Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Marriage of Shields CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Calaveras) In re the Marriage of ROBYN and STEVEN C104057 SHIELDS. (Super. Ct. No. 18FL43332) ROBYN SHIELDS, Appellant, v. STEVEN SHIELDS, Respondent. This is the third appeal in the marital dissolution proceeding involving Steven Shields and Robyn Ritchie. The first appeal, case No. 98005 (hereafter the first appeal), involved a challenge to an order for child support and the division of assets including real estate in Bear Valley and Murphys, California, a Lockheed Martin 401(k) account, and investment accounts. 1 This court reversed portions of the judgment and otherwise affirmed, directing the family court to “recalculate the equalization payments due for the Bear Valley and Murphys properties, make the required findings relating to child support, redetermine the separate and community property interests in Steven’s 1 We will refer to the parties by their first names to be consistent with the first appeal. 1 401(k) account, and conduct further proceedings on Steven’s reimbursement claim for community payments of separate tax obligations.” On remand, the family court considered the parties’ written briefs, conducted two hearings, and amended the judgment. Robyn now contends (1) any amount owed for community payment of separate taxes should be awarded to the community; (2) the trial court improperly relied on a document that was not in evidence and denied Robyn an opportunity to present her own evidence; (3) the trial court’s effort to fast track the proceedings was inconsistent with this court’s direction; (4) the trial court improperly issued different findings pertaining to the Murphys and Bear Valley properties, resulting in incorrect equalization payments; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in apportioning the 401(k); (6) the award of interest was unauthorized; and (7) the matter should be remanded to a different family court judge. Finding merit in some of Robyn’s contentions, we will reverse the judgment with regard to the Bear Valley and Murphys properties, the community payment of separate taxes, and the award of interest on the equalization payment for the Bear Valley property. We will otherwise affirm the judgment. This opinion will explain the applicable law regarding Watts charges, Epstein credits, and equalization payments, and we will remand the matter, directing the family court to do the following: 1. Determine, based on admissible evidence, whether Robyn used community funds to pay property taxes on her separate property, and if so, the amount of reimbursement due the community. 2. Rule, as to the Bear Valley property and based on the factual findings from the trial, that the property had a value of $280,000 at the time of trial; Robyn has a separate property interest of $196,193; Robyn is entitled to a credit of $21,185.50 for separate property improvement contributions; the community has a 22.365% interest in the property; the community’s interest in the net rental value is 22.365% of the Watts charge 2 ($54,862.50) minus the Epstein credits ($37,705.60); the community is credited $369.08 (the mortgage payoff refund) and $3,837.14 (the community share of the net rental value); the property is awarded to Robyn; and Robyn shall pay Steven an equalization payment of $33,413.86. 3. Rule, as to the Murphys property and based on the factual findings from the trial, that the property had a value of $850,000 at the time of trial; Robyn has a separate property interest of $223,141.68; Steven has a separate property interest of $68,285; the community has a 65.72% interest in the property; the community’s interest in the net rental value is 65.72% of the Watts charge ($147,000) minus the Epstein credits ($38,416); the community is credited $71,361.40 (the community share of the net rental value); a rent back of $12,000 is deducted from Steven’s share of the community; the property is awarded to Robyn; and Robyn shall pay Steven an equalization payment of $302,967.36. 4. Determine the interest due Steven in connection with Robyn’s equalization payment for the Bear Valley property as of the date of entry of the amended judgment. We grant Steven’s unopposed request to take judicial notice of the appellant’s appendix in the first appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d). 459, subd. (a).) We also take judicial notice of the briefs filed by the parties in the first appeal. APPLICABLE LAW In general, in the absence of an agreement by the parties, a family court in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage must divide the community estate equally. (Fam. Code, §§ 2550, 2601.) 2 Payment from one spouse to the other -- equalization payment -- may be required to achieve an equal division of community property. ( 1 Cal. Transactions Forms Family Law (June 2026 Update) Marital Settlement 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 3 Agreements, § 2:13.) Separate property is awarded to the owner of that property. (In re Marriage of Mohler (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 788, 791 (Mohler).) Generally, real property is valued as of the date of trial. (In re Marriage of Alan Freeman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 406, 416; Mohler, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 794.) The community’s interest in real property is based on the amount community payments reduced the loan principal owed on the property. (Freeman, at p. 415; Mohler, at p. 792.) For example, where real property has a value or purchase price