Burrise v. State Personnel Board CA3

Filed 10/23/26 Burrise v. State Personnel Board CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) TIMMIYA BURRISE, C103154 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 24WM000069) v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, AND DENYING REHEARING, Defendant and Respondent ORDER DENYING PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Real Party in Interest and Respondent. THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 30, 2026, be modified as follows: 1. On page 12, second sentence in the last paragraph, the word “April” is changed to “August” so the sentence reads: 1  As described above, during her August 2022 interview, Burrise told the investigating agents that Sergeant Marshall’s only contact with her during the altercation consisted of him laughing or smiling at her as he walked by. There is no change in judgment. Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied. Respondent Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s request to publish the opinion is denied. FOR THE COURT: /s/ HULL, Acting P. J. /s/ MAURO, J. /s/ FEINBERG, J. 2 Filed 9/30/26 Burrise v. State Personnel Board CA3 (unmodified opinion) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) TIMMIYA BURRISE, C103154 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 24WM000069) v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant and Respondent DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Appellant Timmiya Burrise was a psychiatric technician employed by real party in interest the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). CDCR dismissed Burrise after she angrily confronted a mentally ill inmate and made misrepresentations about the confrontation in the inmate’s medical records and in an internal investigation. The dismissal was based on charges of inexcusable neglect of duty, dishonesty, discourteous treatment of the public or other employees, and other failure of good behavior. (Gov. Code, § 19572, subds. (d), (f), (m), (t).)1 Burrise appealed to the State Personnel Board (SPB), and the SPB sustained her dismissal. The 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. 1 trial court denied her petition for a writ of administrative mandate, finding that one of the incidents of asserted misconduct was not substantiated but that all of the disciplinary charges sustained by the SPB were supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, Burrise contends that none of the charges was supported by substantial evidence, that dismissal was an excessive penalty, and that, at a minimum, the matter should be remanded to the SPB for reconsideration of the proper sanction. We disagree and affirm. BACKGROUND I. Burrise was employed by CDCR as a psychiatric technician at the California Health Care Facility, a facility for inmates requiring medical care beyond that available at other CDCR institutions. Burrise worked in the psychiatric inpatient program, which served inmates with serious mental health issues. Her primary duties included providing general behavioral and psychiatric nursing care, such as administering medications, and creating a safe and therapeutic environment for inmate-patients. Beginning in March 2021, Burrise began having difficulties with an inmate housed in Unit B3B, which was not her primary station. This inmate was at custody level four, the highest level, and was known to be “very disruptive” and to “constantly batter[] staff at a high rate.” Burrise was familiar with this inmate, but her first personal interaction with him occurred on March 13, 2021, when she was assigned a mandatory overtime shift dispensing medication in his unit. While she was preparing the medication, the inmate screamed and called her derogatory names. When she arrived at his cell to administer his medication, he attempted to spit in her face. Although Burrise was wearing a facial mask, she was sent for a full medical examination and then to the emergency room because of concerns about transmission of infectious disease. The inmate was placed in administrative segregation for his actions, and the incident was reported to the district attorney’s office, which elected to take no action. Burrise was not informed of any 2 consequences imposed on the inmate in response to this incident. Over the following months, Burrise tried to avoid going to Unit B3B, but she heard from other staff members that the same inmate was making threats to harm her. On May 14, 2021, while Burrise was working in another unit, the inmate rode by Burrise while on the back of a golf cart and called out that he would snap her neck when he saw her again. She reported this threat to supervisors, who, according to Burrise, told her there was nothing they could do about it. Later that same day, Burrise went to Unit B3B to request a personal item from another psychiatric technician working there. Burrise was aware that the unit was under a COVID-19 quarantine at the time. Surveillance video admitted during the SPB administrative hearing showed Burrise walking into the B3B nurses’ station wearing a protective face mask below her chin (not covering her mouth or nose) and conversing with other staff. The nurses’ station—which