Gougerchian v. Googerchian CA2/3

Filed 10/29/26 Gougerchian v. Googerchian CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE ABBIE GOUGERCHIAN, B350140 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25STCP00746) v. MOHAMAD ALI GOOGERCHIAN et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Reversed. Afifi Law Group, Faryan Andrew Afifi and Niki Kalantari for Defendants and Appellants. Stone, Elliott H. Stone, Robert S. Throckmorton; Benedon & Serlin, Gerald M. Serlin and Melinda W. Ebelhar for Plaintiff and Respondent.  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ Defendants and appellants Mohamad Ali Googerchian, Patrick Gogerchin, and Bianca Kaveh (together, defendants) appeal the trial court’s order granting plaintiff and respondent Abbie Gougerchian’s motion to disqualify their attorney, Faryan Andrew Afifi, and his law firm under the advocate-witness rule (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.7).1 We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting defendants’ informed written consent to Afifi serving as both advocate and witness at trial. Although Afifi obtained defendants’ informed written consent only after the ruling on the disqualification motion, that consent represented a new fact or circumstance warranting reconsideration of the earlier order. The record was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Afifi serving as advocate and witness at trial would prejudice the plaintiff or cause injury to the integrity of the judicial process. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Abbie is Al’s nephew. Patrick and Bianca are Al’s adult children. Complaint According to the complaint, in the late 1970’s, Al, Abbie, and a third person started MGM Transformer Company (MGM). “Around [that] time,” Abbie proposed a new business model for 1 All further undesignated references to rules are to the California Rules of Professional Conduct. We follow the example of the parties and refer to Mohamad Ali Googerchian as Al and to the other parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended. 2 the company, which had been struggling. At some point in the early 1980’s, “Al made Abbie his partner and together they pushed to open new sales channels for MGM using Abbie’s marketing model.” By the mid-1980’s, MGM was successful, and the pair created “a separate product line” that ultimately became known as Online Power Inc. (Online Power), in which Abbie and Al were equal partners. With respect to MGM, Abbie and Al “agreed to share their profits and also made numerous investments together to further their joint goal of building family wealth.” The success of MGM allowed Abbie and Al “to expand their partnership into several lucrative investments,” some of which were titled in both Abbie and Al’s names “as partners,” while “other Partnership Property, while purchased with partnership assets, was not.” The alleged partnership property in dispute consisted of five business entities and six apartment buildings. In the early 2000’s, Al transferred his interest in Online Power’s parent company, PowerCo Products Inc., to Patrick and Bianca, who each received a 25 percent interest titled to their respective trusts. Patrick “demanded documented formalities [of the partnership] where none-existed before.” Additionally, “Patrick continued making investments using the cash generated by MGM and Online Power but hid those partnership investments from Abbie.” In 2022, Abbie and Patrick “got into a disagreement over PowerCo,” which resulted in a lawsuit that was still pending at the time the complaint was filed. In 2023, Al, Patrick, and Bianca sold their interest in MGM to NEOS Partners, LP, for 3 $400 million, without Abbie’s knowledge.2 Abbie confronted Al and Patrick, “who both repudiated the existence of the long running partnership between Abbie and Uncle Al, as well as Abbie’s entitlement to his fair share of the sale proceeds from the MGM sale.” In February 2025, Abbie filed a verified complaint against defendants seeking a “binding declaration that Abbie is an equal partner with Uncle Al, Patrick, and Bianca in the Partnership Property,” as well as a “binding declaration that as a partner in the Partnership Property, Abbie has an entitlement to half of the sales proceeds from the sale of MGM.” Defendants demurred to the complaint. Request for Disqualification of Afifi and Afifi Law Group Shortly after defendants filed a reply in support of their demurrer, Abbie filed an ex parte application for an order disqualifying Afifi and his law firm as counsel for defendants. Abbie argued that Afifi and his firm should be disqualified because his representation violated rule 1.7, which prohibits concurrent representation of clients with adverse interests, and rule 1.9, which prohibits an attorney from representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter where the person’s interests are materially adverse to a former client. Abbie also argued that, pursuant to rule 3.7, Afifi could not represent defendants because he would be “a material and substantial percipient witness” at trial. In a supporting declaration, Abbie asserted that Afifi should be disqualified from representing defendants because of his prior representation of Abbie and because “Afifi, as the 2 NEOS Partners, LP is a nominal defendant in the action but is not a party to this appeal. 