Sandridge Partners v. Sullivan CA5

Filed 11/6/26 Sandridge Partners v. Sullivan CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SANDRIDGE PARTNERS, LP, F090708 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24CU0240) v. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, OPINION Defendant and Appellant TULARE LAKE RECLAMATION DISTRICT NO. 761, Defendant and Respondent. THE COURT * APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Robert Shane Burns, Judge. Beveridge & Diamond, Jacob P. Duginski; Griswold, Lasalle, Cobb, Dowd & Gin, Robert M. Dowd and Christina D. Smith, for Defendant and Appellant. McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, Scott M. Reddie, Ben Nicholson, and Christopher A. Kent, for Plaintiff and Respondent Sandridge Partners, LP. * Before Levy, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and Harrell, J.  Duane Morris, Colin L. Pearce and Jolie-Anne S. Ansley, for Plaintiff and Respondent Tulare Lake Reclamation District No. 761. -ooOoo- Appellant Michael Sullivan filed this appeal after his anti-SLAPP motion was denied as moot and dismissed. Prior to the filing of a respondent’s brief, Sullivan and respondent Sandridge Partners, L.P. (Sandridge) jointly stipulated to reverse the dismissal so that the trial court could properly consider the motion in the first instance. We accept the stipulation and conclude it satisfies the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is reversed. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This litigation began in 2024 when Sandridge filed a petition for writ of mandate arguing that due to a conflict Sullivan should recuse himself and refrain from participating in settlement discussions related to a pending lawsuit. Relevant to this appeal, Sullivan filed a demurrer to Sandridge’s third amended complaint1 and a separate motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP laws (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). Sandridge opposed both the demurrer and the anti-SLAPP motion. In an order dated September 9, 2025, the trial court granted Sullivan’s demurrer without further leave to amend. After discussing the allegations in depth and considering Sullivan’s role in eventually approving the litigation settlement, the court found that “Sandridge has failed to allege Sullivan’s violation of a mandatory duty of recusal on conflict-of-interests grounds” and that no independent duty to recuse could be found in relevant bylaws. Following this finding, in a one sentence statement, the court concluded that “Sullivan’s special motion to strike is mooted by way of the court’s ruling on Sullivan’s demurrer.” 1 The two prior amendments had also been challenged by demurrer and subjected to anti-SLAPP motions. In both instances the trial court granted the demurrer with leave to amend and deferred ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, denying it without prejudice, because leave to amend had been granted. 2.  Sullivan subsequently appealed the denial of his anti-SLAPP motion. Sandridge did not separately appeal the demurrer ruling. DISCUSSION As noted, the parties have filed a joint stipulation requesting this court reverse the judgment with respect to the finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was moot and to remand so that the trial court can consider the motion, and all related issues, in the first instance. Standard of Review Under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), this court has the power to “amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice.” However, an “appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds” (1) no reasonable possibly that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal; (2) the reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment; and (3) the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement. (See Muccianti v. Willow Creek Care Center (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 13, 19- 20 [discussing relevant factors and case law].) Such requests must be considered on a case-by-case basis. (In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 381.) The Relevant Factors Support Accepting the Stipulation Upon review of the stipulation and the record submitted in this matter, we find that the relevant factors support accepting the stipulation. The issues raised on appeal only concern Sullivan’s anti-SLAPP motion and do not affect the underlying writ proceedings or the tangentially related settlement of a prior action. As such, we find no reasonable probability that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. Rather, as discussed below, reversing an order that denies review under the anti-SLAPP statutes on an erroneous mootness 3. claim, without any consideration of the relevant factors, may positively affect the interests of the public by ensuring that litigation is not used to deter public speech. We likewise find that the parties’ reasons for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from nullifying a judgment. Here the parties stipulate to reversal because they agree that the trial court incorrectly deemed the anti- SLAP motion moot and would prefer the trial court, with its extensive understanding of the history of the case and the merits of the arguments, consider the motion. The law is well settled that a “trial court’s ‘resolution of the underlying action does not moot a fee request under the SLAPP statute.’ ” (Sandlin v. McLaughlin (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 805, 821 (Sandlin).) Under the anti-SLAPP statute, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs” subject to limited exceptions. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c).) Thus, an anti-SLAPP motion is not mooted by a ruling on the underlying merits of the case, or even, for that matter, a voluntary dismissal. (Sandlin, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 821.) Rather, the court is obligated to consider whether a fee award is mandated to protect the overall goals of the statute to “encourage continued participation in matters of public significance” and not let such participation be “chilled through abuse of the judicial process.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).) While dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion as moot is the equivalent of a denial for purposes of appeal and appellate courts review such denials de novo, we conclude that there will be no erosion of the public trust in setting aside an order that erroneously avoided considering the merits in the first instance on mootness concerns. (See Sandlin, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 819, 820 [outlining standard of review and appealability of a motion denied as moot].) Rather, as the parties state and the record confirms, the trial court is well versed in the issues related to Sandridge’s underlying petition and has considered the scope of those allegations at least three separate times. Although this court could review the record and seek to resolve imputed disputes regarding bases for 4. denying the motion, the court agrees that having an experienced trial court do so in the first instance supports the goals of the statutory scheme, the public interest, and the ability to conduct a more thorough review of any future orders. Notably, this conclusion stands even though the parties do not agree as to the resolution of the underlying motion. The “absence of reversible error is not a bar to the acceptance of a stipulated reversal so long as the appellate court makes the three findings listed in section 128, subdivision (a)(8).” (Union Bank of California v. Braille Institute of America, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330.) Here, despite the dispute over the underlying merits, the fact the motion should have been resolved is undisputed. Allowing a merits review before the trial court provides the greater benefit to both the parties and the public at large when an agreement to remand is reached. Finally, this court finds minimal risk that the availability of stipulated reversals will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement in situations such as this. Rather, the potential to have the court most familiar with the facts and procedure of the case consider the motion on the merits is likely to lead to a more sober analysis of a dispute’s potential for success and reduce concerns regarding any perceived wildcard arising from an appellate court being the first and likely only review of the merits. Such factors imply that allowing stipulated reversals when a mootness finding is the stated basis for denial of an anti-SLAPP motion would encourage settlement discussions. Therefore, in line with the parties’ stipulation, the portion of the September 9, 2025 order of the Kings County Superior Court in case No. 24CU0240 that denied as moot appellant Michael Sullivan’s special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to consider and rule on the merits of the special motion to strike, including appellant’s evidentiary objections, and, if appropriate, to award attorney’s fees and costs, and make other appropriate orders. 5.  This reversal shall not affect any other portion of the September 9, 2025 order and this court expresses no view on the merits of the special motion to strike. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and the parties’ stipulation. The remittitur shall issue forthwith. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).) The parties shall bear their own costs incurred on appeal. 6.