Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 B.O. v. V.C. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA B.O., D087187 Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FL013975E) v. V.C., Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Sharon L. Kalemkiarian, Judge. Affirmed. V.C., in pro. per., for Appellant. B.O., in pro. per., for Respondent. INTRODUCTION V.C. (Mother) appeals from the family court’s order renewing a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting B.O. (Father) and adding their two children (Children) as protected parties, as well as accompanying modifications to her visitation schedule. She alleges the court made a variety of errors that deprived her of a fair restraining order hearing. Because the record does not support her allegations, we affirm the order. BACKGROUND Mother and Father were not married but share Children, born in 2016 and 2019. Mother and Father lived together with Children in San Diego. In February 2022, Mother took Children to Las Vegas, Nevada without Father’s permission or knowledge, did not provide Father with the address until December, and cut off contact with Father for three months during that time. Father filed a parentage action and a request for a DVRO against Mother due to her leaving with Children, swearing at and berating him, and breaking and throwing things during arguments. On August 10, 2023, the court issued a two-year DVRO against Mother protecting Father, finding Mother had committed acts of domestic abuse against Father. In its statement of decision, the court explained the restraining order was based on Mother leaving the state with Children and depriving Father of access to them for months, using Children in an attempt to coerce Father to be in a relationship with her and obtain money, and using profanity and berating Father with Children present. Along with the DVRO, the court issued a final custody order giving Father sole legal and physical custody of Children. The court ordered Mother to take a batterer prevention program, or 52 weeks of equivalent therapy, and limited her to professionally or court-approved supervised visitation with Children. Mother did not begin required treatment by the deadline set by the court. Two weeks after the issuance of the DVRO against her, Mother filed for a DVRO against Father based on a 2021 incident. Mother had previously filed a petition for a restraining order based on the same incident but had dismissed the petition. In October 2023, the family court denied Mother’s 2 renewed request for a restraining order. Mother appealed, and this court affirmed in May 2025. Meanwhile, in February 2024, after Mother’s request, the court appointed counsel for Children to provide input on custody and visitation issues. At a Family Court Services mediation that Mother requested in April 2024, she had difficulty following the rules and remaining on topic and became upset, leading to cancellation of the session. In addition, Mother screamed and swore at Father while at the courthouse for the mediation. In June 2024, after Mother expressed hatred for Father during video calls with Children and told Children to accuse him of sexual molestation, the court modified the DVRO to require professional supervision for video and telephone calls. The court found that Mother engaged in impermissible discussions with Children and lacked insight into her behavior. Mother did not visit or call Children from September 2024 until June 2025, when she made a single visit. On August 7, 2025, Father filed a request to renew the restraining order. Father provided a declaration in support of the request, stating that he feared future harm and abuse to Children and himself because of: Mother’s failure to participate in court ordered treatment for perpetrators of abuse; Mother’s behavior on the day of the mediation in April 2024; Mother’s harassing messages to Father over Talking Parents despite the order to contact him only for purposes of visitation; Mother’s expression of hatred for Father during video calls with Children; Mother’s introduction of the concept of sexual abuse to Children and encouraging them to report Father for such abuse; and Mother’s false reports to Child Welfare Services (CWS) that Father was neglecting, emotionally abusing, and sexually abusing Children. CWS investigated the allegations and did not find any abuse. Father later 3 filed a request to add Children as protected parties, among other modifications to the request. The same month, Mother attended an appointment with Children’s pediatrician, reporting that Father abused Children.1 Then, Mother brought a custody case in Nevada, seeking to establish Nevada as their home state and “challenge [the] California custody orders.” In October, the Nevada court dismissed Mother’s custody case for lack of jurisdiction due to the California proceedings. Leading up to the hearing in this case, Children’s counsel recommended Mother not have ability to access their school or medical information or to participate in video or phone calls with them because they were “toxic causing [Children] to feel deeply upset and disturbed.” Counsel found particularly “disturbing” Mother’s unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse by Father and was concerned Mother’s Nevada case showed a high risk for future violations of court orders. Counsel also reported that Children did not feel safe visiting Mother without supervision. Mother filed a response to Father’s requests on October 23, 2025. This document does not appear to be in the record on appeal. The court issued a tentative ruling to renew the restraining order for five years, but Children were not included as protected parties. The evidentiary hearing on the renewal took place on October 24, 2025. Because Mother did not submit a witness list prior