In re Jasper M. CA4/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 4, 2026
DocketE087914
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/4/26 In re Jasper M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re Jasper M. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087914
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J304841-43)
v. OPINION
J.S. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant, J.S.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant, A.M.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel and Landon Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In this dependency proceeding, A.M. (Mother) and J.S. (Father) challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s order removing their three
minor children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1)
(section 361(c)(1)). (Unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Initial referral and investigation
Mother and Father are married and have three children: Alivia M. (born in 2016),
A.M. (female, born in April 2023), and Jasper M. (born in April 2025). Mother has an
older daughter, A.D. (born in 2008), with Brandon D. In May 2025, A.D. lived with
Mother, Father, and her half siblings. This appeal involves only Alivia, A.M., and Jasper.
On May 22, 2025, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS)
received a referral alleging that law enforcement responded to a domestic violence
incident at the parents’ home. Mother called 911 around 1:00 p.m. and reported that
Father had a machine gun and was acting violently, yelling, and throwing things at her.
The children were home. Law enforcement reported that there was an active restraining
order protecting Mother and the children from Father, but Mother told them that Father
was “unable to abide by it.” She said that Father “comes and goes as he pleases.”
According to Mother, Father rang the doorbell at 4:00 a.m. and somehow gained entry to
the home. Law enforcement asked Mother why she did not immediately call 911, and
she answered, “[I]t is what it is.” It was also reported to law enforcement that Father had
been at the house for four days. Law enforcement found Father’s belongings inside the
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home. Law enforcement described Mother as “inconsistent, unclear, and changing her
story.”
Mother refused to provide the children’s names to law enforcement. She said that
they were not involved in the incident, and she refused to provide information about
where they were located in the house during the incident. Law enforcement asked
Mother whether she was able to leave the home to create a safer living environment, and
she “freaked out and started walking away.” She refused to leave the house.
Law enforcement spoke with then-17-year-old A.D., who “said, ‘this happens all
the time and she stopped caring.’” It was reported to law enforcement that Mother did
not call law enforcement every time Father returned home or Mother and Father got “into
a domestic dispute.”
A social worker obtained a record of law enforcement service calls for the home
between July 2024 and June 2025. There were 10 service calls for domestic violence
incidents during that period. CFS confirmed that Mother had an active restraining order
against Father. She applied for it on August 5, 2024, and it is effective through August
27, 2027.1 In the application for the restraining order, Mother identified 11 dates on
which domestic violence incidents occurred between May and August 2024. In the
application, Mother stated that Father did the following: slashed the tires of her car;
broke doors, windows, and appliances; punched holes in walls; stole cash; drove
recklessly; ruined personal belongings; “poured gasoline in the garage in an attempt to set
1
Jasper was born after the restraining order was issued. The record contains no
evidence that the order was amended to include him as a protected person.
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the home on fire;” threatened that he was “going to get people to harm them”; and
verbally abused the children.
Father left the home before law enforcement arrived on May 22, 2025, but he was
arrested later that day and taken into custody. Father was charged with numerous
felonies, possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), assault
with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), and making a criminal threat
(Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)).
About 10 days after the May 2025 incident, a social worker attempted to meet
with the family. No one answered the door, and Mother did not answer the phone. The
social worker returned to the home two days later and saw Mother inside holding a young
child. The social worker identified herself and told Mother that she was investigating a
child abuse report. Mother said that she was busy, closed the curtains, and turned off the
lights. Mother did not answer the door when the social worker subsequently knocked,
and she likewise failed to respond when law enforcement subsequently attempted to
conduct a welfare check. Mother later told a social worker that the children were away
for summer vacation, but she refused to give the social worker any contact information.
CFS obtained an interview warrant, and law enforcement gained access to the
home through a window and served Mother with the warrant. A social worker spoke
with Mother, who reported that Father had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, was
placed on numerous section 5150 holds over the years, had previously attempted to
commit suicide, and used methamphetamines. Mother acknowledged that she and Father
had “been engaging in domestic violence for ‘the last couple years,’” but she refused to
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provide details. Mother confirmed that the domestic violence incidents described in the
restraining order application took place. Mother believed that the restraining order was
inactive because she had not “follow[ed] up” with law enforcement.
