B.O. v. V.C. CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketD087187
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 B.O. v. V.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
B.O., D087187
Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22FL013975E)
v.
V.C.,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sharon L. Kalemkiarian, Judge. Affirmed.
V.C., in pro. per., for Appellant.
B.O., in pro. per., for Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
V.C. (Mother) appeals from the family court’s order renewing a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting B.O. (Father) and
adding their two children (Children) as protected parties, as well as
accompanying modifications to her visitation schedule. She alleges the court
made a variety of errors that deprived her of a fair restraining order hearing.
Because the record does not support her allegations, we affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
Mother and Father were not married but share Children, born in 2016
and 2019. Mother and Father lived together with Children in San Diego. In
February 2022, Mother took Children to Las Vegas, Nevada without Father’s
permission or knowledge, did not provide Father with the address until
December, and cut off contact with Father for three months during that time.
Father filed a parentage action and a request for a DVRO against Mother due
to her leaving with Children, swearing at and berating him, and breaking
and throwing things during arguments.
On August 10, 2023, the court issued a two-year DVRO against Mother
protecting Father, finding Mother had committed acts of domestic abuse
against Father. In its statement of decision, the court explained the
restraining order was based on Mother leaving the state with Children and
depriving Father of access to them for months, using Children in an attempt
to coerce Father to be in a relationship with her and obtain money, and using
profanity and berating Father with Children present. Along with the DVRO,
the court issued a final custody order giving Father sole legal and physical
custody of Children. The court ordered Mother to take a batterer prevention
program, or 52 weeks of equivalent therapy, and limited her to professionally
or court-approved supervised visitation with Children. Mother did not begin
required treatment by the deadline set by the court.
Two weeks after the issuance of the DVRO against her, Mother filed for
a DVRO against Father based on a 2021 incident. Mother had previously
filed a petition for a restraining order based on the same incident but had
dismissed the petition. In October 2023, the family court denied Mother’s
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renewed request for a restraining order. Mother appealed, and this court
affirmed in May 2025.
Meanwhile, in February 2024, after Mother’s request, the court
appointed counsel for Children to provide input on custody and visitation
issues. At a Family Court Services mediation that Mother requested in
April 2024, she had difficulty following the rules and remaining on topic and
became upset, leading to cancellation of the session. In addition, Mother
screamed and swore at Father while at the courthouse for the mediation. In
June 2024, after Mother expressed hatred for Father during video calls with
Children and told Children to accuse him of sexual molestation, the court
modified the DVRO to require professional supervision for video and
telephone calls. The court found that Mother engaged in impermissible
discussions with Children and lacked insight into her behavior. Mother did
not visit or call Children from September 2024 until June 2025, when she
made a single visit.
On August 7, 2025, Father filed a request to renew the restraining
order. Father provided a declaration in support of the request, stating that
he feared future harm and abuse to Children and himself because of:
Mother’s failure to participate in court ordered treatment for perpetrators of
abuse; Mother’s behavior on the day of the mediation in April 2024; Mother’s
harassing messages to Father over Talking Parents despite the order to
contact him only for purposes of visitation; Mother’s expression of hatred for
Father during video calls with Children; Mother’s introduction of the concept
of sexual abuse to Children and encouraging them to report Father for such
abuse; and Mother’s false reports to Child Welfare Services (CWS) that
Father was neglecting, emotionally abusing, and sexually abusing Children.
CWS investigated the allegations and did not find any abuse. Father later
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filed a request to add Children as protected parties, among other
modifications to the request.
The same month, Mother attended an appointment with Children’s
pediatrician, reporting that Father abused Children.1 Then, Mother brought
a custody case in Nevada, seeking to establish Nevada as their home state
and “challenge [the] California custody orders.” In October, the Nevada court
dismissed Mother’s custody case for lack of jurisdiction due to the California
proceedings.
Leading up to the hearing in this case, Children’s counsel
recommended Mother not have ability to access their school or medical
information or to participate in video or phone calls with them because they
were “toxic causing [Children] to feel deeply upset and disturbed.” Counsel
found particularly “disturbing” Mother’s unsubstantiated allegations of
sexual abuse by Father and was concerned Mother’s Nevada case showed a
high risk for future violations of court orders. Counsel also reported that
Children did not feel safe visiting Mother without supervision.
Mother filed a response to Father’s requests on October 23, 2025. This
document does not appear to be in the record on appeal.
