “We don’t want anything from the
charts [because] we don’t have them, but your opinion can be
based on first-hand observations that you obtained in the charts.”
The court overruled additional hearsay, foundation, and People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) objections.
“From the notes” made in W.W.’s chart, Arom believed she
was gravely disabled. The court overruled additional hearsay
objections and declined appointed counsel’s request to continue
the matter to procure the declarants who made notations in the
chart. The court credited Arom’s expert opinion and informed the
parties, as before, that it did not “want to hear anything from the
charts and that’s why I stopped and struck” testimony purporting
to relay such information.2
The court granted the reestablishment petition, noting its
own “benefit of Dr. Arom’s experience and knowledge of the
procedures at [W.W.’s residential facility] and also of the medical
records regarding [W.W.], specifically the direct observations of
her treatment team.” The court had “little doubt on this.
Actually, no doubt” that she remained gravely disabled. W.W.
appealed.
2 The court struck Arom’s testimony concerning “specific
information” appearing in W.W.’s chart, including: “[F]irst-hand
information from a person who is a licensed mental health
professional. First hand, [W.W.] doesn’t believe she has a mental
illness, she refuses blood draws, she doesn’t believe she has a
conservator, she doesn’t believe that she needs medication.”
4
DISCUSSION
A. Overview of the LPS Act
“The LPS Act has many purposes, including ‘end[ing] the
inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of persons
with mental health disorders’ (§ 5001, subd. (a)), ‘provid[ing]
prompt evaluation and treatment’ (id., subd. (b)), and ‘provid[ing]
individualized treatment, supervision, and placement services by
a conservatorship program’ (id., subd. (e)).” (Conservatorship of
K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 706 (K.P.).)
The LPS Act authorizes conservatorships for those who are
gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. (§ 5350.)3 It defines
“‘gravely disabled’” as a “condition in which a person, as a result
of a mental health disorder, . . . is unable to provide for their
basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or
necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); see § 5350,
subd. (e).)
The LPS conservatorship process begins with a
“professional recommendation to initiate conservatorship
proceedings.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If this
recommendation aligns with the opinion of the conservatorship
investigation officer of the county of residence of the proposed
conservatee, the officer must petition the superior court for
conservatorship. (§ 5352.) The officer investigates “available
alternatives to conservatorship, examining ‘all relevant aspects of
the person’s medical, psychological, financial, family, vocational,
and social condition, and information obtained from the person’s
family members, close friends, social worker, or principal
3 “Because this case involves only mental disorders,” we dispense
mention of chronic alcoholism as a qualifying condition. (K.P., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 703, fn. 2; see §§ 5001, subd. (a), 5350.)
5
therapist.’ (§ 5354, subd. (a).) After this investigation, the
[officer] is empowered to ‘recommend conservatorship to the court
only if no suitable alternatives are available.’ (Ibid.)” (K.P., at
p. 709.)
Because LPS proceedings threaten “significant” liberty
interests, the Legislature and courts have “built several layers of
important safeguards into conservatorship procedure.”
(Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 540.) Following
a “carefully calibrated series of temporary detentions for
evaluation and treatment” (id. at p. 541), court proceedings may
be initiated to determine whether a proposed conservatee should
be involuntarily confined for up to one year. (§§ 5350, subd. (d),
5361, subds. (a)–(b).) Various safeguards attend these court
proceedings, including the right to receive a copy of the
conservatorship investigation report (§ 5354, subd. (a)); the right
to a timely hearing on the conservatorship petition and jury or
court trial, if demanded (§§ 5350, subd. (d)(1), 5365); the right to
counsel (§ 5365); and a requirement that any determination of
grave disability “must be unanimous and upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 709.)
At the conservatorship hearing, the court may receive
“evidence both oral and written” (§ 5118, subd. (a)) and may “read
and consider the contents” of the conservatorship investigation
report in rendering judgment (§ 5354, subd. (a)). The proposed
conservatee may waive presence at this hearing. (§ 5365.1.) “If
the proposed conservatee chooses to go forward with the hearing
[they] may agree to be bound by the court’s decision at such
hearing by not contesting the petition or thereafter demanding a
trial.” (Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 651
(Manton).) If, however, the proposed conservatee (or their
6
appointed counsel) demands one, the court must hold a trial at
which it may not admit the conservatorship investigation report
“to the extent it contain[s] inadmissible hearsay.” (Id. at pp. 652–
653.)