Mother told the social worker that she had a home in Arizona that she was
attempting to clean so that she could move there with the children. The social worker
attempted to create a safety plan with Mother to ensure the children’s safety, but Mother
denied that she had a support system or anywhere else that she could go. Mother denied
that she needed shelter services, explaining that “she ‘has a home.’” Mother “declined
family members or friends who would be willing to help her provide safety for her
children.”
The social worker also spoke with then-17-year-old A.D., who confirmed that
Mother would allow Father into the home. A.D. reported that the parents had been
engaging in domestic violence since she was eight, and she was “‘tired of’” it. A.D. had
called law enforcement numerous times to report domestic violence and had intervened in
the violence by “verbally getting involved.” A.D. stayed home when the parents were
arguing, to ensure that Mother was safe. A.D. would take her half siblings into her
bedroom when Father and Mother “verbally or physically fight.” Sometimes A.D. would
leave the door open to ensure Mother remained safe. When A.D. closed the door, she
could still hear them arguing. A.D. saw bruises on Mother after she argued with Father.
The social worker also interviewed then-eight-year-old Alivia. She confirmed that
Mother heard social workers and law enforcement knocking on the door but refused to
answer “because she ‘was trying to keep them safe.’” Alivia said that there is “constant
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domestic violence” between the parents and that they frequently argued and cursed at one
another. She did not feel safe at home when Father was there, and she “really wanted a
new dad.” Alivia said that Father had a key to the back door. She confirmed that when
the parents argued, she and her siblings would “hide in the back bedroom, cover their
ears, and pray to make them stop fighting.” Alivia said that Father “owns a gun and
carries it with him.” She said that both she and A.D. had previously intervened when the
parents argued.
A social worker spoke with A.D.’s father, Brandon, who reported that Mother told
him about multiple domestic violence incidents with Father. Mother told Brandon that
Father “‘pistol whipp[ed]’” her and fired a gun inside the house. According to Brandon,
Mother relied on A.D. to babysit the children during domestic violence incidents.
CFS obtained protective custody warrants for all four children but was unable to
apprehend the children.
II. The allegations and the initial hearing
In June 2025, CFS filed petitions as to Alivia, A.M., and Jasper alleging under
subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 that the children were at substantial risk of physical
harm because of the parents’ domestic violence. CFS alleged that Mother failed to take
reasonable measures to protect the children in that she allowed Father to have access to
them. The petitions contained additional allegations against Father under subdivisions
(b)(1) and (g) of section 300.
The juvenile court held a detention hearing in June 2025. Mother was present and
told the court that the children were camping with the maternal grandmother. The court
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issued protective custody warrants and ordered the children temporarily detained but
continued the matter to the following day to allow Mother to bring the children to court.
The children were present at the continued hearing. The court detained them from both
parents and ordered supervised visits with each parent separately.
III. Jurisdiction and disposition report
CFS filed a jurisdiction and disposition report in July 2025. A social worker
interviewed Mother, Father, A.D., and Alivia for the report.
Mother was initially reluctant to speak with the social worker because she worried
that her words would be “twisted” and used against her, but she eventually agreed to a
telephone interview. Mother did not deny that there had been domestic violence with
Father but refused to discuss “specific details” because of the pending criminal charges
against him. She said that when Father broke into the home on May 22, 2025, she was
asleep in the room with Jasper, who was one-month old. Mother did not agree with the
allegation that she failed to protect the children from the domestic violence, stating that
“she ‘kept them out of the way, in another room, to the best of my availability of what I
had at that time.’” She also said: “‘My failure to shield my kids from these domestic
issues is what led to their removal.’” Mother believed that the restraining order was
invalid because of issues with service on Father.