The court issued a tentative ruling to renew the restraining order for
five years, but Children were not included as protected parties. The
evidentiary hearing on the renewal took place on October 24, 2025. Because
Mother did not submit a witness list prior to the hearing, the court did not
1 According to Father’s declaration and Children’s counsel’s “Second
Notice of Intent to Present Oral Testimony,” CWS closed its investigation
into Mother’s allegations of Father’s abuse as unfounded or “evaluated out.”
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permit her to present any witnesses. The court denied her request to
continue the hearing.
Before hearing testimony, the court summarized evidence from the
declarations, including that Mother was no longer participating in supervised
phone calls and had visited only once, Mother aggressively approached
Father at the Family Court Services mediation, and Mother failed to
recognize her role in the situation. The evidence considered by the court
included Mother’s October 23, 2025 response to Father’s requests, which the
court treated as a declaration and admitted over Father’s objections, stating
“the court should consider what [Mother] has to say.” The court said: “[T]he
evidence I have before me is pretty clear based upon the declarations[.] So
we do not need to spend all day on this,” but would expect the hearing to last
“about an hour.” Nonetheless, the court permitted testimony to continue all
day.
At the hearing, Father’s testimony included the following: Mother’s
communications to him accused him of being a horrible person and a
psychopath and of abusing her or Children; Mother falsely accused Father of
strangling her, telling both Children and a doctor; he believed Mother falsely
reported to CWS that he sexually abused Children; he believed Mother had
him and Children under surveillance; and Mother “put pressure” on Father’s
family to drop the restraining order. Father was concerned that, without a
restraining order in place, Mother would continue to falsely accuse him of
abuse and come to his house to try to hurt him or Children or take Children.
Father presented as evidence the video recordings of Mother’s
unsupervised video calls with Children, during which she repeatedly stated
that the situation was Father’s fault, not hers, and he was abusing her and
Children. She also asked Children if they had been touched inappropriately
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and encouraged the older child to tell her teacher. The court noted that the
videos included Mother and offered her the opportunity to review them,
which Mother declined, stating, “I don’t want them. It’s torture.” Father also
introduced Mother’s Talking Parents messages from August 2023 through
October 2024, on topics other than visitation, in violation of court order,
including blaming Father for the situation, accusing him of hurting Children,
and calling him names.
Throughout Father’s testimony, Mother interrupted to dispute the
truth of his testimony through “objections,” which the court repeatedly
overruled, explaining that Mother could raise these issues during her turn to
testify. On one occasion, Mother objected, claiming Father’s testimony was
not “possible” because she was “just trying to co-parent and make this calmly
fair.” The court overruled the objection, stating it was “not a valid objection.”
The court cut off some of Father’s testimony when it involved repetitive
evidence. The court requested Father’s attorney focus questioning as
necessary for the appellate record, rather than what it already addressed in
its tentative ruling. Later, the court again reminded Father’s attorney, “I’ve
already given a tentative. I’ve admitted his declaration. If there is evidence
of items which are not in his declaration to further make your record,
certainly I expect you to do that. But we’re not going past today.” The court
later told Father’s counsel, “I am inclined to renew the restraining order. For
your record, I don’t need to know [any more].” The court did not want to hear
from Father’s witnesses, paternal grandmother and aunt, having already
received their declarations.
The court then offered Mother the opportunity to cross examine Father,
and she declined, stating: “I want nothing to do with Billy, nor do I ever
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want to talk to him or ask him questions. I’d rather just make my statement
and if you have any questions, I would much rather just talk to you.”
Next, the court permitted Mother to make her own lengthy statement.
Mother stated: the proceedings have been unfair, the court misunderstood
her and the situation, and the rulings were wrong, hurting Children; she is a
good teacher and would never hurt a child; she just wants to coparent and be
there for Children; she took parenting and perpetrator classes; Children had
been thriving with her and were now struggling with Father; Children want
to be with her and were “scratching the walls, screaming, running away from
[Father]” at the end of her visits with them; and Children’s counsel never
spoke to her and was “making up coercive lies.” Referring to her comments
about Father during her calls with Children, Mother stated she would “never
do that again” or “talk ill about [Father].” Shortly thereafter, however, she
accused Father of “want[ing] to just get rid of [her] . . . and mak[ing] sure
that they don’t remember their mother” and of “kidnapp[ing] the
kids . . . legally.” When the court asked Mother why she stopped attending
supervised visitation in San Diego, she explained it was expensive, a long
drive, and upsetting for her and Children. Although the court stated early in
the hearing it would permit Mother to call rebuttal witnesses, she did not
attempt to call any.