sat at the center of the unit, surrounded by holding cells—consisted of a contiguous series of low cubicles encased in protective glass walls, with metal doors at either end. While Burrise waited for her colleague in the nurses’ station, Correctional Officer Padilla was escorting the inmate who had spit at Burrise, unrestrained, from his cell to the exercise yard. The inmate was walking a few feet in front of Officer Padilla, and as he passed Burrise, she heard him say, “[Y]ou like how I got away with spitting on your bitch ass[?]” The surveillance video, which contained no audio, showed the inmate and Burrise staring at each other through the glass for several seconds as he walked past her. Burrise walked a few steps toward him from inside the nurses’ station, keeping her eyes on him until she turned back to the interior of the station. As he approached the yard door, the inmate looked back at her over his shoulder and made further comments before turning back toward the door. At some point, according to Burrise, she told the inmate to leave her alone; and at some point, the inmate said, “Bitch, I’m going to beat your ass.” 3  As shown on the surveillance video, once the inmate reached the yard door, Burrise spun around quickly and took approximately eight or nine steps out of the nurses’ station, to stand about 15 feet away from the inmate, with Officer Padilla positioned midway between them. Officer Padilla and a nearby correctional sergeant, Sergeant Marshall, heard Burrise yell, “[B]itch ass, if you’re going to swing on me[,] swing on me.” According to Burrise, she said, “[I]f you’re going to hit me, hit me because I’m tired of you threatening me.” Sergeant Marshall described the inmate as yelling at Burrise and Burrise “yelling loud[ly]” back. Sergeant Marshall walked up to Burrise and stood directly in front of her, telling her to calm down and go back to the nurses’ station. Burrise tried to step around him to continue responding to the inmate. Another psychiatric technician then came out of the nurses’ station, grabbed Burrise by the arm, and guided her back into the nurses’ station. At the door of the nurses’ station, Burrise briefly turned back toward the inmate, who was still standing with Officer Padilla at the yard door. The intervening technician stood in front of Burrise, gesturing for her to calm down, and then marched her further down the nurses’ station away from the inmate. Meanwhile, Officer Padilla let the inmate into the yard and then walked back down the nurses’ station in the same direction as Burrise. Burrise allowed the intervening technician to walk her toward a secure hallway between the units known as “the Core.” Another inmate who had witnessed the altercation was standing near the door to the Core, and as Burrise and the other technician approached, he said, “Yeah, get that stupid bitch off this fucking unit before I slap the shit out of her.” Burrise started to respond to this inmate, and the intervening technician again grabbed her by the arm and ushered her into the Core. Officer Padilla followed them into the Core, at which point the surveillance footage ended. Another psychiatric technician entered the Core after hearing screaming and yelling. She saw Officer Padilla walking toward Burrise and the intervening technician. Padilla was “yelling in a loud aggressive tone” that Burrise should not come back to the 4 unit because she was making it unsafe. Burrise said she was not going to return, but Padilla kept repeating this command while pointing her finger in Burrise’s face and at one point shaking Burrise slightly by the shoulders. Burrise stepped back when touched and said, “ ‘I told you I was not going to go back there, but what you will not do is talk to me like a child.’ ” The encounter ended with the intervening technician leading Padilla back to Unit B3B. Both of the technicians who witnessed the interaction between Burrise and Padilla perceived Padilla to be the aggressor. At the administrative hearing, Padilla testified that she felt “disrespected” by Burrise’s actions on her unit and felt that Burrise’s behavior made it harder for her to maintain safety for staff and inmates. Padilla first denied yelling, pointing her finger, or touching Burrise, but on further questioning, said she did not remember whether she did those things. The next day, May 15, 2021, Burrise wrote a progress note in the medical file of the inmate whom she had confronted. The note said: “Yesterday, 3w, This writer was present in RN station when [Inmate Patient (I/P)] was being escorted to yard by custody officer. When I/P walked past nurses station, he yelled out words that this writer could not understand but then yelled out ‘bitch!’ This writer looked up as he was directing that to this writer. He then stated, ‘yeah, you like how that max custody didnt stick, huh? You like how I spit on you and got away with it huh bitch! You like how I didnt get charged huh bitch! Watch when UI [sic] get to you! You got nothing but retaliation coming from me bitch for writing me up!’ This writer attempted to redirect him and was unsuccessful as he stood at the yard door holding it open and still yelling and cursing at this writer. There was no intervention from custody at all. Pt continued this inappropriate behavior until the door on the yard was locked by custody. Will continue to monitor.” More than one year later, in August 2022, Burrise was interviewed as part of an administrative investigation by CDCR’s Office of Internal Affairs. At the start of the interview, she was advised of her duty to answer all questions truthfully and that making 5 false statements could result in disciplinary action. When asked whether Sergeant Marshall ever contacted her during the altercation with the inmate, she answered that Marshall had “started laughing and walked by like it was funny.” She said that he never stopped in front of her to intervene. Burrise stated that Marshall only spoke to her later, and that during the interaction with the inmate, “[h]e looked at [her], shook his head,” and had “a smile on his face like the whole thing was funny.” II. In December 2022, CDCR issued a notice of adverse action dismissing Burrise. The notice alleged that she violated section 19572, subdivision (d) (inexcusable neglect of duty), subdivision (f) (dishonesty), subdivision (m) (discourteous treatment of the public or other employees), and subdivision (t) (other failure of good behavior) in her confrontation with the inmate, her interaction with Officer Padilla, her misleading progress note in the inmate’s medical file, and her dishonest statements in the resulting internal investigation. Burrise appealed to the SPB. After hearing testimony in August 2023, an administrative law judge (ALJ) sustained Burrise’s dismissal. The ALJ observed that there were inconsistent accounts of what Burrise said to the inmate, with Officer Padilla and Sergeant Marshall recalling that she had addressed him with the words “bitch ass,” while Burrise recounted making a statement that did not include profanity. After considering the evidence and context for the witnesses’ statements, the ALJ credited Officer Padilla’s and Sergeant Marshall’s accounts. The ALJ sustained the charge that Burrise violated section 19572, subdivision (d) by inexcusably neglecting her duties to (1) act courteously and professionally when she approached the inmate and swore at him and when she responded to Officer Padilla in a raised tone; (2) wear a protective face mask; and (3) act honestly when she made a false statement in the inmate progress note and insisted during her internal investigation interview that Sergeant Marshall did not intervene during the inmate altercation. In 6 finding that Burrise neglected her duty of honesty, the ALJ rejected CDCR’s allegations of six additional instances of dishonesty in statements Burrise made during her internal investigation interview. The ALJ upheld the separate charge that Burrise violated section 19572, subdivision (f) (dishonesty) based on the same sustained instances of making false statements underlying the charge of neglect of the duty to act honestly. The ALJ likewise sustained the charge under section 19572, subdivision (m) (discourteous treatment) based on Burrise’s hostility and rudeness to the inmate; but the ALJ rejected CDCR’s allegation that Burrise was discourteous to Officer Padilla, finding that Burrise merely acted unprofessionally. The ALJ also sustained the charge that Burrise violated section 19572, subdivision (t) (other failure of good behavior) through her confrontational statements to the inmate, which the ALJ found posed a serious risk to institutional safety and security. The ALJ determined that dismissal was a proper penalty for Burrise’s misconduct. The ALJ cited Burrise’s inability to control herself during an interaction with an inmate, which, if repeated, would likely result in serious harm to the public service; the high likelihood of recurrence shown by her blaming others for the altercation; and her dishonesty in using medical documentation to cover up her misconduct. Despite Burrise having received only one prior adverse action in her 10 years of service, the ALJ found mitigation of the penalty unwarranted because of her “deceptive behavior.” The discipline imposed, “though harsh, was not without justification.” The SPB adopted the ALJ’s decision as its own, without modification. Burrise filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied relief, finding that all of the disciplinary charges sustained by the SPB were supported by substantial evidence. The court determined that one of the allegations of inexcusable neglect of duty (§ 19572, subd. (d)) was not supported, reasoning that Burrise’s behavior toward Officer Padilla did not violate her duty to act professionally. The court held, however, that this determination did not compel remand for reconsideration of the 7 dismissal penalty. The unsubstantiated allegation of misconduct toward Officer Padilla was relatively minor compared to the other sustained charges such that there was no real doubt that the SPB would still uphold Burrise’s dismissal, even without considering her behavior toward Padilla. Burrise timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. “The SPB is a statewide administrative agency created by the California Constitution and vested with quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of reviewing punitive action taken against state employees.” (Rodgers v. State Personnel Bd. