In re R.M. CA4/3

Filed 10/27/26 In re R.M. CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE In re R.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, G066545 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 20DP0285-A) v. OPINION N.M. et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeals from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, June Jee An, Judge. Affirmed. Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant N.M. Caitlin E. Howard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ro.M. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for Minor.  Ro.M. (Father) and N.M. (Mother) each appeal from the postjudgment order terminating their parental rights to their now seven- year-old son R.M. (the child). They contend the juvenile court erred in rejecting the parental-benefit exception to the termination of Father’s parental rights.1 They also argue the Orange County Social Services Agency (the Agency) did not adequately document its efforts to comply with the duty of further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. (ICWA), and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (e).2 We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding the parental-benefit exception does not apply. We further conclude the report prepared by the Agency and admitted into evidence by stipulation, adequately documented the Agency’s ICWA compliance efforts and imparted sufficient information to support the court’s ICWA findings. The Agency was not required to also submit copies of its tribal and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) inquiries, the certified mail receipts, or the tribes’ and the BIA’s responses to the court. We therefore affirm. 1 At the permanency hearing, Mother stated she agreed with the termination of parental rights so the child could be adopted. Now on appeal, she joins Father’s argument the juvenile court erred by finding the parental- benefit exception inapplicable, but only with respect to Father. Our references to Mother in this opinion therefore are limited to providing relevant context. 2 “The language of both federal and state law uses the term ‘Indian.’ California courts have used alternative terms, such as ‘American Indian’ or ‘Native American’; we use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory language . . . . No disrespect is intended.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) All further statutory references are to Welfare and Institutions Code. 2  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. OVERVIEW OF THE CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDING Father and Mother have a long-standing history of domestic violence which has been documented since 2019. Their domestic violence history included physical altercations while Mother was pregnant with the child and also later while in the presence of the child and his two older siblings.3 In 2020, the child was detained and ultimately found by the Orange County Juvenile Court to come within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). Father and Mother were offered reunification services. Child welfare jurisdiction was terminated in November 2022 whereafter Mother was given sole custody of the children and Father was only authorized supervised visitation with the child due to his failure to complete a domestic violence program for offenders. On April 8, 2023, Father and Mother again engaged in domestic violence in front of the children. Father fled the scene when law enforcement arrived. Mother declined prosecution and further declined an emergency protective order “as she already ha[d] one in place allowing peaceful contact.” On April 20, 2023, an emergency response social worker attempted to serve a protective custody warrant to remove the children and directed Mother to bring the children to Orangewood Children and Family Center. However, Mother refused and reportedly absconded with the 3 Father and Mother lost custody of the child’s two older half sisters (collectively, the children). Father is not the father of the child’s half siblings. As the half siblings are not at issue in this appeal, our references to them are limited to provide background relevant to the disposition of this appeal. 3 children. Mother brought the children to Orangewood the following day at which time the child was placed in the home of his paternal great-aunt and great-uncle where he has since remained. The Agency initiated the instant action by filing a child welfare petition on April 24, 2023, alleging the child, who was then three years old, came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling). The petition cited, inter alia, the parents’ unwillingness to protect the children from being exposed to domestic violence, their lying about having unauthorized contact with each other, and their respective criminal histories and drug use. In July 2023, the juvenile court sustained the petition, as amended by interlineation, declared the child to be a dependent child of the court, removed the child and vested custody of him with the Agency, and ordered reunification services for both parents. Throughout the reunification period, the Agency reported Father’s cooperation with the case plan and his efforts and progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating court involvement as “minimal.”4 He did not comply with case plan services: he missed alcohol and drug tests and was terminated from batterer’s and child abuser’s treatment programs due to excessive absences. Father’s visitation with the child, although positive, was inconsistent and often brief in duration despite Father having been awarded eight hours of supervised visits. 4 In the November 7, 2024 status review report, Father’s efforts in this regard were described as “moderate” after he attended three sessions each of a batterer’s treatment program and child abuser’s treatment program. 