In re A.C. CA2/6

Filed 10/20/26 In re A.C. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX In re A.C. et al., Persons 2d Juv. No. B348042 Coming Under the Juvenile (Super. Ct. Nos. J073537, Court Law. J073538, J073539, J073540, _____________________________ J073571) (Ventura County) VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Petitioner and Respondent, v. N.C., Appellant. N.C. challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e)1. She contends the juvenile court 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. erred because she was making progress in court-ordered services, visiting the children regularly and consistently, and services were continued for father. We conclude appellant has not demonstrated error and we will affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In August 2024, four siblings (8-year-old twins, a 3-year- old, and a 13-month-old) were detained by Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA). The twins were placed with one resource family and the two younger children were placed with a second resource family. HSA alleged the children were at risk because of both parents’ mental health issues, domestic disputes, an unsafe and uninhabitable home, and inappropriate physical discipline. HSA also noted a 2012 dependency case against appellant. In September 2024, appellant contested the court’s jurisdiction at the first jurisdiction and disposition (J&D) hearing. Father did not contest jurisdiction but expressed a belief that services would help the family. The J&D hearing was set for contest in thirty days. Later that month a fifth sibling was born and taken into protective custody. Additional petition counts were added for the newborn regarding appellant’s prescription drug abuse throughout pregnancy which had resulted in the newborn suffering withdrawal symptoms. At the contested J&D hearing for all five children in December 2024, appellant denied any problems. She testified she was “innocent” with respect to the allegations but said she would participate in a psychological evaluation if ordered to do so. The court sustained the jurisdictional allegations, finding appellant’s testimony was contradicted by the evidence and not credible. The 2 court ordered family reunification services for appellant and father, a psychological evaluation for appellant, and set the matter for a six-month review hearing. At the six-month review hearing in June 2025, HSA recommended continuing reunification services for father and appellant. Appellant opposed the case plan and set the matter for contest. The children’s attorney contested HSA’s recommendation for continued family reunification. Father did not contest the case plan. At the contested six-month review hearing a month later, HSA changed its recommendation and asked the court to terminate appellant’s services due to several concerning developments. Appellant did not agree. She testified she had done everything she needed to do to have her children returned, denied any substance use or mental health issues, insisted she was innocent of all allegations, asked the court to dismiss the dependency, and called HSA “deceitful.” She also indicated an unwillingness to participate in further services if they were ordered. HSA, the children’s attorney, and father each argued for terminating appellant’s reunification services. The juvenile court found the agency “easily” met its burden to show it would be detrimental to return the children to appellant, denied her request to dismiss the case, terminated her reunification services, and ordered continuation of father’s services. Appellant filed notices of appeal from the juvenile court’s minute orders of July 28, 2025, terminating reunification services. On the court’s own motion, we have taken judicial notice of the juvenile court’s formal orders filed on August 12, 2025. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) We will treat the 3 notices of appeal filed on August 4, 2025, as premature but effective from the subsequent formal orders of August 12, 2025. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.405(a)(3) [notice of appeal is liberally construed], & 8.406(d) [reviewing court may treat premature notice of appeal as filed immediately after the rendition of judgment].) DISCUSSION At the six-month review hearing the juvenile court “shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to their parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well- being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) “A substantial risk of detriment means that ‘returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well- being.’ ” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.) HSA has the burden of proving detriment. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1); David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789.) We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence. (L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1034.) We “draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if there is other evidence to the contrary.” (In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628, 645.) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in terminating her reunification services at the six-month review hearing because she was participating and making progress in some of the court-ordered services and visiting the children consistently. She also asserts it was error to terminate her services since the 4 goal continued to be reunification with a parent and services were continued for father. The substantial risk of detriment standard is “a fairly high one.” (In re E.D., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) In applying the standard, the juvenile court must consider “whether the parent shows a ‘grasp of the important parenting concepts— things such as a child’s need for security, adequate nutrition and shelter, freedom from violence, proper sanitation, healthcare, and education.’ ” (Ibid.) It must also “ ‘consider the extent to which the parent participated in reunification services,’ ” as well as “ ‘the efforts or progress’ ” the parent made in eliminating the conditions leading to “ ‘the child’s out-of-home placement.’ ” (Id. at p. 966.) Here, the juvenile court considered witness testimony, evidence submitted, and each party’s arguments, finding HSA “easily” met its burden to prove it would be detrimental to return the children to appellant. The court found appellant was inappropriate during visits with the children, continued to use or abuse substances on a regular basis, did not engage in mental health or substance abuse services, and continued to demonstrate a need for supervised visitation. The court stated there was “some kind of disconnect” between appellant and “what is going on in this particular case.” It said it could not credit appellant’s position that she is innocent of all allegations without finding every other person involved in the case, from the social workers to minor’s counsel, was either being untruthful or misrepresenting their observations. Although appellant completed some aspects of her case plan, including participating in a psychological evaluation and Therapeutic Family Support Services, the juvenile court found 5 appellant made minimal progress in alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating her children’s out-of-home placement. It found appellant’s statement that she had done everything asked of her “not true” and explained, “I was looking for some indication [appellant] was willing to engage” in services but “the evidence has consistently shown [appellant] does not want to engage in all of the services.” The juvenile court found appellant’s failure to engage in individual therapy and counseling “significant” and her increased marijuana use concerning, since it was one of the conditions leading to her children’s out-of-home placement. Finally, it stated it did not hear anything causing it to believe appellant would engage in services if additional services were provided. In her reply brief, appellant acknowledged her participation and progress in her case plan was “far from perfect,” but asserted “these factors must be measured considering her mental health challenges,” arguing that if we consider her mental health issues, her progress and participation in the case plan “was not as disastrous as Respondent portrays . . . .” But this directly contradicts her testimony at the contested six-month review hearing in which she adamantly denied having any mental health issues. Regardless, we do not reevaluate “the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reweigh the evidence.” (In re A.L., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 645.) It is appellant’s burden to show there was “no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the court’s finding” and she did not meet this burden. (Ibid.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that returning the children to appellant would 6 create a substantial risk of detriment to the children. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. YEGAN, Acting P. J. We concur: BALTODANO, J. HIPPACH, J. 7  Gilbert A. Romero, Judge Superior Court County of Ventura ______________________________ Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant. Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, and Joseph J. Randazzo, Principal Assistant County Counsel for Petitioner and Respondent. 8