Jones v. Superior Court CA4/2

Filed 11/10/26 Jones v. Superior Court CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO E088702 ALBERT JONES, (Super.Ct.No. RIC2000912) Petitioner, OPINION v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. F. Paul Dickerson III, Judge. Petition granted. 1  Habeas Corpus Resource Center and Jennifer Molayem, Anuthara Hegoda and Gurnasheen Kalkat for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Jesse Male, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest. INTRODUCTION In this writ proceeding, Albert Jones, a habeas petitioner who was sentenced to death in 1996, challenges the trial court’s denial of his witness’s request under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 United States Code section 12101 et seq. (ADA) and California Rules of Court, rule 1.100 to testify remotely at the evidentiary hearing on his false evidence claim (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)(A)).1 2 Jones argues that the court abused its discretion by denying the request for a reason not authorized by rule 1.100, and he seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to provide the accommodation for his witness. We agree and therefore grant the petition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Conviction and Death Sentence As our Supreme Court stated in its opinion in Jones’s automatic direct appeal, “[t]he [trial] evidence showed that during the early morning hours of 1 Unlabeled citations to rules refer to the California Rules of Court. 2 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code. 2 December 13, 1993, [Jones], 29 years old at the time, and A.J., a 15–year–old boy, entered the Mead Valley home of James and Madalynne Florville, an elderly married couple, hog-tied them, stabbed them to death, and stole their property.” (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 351.) Although no physical evidence at the scene directly implicated Jones, several witnesses “who knew him well” provided accounts of his statements and conduct before and after the murders that supported the prosecution’s theory that he had been the mastermind behind the crimes and that A.J, his girlfriend’s nephew, was his accomplice. (Id. at pp. 351- 355, 372.) Of those witnesses, C.A. was the only one who claimed to have seen Jones leaving the Florville home near the time of the murders. (Id. at p. 353.) At trial, C.A., who was then 14 years old, testified to seeing Jones and A.J. enter and exit the Florville home between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on December 13, 1993. (Ibid.) The jury convicted Jones of the first degree murders of 82–year–old James Florville and 72–year–old Madalynne Florville (§ 187) with personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)) and found true the robbery-murder, burglary- murder, and multiple-murder special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17)). (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 350.) After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. (Id. at p. 351.) B. Habeas Petition and Order to Show Cause In August 2011, shortly after his petition for rehearing in his automatic direct appeal was denied, the California Appellate Project filed a petition for 3 habeas corpus on Jones’s behalf alleging, as relevant here, that the prosecution introduced false material evidence during his trial. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)(A).) In November 2014, the California Supreme Court appointed the Habeas Corpus Resource Center to represent Jones in the habeas proceedings. To support his false evidence claim, Jones submitted evidence that C.A. had recanted her testimony at least five times since trial, including an occasion in 2009, when she traveled from San Francisco to a police station in Riverside and stated in a recorded interview that she had lied at trial about seeing Jones at the Florville home on December 13, 1993. In 2022, the Riverside County Superior Court issued an order to show cause on two of Jones’s habeas claims, including the material false evidence claim. After briefing, at a status conference in December 2025, the parties agreed that the evidentiary hearing on the false evidence claim would begin on June 22, 2026, and estimated it would take six days. C. C.A.’s Disability Accommodation Request On April 3, 2026, after months of attempting to locate C.A., Jones served her with a subpoena to appear in person as a witness on June 22, 2026, at the Riverside County Superior Court in Murrieta. On June 9, 2026, C.A. completed a “Disability Accommodation Request” on Judicial Council form MC-410, requesting an accommodation under the ADA to testify remotely via videoconferencing. On June 11, 2026, Jones filed a notice of remote appearance requesting the ADA accommodation on behalf of C.A. The 4 notice attached as exhibits Jones’s subpoena to C.A.; C.A.’s ADA accommodation request form; and a letter dated June 10, 2026, from C.A.’s physician, Dr. Royce C. Lin. In the letter, Dr. Lin stated that C.A. was under his “direct medical care and supervision at Tom Waddell Urban Health Clinic, part of the San Francisco Department of Public Health” and that she had been his patient since 2011. He stated that it was “against [his] medical advice” for C.A. to travel roundtrip from San Francisco to Riverside County. In the notice, Jones’s counsel explained that C.A., who was now 47-years old and living in a low-income housing facility in San Francisco, was too physically infirm to withstand the travel necessary to appear in person