Mother explained that she had been “‘done done’” with Father for a while before
the May 2025 incident and had been planning to move out of state. She claimed “that
when she filed the paperwork for the restraining order, she also filed divorce paperwork
the same day but hadn’t gone back to officially file that paperwork.”
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With respect to A.D.’s father Brandon, Mother said that she ended that
relationship when A.D. was about six weeks old. She separated from Brandon because
when she was seven and one-half months pregnant he “‘punched’ her in the face and
‘shoved’ her out of the living room and onto the sidewalk and driveway.”
Father was in jail when the social worker interviewed him. He declined to discuss
the allegations concerning domestic violence, given the pending criminal charges against
him, but he did not deny the allegations. He was “looking at a possible plea deal to serve
approximately three years in Wasco prison.” Father explained that he too did not believe
the restraining order from 2024 was valid in May 2025. He admitted that he had been
using methamphetamines on and off since he was 12 years old, and he said that he last
used on May 22, 2025. He begged the social worker to return the children to Mother,
“especially since he is out of the home and will be for the next few years.”
When Alivia spoke with a social worker in June 2025, she recanted most of what
she had previously said about the parents, and she told the social worker that her family is
“‘perfect.’” She admitted that the parents “‘fight sometimes,’” but “‘it is never
uncontrollable.’” She denied witnessing any physical violence.
A.D. told the social worker that the allegations about domestic violence were true,
but she denied that Mother “failed to protect the children.” A.D. said that Mother often
called law enforcement, but Father left before they arrived. A.D. initially denied that she
was at home during the incident on May 22, 2025. After being shown the detention
report, A.D. changed her statement and admitted that she saw Father on that day, but she
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said that she “‘didn’t really remember.’” She denied remembering any incidents
involving a gun and did not believe that Father owned a gun.
CFS recommended that the juvenile court sustain the allegations in the petition,
remove the children from the parents’ care, and order reunification services. CFS opined
that the prognosis for reunification with Mother was guarded. CFS questioned Mother’s
protective capacity, given the history of domestic violence with both Father and Brandon.
CFS concluded that “there was no way to ensure the safety of the children short of
removal.” A safety assessment completed “at the time of Detention” determined that it
was unsafe for the children to remain at home, and those same concerns had “not been
sufficiently addressed by the parents” by the time that the jurisdiction and disposition
report was filed.
IV. Additional reports filed by CFS
The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearings were held in early February
2026. Between July 2025 and February 2026, CFS filed numerous reports with the
juvenile court.
In reports filed in August, October, and December 2025 and January 2026, CFS
reported that it remained concerned about Mother’s protective capacity. CFS’s concern
stemmed from how often Mother had allowed Father to return home despite the extensive
history of violence between them, her “failure to protect the children from ongoing
exposure to domestic violence,” and her failure to take any responsibility for the issues
that led to CFS’s involvement. CFS reported that Mother refused to acknowledge that
her poor decision making, such as allowing Father to return home without ensuring that
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he addressed his substance abuse or anger management issues, contributed to placing the
children at risk of harm. CFS was skeptical about Mother’s position that she acted
protectively by filing for divorce and obtaining a restraining order, because she did those
things before the May 2025 incident.
In September 2025, a therapist reported that Mother had attended eight individual
therapy sessions. Mother told the therapist that she was divorcing Father and had been
separated from him for one year because of past domestic violence. Mother told the
therapist that she protected the children by obtaining a restraining order against Father
and calling law enforcement “immediately on the day of the incident.” The therapist told
CFS that she did not believe that Mother would benefit from further counseling.
According to the therapist, Mother “did not address her role in reasons for the removal of
the children” and “did not demonstrate a readiness to talk about working on herself or her
own protective capacity.” Mother told the therapist that “she ‘did everything she could’
to protect the children” by obtaining a restraining order, ending the relationship with
Father, and asking him to leave the home.
CFS reported that it was having issues communicating with Mother. In December
2025, CFS reported that Mother had “not yet come to the CFS office or spoken on the
telephone with [a particular social worker] regarding the progress of her case.”