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1, 10.) A state employee may seek review of an adverse decision by the SPB in the superior court by means of a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. (Ibid.; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Trial and appellate courts review administrative mandate petitions challenging SPB adjudications under the same standard. (Rodgers, at p. 10.) “The question we must answer is whether the agency has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion by the agency. [Citations.] Abuse of discretion ‘is established if the respondent [agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.] Factual findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard,” while legal questions are reviewed de novo. (Id. at pp. 10-11; see also Pollak v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 [“ ‘Decisions of the State Personnel Board, an agency of constitutional authority [citation], are reviewed only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the determination, even when vested rights are involved’ ”].) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence” is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [Citation.] Such evidence must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’ [Citation.] In applying the substantial 8 evidence test, ‘ “ ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence; we indulge all presumptions and resolve all conflicts in favor of [the board’s] decision. Its findings come before us “with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity.” ’ ” ’ ” (Carrasco v. State Personnel Bd. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 117, 136.) We determine whether substantial evidence supports the SPB’s findings; we do not review the trial court’s conclusions. (Id. at p. 135.) II. Burrise challenges each of the four disciplinary charges sustained by the SPB: inexcusable neglect of duty, dishonesty, discourteous treatment, and other failure of good behavior. She maintains that none was supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. A. Inexcusable neglect of duty (§ 19572, subd. (d)) means an unjustifiable “ ‘ “intentional or grossly negligent failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of a known official duty.” ’ ” (Gubser v. Department of Employment (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 240, 242.) The charge of inexcusable neglect of duty here was sustained based on Burrise’s confrontation of the inmate, her behavior toward Officer Padilla following the confrontation, her failure to wear a face mask, and her dishonesty in the progress note and internal investigation interview. We conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence that Burrise neglected her duty in her behavior toward Officer Padilla, but we find there is substantial evidence to support the SPB’s sustaining of this charge based on the other asserted grounds. First, with respect to Burrise’s confrontation of the inmate, substantial evidence supports the SPB’s finding that on May 14, 2021, Burrise failed to perform her duties to ensure the safe custody of inmates and to treat them courteously and professionally. The record shows that when verbally threatened and derided by an inmate with known mental health issues and a history of violence toward staff, Burrise responded by physically approaching him, yelling at him using profanity, and encouraging him to strike her. At 9 the administrative hearing, Burrise did not deny using profanity, although on appeal she briefly suggests that she did not. The ALJ expressly credited the testimony of Sergeant Marshall and Officer Padilla that Burrise addressed the inmate as “ ‘bitch ass,’ ” and we will not disturb that credibility finding. Based on the facts in the record, we have no difficulty concluding that there is substantial evidence that Burrise displayed unprofessional and discourteous behavior toward an inmate. Burrise argues that, because the altercation with the inmate did not become physical—and because she was “severe[ly]” provoked by this inmate’s verbal abuse and previous assault and threats—her conduct did not rise to the level of intentional or grossly negligent failure to perform a known duty. This argument misses the point that what made her misconduct so serious was its high potential to lead to violence. And the fact that Burrise had herself been mistreated by the inmate over the previous months does not undermine the SPB’s finding. Burrise was instructed as part of her inmate-staff interaction training that an inmate’s lack of respect “is never an excuse for you to be unprofessional.” Staff were required to “maintain professionalism at all times, even when provoked.” We also find no merit in Burrise’s contention that CDCR pointed to “no specific operational duty” that she failed to perform. As identified in the operative notice of adverse action and found by the SPB, CDCR regulations require employees to be “alert, courteous, respectful, and professional in their interactions” with inmates; to avoid behavior or language that is “abusive [or] profane” while on duty; and not to engage in “any conduct that discredits an employee” or the department. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3391, subd. (a)(6), (7).) The regulations also provide that every CDCR employee is responsible for the safe custody of CDCR inmates. (Id., § 3271.) As further identified in the operative notice of adverse action and found by the SPB, CDCR’s Operations Manual prohibits workplace violence, including disruptive behavior, which is defined to include “yelling, using profanity, … [and] verbally abusing others.” 10  We likewise reject Burrise’s argument that the SPB failed to meaningfully consider the “institutional culture and practices” surrounding inmate-staff interactions, as reflected by Sergeant Marshall’s testimony that there are times when staff may appropriately raise their voices to inmates. Sergeant Marshall only testified that yelling at an inmate is sometimes necessary to avoid using force on an inmate. That is not like the scenario here, where, far from seeking to avoid the need for force, Burrise affirmatively dared an inmate to attack her. Second, Burrise challenges the SPB’s finding that she inexcusably neglected her duty of professionalism during her interactions with Officer Padilla in the Core. Our review of the record persuades us that substantial evidence does not support this finding. The ALJ found that Burrise acted unprofessionally in violation of CDCR policy by responding to Officer Padilla in a “raised tone” during what the ALJ characterized as a heated argument. At the same time, the ALJ credited the testimony of one of the witnessing technicians that Officer Padilla was the aggressor, that she waved her finger at Burrise, and that she put her hands on Burrise, while Burrise simply stepped back. While the same technician testified that the altercation was a “heated” argument, she declined to describe Burrise’s behavior as aggressive. Moreover, the ALJ found that Burrise’s statements were made “while Officer Padilla was repeatedly and loudly scolding and berating her in the presence of” the two technicians. Given these circumstances, we do not see substantial evidence that Burrise inexcusably neglected her duty of professionalism in her response to Officer Padilla’s actions. Indeed, CDCR does not defend the SPB’s finding on this point. Third, we see no basis on which to disturb the SPB’s finding that Burrise inexcusably neglected her duty by failing to wear a face mask. While Burrise mentions this finding in her appellate briefing, she fails to advance any meaningful argument on the point. We therefore consider it forfeited. (Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) Any such challenge would fail regardless, as there is no 11 dispute that Burrise was wearing her face mask below her chin while in the unit, which she knew was under a COVID-19 quarantine, during a period when CDCR had a policy requiring the use of face masks to prevent the spread of the disease. As her final challenge to the neglect of duty charges (§ 19572, subd. (d)), Burrise contends that substantial evidence does not support the SPB’s findings that she neglected her duty of honesty by making false statements in both the inmate progress note and in her internal interview description of Sergeant Marshall’s lack of intervention during the incident. As the ALJ found, the CDCR Operations Manual provides that employees requested to make a statement in any CDCR official internal investigation are required to make “full, complete, and truthful statements.” It also states that employees are expected to “[d]emonstrate professionalism, honesty, and integrity” at all times. Regarding the progress note, the ALJ found that Burrise’s statement that she attempted to redirect the inmate but was unsuccessful and that correctional staff did nothing to intervene was “false and misleading” because it omitted her own actions and statements that escalated the situation. Burrise argues that her progress note was factually correct because her use of the word “redirect” was in reference to her initial instruction for the inmate to leave her alone; she further maintains that the note was not misleading because progress notes need not describe every detail of a patient encounter. The ALJ was not obligated to construe the record so generously. Substantial evidence supports that Burrise’s conduct toward the inmate could not reasonably be described as an unsuccessful “attempt[] to redirect” him, as the progress note stated. Omitting any mention of her own escalating actions and statements during the encounter created a false and misleading narrative of events, which the ALJ reasonably deemed dishonest. The SPB also found that Burrise neglected her duty of honesty by making untrue statements about Sergeant Marshall’s involvement in the encounter during her internal investigation interview. As described above, during her April 2022 interview, Burrise told the investigating agents that Sergeant Marshall’s only contact with her during the 12 altercation consisted of him laughing or smiling at her as he walked by. The ALJ found that her statement was “basically an accusation that Sergeant Marshall did nothing to de- escalate the situation” and that the statement was untrue because Marshall stopped in front