at the evidentiary hearing. Counsel stated that C.A.’s health had deteriorated significantly over the last 30 years, much of which she had spent living unhoused. Counsel represented that C.A. had Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and received medical treatment at her housing facility. C.A. was frail, thin, wore adult diapers, and required a wheelchair because she had swelling and open wounds on her feet. She also required help from medical staff to administer her medications, including her anti-viral HIV medication, because she was unable to do so independently. Counsel argued that, given C.A.’s medically fragile condition, she would require ground transport from San Francisco to Murrieta, which was “an approximately 460-mile, 8+ hour journey each way.” Counsel further argued that, given Dr. Lin’s recommendation against such a trip, the Habeas Corpus Resource 5 Center could not “assume the liability or medical care that safe transport requires.” Finally, counsel stated that she had forwarded copies of the ADA request to the department clerk and the court’s ADA coordinator and had reserved a private office at C.A.’s housing facility for June 22, 2026, for her remote testimony. The trial court considered the ADA request at a status conference on June 12, 2026. The People opposed the request, arguing that C.A. was too material a witness to testify remotely. They also argued that C.A.’s request did not appear justified and suggested “see[ing] if Dr. Lin is available to call in or Zoom in so that we can discuss what the actual restrictions on [C.A.] are.” Jones’s counsel responded: “[I]t has always been Mr. Jones’[s] desire, after 33 years, to have [C.A.] testify in person in court. She has been under subpoena for in-person testimony since April. It was always our intention to get her here. She is sick. And for us to transport her here would just be too destabilizing for her.” The trial court stated that, even if the People had agreed to the accommodation request, it was inclined to deny it because “[t]his court wants to see her in court, wants to listen to her testify, see how she testifies, watch her demeanor. I need to hear the inflection of her voice.” In response to the court’s concern, Jones’s counsel suggested a conditional examination in a courtroom in San Francisco as an alternative accommodation. Counsel argued that section 1340 provided a mechanism for conducting her examination in person in a different courtroom before the same judge or a different magistrate. Counsel stated: “She has open wounds on her feet, on her 6 neck. Her legs are swollen. But it was still our earnest desire to get her here in person. It just became apparent talking to her ... that she doesn’t have the stamina or the physical capability to make that travel. And so I just want the court to be clear that this wasn’t an 11th-hour request due to some strategic decision that we made. It is [in] our interest to see you evaluate her in person.” Counsel told the court, “We would find the courtroom. We would find a date certain. We would make all of those accommodations so that you could evaluate her in person.” Counsel estimated that C.A.’s direct examination would take about 20 minutes. Noting the accelerated timeline for capital cases under Proposition 66, the court told Jones’s counsel that the ADA request “should have been brought up before,” adding, “I cannot say that there is enough detail for me here to say, you know what, we’re gonna move [the evidentiary hearing].” Counsel responded that she was not asking for a continuance. Counsel explained that she was not sure “if [C.A.] will be alive six months from now” based upon her current “medical state,” to which the court replied, “That’s my concern too ….” Counsel assured the court that Jones would not seek a continuance but might need to request to submit briefing on C.A.’s unavailability “so that her prior statements come in,” because there was “a possibility, given everything that we have discussed, that she will not get in the car [to travel to the hearing] despite whatever transportation, medical or otherwise, is assured.” The court asked if C.A. had informed counsel that she would not travel to the hearing, and counsel responded, “This is coming from her medical care team. They do not want her to 7 be transported…. They do not want her in a car or on a plane for 11 hours. This is not from us.” The court responded that it was going to require C.A. to testify in person, and that if the witness refused, “then I assume you will be filing some kind of briefs for me to rule on. And I guess it would be prior statements in lieu of direct testimony in court.” The court denied the request and explained that it was basing its decision on the following two grounds: “This was just dropped on the court yesterday; it’s too late; [and] the doctor’s note is insufficient.” In response to the court’s ruling, Jones’s counsel stated, “I just want you to know we are operating in complete good faith, that we will try and get her here.” The court replied: “I have never doubted that. I am not saying that you have tried to sandbag the court for strategic reasons. I am just saying that I understand you also have other cases, you’ve got a letter from the doctor, he said what he said, and I got this request yesterday. But I don’t think you are doing this in bad faith by any stretch. I have never thought that. You have worked very hard, very diligently on this case.” On the portion of the MC-410 request form left blank for the court’s ruling, the court checked the box stating that