In re L.G. CA6

Filed 11/3/26 In re L.G. CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re L.G. et al., Persons Coming Under H054035 the Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. 25JD029019, 25JD029020) SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.G., Defendant and Appellant. In this dependency case, appellant J.G. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional orders removing his minor children, twins Lo.G. and Le.G., from his care under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361. He makes two arguments on appeal. First, father contends the court’s findings that the children would be placed in substantial danger if returned to his care and that there were no reasonable means to protect the children without removing them are not supported by substantial evidence. Second, he claims that respondent Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (the department) did not establish that it made reasonable efforts to prevent the children’s 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. removal, and that the court did not state the facts upon which it based its decision. Because we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s findings and orders, we affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. The First Dependency Proceedings Shortly after their birth in February 2024, the Solano County Department of Health and Social Services removed the children from their parents, L.J. (mother) and father, and filed a dependency petition. Mother tested positive for fentanyl and methamphetamine days before giving birth and had a history of longstanding substance abuse dating back to at least 2010. Mother also admitted to using fentanyl while in the hospital to avoid withdrawal symptoms. She reported that father provided her with the drugs in the hospital bathroom. During the social worker’s investigation, father denied supplying mother with fentanyl and also denied using substances himself; however, he tested positive for methamphetamines the day after the children were born. Father subsequently disclosed a chronic pattern of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana use, as well as several prior attempts at treatment. Both parents were offered reunification services, and the dependency case was eventually transferred to Santa Cruz County. After the transfer, father continued to receive reunification services for six months, including counseling, drug testing, and treatment. Father also enrolled in a 90-day residential treatment program, where he remained for 110 days. The case was eventually dismissed in February 2025, and the children were returned to the parents. 2 “In light of the limited scope of this appeal, we provide an abbreviated summary of the dependency proceedings.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1046.) Also, because the children’s mother is not a party to these appellate proceedings, we omit facts related to her that are not pertinent to the disposition. 2  B. Additional Referrals and the Parents’ Arrest In July 2025, the department received a referral concerning the safety of the children, who by then were a year old, based on allegations that mother and father had relapsed into substance abuse. When the department initially spoke to father following the referral, he stated that he and mother argued because he believed she had resumed using fentanyl, which mother denied. Father admitted to using methamphetamine after the argument, and stated that he briefly entered but then left a treatment program to return home. He acknowledged “a longstanding pattern of methamphetamine use[ ] dating back to his teens, a prior period of about a year and a half of sobriety, participation in multiple treatment programs, and current symptoms of depression.” A few days later, father contacted the social worker and recanted his statement about mother’s drug use and stated that he planned to “complete his 30-day residential program, attend three groups daily, and begin attending [Narcotics Anonymous (NA)] meetings.” After completing an investigation, the department determined that allegations of neglect by mother were inconclusive. However, the department substantiated allegations of neglect by father due to his presence in the family home while under the influence. Notwithstanding that finding, the department concluded that no further intervention was necessary and closed the referral. In October 2025, the department received another referral alleging neglect by mother. Family members suspected that mother had relapsed because she dropped the children off with relatives unexpectedly, had become “unreliable,” and was difficult to reach. When the social worker contacted the parents, mother denied substance abuse. Father, however, admitted to recent methamphetamine use and tested positive for alcohol. Before the investigation of the October referral had concluded, the department received two more referrals concerning the family. Then, in November 2025, both parents were arrested for drug possession, child endangerment, and domestic violence 3 occurring in the children’s presence. In response, the department obtained a warrant from the juvenile court, took the children into protective custody, and placed them temporarily with their maternal grandmother. Mother and father were interviewed by law enforcement officers after the November incident and each gave a different account. Mother stated that she told father to leave their home because he was using drugs. The two began to argue, and mother alleged that father grabbed her hair, pinned her down on the ground with his knee, struck her twice with closed fists, and choked her. Father then left the home with the children. In his statement, father denied physically assaulting mother. Father told officers that mother was under the influence of fentanyl and had “fentanyl all over the floor … along with drug paraphernalia pipes.” Father also reported that mother had “picked up a butter knife and threatened to stab him,” after which he fled to a nearby grocery store with the children and called 911. When officers conducted a protective sweep of the home, they located “a clear baggie with a white crystalline substance inside” that they believed to be methamphetamine. No substances were found in locations accessible to the children, but officers observed “garbage on the floor, a sticky floor, and expired food on the counter.” The home appeared “as if there were 10 individuals living” there. The district attorney later decided not to pursue criminal charges against either parent. A few days after his release from custody, the department interviewed father regarding the incident and he provided an account consistent with the one he had previously given to the responding officers. Father indicated a desire to engage in drug treatment and agreed to the department’s temporary safety plan prohibiting him from being around the children without supervision or while under the influence. 