of her, spoke to her, and only walked away when she was guided back to the nurses’ station. The ALJ also observed that because Marshall was wearing a face mask during his interaction with Burrise, it would have been difficult for her to tell if he was smiling. In challenging this finding on appeal, Burrise’s opening brief argues that the evidence does not support finding an inexcusable neglect of duty based on her recollection of Sergeant Marshall smiling at her. This overlooks the fact that the ALJ’s finding of dishonesty centered not on Marshall’s facial expression but on Burrise’s repeated denial of Marshall making any effort to intervene during the altercation—when the video evidence clearly showed to the contrary. Based on these instances of Burrise neglecting her duty of honesty, the SPB also sustained the separate charge that she had committed acts of dishonesty in violation of section 19572, subdivision (f). The ALJ found that Burrise made knowingly false statements in the progress note and internal interview. Substantial evidence supports these findings because a reasonable factfinder could infer that, in recounting the incident, Burrise intentionally skewed the facts of the encounter to portray herself as a victim and justify her conduct. (Gee v. California State Personnel Bd. (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 713, 718-719 [“ ‘Dishonesty’ connotes a disposition to deceive”].) Substantial evidence supports the SPB’s finding of three forms of inexcusable neglect of duty (all except unprofessional treatment of Officer Padilla) and the overlapping charge of two instances of dishonesty. (§ 19572, subds. (d), (f).) B. We likewise conclude that substantial evidence supports the SPB’s finding that Burrise’s statements and conduct toward the inmate during their altercation constituted 13 discourteous treatment in violation of section 19572, subdivision (m) and other failure of good behavior in violation of section 19572, subdivision (t). The ALJ found that Burrise exhibited discourteous treatment under section 19572, subdivision (m) when she “displayed hostility and was rude to [the inmate] by calling him ‘bitch ass.’ ” Burrise argues that, to the extent she used profanity toward the inmate, her conduct did not reflect hostility or rise to the level of “discourteous treatment” as provided in the statute. We are not persuaded. The SPB could reasonably find that a correctional employee’s use of profanity while advancing toward an inmate and urging the inmate to strike the employee amounts to discourteous treatment. (Cf. Walker v. State Personnel Board (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 550, 552-553 [shouting at coworkers occupying lower positions in organizational hierarchy discourteous].) “Other failure of good behavior” applies to conduct that “is of such a nature that it causes discredit to the appointing authority or the person’s employment.” (§ 19572, subd. (t).) The misconduct “must bear some rational relationship to [the employee’s] employment and must be of such character that it can easily result in the impairment or disruption of the public service.” (Stanton v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 729, 739-740.) As Burrise argues, this subdivision does not apply to “just any behavior which the agency might consider improper.” (Orlandi v. State Personnel Bd. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 32, 37.) She is mistaken, however, in her assertion that this subdivision applies “only” to conduct that does not fit within one of the other specified statutory causes for discipline. In Orlandi, we observed that section 19572, subdivision (t) is a “catchall to include situations and acts which do not easily fit into the 19 specific causes” (ibid.), but that does not mean the same conduct cannot support multiple grounds for discipline, including those arising under subdivision (t). (See Paulino v. Civil Service Com. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 962, 970 [concluding that the evidence supporting findings of inefficiency and dishonesty also supported findings of unbecoming conduct and failure of good behavior].) 14  Burrise also contends, with little explanation, that there was insufficient evidence that her conduct toward the inmate related to her duties, discredited her employment, or disrupted the public service. The record contains ample evidence supporting the SPB’s contrary findings. As the altercation occurred while Burrise was on duty and arose out of her previous interaction with the inmate while administering his medication, her conduct bore a rational relationship to her employment. Her inappropriate behavior occurred in the main hall of Unit B3B while in full view of inmates in the surrounding cells and other staff on duty in the unit. When Burrise approached the inmate, she placed Officer Padilla between Burrise and the inmate, such that Padilla would have had to restrain the inmate, at risk to her own safety, if the inmate reacted with physical violence toward Burrise. And after the confrontation, another inmate who was outside of his cell made a profanity- laced threat to attack Burrise if she were not taken off the unit. Furthermore, Burrise’s conduct required