According to CFS, Mother insisted that she had “a right to have all communication in
writing only.” CFS reported that it was “imperative that for the purposes of assessing the
mother’s progress, as to her case plan services, that the discussions are completed in real
time, preferably face to face, but at a minimum, a voice-to-voice communication.”
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CFS reported that there were issues with Mother’s visitation. The relative
caregivers with whom Alivia, A.M., and Jasper were initially placed were taking the
children to Mother’s house for visits until November 2025, when they refused to continue
because conflict arose with Mother during every visit. Visitation thereafter occurred at a
visitation monitoring center, but Mother started waiting outside the center to confront the
caregiver who picked up the children. When the caregiver refused to exit her car until
Mother left, Mother pretended to leave and parked her car elsewhere in the parking lot.
The chief executive officer of the center advised CFS that if Mother caused further
disruptions, then visits would no longer be permitted at the center.
In mid-December 2025, a visit with Jasper, Alivia, and A.M. was almost cancelled
as a result of “mother’s defiant behavior, not following the rules of no whispering and
talking about the case.” “[M]other became combative with the visitation monitor[]” and
had difficulty “comply[ing] with the rules.”
V. Placement of the children
Alivia, A.M., and Jasper were placed with a maternal relative in June 2025. In late
November 2025, the caregiver submitted a 14-day notice to change placement. There
were issues with Mother changing the visitation schedule and Mother consistently
making “rash and unsettling comments, in front of her own children as well as the
caregiver’s children.”
Mother filed a section 388 petition, asking the court to prevent CFS from moving
the children until it considered whether the children could be placed with the paternal
grandmother, whom Mother said had an application pending for resource family
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approval.2 CFS determined that it would not be suitable to place the children with the
paternal grandmother. The paternal grandmother lived with Mother and “did not feel that
there has been any wrong doing on the mother’s part and that the children are safe with
her.”
By mid-December 2025, the children were placed with a foster family. The
caregiver reported that she was having issues with Alivia and Mother communicating
constantly via Alivia’s cell phone, and Alivia was showing Mother the interior and
exterior of the caregiver’s home while video chatting with Mother. CFS intervened and
explained to Alivia that she could not talk on the phone after 8:00 p.m., could not video
record the caregiver’s home, and was allowed only one phone call per day with Mother,
which must take place when the caregiver is home to monitor the call. In late December
2025, the caregiver gave a 14-day notice requesting a change of placement. CFS reported
that both Mother and Alivia ignored the caregiver’s and CFS’s rules concerning phone
usage.
2
The court set a hearing on whether to hold a full evidentiary hearing on Mother’s
section 388 petition, and the court subsequently denied the petition. Mother was
represented by counsel but filed her section 388 petition pro se. The document thus
should have been rejected by the clerk or stricken by the judge. (In re P.C. (2026) 122
Cal.App.5th 628, 635-636.) In addition, section 388 applies only to “a dependent child”
(subject to certain narrow exceptions not applicable here), so it applies only after
disposition, at which dependency is declared. (§ 388, subd. (a).) The petition was
therefore legally unauthorized. (The juvenile court’s order denying Mother’s petition
notes that “this was a pre J/D 388.”)
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VI. Jailhouse communications between the parents
In late January 2026, the sheriff’s department provided CFS with four audio
recordings of jailhouse telephone conversations between Father and Mother. CFS
believed that the first call took place around the start of the case, because Mother said
something about CFS being at the front door. Father told Mother that he would be eating
better once he was released and able to return home to her and the children. In the
second recording, the parents discussed “future plans.” Father wanted Mother “to get a
burner phone and a $20 phone line,” and Mother said that “she needed to figure out a way
to have private communication with” Father. In the third recording, Father talked about a
visit to the jail’s mental health department. In the final recording, the paternal
grandmother can be heard in the background speaking with both parents. Father referred
to the house where Mother and the children lived “as his home.”