4  C. The Current Dependency Proceedings The department filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), citing a risk of serious harm to the children from the parents’ domestic violence and untreated substance abuse. The department alleged that mother and father had “engaged in high lethality domestic violence in the presence of the children, where the mother threatened to stab the father with a butter knife, the mother grabbed [Le.G.] as the father ran down the street, and the father attempted to strangle the mother.” Specific to father, the department alleged he was under the influence of methamphetamine during the domestic violence incident and that drugs were found in the home. Neither mother nor father attended the detention hearing; mother was enrolled in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program and father was in the process of entering an inpatient program in Humboldt County. The department recommended that the juvenile court detain the children and remove them from the parents’ care. Both mother and father submitted on the recommendation through counsel. The juvenile court found that “[c]ontinuance of either child in the home of either [mother or father] is contrary to their welfare” and that “[d]etention is necessary because of substantial danger to [the children’s] physical health or emotional damage.” The court also found that there was “no reasonable means of protection without removal from both parents,” temporarily placed responsibility for placement and care of the children with the department, and ordered supervised visitation for both parents. The department made several attempts to contact father before and after the detention hearing, but he either did not respond or was unable to speak privately. In early December, father notified the department that he had enrolled in a substance abuse treatment program and was in “detox” but would soon transition to residential treatment. The social worker requested that father participate in an interview, but father declined 5 because he wanted to speak with his attorney first. Father tested positive for methamphetamines when he entered the program. Before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the department submitted a report in which it recommended that the juvenile court sustain the petition, declare the children dependents, maintain the children in an out-of-home placement, and order reunification services for both parents. According to the department, the children had remained in maternal grandmother’s care since being placed into protective custody. The department also submitted a letter addressed to the court from father, which included the following statement: “I fully accept and acknowledge that the events leading to the children’s removal, stemming from my recent relapse, were entirely a result of my poor choices and actions. I understand the profound negative impact my relapse has had on my family, especially on [Lo.G] and [Le.G.], whose safety and security were jeopardized.” Father disclosed in the letter that he was enrolled in a 30-day intensive treatment program and, after completing it, would “participate in any court mandates by fully cooperating with drug tests, parenting groups, anger management, 12-step programs, getting a sponsor, building a support system, and creating a relapse prevention plan.” In a separate written statement, father committed to “90 meetings in 90 days” with NA and to finding a sponsor. Father was discharged from the residential treatment program at the end of December. While there, father had completed parenting and anger management courses. He did not have any in-person visitation with the children but had engaged in telephone calls with them. C. Contested Disposition Hearing The combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing occurred in early January 2026. Mother agreed to the department’s recommendations. Father submitted on the issue of jurisdiction but contested the department’s disposition recommendation that the children 6 be removed and remain in an out-of-home placement. Finding that the parents had waived a hearing on jurisdiction, the juvenile court sustained the jurisdictional allegations and adjudged the children dependents of the court. The court then held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of disposition at which a social worker and father testified. The social worker acknowledged that father had tested negative for all substances in early January 2026, and that father had successfully completed a residential substance abuse treatment program. She opined that to achieve long-term sobriety, father needed to continue attending NA meetings and obtain a sponsor, which father had not yet done. Although she was aware that father claimed to have attended virtual meetings, he had not provided any attendance slips before the hearing. The social worker assessed that father still posed a risk to the children due to his longstanding substance abuse, recent relapse, intermittent participation in treatment programs, and unconfirmed attendance at NA meetings and lack of sponsor. Father testified he had maintained sobriety for a year and a half after the children were born, but had resumed using methamphetamine between June and October 2025. According to father, his most recent treatment helped him better understand his triggers and develop strategies to prevent relapse. Father stated that he had attended NA meetings every day since he was discharged