If grave disability is found at the hearing and any contested
trial, the court appoints a conservator (§ 5350), imposes
restrictions on the conservatee as needed, for example, to prevent
the conservatee from driving or refusing medical treatment
(§ 5357), and determines the least restrictive appropriate
placement (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A)). A conservatorship
automatically ends after one year and may be reestablished by a
new petition, subject to the same jury trial rights and
proceedings. (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 709–710; see §§ 5350,
subd. (d), 5361, subds. (a)–(b); Conservatorship of Deidre B.
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312.) The reestablishment
petition “must include the opinion of two physicians, or other
described professionals, ‘that the conservatee is still gravely
disabled as a result of mental disorder . . . .’” (K.P., at p. 710,
quoting § 5361, subd. (b).)
B. Insufficient Evidence of Grave Disability
W.W. contends the Public Guardian failed to present
substantial evidence that she suffers from grave disability. We
agree.
“‘In order to establish that a person is gravely disabled, the
evidence must support an objective finding that the person, due
to [a] mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to
carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise
provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.’
[Citation.] ‘On review, we apply the substantial evidence test to
7
determine whether the record supports a finding of grave
disability. [Citation.] The testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.’ [Citation.]”
(Conservatorship of M.B. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 98, 106.)
Substantial evidence also “includes circumstantial evidence and
the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” (Conservatorship
of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577.)
The sole witness in this case was a stipulated expert.
Expert witnesses are given greater latitude when testifying than
lay witnesses, who may only testify to matters within their
personal knowledge. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) “In
addition to matters within their own personal knowledge, experts
may relate information acquired through their training and
experience, even though that information may have been derived
from conversations with others, lectures, study of learned
treatises, etc. This latitude is a matter of practicality. A
physician is not required to personally replicate all medical
experiments dating back to the time of Galen in order to relate
generally accepted medical knowledge that will assist the jury in
deciding the case at hand.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 675.) “When giving such testimony, the expert often relates
relevant principles or generalized information rather than
reciting specific statements made by others.” (Ibid.)
This latitude is, however, limited. If an expert testifies to
“case-specific out-of-court statements to explain” the bases for
their opinion, the statements, presented for their truth,
constitute hearsay. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 684.) “Like
any other hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted
through an applicable hearsay exception. Alternatively, the
evidence can be admitted through an appropriate witness and the
8
expert may assume its truth in a properly worded hypothetical
question in the traditional manner.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “What
an expert cannot do is relate as true case-specific facts asserted
in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by
competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Id.
at p. 686.)
In Sanchez, a gang expert testified both to his knowledge
concerning the motivations and actions of gangs generally and to
case-specific facts involving the defendant, including his past
interactions with local law enforcement. (Sanchez, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 672–673.) The expert was not present for the past
interactions and derived knowledge of them from police reports,
which were not admitted into evidence and were not part of the
appellate record. (Id. at pp. 673, 694.) Our Supreme Court found
these police reports contained case-specific hearsay. (Id. at
p. 694.) Absent independent proof or an applicable hearsay
exception, the expert could not relay the past law enforcement
interactions and treat the content of those statements as “true
and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, . . .” (Id. at p. 686.)
LPS Act cases similarly prohibit expert witnesses from
relaying “‘case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under
a statutory exception.’” (Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 1274, 1283, quoting Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 685–686.) One such exception permits hearsay “from medical
records that qualif[y] for admission under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.” (Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 438, 448; see Evid. Code, § 1561.) Another permits
statements in medical records reflecting a proposed conservatee’s
“symptoms or behavior stemming from a mental health disorder”
if, after considering certain factors, the court makes a
9
preliminary determination that the statements are sufficiently
reliable. (§ 5122, subd. (a), enacted by Stats. 2023, ch. 637, § 3.)4
The latter exception was enacted to “abrogate Sanchez in
the LPS Act context by allowing expert witnesses [to testify] . . .
about information contained in a medical record without a
hearsay bar.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 43 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 17, 2023, p. 21.)