the request was denied. The form lists the following three grounds for denial, accompanied by a checkbox: (1) “Does not meet the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100”; (2) “Creates an undue financial or administrative burden for the court”; and (3) “Changes the basic nature of the court’s service, program, or activity.” The court crossed out the third ground and wrote next to it, “Other.” In the space for explaining “the reasons 8 supporting the box(es) checked above,” the court wrote: “The request by petitioner requested the court allow the witness to appear remotely due to medical issues. The court denied the request.” Jones filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the court’s ruling and requesting a stay. We granted the stay request and issued an order to show cause. DISCUSSION Jones argues that the court abused its discretion by denying the request for a reason not authorized by rule 1.100. He argues that, on this record, the court was required to grant one of the requested accommodations—either the request to testify remotely or in-person at a conditional examination in San Francisco. We agree. “Relief by writ of mandate is appropriate to correct a trial court order that constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Gropen v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1075 (Gropen).) In addition, rule 1.100 “explicitly permits an applicant for an accommodation under [the ADA] to file a petition for writ of mandate if the court denies such a request.” (Ibid.; see rule 1.100(g)(2) [authorizing mandate review for rulings on ADA accommodation requests].) “Rule 1.100 states and implements the policy of the California courts to ‘ensure that persons with disabilities have equal and full access to the judicial system.’ ” (Gropen, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075, quoting rule 1.100(b).) To achieve that purpose, “[t]he rule establishes a procedure for a disabled person to request an accommodation.” (Ibid.) 9  The rule defines “ ‘[p]ersons with disabilities’ ” to mean persons covered by the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.), the ADA, or other applicable state or federal law (rule 1.100(a)(1)). Accommodations are defined as “actions that result in court services, programs, or activities being readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.” (Rule 1.100(a)(3).) The rule provides a nonexhaustive list of accommodations, which includes, “making reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and procedures,” “relocating services or programs to accessible facilities,” and “providing services at alternative sites.” (Rule 1.100(a)(3).) Requests for an accommodation “may be presented ex parte on a form approved by the Judicial Council, in another written format, or orally” and must also be forwarded to the court’s ADA or access coordinator. (Rule 1.100(c)(1).) Requests “must include a description of the accommodation sought, along with a statement of the medical condition that necessitates the accommodation,” and the court “may require the applicant to provide additional information about the medical condition.” (Rule 1.100(c)(2).) Requests “must be made as far in advance as possible, and in any event must be made no fewer than 5 court days before the requested implementation date.” (Rule 1.100(c)(3).) However, the rule gives the trial court discretion to waive the five-court-day deadline. (Ibid.) The grounds for denying a request for accommodation are “limited.” (In re Marriage of James & Christine C. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273.) Rule 1.100(f) provides that the court may deny a request for an accommodation “only 10 when” it determines that one of the following three grounds for denial exists: “(1) the applicant [fails] to satisfy the requirements of [the] rule; (2) [t]he requested accommodation[s] would create an undue financial or administrative burden on the court; or (3) [t]he requested accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” (Rule 1.100(f).) If the court denies a request in whole or in part for one of those reasons, “the response must be in writing.” (Rule 1.100(e)(2).) If a request complies with rule 1.100 and none of the authorized grounds for denial apply, then “the court ha[s] no choice but to grant [the] request.” (In re Marriage of James & Christine C., at p. 1274.) Applying these principles here, we agree with Jones that, because the request complied with rule 1.100 and none of the authorized grounds for denial applied, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant the request. The ADA request, which Jones submitted on C.A.’s behalf, satisfied all of rule 1.100’s requirements. The MC-410 form specified the requested accommodation (of remote testimony) and Jones suggested an alternative accommodation (of conditional examination in San Francisco) at the status conference during which the court considered the request. (Rule 1.100(c)(2).) Jones’s notice contained a statement of C.A.’s HIV diagnosis, a detailed description of her physical impairments, and an explanation of why the accommodation was necessary. (Ibid.) C.A. satisfied the definition of a person with a disability because “HIV is a disability within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act” (Maureen K. v. Tuschka (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 519, 529) and because her physical condition 11 “limits” her ability to walk, which is a “major life activity” (rule 1.100(a)(1)). Finally, Jones submitted the request six court days before the start