4 Partnership’s former attorney for over 22 years, is a crucial percipient witness in this action regarding the nature and extent of the Partnership’s interests and properties.” Abbie’s declaration described Afifi’s prior representation of Abbie and purported partnership entities. With respect to Afifi’s role as a percipient witness, Abbie stated: “Since Afifi has been intimately involved in the business affairs of the Abbie-Uncle Al-Pat partnership for over 23 years, he is a vital percipient witness in this action. Afifi possess[es] a myriad of facts respecting the multigenerational partnership and will testify about the linkages between Abbie, Uncle Al, Pat and their numerous partnership entities because over the years Afifi has represented them in numerous personal and business capacities and was also aware of the structure, management[,] and financial affairs of the partnership.” Defendants opposed the motion. In support of the opposition, Afifi submitted a declaration stating that he met Al and Patrick in 1994 and first represented Al in a personal legal matter concerning his home “in or about 1998.” Afifi denied knowing about a partnership between the parties. He also denied having access to Abbie’s or Al’s personal financial information, or the financial affairs of any partnership between them. Disqualification Motion Ruling In its written ruling, the trial court rejected Abbie’s arguments based on Afifi’s purported current or former representation of Abbie, or his purported role as a mediator between Abbie, Al, and Patrick over partnership assets. The court was not persuaded that Afifi possessed any confidential 5 information of Abbie’s that was not already known to one or more of the defendants. However, the court found disqualification appropriate under rule 3.7. Quoting Smith, Smith & Kring v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573, 580, 581 (Smith), the trial court stated that it was required to consider: (1) “the combined effects of the strong interest parties have in representation by counsel of their choice, and in avoiding the duplicate expense and time- consuming effort involved in replacing counsel already familiar with the case”; (2) “the possibility counsel is using the motion to disqualify for purely tactical reasons”; and (3) “ ‘ “whether counsel’s testimony is, in fact, genuinely needed.” ’ ” (Boldface omitted.) Since the motion to disqualify counsel “was brought less than a month after Defendants filed their demurrer and motion to strike,” the court found “[t]here would not be much duplicate expense and time consuming effort involved in replacing counsel.” This weighed in favor of disqualification. The court further found Abbie’s assertion that “Afifi’s percipient testimony will be crucial in helping the Court determine whether, or not, a UPA partnership existed amongst the parties” was a “plausible explanation which is not purely tactical,” and weighed in favor of disqualification. Finally, with respect to whether Afifi’s testimony was genuinely needed, the court found that “Afifi’s testimony may carry particular weight as he was an objective observer, as to whether the parties conducted themselves as a partnership, after its alleged formation.” The court therefore granted the motion to disqualify Afifi and Afifi Law Group. However, it rejected Abbie’s request to 6 strike the pleadings filed by Afifi “on the ground Afifi possessed confidential information and material about [Abbie] and to minimize possible injustice to [Abbie].” The court found the argument “not persuasive,” since Abbie did “not identify confidential information which Afifi used in preparing the demurrer and motion to strike of which the Defendants did not have independent knowledge which they could convey to Afifi.” Motion for Reconsideration The day after the court ruled on the motion for disqualification, Abbie filed an amended complaint, which identified another entity, DSPM Inc. (DSPM), as partnership property at issue. Abbie’s declaration in support of the motion for disqualification had discussed Afifi’s involvement in creating a new entity named GHI Industries, Inc. (GHI) to hold the parties’ interests in DSPM. Defendants moved for reconsideration of the ruling on the motion for disqualification on the ground that defendants had now provided Afifi their informed written consent to serve as advocate and witness at trial. Defendants argued they could not execute informed consents until the trial court identified the testimony that Afifi was likely to provide at trial. The consents submitted with their motion expressly cite the trial court’s order and findings. Defendants further argued the amendment of the complaint to identify DSPM as partnership property in dispute was an “attempt to retroactively manufacture a factual basis for disqualification by inserting DSPM into the dispute solely because of Mr. Afifi’s prior legal representation in that matter.” The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. It concluded that defendants’ execution of informed written 7 consents did not constitute a new or different fact because defendants could have executed them prior to the hearing on the motion for disqualification. The court found that defendants had not proffered a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide consent earlier, since the motion for disqualification “specified the theory upon which the Court relied in granting the motion to disqualify.” The court exercised its discretion not to accept waivers executed after it issued its ruling. The trial court further concluded that the amendment of the complaint had been permissible prior to the hearing on the demurrer and “[t]he fact that the allegations contained therein are relevant to a disqualification theory do not constitute a new or different circumstance which justifies reconsideration.” Defendants timely appealed. DISCUSSION Defendants contend the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard in granting the disqualification motion and there was no substantial evidence that Afifi’s testimony was likely or that his representation of defendants would injure the integrity of the judicial system. They further contend their informed written consent to Afifi’s dual role mandates reversal of the trial court’s ruling. For purposes of argument, we assume the trial court applied the correct legal standard when ruling on the motion for disqualification and that substantial evidence supported a finding that Afifi was likely to testify at trial. However, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the informed written consents were not a new fact or circumstance warranting reconsideration. Further, the record was insufficient to support 8 Afifi’s disqualification notwithstanding defendants’ informed written consent. I. Rule 3.7 and the Informed Written Consent Exception Rule 3.7, subdivision (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Fn. omitted.) Comment 3 to rule 3.7 states: “Notwithstanding a client’s informed written consent, courts retain discretion to take action, up to and including disqualification of a lawyer who seeks to both testify and serve as an advocate, to protect the trier of fact from being misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced. (See, e.g., Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470.)” (Fn. omitted.) Under the former rule, an attorney was required to withdraw from representing a client if he or she was likely to act as a witness. In Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470 (Lyle), the appellate court addressed the amendment of the advocate witness rule to permit an attorney’s continued representation of the client if the attorney obtains the client’s informed written consent. (Id. at pp. 474–475.) The court observed that the advocate witness rule involves the balancing of competing interests. On the one side, the rule is intended to address the appearance of impropriety. (Id. at pp. 480–481.) “On the other hand, the client has an interest in competent representation by an attorney of his or her choice.” (Id. at 9 p. 481.) The amendment “change[d] the emphasis which the trial court must place upon the competing interests in reaching its decision” and required trial courts to “resolve the close case in favor of the client’s right to representation by an attorney of his or her choice.” (Id. at p. 482.) “Under the present rule, if a party is willing to accept less effective counsel because of the attorney’s testifying, neither his opponent nor the trial court should be able to deny this choice to the party without a convincing demonstration of detriment to the opponent or injury to the integrity of the judicial process. [Citations.] In other words, under the present rule the trial court can disqualify counsel only where it is confronted with manifest interests which it must protect from palpable prejudice.” (Lyle, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 482.) Accordingly, in the case before the Lyle court, the trial court had erred in disqualifying counsel since it “failed to point to any clear evidence of detriment, either to the opponents or to the integrity of the judicial process.” (Id. at p. 483.) II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying the Motion for Reconsideration A motion for reconsideration must be based on “new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) A party seeking reconsideration must “offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 213 (New York Times).) Additionally, “the moving party must provide a ‘ “ ‘satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Shiffer v. CBS Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 246, 255.) We review the trial 10 court’s order on a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) Here, in light of the strong interest a client has in being represented by the attorney of the client’s choice (Lyle, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 482), the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that defendants’ informed written consents did not constitute new or different circumstances justifying reconsideration of the disqualification order. (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1144 [“disqualification motion involves concerns that justify careful review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion”].) “ ‘The concept of informed consent is a familiar one. It signifies that a person making an important decision does so on the basis of adequate knowledge of the facts and an awareness of the consequences of [the] decision.’ [Citation.] . . . Once the client has been provided with sufficient information about the situation, the client can make a rational choice [citation], based upon full disclosures as to the risks of the representations, the potential conflicts involved, and the alternatives available as required by the particular circumstances. [Citation.] By mandating a writing, the client’s attention is focused ‘on the fact that the decision should not be taken lightly.’ [Citation.] It will ‘impress upon [the] clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.’ [Citations.]” (Sharp v. Next Entertainment Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 410, 430.) Defendants had not executed informed written consents prior to the ruling on the disqualification motion. This was a new 11 fact or circumstance. Further, defendants offered a reasonable explanation as to why the informed written consents were not obtained or submitted earlier. Defendants do not intend to call Afifi as a witness and continue to dispute that he has any knowledge relevant to the contested issues which renders him a necessary witness.3 Although we assume for purposes of argument that there was substantial evidence that Afifi is likely to be a trial witness, the evidence presented did not compel that conclusion, such that defendants should have anticipated he would inevitably be a witness in the case. Indeed, neither the disqualification motion nor Abbie’s declaration specifically identified the topics on which Abbie intended to seek Afifi’s testimony. The motion only generically asserted that Afifi had been involved in the parties’ business affairs, he had represented the parties in litigation, and he was “aware of the structure, management and financial affairs of the partnership.” For his part, Afifi denied that he had any knowledge of the alleged partnership, which Abbie asserts was formed well before Afifi met Al in 1994. Afifi further declared that he “never had access to or was provided any personal financial information of either [Abbie or Al], and [had] no knowledge one way or the other whether a partnership was created between then or not.” Thus, the scope of the consent the defendants would need to execute to allow Afifi to testify and serve as their trial counsel was unclear until the trial court ruled 3 Although Abbie’s motion sought to disqualify Afifi in part because Abbie intends to call him to testify, the majority of the motion asserted Afifi’s disqualification was required under rules 1.7 and 1.9 because Abbie was Afifi’s current and former client. Notably, the trial court rejected those arguments. 12 on Abbie’s motion. A blanket consent prepared prior to the order would not have apprised defendants of the relevant facts and risks of representation in any detail and, arguably, could not therefore be fully informed. This case was in an early stage when Abbie moved to disqualify Afifi and his firm. Defendants’ demurrer to the original complaint was pending, and no trial date was set. To conclude that no new circumstances were present here would be to hold that a client must consent to his or her attorney acting as both advocate and witness from the outset of a case—even if the client and the attorney believe the attorney has no relevant testimony to provide, and the client does not intend to call the attorney as a witness—or the client irrevocably forfeits the ability to provide informed consent and keep the client’s trial counsel of choice. We decline to limit defendants’ important rights to their attorney of choice in this manner. Trial court rulings and additional facts that emerge as a case is litigated are plainly relevant to a client’s ability to provide informed consent.4 4 Although there are no published California decisions addressing the timeliness of informed written consent for purposes of rule 3.7, federal district courts in California have denied disqualification motions under rule 3.7 as premature when client consent could still be obtained. (See, e.g., BHS L. LLP v. Worldex Indus. & Trading Co. (N.D.Cal., Dec. 29, 2025, No. 25-cv-04471-SVK) 2025 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 266886, at p. *23 [finding disqualification motion premature where it was unclear whether client might consent to attorney testifying as witness]; Santos Elecs. Inc. v. Homni Elecs. Co. Ltd. (C.D.Cal., Dec. 26, 2024, No. 8:24-cv-00458-JVS-KES) 2024 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 240799, at p. *5 [disqualification motion premature where counsel represented that he could obtain written consent but had not 13  The circumstances here are distinguishable from New York Times, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th 206, on which the trial court relied. In New York Times, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff moved for reconsideration based on testimony from depositions taken days before the trial court ruled on the motion for summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 209–210, 213.