4  In January 2025, at the 18-month permanency review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a permanency hearing pursuant to section 366.26 after finding Father and Mother had made no progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement of the child. After considering the Agency’s reports admitted into evidence and Father’s and Mother’s testimony, the juvenile court terminated parental rights and ordered adoption to be the permanent plan for the child after finding the child adoptable and the parental-benefit exception to adoption inapplicable. Father and Mother each filed a notice of appeal from the order terminating parental rights.5 II. FACTS RELATED TO ICWA Our record shows Father and Mother have each consistently denied knowledge of any Indian heritage. The child’s living grandparents and great-grandparents, aunts and uncles, and non-related extended family members, for whom the Agency had contact information, denied knowledge of any Indian heritage, with one exception. One of the child’s maternal aunts reported that the maternal great-grandfather had Apache heritage. In a June 2023 interview with an assigned social worker, that maternal great- grandfather claimed Apache ancestry through his mother and his mother’s 5 Mother’s notice of appeal indicated she also appeals from the juvenile court’s January 26, 2026 order denying Mother a hearing on her section 388 motion. Although she acknowledges she appealed from that order in her opening brief, she appears to have abandoned that aspect of her appeal as she has not provided any analysis or citations to legal authority supporting any challenge to that order. She has therefore forfeited her challenge to the January 26, 2026 order and we do not consider it further. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) 5 father, but also “stated the Apache blood was ‘way back.’” He denied enrollment in a tribe and denied knowing if any relatives were enrolled in a tribe. The maternal great-grandfather provided the Agency with (1) the maternal great-great-grandmother’s date of birth, place of birth, approximate date of death, and place of death; (2) the maternal great-great-great- grandfather’s name and place of birth; and (3) the maternal grandmother’s full name and date of birth.6 The maternal great-grandfather stated he did not have any further information and could not identify other relatives who could provide additional information. Based on the information provided by the maternal great- grandfather, the Agency determined there was reason to believe the child may be an Indian child and conducted further inquiry with the Apache tribes. In June 2023, the assigned social worker reviewed the BIA’s list of designated tribal agents from the Federal Register and identified eight potentially relevant tribes: (1) Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, (2) Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, (3) Jicarilla Apache Nation, (4) Mescalero Apache Tribe, (5) San Carlos Apache Tribe, (6) Tonto Apache Tribe of Arizona, (7) White Mountain Apache Tribe, and (8) Yavapai-Apache Nation of the Camp Verde Indian Reservation. In June 2023, the social worker sent ICWA inquiries by e-mail and certified mail to the agents of those eight tribes. Each ICWA inquiry included “information gathered on the family’s Native American ancestry and a family tree.” By September 11, 2023, the Agency had received a response 6 The maternal great-grandfather also stated the maternal grandmother was homeless and he did not have contact information for her. 6 from each tribe indicating the child was not eligible for membership in the tribe. From December 2023 through April 4, 2024, the social worker periodically contacted Mother, Father, and the paternal great-aunt and great uncle, who were the child’s caregivers, to ask again whether any had any new information pertaining to the family’s Indian ancestry or contact information for any other relatives. None of them had additional information to report. On April 3, 2024, the juvenile court found ICWA does not apply but stated the Agency was “to continue exercising due diligence and follow up on any new information suggesting that [the child] might be an Indian [c]hild.” From July 2024 through April 2025, the social worker continued to make the same inquiries by periodically contacting Mother, Father, and the paternal great-aunt and great-uncle. None provided any further information. DISCUSSION In this appeal, Father contends the juvenile court erred by finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable with respect to him; Mother joins in Father’s contention. Mother contends the Agency’s ICWA compliance efforts were not adequately documented; Father joins in Mother’s contention. For the reasons we explain, we find no error. I. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE PARENTAL-BENEFIT EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding the parental- benefit exception to termination of parental rights does not apply. While we appreciate Father’s “affectionate connection” with the child during visits, the juvenile court did not err. 7  When the juvenile court terminates a parent’s reunification services and orders a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26, the focus “shifts from the parents’ interest in reunification to the child’s interest in permanency and stability.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 223.)7 At the section 366.26 hearing, termination of parental rights and an order placing the child for adoption is the preferred plan. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) This preference may be overcome only in limited circumstances. One such circumstance is the parental-benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A parent may avoid termination of parental rights by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, three things: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent”; and (3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636– 637.) We review the first two elements for substantial evidence but review the third element for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) The juvenile court found Father’s visits with the child “[had not] really been consistent,” although they became more consistent after termination of reunification services and the setting of the permanency hearing. The court nevertheless found, for the “purposes of argument,” Father established the first element that he had maintained regular visitation and contact with the child. The court observed Father and the child 7 Adoption is the Legislature’s preferred permanent plan because “‘it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) 8 “have a special language, a special bond” and further observed Father is “able to really settle him down.” The court explained, however, it could not find terminating that bond would be detrimental to the child when balanced against the benefit of a new adoptive home. The juvenile court noted this case is “a little different” because the child has “limited verbal ability . . . due to his autism diagnosis.” The court stated, “even if I assume that there is a substantial emotional attachment” between Father and the child, the court could not find “it is strong enough for purposes of the detriment analysis.” The court explained the then six-year-old child had lived half of his life with his caregivers. The court further explained that although the child shares an “affectionate connection” with Father during visits, there is no evidence that “he has ever show[n] distress or was upset when separating from [Father].”8 The court concluded the child “would suffer no specific harm from the termination of parental rights.” Father does not identify any particular harm the child would suffer from the termination of parental rights, aside from the loss of the parental relationship. “There is no question that there are benefits in continued visits with loving parents to which the child has some substantial attachment. Yet to justify withholding the ‘security,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘“sense of 8 As pointed out in Father’s opening brief, the record shows on one occasion, when a visit at Chuck E. Cheese was winding down, the child “looked upset, frowned, and said[, ‘No’].” And on one other occasion, at the end of a visit, the child grabbed Father’s hand and did not want to let go; Father let the child hold his hand until the child “was ready to let go.” While the evidence of these two occasions supports the juvenile court’s finding of the child’s affectionate attachment to Father, it does not show distress in separating from Father so as to render the court’s detriment determination an abuse of discretion. 9 belonging a new family would confer”’ [citation], the parents . . . must prove some type of harm beyond the fact that their loving visits would cease.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 820.) As Father did not establish terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating parental rights. To the extent Father suggests the juvenile court considered inappropriate factors in finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, the record does not support such a suggestion. To the contrary, the court’s comments at the permanency hearing reflect the court’s correct understanding and application of the elements of the parental-benefit exception pursuant to In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614. II. THE AGENCY’S ICWA COMPLIANCE EFFORTS WERE ADEQUATELY DOCUMENTED Mother does not challenge the Agency’s inquiry efforts or its determination of which tribes should be contacted in response to information it received in conducting its ICWA inquiry. Instead, Mother’s challenge is limited to arguing the Agency’s documentation of such efforts is insufficient because it did not include “the actual packet of information sent to the relevant tribes, proof that the tribes received the packet[,] and whatever formal response the tribes tendered to [the Agency].” Mother argues, therefore, “[e]ven if this [c]ourt . . . affirms the decision of the [juvenile] court to terminate parental rights, reversal and a limited remand for compliance with ICWA is still required in this case.” In his opening brief, Father states he joins in Mother’s argument. 10 A. Overview of ICWA Inquiry Requirements and Standard of Review “ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes . . . .” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1129.) The juvenile court and the county welfare department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child” who is the subject of a child welfare petition “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) ICWA and related California law impose on the juvenile court and a county welfare agency a duty to inquire, a duty of further inquiry, and a duty to provide ICWA notice. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131–1133.) The duty to inquire “begins with the initial contact” and includes “asking a party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) “Section 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies that once a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department, the duty to inquire ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) The duty of further inquiry arises if the juvenile court or social worker “has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This duty of further inquiry includes (1) interviewing parents and extended family members to gather certain information, (2) “[c]ontacting the [BIA] and the State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the . . . tribes in which the child may be a member . . . or eligible for membership,” and (3) “[c]ontacting the tribe or tribes and any other person [who] may reasonably be expected to have 11 information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.” (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) [same requirements].) Contact with a tribe includes “sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as well as information on the current status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(c).) The duty to provide ICWA notice is triggered if, after the duty of inquiry and of further inquiry are satisfied, the juvenile court or the county welfare agency “knows or has reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved” in the child welfare proceedings. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Notice pursuant to ICWA must be given to the tribes identified through inquiry to enable them “‘to determine whether the child involved in a dependency proceeding is an Indian child and, if so, whether to intervene in, or exercise jurisdiction over, the matter.