intervention by Sergeant Marshall and a fellow psychiatric technician, pulling them away from their normal duties. All of these circumstances support a finding that her conduct posed a serious safety risk to her, her coworkers, and the inmate. Burrise’s challenge to this cause of discipline fails. III. Burrise additionally challenges the SPB’s decision to uphold the penalty of dismissal. She contends that dismissal was excessive given the circumstances of her conduct, that the SPB committed various errors in its penalty analysis, and that, at a minimum, the matter should be remanded for the SPB to reconsider the appropriate penalty without relying on the neglect of her duty of professionalism finding that we have found unsupported as to the interaction with Officer Padilla in the Core. We reject these contentions. The SPB’s determination of an appropriate disciplinary penalty “will not be disturbed in a mandamus proceeding unless the SPB patently abused its exercise of discretion by acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or beyond the bounds of reason.” (County 15 of Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1615.) “[I]f reasonable minds may differ as to the propriety of the penalty, there is no abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) In considering whether the SPB acted within its discretion in setting a disciplinary penalty, “the overriding consideration … is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, ‘[h]arm to the public service.’ ” (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 218.) “Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.” (Ibid.) Burrise first contends that dismissal was excessive given the nature of her conduct and that the SPB’s rationales for upholding the penalty were not supported. Her arguments largely repeat her substantial evidence challenges to the SPB’s findings concerning her conduct toward the inmate and her dishonesty, and we have already rejected those claims. We also conclude that the SPB had an adequate basis for its findings that Burrise’s conduct, if repeated, would likely result in serious harm to the public service and that there was a high likelihood of recurrence. While Burrise downplays the severity of her conduct, the SPB could properly view it as serious, given the safety risks created by a staff member advancing toward an inmate with mental health issues and using profanity to encourage the inmate to be violent. (See County of Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1615 [“ ‘The public is entitled to protection from unprofessional employees whose conduct places people at risk of injury and the government at risk of incurring liability’ ”].) Furthermore, Burrise’s discipline was based not just on her actions that day but also on her dishonest statements regarding those actions on two subsequent occasions. “Dishonesty is not an isolated act; it is more a continuing trait of character. False statements, misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in internal investigations, if repeated, would result in continued harm to the public service.” (Kolender v. San Diego County Civil Service Com. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 716, 721.) And the SPB reasonably found that Burrise’s 16 deception, failure to take responsibility, and lack of self-control on the day of the confrontation with the inmate all showed a high likelihood of recurrence. Burrise argues that her behavior was less egregious than the misconduct in Blake v. State Personnel Board (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 541, where dismissal was found to be a “clearly excessive” penalty. (Id. at p. 553.) Her reliance on Blake is misplaced. There, a deputy labor commissioner brandished a gun at two state employees after a social event involving drinking. (Id. at pp. 546-547.) The next morning, the deputy commissioner apologized and acknowledged how “unjustified and inexcusable” his actions were; at the administrative hearing, he said that he had sold his gun and gave assurances that the inappropriate behavior would not recur. (Id. at pp. 553-554.) In contrast here, Burrise’s misconduct occurred at work, during an interaction with a mentally ill inmate-patient, and rather than immediately acknowledge the impropriety of her behavior, Burrise instead penned a misleading progress note that mentioned none of her own actions. Burrise separately contends that, in upholding the dismissal penalty, the ALJ improperly relied on a prior, unrelated notice of adverse action and failed to consider applicable mitigating factors. The ALJ’s only observable reliance on the prior adverse action was to acknowledge that Burrise “ha[d] only received one prior adverse action in her 10-year state career.” We fail to see how Burrise was prejudiced by the ALJ’s consideration of this mitigating evidence. As to other mitigating factors that Burrise claims the ALJ disregarded, she provides no record citations for that evidence, and in any event, we see nothing in the record that suggests the ALJ failed to understand the full context for her actions or that the circumstances she cites would have led the SPB to reduce the penalty. The SPB’s decision to uphold Burrise’s dismissal