of $168,000 and community payments reduced the loan principal by $56,557, the community interest in the property is 33.66 percent. (Mohler, at p. 793.) As for separate property, the separate property interest of the spouse who entered the marriage owning the property remains the separate property of that spouse. (See id. at pp. 792, 794.) Principal and improvement payments made by a spouse using his or her separate property are that spouse’s separate property. (Id. at p. 795; In re Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058- 1060.) Epstein credits reimburse a spouse who, after separation, uses separate property to pay a community obligation such as a mortgage. (Mohler, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 797, fn. 4; In re Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 548, 552.) Watts charges compensate the community for the reasonable value of use when a spouse has exclusive use of a community asset between separation and trial. (Mohler, at pp. 796- 797; Jeffries, at p. 552.) Epstein credits are paid from the community. (Mohler, at p. 797, fn. 4; Jeffries, at pp. 552-553.) Watts charges are paid to the community. (Mohler, at pp. 796-797; Jeffries, at p. 552-553.) To determine the amount the occupying spouse is charged for use of real property after separation under Watts, the court must determine the net rental profit that would have been obtained during the period the occupying spouse used the property, i.e., the expected rent minus necessary expenses paid by the occupying spouse. (Mohler, at p. 798.) When the community has only a partial interest 4 in the real property, the Watts charge due the community is the portion of the net rental profit appropriately assignable to the community’s interest. (Id. at p. 797.) BACKGROUND Robyn and Steven asserted various arguments on remand. They also proposed calculations for equalization payments, the interests in Steven’s 401(k), and the community payment of separate taxes. Regarding equalization payments, the family court noted that the decision in the first appeal set forth directions on how to recalculate them. It ordered Robyn to pay Steven an equalization payment of $39,548.75 for the Bear Valley property and $280,018.84 for the Murphys property. As for the claim that Robyn had used community property to pay taxes related to separate property, the family court found that Steven did not have actual knowledge until trial and thus an asserted limitations period did not apply. It determined that the amount of the taxes and preparation fees paid from the community totaled $277,461, and ordered Robyn to pay Steven half of that amount, $138,730.50. With regard to the 401(k) account, the family court ordered the parties to use Moon, Schwartz & Madden to apportion the separate and community property interests in the account. On the subject of accrued interest, the family court ruled that the decision in the first appeal was a modification of the judgment, not a reversal for retrial, and therefore interest accrued from the date of entry of the original judgment. DISCUSSION I Robyn contends any amount owed for the community payment of separate taxes should be awarded to the community. She argues the family court erred in giving Steven the entire amount due. Steven counters that Robyn forfeited the issue by not objecting 5 in the family court on the ground raised in this appeal. We exercise our discretion to address the merits on this pure question of law. The family court ordered Robyn to pay Steven $277,461 for the use of community funds to pay taxes related to separate property. However, as this court stated in the first appeal, if community funds were used to pay taxes related to Robyn’s separate property, the community must be reimbursed and not Steven. (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 89, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Marriage of Perkal (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1198, 1201-1202; In re Marriage of Frick (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997, 1014; In re Marriage of Walter (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 802, 806- 807.) II Robyn next contends the trial court improperly relied on a document that was not in evidence, and denied Robyn an opportunity to present her own evidence. As a result, Robyn claims there was a lack of evidentiary support for the family court’s order directing her to pay $277,461 as reimbursement for the use of community funds to pay taxes related to separate property. At trial, Steven sought a reimbursement of $229,323 to the community for the tax payments related to separate property. But no evidence was presented on the claim because the family court concluded it was time-barred by the limitations period in section 920. Steven challenged that ruling and this court remanded for further proceedings, instructing the family court to determine when Steven had actual knowledge of the use of community funds to pay taxes related to separate property, which would establish when the limitations period had triggered. On remand, the parties submitted further argument, but neither party submitted evidence. Although the family court indicated that all tax returns had been admitted at trial, the record on appeal only includes, for the relevant time period of 2005 to 2017, a 2017 joint tax return. No evidence was presented or identified on remand tracing 6 the use of community funds for tax payments relating to Robyn’s separate property. Despite Robyn’s objections that no evidence had been admitted, the family court adopted Steven’s calculations, requiring