from the program and was gathering proof of his attendance. Father also acknowledged that he was still attempting to find a sponsor. The juvenile court admitted into evidence the department’s reports, which included letters from father’s treatment counselors. One counselor wrote: “I have personally witnessed [father] work on himself through self-reflection, emotional regulation, and healthy communication. He is receptive to feedback, takes responsibility for his behavior, and shows a genuine desire to make lasting changes. His progress has been consistent and meaningful.” The counselor further noted that one of father’s “primary motivations is to complete his treatment successfully and reunify with his 7 children.” Another counselor wrote that father had gone “beyond what is required to take advantage” of the program, including attending various evidence-based groups focused on relapse prevention, personal health, and trauma. The counselor believed that father was “serious about making lasting changes in his life and following through on his recovery.” Following the testimony, the juvenile court stated its ruling on the record. The court first observed that mother was in substance abuse treatment and that father had completed a residential program. The court commended father for his honesty and “for being open” and “forthright” throughout the proceedings. The court noted that father had a “year and a half of sobriety” before relapsing in 2025, which it described as a “really large period of time.” But the court also found that father was “still in [the] early steps in the journey” and was concerned that father may be “back and possibly around people … [and] in the place where” he might encounter potential triggers. In the juvenile court’s view, father had not yet “fully developed the tools” or formulated a plan to maintain sobriety, and had not effectuated “what needs to be done to stay sober.” After considering “the long history of substance use[,] … the intimate partner violence that led to this dependency[,] … [and] the previous dependency case,” the juvenile court found a substantial risk to the children if they were returned to their parents, and that there were no alternative means to protecting the children short of removal. The court also found that the department had made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. Based on its findings, the juvenile court ordered the children removed and that the department initiate reunification services for the parents, which for father included weekly random drug testing, completion of a 12-step substance abuse program, the development of an aftercare relapse prevention plan, and a domestic violence accountability program. The court also ordered supervised visitation for both parents. 8  Father filed a timely notice of appeal from the dispositional order. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196 [“the dispositional order is the adjudication of dependency and is the first appealable order in the dependency process”].) II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard and Standard of Review “ ‘Dependency proceedings span up to four stages: jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency. [Citations.] …. At the dispositional stage, the court decides if the child can be returned to, or must be removed from, a parent’s custody. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373, 377; § 358, subd. (a); In re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1230 (L.G.) [at the dispositional hearing, “[t]he court usually chooses between allowing the child to remain in the home, with protective services, and removing the child from the home while the parent engages in services to facilitate reunification”].) “ ‘The fundamental right to the care and custody of one’s child is protected by Constitution and statute.’ ” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 958.) “ ‘Because we so abhor the involuntary separation of parent and child, the state may disturb an existing parent-child relationship only for strong reasons and subject to careful procedures.’ [Citation.]” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 244 (L.O.).) Thus, removal “ ‘is a last resort, to be considered only when the child would be in danger if allowed to reside with the parent.’ ” (M.V., at p. 959.) “Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the ‘child shall not be taken from the physical custody of their parent[ ]’ unless the court finds clear and convincing evidence of two circumstances. [Citation.]” (L.G., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230, fn. omitted.) First, the juvenile court must find that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child from being returned home. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); L.G., at p. 1230.) Second, the 9 court must find that “ ‘ “that there are no reasonable means to protect the child’s physical health without removing the child.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Miguel J. (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 266, 287; L.G., at p. 1230.) “In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent’s past conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention. [Citation.]” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) Indeed, “ ‘ “[a] parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Miguel J., at p. 279.) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citation.]” (D.B., at p. 328.) Additionally, the juvenile court is statutorily required to determine before removing a child from parental custody at a disposition hearing “ ‘whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from his or her home’ ” and “ ‘shall state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.’ [Citation.]” (In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 246–247, quoting § 361, subd. (e).) To that end, “California law therefore ‘requires that there be no lesser alternative before a child may be removed from the home of his or her parent.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 244–245.) We review the juvenile court’s dispositional findings for substantial evidence, “taking into account the level of confidence that the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard demands. [Citation.]” (In re Zoe H. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 58, 71.) Clear and convincing evidence exists when “ ‘the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]” (B.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1150.) “ ‘ “Under this burden of proof, ‘evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial 10 doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “Still, the appellant bears the burden of showing ‘ “there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature” ’ to support the dispositional removal order. [Citation.]” (L.O., supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 960.) B. Analysis 1. Substantial Danger and Reasonable Alternatives to Removal We first address father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s findings under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), that returning the children to his custody would place them in substantial danger and that there were no other reasonable alternatives to removal. Father argues that in reaching its decision the court erred by disregarding evidence of his progress with substance abuse treatment and other interventions. More specifically, he claims there was “significant evidence of the broad range of voluntary services in which he participated, including completing a detoxification treatment and residential drug treatment program, the Triple P Positive Parenting Program, and an anger management training.” According to father, “[g]iven [his] calling 911 originally, his participation in services, and progress from the time of the initial appearance hearing and the lack of any current risk to the minors, substantial evidence is lacking that [he] posed a substantial danger to the minors, a requirement for removal.” We recognize the evidence in the record detailing father’s more recent efforts toward long-term sobriety and the development of his parenting and interpersonal skills, including the letters from father’s treatment counselors, one of which praised father’s commitment to “making lasting changes in his life and following through on his recovery.” We also acknowledge father’s account that, after the November 2025 incident, he removed the children from the home and called 911 to ensure their safety. The juvenile court observed, and we agree, that father’s commitment to self-improvement 11 was commendable and reflected his love for the children. But the problem with father’s recitation of only favorable evidence in this context is that other evidence in the record provides an adequate basis for the juvenile court’s assessment that removal was necessary. When reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s findings, “our power begins and ends with a determination as to whether substantial evidence exists, contradicted or uncontradicted, supporting the dependency court’s determinations. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the dependency court’s findings and draw all reasonable inferences in support of those findings. [Citations.] Thus, we do not consider whether there is evidence from which the dependency court could have drawn a different conclusion but whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the court did draw. [Citations.]” (In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 366; L.G., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 [“When we review a juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”].) Here, evidence in the record shows that father is a longstanding methamphetamine user, whose substance abuse issues have not resolved despite receiving services in connection with a prior dependency case and participating in seemingly intensive, albeit incomplete, treatment on more than one occasion. Father admitted to relapsing twice in 2025—once in July after an argument with mother and again in October—with the second relapse occurring even after the department substantiated a referral claiming that father’s presence in the home while under the influence placed the children at risk. During her testimony, the social worker shared that before completing a program in December 2025, father had previously entered two residential treatment programs but had a “negative experience” at each one and did not complete either program. She explained that a parent’s relapse increases the risk to children in their care because “being under the influence can affect their judgment to provide a safe and stable environment for the 12 children … especially due to [their] age.” She further stated that although “father knows what’s needed,” he is “unable to maintain the things that he’s learned throughout his treatment and incorporate it into his everyday life.” To the social worker, it was “a concern having the children in [father’s] care, as there is the possibility that he will relapse as he has shown in previous behavior.”3 This evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that father, who had voluntarily reengaged with treatment only after the department became involved with the family again and was released from a residential program just one week before the dispositional hearing, was still in the “early steps” of achieving sobriety and had not fully developed the skills needed to avoid another relapse. The court could reasonably infer from father’s history of returning to substance abuse after prior efforts toward rehabilitation and from his admission to using methamphetamine since he was a teenager that his addiction was chronic and refractory, that the potential for another relapse was not minimal or speculative, and that more time was needed for father to demonstrate he could maintain sobriety and mitigate the risk to the children. (See In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228 (William B.) [“Substance abuse is notoriously difficult for a parent to overcome, even when faced with the loss of [his or] her children.”]; Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 893, fn. omitted [observing that “drug addiction is a complex disease like many other chronic health conditions and progress is rarely linear,” and “ ‘people in recovery from drug use disorders are at increased risk for returning to drug use even after years of not taking the drug’ ”].) 