CFS observed that Father was violating the restraining order by communicating
with Mother on the telephone. CFS opined that it was “clear the mother has continued
her relationship with [Father] because they are in constant communication with each
other,” and their “lack of compliance show[ed] a lack of protective capacity by the
mother and ongoing risk of harm to the children.”
VII. Contested jurisdiction and disposition hearings
Mother, Alivia, two social workers, and a family friend of Mother’s who referred
to herself as Mother’s aunt, Sharon B., testified at the contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearings in February 2026. Father was present for only one day of the two-
day hearings because of issues with the state prison in which he was incarcerated. A
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social worker testified that Father was convicted in the criminal case related to the May
22, 2025, incident and was sentenced to four years in state prison.
A. Testimony
1. Alivia
Alivia was nine years old when she testified. The court described her as crying
and distraught. Alivia loved her parents and wanted to return home. She said that
Mother and Father “had some argue issues that they couldn’t handle” and “a couple fights
... every single day,” which made Alivia feel “super nervous and stuff.” When the
parents fought, Alivia, Jasper, and A.M. would stay in A.D.’s locked bedroom, where
they would watch television.
2. Mother
Mother testified that she obtained the restraining order against Father in August
2024 because of “multiple incidents of domestic violence.” Mother and Father had been
“on and off” in a relationship since high school, and there was domestic violence in the
relationship “from the very beginning.” Mother said that the relationship was over, she
filed for divorce, and she does not intend to reunite with Father when he is released from
prison.
Mother testified that she and Father were already separated by May 22, 2025.
Father broke into the house at 4:30 a.m., and Mother awoke to Father standing over her
holding a machine gun and “ranting and acting bizarre and saying things about hurting
himself.” Father threatened to kill himself and Mother. She feared for her life and for
the children. She worried about how she was going to get to each child in their
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bedrooms. Mother called 911 approximately four hours after Father left her bedroom.
She did not call immediately, because she believed it would aggravate the situation.
Mother explained that the children’s bedrooms were in the front of the house, so she
worried about possible crossfire if she called law enforcement.
Mother initially denied that she had ever been in another romantic relationship
involving domestic violence. But she then admitted that Brandon hit her once, and she
described how “he busted [her] eye open and shoved [her] out [her] front door” when she
was pregnant with A.D. Mother immediately called law enforcement, left Brandon, and
never returned.
Mother completed all of the predisposition services that CFS asked her to
complete: parenting classes, domestic violence classes, and eight individual therapy
sessions. In addition to those services, Mother on her own attended support and therapy
groups and individual therapy provided by her private health insurance provider. She had
not signed a release of information waiver to allow her private therapist to speak with
CFS, because it was her “private health information.”
Mother admitted that she communicated with CFS only via email and “kept [her]
distance.” The day before trial, she “[r]eluctantly” met in person with two social
workers. Mother acquiesced to the in-person meeting because she believed that her “case
plan would not move forward without meeting with them in person because they said
they couldn’t gauge [her] insights.”
Asked whether she believed that she could be protective of the children, Mother
said, “I think I am protective, and I think I was protective given the circumstances I was
15
faced with.” She believed that “given the circumstances” she acted protectively during
the domestic violence incident on May 22, 2025. Asked whether she believed that she
had previously placed the children at risk, Mother answered, “I have a hard time coming
to terms with that, with saying that I placed them at risk when it wasn’t me who violated
the restraining order.” She said that she had played a role “in the case coming to court”
in the way that she “handled the situation as a whole.” Asked what she would do
differently, Mother explained that her “engagement with the original detention worker
would have been different” and her “engagement with the police officers would have
been different.” Mother believed that she “wouldn’t be having the problem” if law
enforcement had “do[ne] their job and arrest[ed]” Father. Asked how she would respond
differently now that she has participated in services, Mother responded, “Well, around
my house, I’ve beefed up security. I had also—my—me and my kids were actually
moving back to the house that we own out of state.” Mother did not know how domestic
violence could occur in the future, given that she was not dating anyone, did not plan to
date anyone, and was no longer in a relationship with Father, who was incarcerated.