Robyn to pay $277,461 for community payment of taxes related to separate property. In general, marital dissolution proceedings are governed by the rules of evidence applicable in other civil actions. (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1354, 1362 (Elkins), superseded by statute on another point as stated in In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 840; In re Marriage of Pasco (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 585, 591.) Facts generally must be established by admissible evidence. (Elkins, at p. 1362; see Pasco, at pp. 590-591.) Statements and charts in the parties’ briefs are not admissible evidence. (GC Brothers Entertainment LLC v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1030; Pasco, at p. 592; In re Marriage of Kywiciel (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083; see United States v. Johnson (4th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 1150, 1159, fn. 10.) Because there was no evidentiary support for the family court’s order directing Robyn to pay $277,461 as reimbursement for the use of community funds to pay taxes related to separate property, we will reverse that portion of the amended judgment. On remand, to the extent the family court relies on evidence admitted at trial, a clear record should be made of the evidence upon which it relies. The family court may, in its discretion, conduct an evidentiary hearing. It must determine, based on admissible evidence, whether Robyn used community funds to pay taxes related to her separate property, and if she did, the amount of reimbursement due the community. Steven claims the amended judgment should be affirmed based on an implied finding that Robyn breached her fiduciary duty to him. But on remand Steven represented that he was not asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 7 III Robyn contends the trial court’s effort to fast track the proceedings was inconsistent with this court’s direction. Specifically, she claims the disposition in the first appeal as to the Bear Valley property was the type of reversal entitling her to a new trial. In general, a reversal of a judgment without directions results in a remand of the case for a new trial, and places the parties in the same position as if no trial had occurred. (Hall v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381 [partial reversal]; Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 547, 549; In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499-1500.) In contrast, when a judgment is reversed with specific directions to the trial court, those directions are binding on the trial court. (In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434-1435; English v. Olympic Auditorium, Inc. (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 196, 201-202.) In such a case, the trial court may address only those issues specified by the appellate court. (Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 851, 859-860, 863-864 (Ayyad); Hanna v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 363, 376.) Any action by the trial court not in conformity with the appellate court’s directions is unauthorized and void. (Ayyad, at pp. 859-860.) Whether a trial court has correctly interpreted an appellate opinion is an issue of law we determine de novo. (Ducoing Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 306, 313 (Ducoing Management, Inc.); Ayyad, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 859.) In interpreting the language of an appellate opinion, we consider the dispositional language and the opinion as a whole. (Ducoing Management, Inc., at p. 313; Ayyad, at p. 859; In re Justin S., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435.) As relevant to Robyn’s contention, the disposition in the first appeal reversed the judgment as to the Bear Valley property and remanded to the family court with specific direction to recalculate the equalization payment. The disposition must be understood in a manner consistent with the portion of the decision in the first appeal holding that 8 (1) there was no dispute on appeal that the property had a value of $280,000 at the time of trial, Robyn had a separate property interest of $196,193 and was entitled to a credit of $21,185.50 for separate property improvement contributions and $37,705.60 in Epstein credits; (2) based on undisputed facts, Robyn had a separate property interest of 77.635% in the property and the community property interest was 22.365%; (3) the family court must credit the Watts charge to the community estate, instead of deducting the charge from the community estate; (4) in calculating the Watts charge, the family court must account for the community estate’s partial interest in the property; (5) the family court must reimburse Robyn for Epstein credits from the community estate; and (6) the family court must credit the community estate the full amount of the $365.76 mortgage payoff refund. The disposition did not require a new trial on remand because the undisputed facts on appeal and unchallenged family court findings established the pertinent amounts. IV According to Robyn, the trial court improperly issued different findings pertaining to the Murphys and Bear Valley properties, resulting in incorrect equalization payments. A Robyn contends that no Watts charge should have been imposed against her for her use of the Bear Valley property when Steven unilaterally elected not to use the property, she did not occupy the property exclusively or full time, there was no agreement that she would have exclusive possession of the property, and there