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration. The evidence presented with the motion was not new because plaintiff knew the subject matter covered in the depositions was relevant. (Id. at pp. 213–214.) Further, the plaintiff did not provide a satisfactory explanation for its failure to obtain or present the evidence earlier. (Id. at p. 213.) The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it reasonably failed to present the testimony earlier because “it was not needed to defeat summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 213–214.) The failure to present relevant evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is distinguishable from the purported failure to obtain client consent regarding an advocate- witness issue that only exists because the opposing party may call the client’s attorney to testify in a trial many months, if not years, away. The trial court also relied on Sanchez v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 617 (Sanchez), for the proposition that the court has the discretion to reject a litigant’s valid waiver of counsel’s conflict of interest. But Sanchez is also inapposite. Sanchez concerned the removal of appointed defense counsel in an effort to “insulate the criminal proceedings from issues arising done so because “there is only a remote possibility that he will testify”].) 14 under the [Racial Justice Act],” after the prosecutor reported that defense counsel had made race-based comments. (Id. at p. 627.) The Sanchez court explained that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to an appointed counsel of choice, and the court need only consider “whether a defendant’s choice of counsel can be reasonably accommodated under the circumstances.” (Ibid.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing defense counsel based on a conflict that arose because the defendant may have had a Racial Justice Act claim based on defense counsel’s conduct. Even if the defendant waived the conflict, he could not waive rights which belong to the public generally, including having criminal proceedings free of racial bias. (Id. at pp. 632–633.) The Sanchez court further noted that the defendant had not offered to waive any conflict at the time of the trial court proceedings, thus the decision of whether to accept a waiver was not presented to the trial court. (Sanchez, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 634.) However, the reviewing court explained the trial court would have had the discretion to reject the defendant’s waiver, had it been made. This reasoning was based on cases in which courts noted that while a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel of the defendant’s choice, the defendant does have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, which the trial court must safeguard. (Id. at pp. 633–634.) As a result, the trial court has “ ‘ “substantial latitude” ’ ” to refuse a criminal defendant’s waiver of a conflict of interest, even when the conflict is still only potential. (Id. at p. 633, quoting People v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 234, 241.) 15  This is not a criminal proceeding and Afifi is not appointed counsel. Defendants have no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Rather, the relevant balance of interests is set forth in Lyle, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at page 482: “[I]f a party is willing to accept less effective counsel because of the attorney’s testifying, neither his opponent nor the trial court should be able to deny this choice to the party without a convincing demonstration of detriment to the opponent or injury to the integrity of the judicial process.” Moreover, defendants here presented executed consents to the trial court, necessitating a decision as to whether the trial court would accept them. The court therefore abused its discretion by concluding that defendants’ informed written consent was not a new fact or circumstance requiring reconsideration of the disqualification order. III. There is No Evidence That Allowing Afifi to Serve As Advocate and Witness Would Prejudice Abbie or Injure the Integrity of the Judicial System Once Afifi obtained defendants’ informed written consent, the rule 3.7(a)(3) exception was established. As explained in Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at page 580, “ ‘[t]he right of a party to be represented in litigation by the attorney of his or her choice is a significant right [citation] and ought not to be abrogated in the absence of some indication the integrity of the judicial process will otherwise be injured . . . .’ [Citations.]” The Smith court proceeded to identify three factors that courts should consider when weighing “the competing interests of the parties against [the] potential adverse effects on the integrity of the proceeding[s]” (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 580): (1) “the combined effects of the strong interest parties have in 16 representation by counsel of their choice, and in avoiding the duplicate expense and time-consuming effort involved in replacing counsel already familiar with the case” (ibid.); (2) “the possibility [opposing] counsel is using the motion to disqualify for purely tactical reasons” (id. at p. 581); and (3) “ ‘ “whether counsel’s testimony is, in fact, genuinely needed” ’ ” (ibid.).5 The trial court in Smith abused its discretion in disqualifying the defendant’s counsel because “[t]here [was] no indication from the record the trial court recognized the importance of [the defendant’s] waiver” and the moving party “failed to provide an adequate evidentiary showing as to why [the defendant’s attorneys] must testify or how any testimony would be harmful to the integrity of the judicial process.” (Smith, at p. 582.) Accordingly, while the Smith factors are relevant considerations, Smith is clear that the fundamental issue is whether a lawyer acting as a witness at trial will harm the integrity of the judicial system or prejudice the other party. Courts after Smith have emphasized that a trial court has discretion to disqualify an attorney witness, notwithstanding client consent, “only upon ‘a convincing demonstration of detriment to the opponent or injury to the integrity of the judicial process.’ [Citations.]” (Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 813, 822 (Geringer), quoting Lyle, supra, 122 5 We note that the Smith court’s concern with respect to the first two factors was not whether an attorney’s dual role at trial would injure the integrity of the judicial system, but whether the moving party’s ability to disqualify opposing counsel by calling the attorney as a witness “would ‘pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process that [motions to disqualify] purport to prevent.’ ” (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 581.) 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 482; accord, Wu v. O’Gara Coach Co., LLC (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1085 (Wu).) Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a discretionary matter. (Geringer, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 821.) However, “ ‘where there are no material disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination as a question of law.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Although we would normally remand to allow the trial court to address this issue in the first instance, we need not do so here because, as a matter of law, the evidence in the record was insufficient to support a finding of detriment to Abbie or injury to the judicial process. Several cases are instructive. In Doe v. Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 576 (Yim), a mother represented her daughter in an action against the mother’s ex-husband. The daughter alleged that the ex-husband had exploited the marriage to sexually abuse her when she was a minor. (Id. at p. 577.) The trial court granted the ex-husband’s motion to disqualify the mother from representing her daughter in all phases of litigation. (Id. at p. 580.) The appellate court affirmed. It concluded the mother’s dual role posed a risk of misleading the jury into mistaking her arguments as evidence based on her extensive personal knowledge of her ex-husband, which could prejudice him. (Id. at pp. 584–585.) The court further concluded that the mother’s potential misuse of confidential information “to appellant’s advantage in litigating appellant’s claims of sexual abuse during the marriage” supported extending her disqualification to all phases of litigation. (Id. at p. 586.) The court rejected the argument that disqualification under these unique circumstances would “ ‘open the floodgate of abusive disqualification motions.’ ” (Id. at p. 589.) It “trust[ed] trial 18 courts to detect—and reject—abuses of the advocate-witness rule and duties of confidentiality, particularly where the targeted attorney’s personal relationships with the parties are not so close, or so closely related to the subject matter of the parties’ dispute, as [the mother’s] relationships with her ex-husband and his alleged victim.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1200 (Kennedy), the trial court disqualified a grandfather from representing his son in a custody battle against his grandchild’s mother, Kayla. The grandfather’s law firm had previously represented Kayla’s father in a divorce proceeding and obtained declarations from Kayla in connection with that proceeding. (Id. at pp. 1201–1202.) The Court of Appeal held that “an amalgamation of interrelated factors support[ed]” the trial court’s disqualification order. (Id. at p. 1205.) The trial court could reasonably find a significant risk that the grandfather’s firm had obtained “relevant confidential information about Kayla” when it previously represented her father. (Id. at p. 1207.) “[T]he conflict posed by the almost inevitable prospect that [the grandfather] will act both as a percipient witness and an advocate” in the custody proceedings further supported disqualification. (Id. at p. 1208.) Finally, “the multiple and interconnected family entanglements . . . result[ed] in a strong appearance of impropriety and undermine[d] the integrity of the judicial system.” (Id. at p. 1211.) The family court’s function of “mak[ing] delicate decisions that promote the child’s best interest . . . could be severely disrupted in a situation where the child’s grandfather might well argue for reducing the mother’s time with her child, where counsel could wind up both litigating and testifying about what goes on in his household, and 19 where [the attorney’s] self-interest could skew the legal advice he gives to his own son.” (Id. at p. 1212.) In contrast, in Lopez v. Lopez (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 412, 415 (Lopez), the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying counsel. The plaintiff’s husband represented her in a lawsuit against her brother, in which she alleged that the brother “falsely accused her of committing crimes against him and their elderly parents.” (Ibid.) The plaintiff had executed an informed written consent. (Ibid.) Two months before trial, and four years into the case, the plaintiff’s brother moved to disqualify her husband pursuant to the advocate- witness rule. (Ibid.) “[N]either party specified the precise subject matter of [the husband’s] expected testimony,” but the plaintiff represented that her attorney husband would testify concerning two e-mails he received from her brother. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 416.) The trial court granted the motion to disqualify. (Id. at p. 421.) The Lopez court concluded that the trial court erred by failing to apply rule 3.7’s informed consent exception and by failing to make the necessary finding that the attorney’s “disqualification was necessary, notwithstanding appellant’s informed written consent, in order to ‘protect the trier of fact from being misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced.’ [Citation.]” (Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 424.) “The court found only that [the attorney’s] dual role would impair his credibility as a witness (for appellant) and diminish his effectiveness as an advocate (for appellant). It made no finding of prejudice to respondent, much less of potential confusion.” (Id. at pp. 424–425.) Because the record provided only minimal information about the substance of the attorney’s expected 20 testimony, the trial court could not have reasonably found detriment to the respondent or injury to the integrity of the judicial process. (Id. at p. 425.) Unlike the attorneys in Yim and Kennedy, Afifi is not a close relative or spouse of any party.6 The subject matter of the lawsuit does not implicate Afifi’s personal or domestic relationships. Abbie also did not argue that Afifi’s dual role would mislead the trier of fact, nor did he demonstrate that Afifi’s prior representation of entities in which Abbie had an interest allowed Afifi to “acquire[] relevant confidential information about [Abbie] to which [he] otherwise would not have had access” through defendants. (Kennedy, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207.) Notably, the trial court rejected as “not persuasive” Abbie’s request to strike all pleadings Afifi filed since Abbie had failed to “identify confidential information which Afifi used in preparing the demurrer and motion to strike of which the Defendants did not have independent knowledge which they could convey to Afifi.” Indeed, the e-mail communications with Afifi that Abbie submitted in support of his disqualification motion invariably included Al and Patrick. Moreover, as in Lopez, Abbie did not “specif[y] the precise subject matter of [Afifi’s] expected testimony.” (Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 415.) Although Abbie claimed that Afifi “possess[es] a myriad of facts respecting the multigenerational partnership,” he failed to identify a single relevant fact known to Afifi but no other third party. Abbie further asserted that Afifi would testify concerning the “structure, management and financial affairs” of entities that are purportedly part of the 6 According to Afifi’s declaration, Bianca is married to Afifi’s second cousin. 21 partnership but did not offer evidence demonstrating that these facts could not be established through documentary evidence or the testimony of the parties’ other lawyers or accountants. For example, the creation of GHI to hold the parties’ interest in DSPM and the parties’ respective ownership interests in GHI are established by documentary evidence. That Afifi advised the parties in corporate and litigation matters does not establish that he would be an integral witness at trial. (Cf. Yim, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 584 [court reasonably concluded based on pleadings that mother-attorney was “almost certain to be a key witness at trial”]; see id. at p. 585 & fn. 4; Kennedy, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209 [“virtual certainty” that grandfather-attorney’s testimony would be “necessary” where he was “head of a household that is the subject of controversy and conflicting averments”].) Indeed, Abbie did not assert that Afifi has direct knowledge of the 1980’s agreement between Al and Abbie that appears to be at the heart of Abbie’s complaint, or of the first approximately 20 years of the alleged partnership. In sum, on the record before the trial court, there was no basis to conclude that Afifi’s disqualification was necessary, despite defendants’ consent, because of “manifest interests which it must protect from palpable prejudice.” (Lyle, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 482.) There were also no grounds in the record to support the disqualification of Afifi Law Group. (Rule 3.7(b) [“lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm[] is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 1.7 or rule 1.9”]; Wu, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 [attorney’s likely testimony as percipient 22 witness did not justify disqualification of law firm or other attorneys].) DISPOSITION The order disqualifying Afifi and the Afifi Law Group is reversed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ADAMS, P. J. We concur: HANASONO, J. DELGADO, J.* * Judge of the Santa Clara Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 23