The Legislature sought to “prioritize the considerations of court
efficiency and medical professionals’ time by allowing a medical
expert to recount the observations and opinions of the proposed
conservatee’s treating medical professionals wholesale, despite
not being able to independently verify the medical conclusions
being presented.” (Id. at p. 22.) The court’s required preliminary
finding of reliability by the court was not, however, intended to
be a rubber stamp. The Legislature recognized that the
preliminary finding is significant because the proposed
conservatee’s counsel has “no way to meaningfully question the
medical opinions being presented to the court.” (Ibid.) “[I]f the
file contained an error or faulty assumption, that material would
be passed on as fact. Without any way to test the evidence
supporting the state’s assertions of grave disability, there is a
risk that LPS Act conservatorships could resemble the
4 This exception requires a preliminary fact determination that
(1) the statements appear in “medical record[s]” and were made by
“health practitioner[s],” as defined; (2) the statements were based on
observations by the declarants; and (3) the time, content and
circumstances of the statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability.
(§ 5122, subds. (a), (d); see id., subd. (e) [“Nothing in this section
affects” application of the multiple hearsay rule].) The trial court did
not consider this hearsay exception. As such, we decline to consider
W.W.’s arguments questioning Arom’s testimony under it.
10
‘ceremonial rather than functional’ commitment hearings of the
1950s and 1960s.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Beyond considering the admissibility of an expert’s opinion,
we must equally bear in mind the weight to be accorded to it. In
assessing the evidentiary value of an expert’s opinion, “we are
mindful that [the expert] ‘does not possess a cart blanche to
express any opinion within the area of expertise.’ [Citation.]
When an expert’s opinion is ‘based on assumptions of fact without
evidentiary support,’ or ‘on speculative or conjectural factors,’ it
has ‘no evidentiary value.’ [Citation.]” (People v. G.A. (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 1126, 1138–1139 (G.A.); see Jennings v. Palomar
Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108,
1117 [expert opinion is “‘worth no more than the reasons upon
which it rests’”].)
Applying these principles, we cannot conclude Arom’s
opinion furnished substantial evidence that W.W. presently
suffers from grave disability. Though Arom opined that W.W.
suffered from schizoaffective disorder and was “still gravely
disabled,” virtually no facts were admitted to support either
opinion. The Public Guardian did not produce W.W.’s residential
chart at trial. Nor did it offer the chart into evidence as a
business record (Evid. Code, § 1561) or sufficiently reliable
medical record (§ 5122). The court denied appointed counsel’s
request to continue the matter to procure the declarants who
made the notations in the chart. Without knowing how the
notations in W.W.’s residential chart were recorded, much less
what they said, the expert opinion derived from them does not
constitute substantial evidence. (See G.A., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1130–1131, 1138–1139; accord, People v. Wright (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 537, 541–542, 546.) A judgment “based solely on an
11
expert opinion that relied on such assumptions and factors must
be reversed for lack of substantial evidence.” (G.A., at p. 1139.)5
We must reverse the conservatorship judgment for
insufficient evidence, but this reversal “does not mandate that
any existing conservatorship be vacated. [W.W.’s] present status
as conservatee, if applicable, would, of course, be pursuant to
proceedings subsequent to those at issue here.” (Manton, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 652, fn. 5.) The conservatorship judgment in this
appeal commenced in November 2025 for one year and expired on
October 30, 2026. (§ 5361.) If a new reestablishment petition
was filed, considered, and granted, our reversal will have no
effect on the more recent judgment. (Conservatorship of K.Y.
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 985, 988–989.) If the trial court has yet
to consider or decide a subsequent reestablishment petition, our
reversal does not bar a trial on that petition either. “[T]here is, of
necessity, no bar to the public guardian filing a new petition” to
reestablish a conservatorship whenever necessary.
(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, 550,
disapproved on another ground in K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 717.)
5 More than two months after its respondent’s brief was due and
briefing was submitted, the Public Guardian applied for relief from
default. We denied the untimely application for lack of good cause.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2), (d).) The proposed brief
argued that W.W.’s grave disability finding was supported by unsworn
statements from stand-in counsel at the September 2025 hearing and
the unidentified employee prior to the November 2025 trial. The
Public Guardian provided no authority in which to admit such
unsworn statements. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 281; In re
B.S. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 246, 253.)
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DISPOSITION
The conservatorship judgment is reversed. If W.W.’s status
as conservatee has already been reestablished by proceedings
subsequent to those at issue here, this appeal is moot and shall
have no effect. If it has not, our reversal is without prejudice to
the Public Guardian filing a new reestablishment petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
DAUM, J.
13