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1133.) We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence standard. (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774, see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) Under that standard, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ICWA findings and draw all reasonable inferences in their support. (In re J.N., at p. 774.) We review for abuse of discretion the court’s finding that the Agency’s ICWA inquiry was adequate, proper, and duly diligent. (In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 66; see Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141 [“the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’”].) 12 B. The Agency Produced Sufficient Evidence To Prove It Satisfied Its ICWA Duty of Further Inquiry The parties stipulated to the admission of the Agency’s status review report dated April 3, 2024, which included a detailed 13-page section on the Agency’s efforts to satisfy its ICWA inquiry duties. At the April 3, 2024 status review hearing, the juvenile court stated it read, considered, and accepted into evidence the April 3, 2024 status review report and further stated it found ICWA does not apply in this case but that the Agency was to continue exercising due diligence and follow up on any new information suggesting that the child might be an Indian child. The parties similarly stipulated to the admission of the Agency’s permanency report, dated May 29, 2025, which restated the account of the Agency’s ICWA compliance efforts and added details of the Agency’s efforts since the April 3, 2024 status review report. A social worker’s reports generally are admissible and competent proof, even if they contain hearsay. (See In re M.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1069–1071; In re Jonique W. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 685, 698 [“[g]enerally speaking,” a social worker’s report containing hearsay “is competent and admissible proof” in a child welfare proceeding]; see also § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)(C) [at permanency hearing “the court shall review and consider the social worker’s report and recommendations”].) In stipulating to the admission of the April 3, 2024 status review report and the May 29, 2025 permanency report, neither Father nor Mother objected to any content of those reports. Nor did they ask for the reports’ preparers to be made available for cross-examination at any hearing. The April 3, 2024 status review report constitutes substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s April 3, 2024 ICWA findings. That 13 report identified each person interviewed by the Agency (including Father; Mother; paternal great-aunt, great-uncle, grandmother, aunt, and uncle; and maternal great-grandmother, great-grandfather, great-aunt, and aunts; and non-related extended family members); documented each of the numerous instances in which the Agency interviewed them; provided detailed information about each person interviewed; and for each person interviewed, provided a summary of information received about potential Indian ancestry. The report also gave detailed information on the Agency’s review of the BIA’s resources, the names of the eight Apache tribes and their agents obtained from that review, and the contact information for each agent. The report established that in June 2023, the social worker sent ICWA inquiries by e-mail and certified mail to the eight Apache tribes. As to each of the eight tribes, the report noted the Agency received an unqualified response “indicating that [the child] w[as] not eligible for membership in the tribe.” The Agency was not required to submit actual copies of the Agency’s e-mail inquiries, inquiry letters, certified mail receipts, and responses from the tribes. Section 224.2, which governs the duties of initial inquiry and further inquiry, has no requirement of producing or filing inquiry letters, return receipts, or responses with the juvenile court. “[S]ection 224.2, subdivision (e) does not require that the [Agency] report its [ICWA] inquiry efforts to the juvenile court in the form of a declaration or in any particular form at all.” (In re M.W. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1046.) In contrast, when ICWA notice is given pursuant to section 224.3, section 224.3, subdivision (c) expressly requires that “[p]roof of the notice, including copies of notices sent and all return receipts and responses received, shall be filed with the court in advance of the hearing.” (§ 224.3, subd. (c); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.482(b) [“Proof of notice . . . must be 14 filed with the court in advance of the hearing . . . and must include . . . return receipts, and any responses received from the [BIA] and tribes”].) Mother does not contend there was “reason to know” the child was an Indian child that would have triggered the duty to provide ICWA notice under section 224.3. Our conclusion is supported by other decisions addressing the nature and sufficiency of the documentation necessary to prove compliance with ICWA inquiry requirements. (See, e.g., In re M.W., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1045–1046 [rejecting the father’s challenge to the county welfare department’s documentation of further inquiry efforts and finding “section 224.2, subdivision (e) does not require that the [county welfare] department report its inquiry efforts to the juvenile court in the form of a declaration or in any particular form at all”]; In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1054 [the Agency’s addendum report contained sufficient information to support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply]; In re H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1184 [rejecting the mother’s claim the documentation in the Agency addendum reports of further inquiry was inadequate].) We therefore find no error. 15  DISPOSITION The postjudgment order terminating parental rights and placing the child for adoption is affirmed. MOTOIKE, P. J. WE CONCUR: GOODING, J. SERVINO, J. 16