3 The juvenile court qualified the social worker as an expert in three areas: risk assessment, dependency investigations, and the provision of services in dependency cases. Having been so qualified, the court was entitled to rely on the social worker’s opinions in reaching its disposition decision. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1159.) 13  Moreover, because Lo.G. and Le.G. were just under two years old at the time of the disposition hearing, and because the record does not reveal that another caretaker was available to assist father with the children if they were placed in his care, the juvenile court could permissibly infer that the potential for another relapse meant that father could not yet, on his own, provide the elevated level of care needed to safely parent twin toddlers. “[A] child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the child may require and whether a parent’s … substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 559.) “Courts may in appropriate circumstances discern an inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness from the evidence that has been introduced in a particular case, including evidence relating to substance abuse, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence.” (Ibid.) Given their young ages, Lo.G. and Le.G. undoubtedly required “consistent, active supervision.” (L.G., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.) That said, any “lapse of care would pose particular risks” because the children cannot care for themselves, feed themselves, change themselves, “call for help, stay home alone, or do any number of things that an older child might be able to do.” (Id. at p. 1227.) Citing In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282 (Jasmine G.), father argues that the juvenile court should have placed more weight on his voluntary acceptance of services since it demonstrated that father “was motivated to address the issues of the case and did not present a risk to the minors.” As father correctly observes, the Jasmine G. court faulted the juvenile court for giving undue consideration to improper factors in deciding to remove the child from both parents while discounting evidence that the child could be safely returned to their custody. (Id. at p. 289.) But Jasmine G. is otherwise distinguishable on its unique facts. In that case, the parents were “two fairly strict, religiously oriented” individuals whose corporal punishment of their teenager led the 14 county social services agency to initiate dependency proceedings; the parents were otherwise “ ‘law-abiding citizens’ with no alcohol or drug dependencies and no prior encounters with the juvenile dependency system.” (Id. at pp. 285, 289.) At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court determined the child could not be safely returned to either parent based on three “strains of evidence”: the social worker’s subjective belief that the parents had not sufficiently “ ‘internalized’ ” the parenting skills they learned from classes and therapy; a “ ‘lack of cooperativeness and the hostility’ ” perceived by the social worker from the parents; and the mother’s continued belief that corporal punishment was appropriate under certain circumstances. (Id. at pp. 289–291.) The appellate court held these considerations did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the child’s safety. (Jasmine G., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 289.) In fact, the court commented that the case was “remarkable for the clear and convincing evidence that it was safe” to return the child to the parents since both had “forsworn corporal punishment of teenagers” and expressed remorse for their use of such punishment. (Id. at p. 288.) Also, the parents had attended parenting classes, had participated in therapy to improve their parenting skills, and the child had no fear of either parent and wanted to return home. (Id. at pp. 288–289.) Unlike Jasmine G., this case does not involve the corporal punishment of a teenage child, a socially debatable child-rearing philosophy, or unwarranted reliance on the personal views of the social worker. Nor does it involve a comparable quantum of clear and convincing evidence that it was safe to return the child to father. Instead, the central issues of concern for the department and for the juvenile court in this case were the parents’ domestic violence and their persistent substance abuse which, in contrast to a parenting practice like corporal punishment, is not readily remedied through parenting education and therapy. (See William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1228.) The juvenile court—aware that father had recently participated in substance abuse treatment 15 and other programs—still found that there remained a substantial danger to the children based principally on the facts that father had been discharged from residential treatment only days before the hearing, was still early in the recovery process, and had a pattern of relapsing after receiving services. That finding was not merely an adoption of the social worker’s subjective beliefs about the potential success of father’s more recent course of treatment or whether he had “ ‘internalized’ ” parenting skills (Jasmine G., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 289), but rather a conclusion based on record facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. We perceive no error in the juvenile court’s assessment of the evidence. Father also claims that the juvenile court failed to consider his enrollment in services when it found that no reasonable means existed to protect the children without removing them. However, when reviewing for substantial evidence, we presume the juvenile court “considered all the pertinent matters presented to it” where the record is otherwise silent with respect to the what the court considered. (Lydig Construction, Inc. v. Martinez Steel Corp. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 937, 945.) Regardless, the record contradicts father’s contention. During his testimony, father described the treatment program he completed immediately before the disposition hearing, which included “anger management and the Triple-P Parenting.” Father also stated that he could “stay in recovery” by continuing to attend NA meetings and keeping in contact with his “support systems,” who he identified as his mentor parent and treatment counselor. Father’s attorney highlighted this testimony during closing argument and urged that father’s actions were “reasonable means the Court must consider that could allow the twins to be returned to the care of [father] without the presence of a substantial risk.” Rather than disregarding this information, the juvenile court directly referenced father’s testimony about programs and services but nonetheless found that father had not “fully developed the tools” needed to maintain sobriety. Accordingly, contrary to father’s position, the 16 record demonstrates that the court considered the programs and services father had completed when determining there were no reasonable alternatives to removal. In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s dispositional findings by clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the children’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned to father’s care, and that no reasonable means existed to protect the children short of removal. 2. Reasonable Efforts to Prevent Removal We now turn to father’s second argument. Citing section 361, subdivision (e), father contends that the juvenile court failed to specify the reasonable efforts made by the department to prevent removal, and that “substantial evidence is lacking that reasonable means were explored.” On this record, we disagree. We again observe that the juvenile court was obligated to determine at the disposition hearing “ ‘whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal.’ ” (L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 246–247.) Thus, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.695(d),4 the court had to “make one of the following findings: [¶] (1) Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent removal; or [¶] (2) Reasonable efforts have not been made to prevent removal.” Additionally, the court was required to “state the facts” supporting its decision to remove the children. (§ 361, subd. (e).) The juvenile court complied with these requirements. First, the court made one of the two findings mandated by rule 5.695(d); the court stated as part of its ruling that “[r]easonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the children from their home.” Second, the court recited several facts supporting its decision 4 All unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 17 to remove the children. The court identified the parents’ domestic violence and their “extensive histories of substance abuse” as “risk[s] in this dependency matter.” The court also noted the “previous dependency case” involving the family and, in reference to father, its determination that he was in the early stages of recovery. Substantial evidence in the record corroborates both the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts finding and the statements it made in support of its removal decision. As to the latter, we have previously described the evidence in the record underlying the facts relied upon the court. (Ante, at pp. 12–18; § 300, subd. (b)(1).) As to the former, the department described in its third addendum report filed six days before the disposition hearing the steps it took to determine whether father was a suitable placement for the children. In mid-December, the department interviewed father while he was at the residential facility, and father provided the social worker with a written statement describing his earlier attempts at treatment, the November 2025 incident with mother, and his plan to stay in recovery, which included “attending 90 meetings in 90 days … and getting a sponsor.” But father also wrote that he planned to return to the apartment he shared with mother, with whom he believed he could “have a healthy relationship and home” if she maintained sobriety.5 Aside from interviewing father, the department made several contacts with father’s treatment counselors and requested details about father’s progress, his drug testing results, and his relapse prevention plan. Some of the requested information was provided but the department noted in the report that it had not yet received a relapse prevention plan from father. The social worker later testified that she had received father’s discharge paperwork “over the weekend,” and that she was aware father was participating in virtual NA meetings. However, father had not provided the social worker 5 When asked at the disposition hearing whether he and mother were “currently in a romantic relationship,” father responded, “[a]t this time, no.” 18 with any attendance slips for those meetings and had not obtained a sponsor, which was a component of father’s “case plan and a part of his discharge paperwork.” Additionally, the department described in the third addendum report its attempts to arrange visitation for father. Father was unable to visit with the children in-person because he was staying at a facility in Humboldt County, and the department stated that virtual visitation had not begun “as there was some miscommunication” between the department, the maternal grandmother, and the treatment program. Thus, by the date of the disposition hearing, father’s only recent contact with the children had been through telephone calls. Given that domestic violence and substance abuse were the primary sources of danger to the children’s well-being, we conclude that that the department satisfied its burden to prove that it made reasonable efforts to prevent removal by a preponderance of the evidence. (L.G., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1232.) The record shows that the department took meaningful steps to assess father’s treatment progress, his recovery plan, and whether the children would be again exposed to domestic violence if placed in his care. Furthermore, the department attempted to facilitate visitation, ostensibly to assess father’s parenting skills and his relationship with the children. We understand that father believes the department should have explored different arrangements, such as retur