to the hearing, the court did not 1 According to Father’s declaration and Children’s counsel’s “Second Notice of Intent to Present Oral Testimony,” CWS closed its investigation into Mother’s allegations of Father’s abuse as unfounded or “evaluated out.” 4 permit her to present any witnesses. The court denied her request to continue the hearing. Before hearing testimony, the court summarized evidence from the declarations, including that Mother was no longer participating in supervised phone calls and had visited only once, Mother aggressively approached Father at the Family Court Services mediation, and Mother failed to recognize her role in the situation. The evidence considered by the court included Mother’s October 23, 2025 response to Father’s requests, which the court treated as a declaration and admitted over Father’s objections, stating “the court should consider what [Mother] has to say.” The court said: “[T]he evidence I have before me is pretty clear based upon the declarations[.] So we do not need to spend all day on this,” but would expect the hearing to last “about an hour.” Nonetheless, the court permitted testimony to continue all day. At the hearing, Father’s testimony included the following: Mother’s communications to him accused him of being a horrible person and a psychopath and of abusing her or Children; Mother falsely accused Father of strangling her, telling both Children and a doctor; he believed Mother falsely reported to CWS that he sexually abused Children; he believed Mother had him and Children under surveillance; and Mother “put pressure” on Father’s family to drop the restraining order. Father was concerned that, without a restraining order in place, Mother would continue to falsely accuse him of abuse and come to his house to try to hurt him or Children or take Children. Father presented as evidence the video recordings of Mother’s unsupervised video calls with Children, during which she repeatedly stated that the situation was Father’s fault, not hers, and he was abusing her and Children. She also asked Children if they had been touched inappropriately 5 and encouraged the older child to tell her teacher. The court noted that the videos included Mother and offered her the opportunity to review them, which Mother declined, stating, “I don’t want them. It’s torture.” Father also introduced Mother’s Talking Parents messages from August 2023 through October 2024, on topics other than visitation, in violation of court order, including blaming Father for the situation, accusing him of hurting Children, and calling him names. Throughout Father’s testimony, Mother interrupted to dispute the truth of his testimony through “objections,” which the court repeatedly overruled, explaining that Mother could raise these issues during her turn to testify. On one occasion, Mother objected, claiming Father’s testimony was not “possible” because she was “just trying to co-parent and make this calmly fair.” The court overruled the objection, stating it was “not a valid objection.” The court cut off some of Father’s testimony when it involved repetitive evidence. The court requested Father’s attorney focus questioning as necessary for the appellate record, rather than what it already addressed in its tentative ruling. Later, the court again reminded Father’s attorney, “I’ve already given a tentative. I’ve admitted his declaration. If there is evidence of items which are not in his declaration to further make your record, certainly I expect you to do that. But we’re not going past today.” The court later told Father’s counsel, “I am inclined to renew the restraining order. For your record, I don’t need to know [any more].” The court did not want to hear from Father’s witnesses, paternal grandmother and aunt, having already received their declarations. The court then offered Mother the opportunity to cross examine Father, and she declined, stating: “I want nothing to do with Billy, nor do I ever 6 want to talk to him or ask him questions. I’d rather just make my statement and if you have any questions, I would much rather just talk to you.” Next, the court permitted Mother to make her own lengthy statement. Mother stated: the proceedings have been unfair, the court misunderstood her and the situation, and the rulings were wrong, hurting Children; she is a good teacher and would never hurt a child; she just wants to coparent and be there for Children; she took parenting and perpetrator classes; Children had been thriving with her and were now struggling with Father; Children want to be with her and were “scratching the walls, screaming, running away from [Father]” at the end of her visits with them; and Children’s counsel never spoke to her and was “making up coercive lies.” Referring to her comments about Father during her calls with Children, Mother stated she would “never do that again” or “talk ill about [Father].” Shortly thereafter, however, she accused Father of “want[ing] to just get rid of [her] . . . and mak[ing] sure that they don’t remember their mother” and of “kidnapp[ing] the kids . . . legally.” When the court asked Mother why she stopped attending supervised visitation in San Diego, she explained it was expensive, a long drive, and upsetting for her and Children. Although the court stated early in the hearing it would permit Mother to call rebuttal witnesses, she did not attempt to call any. Children’s counsel joined Father’s arguments in support of renewing the restraining order with Children included as protected parties. Counsel argued they should be included due to Mother’s past conduct—taking Children to Nevada without Father’s knowledge, attempting to gain custody in Nevada despite the California proceedings, and false accusations of sexual molestation by Father—and the “inability to appreciate her behavior.” 