Children’s counsel joined Father’s arguments in support of renewing
the restraining order with Children included as protected parties. Counsel
argued they should be included due to Mother’s past conduct—taking
Children to Nevada without Father’s knowledge, attempting to gain custody
in Nevada despite the California proceedings, and false accusations of sexual
molestation by Father—and the “inability to appreciate her behavior.”
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The court renewed the restraining order for five years, determining
based on the videos and messages there was “no question [Mother] will
continue to disturb [Father]’s peace.” The court included Children as
protected parties, finding Mother emotionally abused Children and lacked
insight about the effect of her behavior on them. The court also noted
Mother’s refusal to use Talking Parents to communicate with Father, lying to
the Nevada court about her custody, lying to doctors, and failing to call and
visit Children. Aside from Mother loving and missing Children, the court did
not find Mother credible. The court noted that Mother had no action pending
to change the custody and visitation orders, but issued a modified child
custody and visitation order with the DVRO. The order prevented Mother
from accessing Children’s school and health information, reduced Mother’s
professionally supervised visitation from once a week to once a month, and
reduced Mother’s professionally supervised telephone calls from twice a week
to once a week.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motions to Strike Reply Brief and Exhibits
Father filed a motion to strike part or all of Mother’s reply brief and a
motion to strike the exhibits she lodged with this court on June 9, 2026,
which he states were not part of the record below. Mother opposed the
motions but did not deny that the exhibits were not before the superior court.
Rather, she states she lodged the exhibits “in good faith” and “to demonstrate
the nature of evidence that she contends was excluded, rejected, or not
considered below,” a tacit concession that they were not in front of the court.
We deny Father’s motion to strike Mother’s reply brief, but we consider only
matters relevant to this appeal. We grant Father’s motion to strike the
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exhibits lodged by Mother on June 9, 2026, because we are not permitted to
consider them. (See, e.g., Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 739, 751, fn. 7.)
II.
DVRO Renewal
Mother asserts the court made several errors during the restraining
order proceedings, depriving her of a fair hearing. We do not find any of her
claims persuasive. Our review of Mother’s contentions on appeal is limited
by the standards and presumptions that involve substantial deference to the
trial court on its discretionary decisions and its resolution of factual issues, as
well as its inherent authority to control the proceedings. The judgment is
presumed correct and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Mother carries the burden
to overcome the presumption of correctness and show prejudicial error,
including by presenting argument and legal authority on each contention
showing the trial court erred. (Ibid.; Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457; see Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)
[briefs must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by
citation of authority”], (C) [briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in
the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where
the matter appears”].) As a self-represented litigant, she “is entitled to the
same, but no greater[,] consideration” as any other attorney or litigant on
2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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appeal and is required to follow the rules. (Barton v. New United Motor
Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.)
Inconsistent with these established appellate principles, Mother cites
minimal legal authority and limited portions of the record that fail to present
the full picture of the restraining order renewal proceedings. She makes no
attempt to argue the court abused its discretion in issuing the renewed
restraining order or prejudicially erred during the proceedings. (Perez v.
Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 396 [review of restraining order
renewal is for abuse of discretion]; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 814, 822–823 [any error must have been prejudicial,
affecting the result].)
“It is also well established that courts have fundamental inherent
equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to
control litigation before them. [Citation.] ‘In addition to their inherent
equitable power derived from the historic power of equity courts, all courts
have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to
carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory authority[.]
That inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over
all proceedings connected with pending litigation . . . in order to insure the
orderly administration of justice.’ ” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997)
16 Cal.4th 953, 967.) “This authority includes the power to supervise
proceedings for the orderly conduct of the court’s business and to guard
against inept procedures and unnecessary indulgences that tend to delay the
conduct of its proceedings. [Citation.] In this vein, the court has the power to
expedite proceedings which, in the court’s view, are dragging on too long
without significantly aiding the trier of fact.” (California Crane School, Inc.
v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
10
12, 22.) With these principles in mind, we address each of Mother’s
arguments.
First, Mother contends the court deprived her of the due process right
to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard by prohibiting her from calling
witnesses. The court ruled that Mother could not present other witnesses
because she failed to produce a witness list prior to trial as required by
statute. Under Family Code3 section 217, subdivision (a), the court is to
“receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope
of the hearing,” but subdivision (c) requires: “A party seeking to present live
testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing,
file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated
testimony. If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court
may, on request, grant a brief continuance[.]” (Italics added; see rule 5.113(e)
[“Witness lists required by Family Code section 217(c) must be served along
with the request for order or responsive papers”]; In re Marriage of Deamon
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476, 481–482 [the family court is not required to
receive testimony when the party did not follow the proper procedures].)