of the evidentiary hearing on his false evidence claim, which satisfied the five-court-day deadline, and his counsel forwarded the request to the court’s ADA coordinator. (Rule 1.100(c)(1), (3).) Given the content and timing of the request, neither the court’s written decision nor its oral ruling provides a valid basis for denial. The written decision does not provide a valid basis for denial because it shows that the court denied the request for a reason other than those listed in rule 1.100(f). On the MC-410 form, the court crossed out the third authorized reason for denial and wrote “Other,” explaining, “The court denied the request.” Rule 1.100 requires written decisions in the event of a denial, and the court’s written decision, when considered on its own, compels the conclusion that the court abused its discretion under rule 1.100 by denying the request. (Rule 1.100(e)(2).) Nor can we uphold the denial based on the two reasons that the court provided orally during the status conference—(1) that the request was untimely and (2) that Dr. Lin’s note was insufficient to justify the request. As already noted, the request satisfied rule 1.100’s timing requirement. And, while the court had discretion to waive that deadline, it did not have the authority to apply a stricter one. (Rule 1.100(c)(3).) We recognize that the rule also requires that requests “must be made as far in advance as possible” (rule 1.100(c)(3)), but there was no evidence in the record 12 to suggest—and the court made clear that it was not finding—that Jones’s counsel unreasonably delayed in submitting the request. During the status conference, Jones’s counsel represented that she submitted the request as soon as she had become aware of C.A.’s medical condition, and the court assured counsel that it understood that was the case, remarking, “I don’t think you are doing this in bad faith by any stretch …. You have worked very hard, very diligently on this case.” Although the court was understandably concerned with granting a continuance that would delay resolution of the false evidence claim, Jones submitted the request within the timeframe provided by rule 1.100 and his counsel made clear that neither of the accommodations would require a continuance. As a result, we conclude that the court’s finding that the request was untimely is not supported by the record. As to the court’s second reason, rule 1.100 contains no requirement that an applicant submit a physician’s note, or any other type of evidence, justifying the accommodation. Rather, the rule requires only “a statement of the medical condition that necessitates the accommodation.” (Rule 1.100(c)(2).) The request satisfied that requirement because it was accompanied by habeas counsel’s detailed description of C.A.’s medical condition and an explanation why that condition prevented the witness from traveling several hours to attend the evidentiary hearing in person. (See Gropen, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1077, fn. 5 [Counsel’s explanation of the applicant’s medical condition was sufficient to satisfy the “statement” requirement in rule 1.100(c)(2).].) Rather than being a 13 reason to deny the request, Dr. Lin’s note provided additional support for counsel’s already sufficient statement regarding C.A.’s disability and the necessity of either requested accommodation. As a result, the court’s finding that Dr. Lin’s note was insufficient is not a valid reason for denying the request. The People contend that we can affirm the court’s denial of the request on other grounds, but we find none of their arguments persuasive. First, they argue that we can construe the court’s stated preference for in-person testimony as a finding that the requested accommodation would “fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity” within the meaning of rule 1.100(f)(3). The court’s written decision prevents such a construction, because the court crossed that reason out and wrote “Other” next to it, demonstrating that it was expressly not concluding that remote testimony would fundamentally alter the nature of C.A.’s examination. During the status conference, the court did express a strong preference for in-person testimony; however, that preference does not equate to a finding under rule 1.100(f)(3). And, contrary to the People’s contention, the reasons the court provided for its preference do not support a conclusion that remote testimony would fundamentally alter the nature of C.A.’s examination. The trial court stated that it needed to be able to “listen to [C.A.] testify, see how she testifies, watch her demeanor [and] hear the inflection in her voice,” but all of those aspects of a witness’s testimony can be observed over video or in person in San Francisco. 14  To be sure, we sympathize with the court’s preference for in-person testimony and recognize that it is a commonplace preference. As one appellate court observed in the context of provisions enacted during the global COVID-19 pandemic to authorize the use of remote technology, “one operating assumption of our system of justice has long been that the opportunity to observe witnesses ‘upon the stand and the manner in which they gave their testimony ... in no small degree aid[s] in the determination of the truth and correctness of testimony.’ ” (Rycz v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 841.) But the preference for in-person testimony must sometimes yield to other more weighty concerns, such as mitigating the health risks posed by the pandemic, or, as here, implementing “the policy of the courts of this state to ensure that persons with disabilities have equal and full access to the judicial system.” (Rule 1.100(b).) The fact that rule 1.100 makes it relatively simple for people with disabilities to request reasonable accommodations, while at the same time imposes such clear limits on a trial court’s authority to deny those requests, indicates the importance of the equal access policy to our state courts. In a related argument, the People reiterate the point they made below, that C.A. is too material a witness to be examined remotely. In our view, this argument overlooks two important points—first, that rule 1.100 contains no such allowance for denying requests and, second, that Jones is requesting the accommodation for his witness on his false evidence claim. If any party is disadvantaged by an accommodation that could potentially impair the trial court’s 15 ability to assess C.A.’s credibility, it is Jones, who bears the burden of proof on his habeas petition. (Pen. Code, § 1473; see generally People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) Next, the People argue that the provisions governing claims for habeas relief should be construed to require in-person participation for all witnesses. In support, they point out that section 1473 expressly authorizes remote appearances only for incarcerated habeas petitioners or habeas petitioners raising claims under the Racial Justice Act. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subds. (e)(7)(B), (f).) They also point out that section 1484 gives the court the authority to “perform all ... things necessary to a full and fair hearing and determination of the case,” including “ ‘full power and authority to require and compel the attendance of witnesses.’ ” We are not persuaded. Section 1473 generally sets forth the grounds upon which habeas relief may be sought and the procedures for granting such relief. The provision does not address witness testimony or specify the procedures for examining witnesses. As such, there is no conflict between Penal Code section 1473 and California Rules of Court, rule 1.100. And in any event, it is not true that section 1473 authorizes remote appearances only for certain types of petitioners, as the provision also allows courts, in Racial Justice Act cases, to “conduct the hearing through the use of remote technology.” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(7)(B).) As for section 1484, nothing in that provision precludes the application of rule 1.100. Generally speaking, section 1484 permits a court to compel a witness 16 to testify in person on a habeas claim. However, if that witness has a disability and requests an ADA accommodation, then rule 1.100 provides the framework for ruling on such a request. For all of these reasons, we decline to interpret the provisions governing habeas proceedings as prohibiting the use of remote technology to examine witnesses. The People raise additional arguments for affirming the trial court’s ruling based on other statutes providing for, or restricting the use of, remote testimony. (Pen. Code, §§ 977.3 [remote witness testimony in criminal proceedings]; 1428.5 [remote proceedings for infractions]; Code Civ. Proc., § 367.75 [remote witness testimony in civil proceedings].) We do not find those other statutory provisions helpful to our analysis, however, because they do not govern habeas proceedings or requests for ADA accommodations. Finally, we agree with Jones that the remaining authorized reason for denial—that the accommodation would unduly financially or administratively burden the court—does not apply. (Rule 1.100(f)(2).) The People did not argue that remote testimony was unduly burdensome, and no evidence in the record suggests that it would be. Jones’s counsel arranged for C.A.’s remote testimony at her housing facility and, as Jones’s points out, the “Remote Appearances” tab on Riverside Superior Court’s website reflects that the court has in place the procedures and technology to enable remote testimony. (See Superior Court of California County of Riverside, Remote Appearances <https://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/remoteappearance> [as of Nov. 9, 2026].) It 17 is possible that, when choosing between the two requested accommodations on remand, the trial court could find that the accommodation requested in the alternative, C.A.’s conditional examination in San Francisco, is unduly burdensome within the meaning of this provision. If that is the case, the court must grant the request for remote testimony. In sum, we conclude that rule 1.100 provided the framework for how the court was required to evaluate the ADA accommodation request to testify either remotely or in an alternate location in San Francisco. Because the record demonstrates that the request satisfied the requirements of rule 1.100 and none of the authorized grounds for denial applied, the trial court was required to provide the accommodation. (In re Marriage of James & Christine C., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274.) 18  DISPOSITION Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to (1) vacate its June 12, 2026 ruling denying C.A.’s request for disability accommodation, and (2) issue a new ruling granting the request by offering an ADA accommodation of either remote video testimony or conditional examination in San Francisco. The stay issued by this court on June 18, 2026, is vacated upon issuance of the remittitur. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS FIELDS J. We concur: MILLER Acting P. J. MENETREZ J. 19