7 The court renewed the restraining order for five years, determining based on the videos and messages there was “no question [Mother] will continue to disturb [Father]’s peace.” The court included Children as protected parties, finding Mother emotionally abused Children and lacked insight about the effect of her behavior on them. The court also noted Mother’s refusal to use Talking Parents to communicate with Father, lying to the Nevada court about her custody, lying to doctors, and failing to call and visit Children. Aside from Mother loving and missing Children, the court did not find Mother credible. The court noted that Mother had no action pending to change the custody and visitation orders, but issued a modified child custody and visitation order with the DVRO. The order prevented Mother from accessing Children’s school and health information, reduced Mother’s professionally supervised visitation from once a week to once a month, and reduced Mother’s professionally supervised telephone calls from twice a week to once a week. DISCUSSION I. Motions to Strike Reply Brief and Exhibits Father filed a motion to strike part or all of Mother’s reply brief and a motion to strike the exhibits she lodged with this court on June 9, 2026, which he states were not part of the record below. Mother opposed the motions but did not deny that the exhibits were not before the superior court. Rather, she states she lodged the exhibits “in good faith” and “to demonstrate the nature of evidence that she contends was excluded, rejected, or not considered below,” a tacit concession that they were not in front of the court. We deny Father’s motion to strike Mother’s reply brief, but we consider only matters relevant to this appeal. We grant Father’s motion to strike the 8 exhibits lodged by Mother on June 9, 2026, because we are not permitted to consider them. (See, e.g., Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 739, 751, fn. 7.) II. DVRO Renewal Mother asserts the court made several errors during the restraining order proceedings, depriving her of a fair hearing. We do not find any of her claims persuasive. Our review of Mother’s contentions on appeal is limited by the standards and presumptions that involve substantial deference to the trial court on its discretionary decisions and its resolution of factual issues, as well as its inherent authority to control the proceedings. The judgment is presumed correct and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Mother carries the burden to overcome the presumption of correctness and show prejudicial error, including by presenting argument and legal authority on each contention showing the trial court erred. (Ibid.; Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457; see Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”], (C) [briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”].) As a self-represented litigant, she “is entitled to the same, but no greater[,] consideration” as any other attorney or litigant on 2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 9 appeal and is required to follow the rules. (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) Inconsistent with these established appellate principles, Mother cites minimal legal authority and limited portions of the record that fail to present the full picture of the restraining order renewal proceedings. She makes no attempt to argue the court abused its discretion in issuing the renewed restraining order or prejudicially erred during the proceedings. (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 396 [review of restraining order renewal is for abuse of discretion]; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 822–823 [any error must have been prejudicial, affecting the result].) “It is also well established that courts have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them. [Citation.] ‘In addition to their inherent equitable power derived from the historic power of equity courts, all courts have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory authority[.] That inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with pending litigation . . . in order to insure the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967.) “This authority includes the power to supervise proceedings for the orderly conduct of the court’s business and to guard against inept procedures and unnecessary indulgences that tend to delay the conduct of its proceedings. [Citation.] In this vein, the court has the power to expedite proceedings which, in the court’s view, are dragging on too long without significantly aiding the trier of fact.” (California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 10 12, 22.) With these principles in mind, we address each of Mother’s arguments. First, Mother contends the court deprived her of the due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard by prohibiting her from calling witnesses. The court ruled that Mother could not present other witnesses because she failed to produce a witness list prior to trial as required by statute. Under Family Code3 section 217, subdivision (a), the court is to “receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing,” but subdivision (c) requires: “A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony. If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance[.]” (Italics added; see rule 5.113(e) [“Witness lists required by Family Code section 217(c) must be served along with the request for order or responsive papers”]; In re Marriage of Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476, 481–482 [the family court is not required to receive testimony when the party did not follow the proper procedures].) We see no abuse of discretion. Mother fails to explain why she could not have filed a witness list along with her October 23, 2025 response