Mother said that she would be amenable to having her aunt live with her in order
to facilitate return of the children to her. Mother said that she would follow any court
order.
On cross-examination, CFS’s counsel questioned Mother about the jailhouse
recordings. Mother admitted that Father made collect calls to her from jail and that they
last spoke sometime after January 1, 2026, which was about one month before the
hearing. Mother was unaware that CFS knew about the parents’ communications and had
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recordings of them. She was unaware that CFS had the recording of her and Father
“discussing [their] plan and strategy for beating this case.” She was also unaware that
CFS knew that she and Father “discuss[ed] care packages he received from [Mother]
while he was in jail.”
3. The family friend
Sharon testified that she had been friends with the maternal grandmother since
long before Mother was born. Sharon was willing to live with Mother and the children if
they were released to Mother’s custody, and she could stay with them for at least six
months if needed. Sharon would follow all of the court’s orders and any orders from
social workers and would let a social worker or law enforcement know if Mother was not
following any orders or instructions.
4. The social workers
Mother called Joseph Henderson and Nancy Ramirez to testify. Henderson
described himself as “the carrier social service practitioner,” and Ramirez is “the
jurisdiction/disposition social service practitioner.” Ramirez authored the jurisdiction
and disposition report.
Henderson confirmed that he and Ramirez met in person with Mother the day
before the hearing. In email messages exchanged before the meeting, Henderson and his
supervisor explained to Mother that “it would be best” for CFS and Mother “to speak” so
that CFS could “assess her progress.” Mother had resisted speaking with CFS because
she believed “that it’s best to communicate by email so she can have documented
evidence of the conversations.”
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During the in-person meeting, the social workers and Mother discussed “all
aspects of the case,” including visitation and placement options that Henderson was
exploring. Henderson also said that “[m]ost of the discussion evolved around [Mother]
wanting to know what her part in this was.” Before the meeting, Mother informed CFS
via email that she completed domestic violence classes, and the topic was briefly
discussed during the in-person meeting. But Mother refused to discuss with the social
workers what she had learned from any predisposition services. Mother “stated she had
already informed the Department of that, and why should she have to tell us again.”
Henderson recommended that Mother receive reunification services because
“there needs to be some issues resolved so that we can keep the children safe, and Mother
to have good protective capacity.” Ramirez concurred in that recommendation.
Ramirez did not speak with any relatives about possibly living in Mother’s home
as a less restrictive alternative to removal. Ramirez could not think of any safety plan
that could be implemented at that time that would allow the children to safely return to
Mother’s custody. Ramirez explained that CFS believed that the children should not be
returned to Mother because she continued to lack protective capacity. Ramirez explained
that Mother had not provided any insight into how she would protect the children from
future domestic violence, whether from Father or someone else. Ramirez stated: “We
don’t have anything from her or from her therapist, so we do believe that there is a lack
of protective capacity still, and we do believe that the children ... would be at risk ... if
placed with Mom.”
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B. The court’s ruling
The juvenile court sustained the allegations under subdivision (b)(1) of section
300 against both parents (but struck one duplicative allegation as to Father) and an
amended allegation under subdivision (g) of section 300 against Father. The court
removed all three children from both parents and ordered reunification services for both
parents.
With respect to removal from Mother, the court acknowledged that Father had
been sentenced to four years in state prison and thus was “not going to do anything.” The
court also stated that it had witnessed how much the children loved Mother and were
bonded with her. The court weighed those factors “against the ongoing trauma ... of
repeated exposure of a domestic violence perpetrator, even by verbal, telephonic
association.” The court reasoned that Mother’s contacts while Father was incarcerated
demonstrated that there was an ongoing relationship between the parents and that Mother
had not broken “any pattern,” given Mother’s history of taking Father back despite the
ongoing domestic violence and even the restraining order. The court found that there was
clear and convincing evidence of a “substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the children or would be if the children
were returned home” and that there were no reasonable means by which the children’s
physical health could be protected without removing the children from Mother’s custody.
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DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
finding that there were no reasonable means to protect the children without removal. The
argument lacks merit.