We see no abuse of discretion. Mother fails to explain why she could
not have filed a witness list along with her October 23, 2025 response to
Father’s requests, nor does she name which witnesses she would have called
or explain how their testimony would have been relevant.4 Additionally,
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
4 Even if the court was required to make a good cause finding and state
its reasons for refusing the witnesses on the record under section 217,
subdivision (b), the court did not err and there was no prejudice. The court
stated on the record Mother could not call the witnesses because she did not
provide a witness list. (Rule 5.113(b)(5) [compliance with § 217, subd. (c) is a
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contrary to Mother’s representation in her opening brief, the court indicated
it would permit her to present rebuttal witnesses, but Mother did not attempt
to do so.
Second, Mother contends the court erred by relying on declarations—
particularly Father’s—rather than duplicative live testimony. The record
shows, however, the court gave Mother the opportunity to cross-examine
Father and permitted her to testify at length, fulfilling the requirement that
the court “receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within
the scope of the hearing.” (§ 217, subd. (a).) Mother declined the opportunity
to cross-examine Father and cannot now claim she did not have the
opportunity to “confront adverse evidence.” To the extent the court limited
live testimony by Mother and Father, the court had inherent authority to do
so to expedite proceedings, prevent duplicative evidence, and focus testimony
on what would aid the court. Moreover, the court largely limited Father’s
testimony by reminding counsel on multiple occasions that it had Father’s
declaration, as well as those of his potential witnesses, and had issued a
tentative ruling; this limitation did not affect the court’s ruling for Father
and is not helpful to Mother’s appeal. By complaining that the court
“primarily relied on [Father]’s declarations and written submissions,” Mother
appears to merely disagree with the court’s credibility findings, which we
factor courts must consider “in making a finding of good cause to refuse to
receive live testimony”], (c) [“The court is required to state only those factors
on which the finding of good cause is based”].) There is no prejudice where
the appellant fails to show how the testimony “would have related to the
issues on which the trial court based its . . . order.” (In re Marriage of Hearn
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 392 [involving fee order].)
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cannot reweigh on appeal. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970,
981.)
Third, Mother contends the court erred by issuing a tentative ruling
prior to hearing live testimony. Mother fails to support her argument that
the court’s issuance of a tentative ruling was improper. “One cannot simply
say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.”
(Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) The California Rules of
Court contemplate the issuance of tentative rulings. (Rule 3.1308.) The
court did not issue its final decision until after a full day of testimony from
Father and Mother. Indeed, the court demonstrated a willingness to deviate
from its tentative ruling by including Children as protected parties in the
restraining order, which was not a condition of the tentative.
Fourth, Mother contends the court erred by depriving her of a full and
fair opportunity to be heard, including the “opportunity to present live
testimony, confront adverse evidence, or meaningfully develop the factual
record.” As best we can discern, this argument largely repeats prior points,
and we have already determined that the court fulfilled its obligation to
permit live testimony, including cross-examination of Father and testimony
by Mother, in addition to the parties’ filings.
Fifth, Mother contends the court erred by inconsistently applying
evidentiary rules. Yet she fails to cite any evidentiary rules in her argument.
She references her interruptions of Father’s evidence, her inability to testify
on incidents before the initial restraining order, and exhibits she claims she
did not receive in time to review. The court properly prevented Mother from
disputing the truthfulness of Father’s testimony through objections; she cites
no authority permitting her to do so. The proper time for her to dispute
Father’s testimony was either through cross-examination, which she chose
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not to do, or by providing contrary evidence while presenting her case. (See
Fost v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 724, 733 [the “chief purpose” of
cross-examination is “ ‘to test the credibility, knowledge and recollection of
the witness’ ”].) We agree with Father that the court showed considerable
patience with Mother’s many interruptions questioning his credibility.
Regarding prior incidents, the court did not hear testimony from either side
about incidents prior to the initial restraining order hearing, and Mother
does not point to any instances of unequal treatment. As to exhibits, Mother
provides no information to contradict the court’s finding she received proper
service. Additionally, she waived any argument regarding her inability to
review video exhibits in advance by declining the court’s offer to permit her to
review them before their presentation. And, to the extent the video exhibits
“were played ‘without comment,’ ” it was because she chose not to
cross-examine Father.
To the extent Mother raises additional errors without developing or
supporting them, we decline to address those arguments. (Niko v. Foreman,
supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 368; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 701, fn. 15 [failure to develop an argument forfeits
that point].)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal, if
any. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
RUBIN, J.
BERMÚDEZ, J.
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