Full Opinion

Filed 10/28/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE In re the Marriage of A.O. and ALINA VOLOGODSKAYA. A.O., Respondent, A176388 v. (San Mateo County ALINA VOLOGODSKAYA, Super. Ct. No. 23-FAM- Appellant. 01790) A.O. and Alina Vologodskaya were married. Both sought domestic violence restraining orders against the other; ultimately, they stipulated to the issuance of a one-year order protecting him from her. More than a year later, he asked the trial court to order her to pay his attorney fees as a prevailing party on his restraining order and as a respondent who successfully defended against her request for a restraining order. (Fam. Code, § 6344; undesignated statutory references are to this code.) The court awarded $39,000 in fees. On appeal, Vologodskaya contends A.O.’s request was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702. (Undesignated rule references are to these rules.) That rule requires a motion for statutory attorney fees “be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal.” (Rule 3.1702(a), (b)(1).) We conclude rule 3.1702 applies to a 1 request for attorney fees under section 6344, agree A.O.’s request was untimely under the rule, and reverse the award of attorney fees. BACKGROUND In August 2023, A.O. filed for divorce from Vologodskaya and requested a restraining order. He also asked that she be ordered to pay “for some or all of [his] lawyer’s fees and costs.” In November, she sought her own restraining order and spousal support. The trial court set the matters for a long cause hearing in January 2024. In his trial brief, A.O. requested a five- year restraining order and that Vologodskaya be ordered to pay “[a]ttorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with this DVPA proceeding.” In her trial brief, she requested a three-year restraining order. On the day of the long cause hearing — while represented by counsel — the parties indicated they had settled their competing requests and recited their agreement on the record. They agreed to the issuance of a one-year restraining order protecting A.O. As part of the agreement, Vologodskaya admitted she “committed one or more acts of domestic abuse such that the issuance of a restraining order is warranted” and dismissed her request with prejudice. Additionally, the parties agreed he would pay her temporary spousal support, she would assume responsibility for her own rent and monthly car payments, and they reserved the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate any future bonus or additional income for purposes of support. They also agreed each would receive a $50,000 advance on their community interest. In reciting the agreement, the parties did not mention attorney fees. A.O.’s attorney prepared the findings and order after hearing (FOAH) and the restraining order after hearing (ROAH). The FOAH indicated attorney fees were “[n]ot applicable.” And on the ROAH, the attorney fee 2 section was left blank. The FOAH included standard language found on all FOAHs — “[a]ll other issues are reserved until further order of court.” On February 1, 2024, the trial court filed the orders. In April 2025, A.O. filed a motion seeking $75,476 in attorney fees under section 6344. He argued he was entitled to the fees because he prevailed on his restraining order request and successfully defended against Vologodskaya’s request. She opposed the request, arguing it was untimely under rule 3.1702. The trial court heard arguments in October and December 2025 before taking the matter under submission. In February 2026, the court ordered Vologodskaya to pay A.O. $39,000 in fees. DISCUSSION Vologodskaya contends the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees because A.O.’s fee motion was untimely under rule 3.1702. We agree. Section 6344 provides “ ‘a court, upon request, shall issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a prevailing petitioner’ ” for an action brought pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, and “ ‘upon request, may issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a prevailing respondent only if the respondent establishes . . . [the] request [was] frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay.’ ” (Dragones v. Calkins (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1080–1081.) Rule 3.1702 “governs claims for attorney fees,” and it “applies in civil cases to claims for statutory attorney’s fees” except as otherwise provided by statute. (Rule 3.1702; In re Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [discussing predecessor rule]; Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505, fn. 3 [rule 3.1702 and predecessor rule “are substantively equivalent”].) There is “no exception for family law cases.” (Freeman, at p. 9.) The rule provides a “motion to claim attorney’s fees for 3 services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal.” (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) A notice of appeal must be filed, at most, within 180 days after entry of judgment. (Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, 649.) An order granting or denying a request for a domestic violence restraining order is appealable as an injunction and thus must be appealed within — at most — 180 days. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6); Meinhardt, at p. 649; Rivera v. Hillard (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 964, 974 (Rivera).) Nonetheless, orders granting a request for a domestic violence restraining order are referred to and reviewed as judgments on appeal. (See, e.g., Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 116; Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 819, fn. 1.) Given this timeline, A.O.’s fee request was untimely. (Nicole G. v. Braithwaite (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001 [stating parties may apply for fees under § 6344 pursuant to rule 3.1702]; Robert J. v. Catherine D., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1505, fn. 1, 1516, 1522–1523 [applying rule 3.1702 to Family Code statute that did not set its own deadline]; In re Marriage of Freeman, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 4, 7–9 [applying rule 3.1702’s predecessor to § 271].) He waited until April 2025 — 14 months after the court issued a restraining order, and well after 180 days had elapsed. To avoid rule 3.1702, A.O. contends he preserved his claim for attorney fees because he requested them in his petition for restraining order, and the trial court’s FOAH states “[a]ll other issues are reserved until further order of the court.” Not so. When the parties recited their agreement on the record, they did not address fees or reserve the court’s jurisdiction to award them. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Perow & Uzelac (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 984, 988, 992 [attorney fees reserved when parties and court explicitly reserved 4 jurisdiction over fee request, regardless of written order]; Rivera, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 974 [restraining order final except where it reserved jurisdiction].) We note the parties were represented by counsel when they drafted their agreement and entered it into the record, and A.O.’s attorney prepared the FOAH and ROAH. Moreover, the FOAH and ROAH — both of which have specific places to indicate attorney fees orders — do not specifically indicate the parties reserved the court’s jurisdiction to award fees. Instead, the orders indicated the court was not making fee orders. By contrast, the parties explicitly reserved the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate any future bonus or additional income. Put simply, given the record’s silence regarding attorney fees and its explicit reservation of jurisdiction over other issues in the FOAH, the record does not support the conclusion that the parties intended to reserve jurisdiction to award fees. (Rivera, at p. 974.) A.O. next argues that since no judgment exists in the dissolution, rule 3.1702 does not yet apply. Not so. While the dissolution remains pending, the competing restraining order requests are final. (Rivera, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 974; Warwick California Corp. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 67, 72–73 [judgment is final when it terminates the litigation and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined].) Here, after the parties entered their agreement, there was nothing left to litigate with respect to their restraining orders. (Rivera, at p. 974.) Thus, the restraining order is a final judgment for purposes of rule 3.1702 with respect to the parties’ competing restraining order requests. (Rivera, at p. 974; Applied Underwriters, Inc., at pp. 72–73; Sabbah v. Sabbah, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 819, fn. 1.) Next, relying on Faton v. Ahmedo (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1160, A.O. contends rule 3.1702 does not apply because section 6344 supplies its own fee 5 request procedure sans deadlines. But Faton did not state section 6344 supplies its own deadlines for requesting fees. (Faton, at pp. 1169–1173.) Rather, it only concluded a party may make a section 6344 fee request after an evidentiary hearing on a petition for restraining order. (Faton, at pp. 1169–1173.) The court had no occasion to discuss rule 3.1702 because the prevailing party requested fees the same day the court granted the restraining order. (Faton, at p. 1165.) And contrary to his claims, rule 3.1702 explicitly applies to statutes that do not provide their own deadlines for requesting attorney fees, and courts apply it to the Family Code to promote consistency and avoid confusion. (Rule 3.1702(a); Robert J. v. Catherine D., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1523, 1527.) Finally, relying on Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128, 135–136, A.O. invites us to remand the matter to the trial court for it to determine whether good cause exists to extend the time to seek attorney fees. (Rule 3.1702(d).) Although Vologodskaya invoked rule 3.1702 below in her opposition to A.O.’s request for attorney fees, A.O. did not raise the good cause issue either in his briefing below or during the hearings and thus forfeited the issue. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 117 [“issues or theories not properly raised or presented in the trial court may not be asserted on appeal”].) We decline his request to remand the matter for further proceedings.1 1 After this court issued a tentative opinion, A.O. sought to file a supplemental brief. His proposed brief simply repeats arguments he made in his respondent’s brief. Thus, we decline his request to file a supplemental brief. (Rule 8.200(a)(4).) 6 DISPOSITION We reverse the February 23, 2026 order granting A.O. attorney fees under section 6344. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Rule 8.278(a)(5).) 7 _________________________ RODRÍGUEZ, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ TUCHER, P. J. _________________________ FUJISAKI, J. A176388; In re the Marriage of A.O. and Vologodskaya 8 Superior Court of San Mateo County, Hon. Chinhayi C. Cadet. Counsel: Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli and Stephanie J. Finelli for Appellant. A.O., in pro. per., for Respondent. 9