Section 361(c)(1) provides that a child may be removed from their parents’
physical custody if the juvenile court finds “by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
there ‘would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being’ of the child in the parents’ home, and (2) ‘there are no
reasonable means by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected without’
removal.” (In re Zoe H. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 58, 71 (Zoe H.), quoting § 361(c)(1).)
We review the removal findings for substantial evidence, “taking into account the
level of confidence that the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard demands.” (Zoe H.,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 71; Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996.)
In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence,
and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B., at
pp. 1011-1012.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that there were no
reasonable means to protect the children short of removal. Mother asserts that CFS could
have placed the children in Mother’s custody on condition that her family friend Sharon
live with them. But the record contains substantial evidence that the condition would
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have been inadequate to protect the children. A social worker testified that she could not
think of any safety plan that could be implemented to permit the children to be placed
with Mother, and that opinion is supported by substantial evidence.
For the children to be safe in Mother’s home, she would need to cooperate with
CFS and meaningfully engage in services. Mother overlooks the ample evidence
demonstrating her unwillingness to cooperate with CFS. She insisted on communicating
in writing, thus making it difficult for CFS to gauge Mother’s progress, insight, or
sincerity. There was no way for CFS to verify that Mother was even the author of any of
the written communications. And when Mother finally agreed to an in-person meeting,
she refused to discuss what she had learned from any of the predisposition services,
further impeding CFS’s efforts to gain insight into her progress. To that end, Mother also
refused to sign a waiver allowing CFS to speak with her privately retained individual
therapist. And Mother demonstrated an inability to comply with rules established by
CFS; she disregarded the rules concerning visitation and Alivia’s cell phone use.
Moreover, it is reasonable to infer that Mother was not being forthright about her
relationship with Father in her trial testimony or in her communications with CFS or with
the therapist she was referred to by CFS. Mother admitted that she communicated with
Father while he was incarcerated and last accepted a collect phone call from him
sometime within one month before she testified, even though the domestic violence
restraining order remained active. And a fact finder could reasonably infer from the
jailhouse recordings of some of those communications that Mother remained in a
relationship with Father, given that the parents discussed plans to communicate
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surreptitiously while he is incarcerated. Those plans further support a reasonable
inference that Mother would continue to be deceptive in her communications with CFS.
In addition, despite Mother’s participation in predisposition services, it is
reasonable to infer that the participation was less than meaningful. The therapist with
whom Mother attended eight sessions reported that Mother was unwilling to discuss or
recognize her role in failing to protect the children. Moreover, in her trial testimony
Mother continued to display lack of insight into her failure to protect the children from
domestic violence and her role in placing them at substantial risk of harm. Mother could
not identify anything that she would have done differently to protect the children. She
testified that she acted protectively during the underlying incident, because she obtained a
restraining order against Father and immediately called 911 when Father broke into the
home. But she ignored the evidence that contradicts that account of the incident,
including her own prior statement that she did not believe that the restraining order was
valid, the presence of Father’s belongings in the home, Alivia’s statement that Father
gained entry by using his key, and A.D.’s statement that Father had been at the home for
several days before Mother called 911. Moreover, A.D. said that Father was frequently at
the house, both A.D. and Alivia described Mother and Father as constantly fighting when
they were together, and A.D. said that Mother did not call law enforcement every time
Father was at the house.
In sum, the juvenile “court could reasonably infer from this record that a
combination of services and monitoring that might, under different circumstances,
provide a viable alternative to removal, would not sufficiently protect the children in this
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case.” (In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 124; see ibid. [substantial evidence
showed that there existed no reasonable means of protecting the children short of removal
because the mother continued to engage in domestic violence with the father despite
having attended domestic violence classes and “was initially evasive and uncooperative”
with the agency]; see also In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 996-997 [no reasonable
means finding was supported in part by evidence of the parent’s refusal to cooperate with
service providers]; In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 215 [no reasonable means
finding was supported in part by evidence that the parent “had not made a