to Father’s requests, nor does she name which witnesses she would have called or explain how their testimony would have been relevant.4 Additionally, 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 4 Even if the court was required to make a good cause finding and state its reasons for refusing the witnesses on the record under section 217, subdivision (b), the court did not err and there was no prejudice. The court stated on the record Mother could not call the witnesses because she did not provide a witness list. (Rule 5.113(b)(5) [compliance with § 217, subd. (c) is a 11 contrary to Mother’s representation in her opening brief, the court indicated it would permit her to present rebuttal witnesses, but Mother did not attempt to do so. Second, Mother contends the court erred by relying on declarations— particularly Father’s—rather than duplicative live testimony. The record shows, however, the court gave Mother the opportunity to cross-examine Father and permitted her to testify at length, fulfilling the requirement that the court “receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing.” (§ 217, subd. (a).) Mother declined the opportunity to cross-examine Father and cannot now claim she did not have the opportunity to “confront adverse evidence.” To the extent the court limited live testimony by Mother and Father, the court had inherent authority to do so to expedite proceedings, prevent duplicative evidence, and focus testimony on what would aid the court. Moreover, the court largely limited Father’s testimony by reminding counsel on multiple occasions that it had Father’s declaration, as well as those of his potential witnesses, and had issued a tentative ruling; this limitation did not affect the court’s ruling for Father and is not helpful to Mother’s appeal. By complaining that the court “primarily relied on [Father]’s declarations and written submissions,” Mother appears to merely disagree with the court’s credibility findings, which we factor courts must consider “in making a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony”], (c) [“The court is required to state only those factors on which the finding of good cause is based”].) There is no prejudice where the appellant fails to show how the testimony “would have related to the issues on which the trial court based its . . . order.” (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 392 [involving fee order].) 12 cannot reweigh on appeal. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) Third, Mother contends the court erred by issuing a tentative ruling prior to hearing live testimony. Mother fails to support her argument that the court’s issuance of a tentative ruling was improper. “One cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.” (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) The California Rules of Court contemplate the issuance of tentative rulings. (Rule 3.1308.) The court did not issue its final decision until after a full day of testimony from Father and Mother. Indeed, the court demonstrated a willingness to deviate from its tentative ruling by including Children as protected parties in the restraining order, which was not a condition of the tentative. Fourth, Mother contends the court erred by depriving her of a full and fair opportunity to be heard, including the “opportunity to present live testimony, confront adverse evidence, or meaningfully develop the factual record.” As best we can discern, this argument largely repeats prior points, and we have already determined that the court fulfilled its obligation to permit live testimony, including cross-examination of Father and testimony by Mother, in addition to the parties’ filings. Fifth, Mother contends the court erred by inconsistently applying evidentiary rules. Yet she fails to cite any evidentiary rules in her argument. She references her interruptions of Father’s evidence, her inability to testify on incidents before the initial restraining order, and exhibits she claims she did not receive in time to review. The court properly prevented Mother from disputing the truthfulness of Father’s testimony through objections; she cites no authority permitting her to do so. The proper time for her to dispute Father’s testimony was either through cross-examination, which she chose 13 not to do, or by providing contrary evidence while presenting her case. (See Fost v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 724, 733 [the “chief purpose” of cross-examination is “ ‘to test the credibility, knowledge and recollection of the witness’ ”].) We agree with Father that the court showed considerable patience with Mother’s many interruptions questioning his credibility. Regarding prior incidents, the court did not hear testimony from either side about incidents prior to the initial restraining order hearing, and Mother does not point to any instances of unequal treatment. As to exhibits, Mother provides no information to contradict the court’s finding she received proper service. Additionally, she waived any argument regarding her inability to review video exhibits in advance by declining the court’s offer to permit her to review them before their presentation. And, to the extent the video exhibits “were played ‘without comment,’ ” it was because she chose not to cross-examine Father. To the extent Mother raises additional errors without developing or supporting them, we decline to address those arguments. (Niko v. Foreman, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 368; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 701, fn. 15 [failure to develop an argument forfeits that point].) 14 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal, if any. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) DO, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: RUBIN, J. BERMÚDEZ, J. 15