was no order pursuant to section 6324. However, those were not issues the disposition in the first appeal authorized the family court to address on remand. Additionally, Robyn was entitled to one appeal from the original judgment (see generally Jordan v. Malone (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 18, 21) and she forfeited the issues she now raises by not raising them in her appellate opening brief in the first appeal (see American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh 9 (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453; Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8). Robyn asserts she did not challenge the family court’s findings regarding the Bear Valley equalization payment in the first appeal because the judgment required Steven to pay her an equalization payment. But like Steven, Robyn argued in the first appeal that the family court’s calculation of the Bear Valley equalization payment was incorrect. She did not assert in that appeal that she did not owe anything under Watts. Instead, her calculation of the “net rental profit” adopted $54,862.50 as the amount of the Watts charge. Robyn cannot raise issues forfeited in the first appeal. Robyn further argues that the family court erred in basing the Watts charge on her use of the Bear Valley property for 1,155 nights. She asserts the charge must be reduced because at trial Steven claimed a Watts charge based on 577.5 nights and the family court reduced that component of the Watts charge by half, reasoning that the property had no rental value in the fall and spring seasons. We agree. At trial, Steven asked the family court to impose $109,725 as a Watts charge calculated as follows: $190/night x 15 nights per month x 38.5 months (577.5 nights). The family court gave Steven half of what he had requested, finding that the property had no rental value in the spring and fall seasons. On remand, Steven correctly stated that the original judgment was for one-half of the 38.5 months requested but incorrectly stated that the Watts charge was $109,725. The original judgment imposed a $54,862.50 Watts charge, not $109,725. But the family court’s amended judgment adopted Steven’s use of $109,725 as the Watts charge. This was error because Steven did not challenge the portion of the judgment imposing a $54,862.50 Watts charge in the first appeal. And the issue is not within the scope of the disposition in the first appeal. In light of our conclusion, we do not consider Robyn’s additional contentions regarding the Watts charge. 10 Robyn also argues that the family court erred in not giving her a $42,371.05 credit for remodeling expenditures from separate property. However, because the disposition in the first appeal did not include this issue, there was no error by the family court on remand. Moreover, at trial Robyn claimed $42,371.05 for remodeling costs, but the family court only gave her a credit of $21,185.50 and she did not challenge that ruling in her appeal of the original judgment. Robyn may not do so now. B In addition, Robyn raises a number of arguments challenging the amended judgment with regard to the Murphys property. The judgment as to the Murphys property was reversed in the first appeal and the matter was remanded with specific directions to recalculate the equalization payment. The disposition must be read in the context of this court’s determinations that (1) there was no dispute on appeal that the property had a value of $850,000 at the time of trial and that Robyn had a separate property interest of $223,141.68; (2) the family court was required to credit the Watts charge to the community, rather than deducting the charge from the community; (3) in calculating the Watts charge, the family court was required to account for the interests of the community, Steven, and Robyn in the Murphys property; and (4) the family court was required to reconsider the Epstein credits for Steven’s separate property payments for insurance, taxes, interest, and maintenance, and the credits had to be paid from the community. (Ducoing Management, Inc., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 313; Ayyad, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 859; In re Justin S., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435.) As with the Bear Valley property, the disposition with regard to the Murphys property did not authorize a new trial. According to Robyn, the family court incorrectly believed the parties were in agreement as to the amounts for Steven’s and Robyn’s separate and community property interests. Turning first to the separate property interests, there was no error. Steven stipulated at trial that Robyn’s separate property interest was $223,141.68. The family 11 court found Steven had a separate property interest of $68,285. Steven’s and Robyn’s final briefs on remand did not challenge those amounts, except that Robyn listed her separate property interest as $223,141.19 instead of $223,141.68. As for the parties’ calculations of the community interest in the Murphys property before consideration of the Watts charge and Epstein credits, it is true the parties identified different amounts. That is because, among other things, Robyn’s calculation included an outstanding mortgage balance, a claim she had forfeited in the first appeal. (Barber Group, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1036, fn. 4 (Barber Group, Inc.).) The disposition in the first appeal did not authorize the family court to consider Robyn’s assertion that an outstanding mortgage balance of $63,813.06 should be considered in determining the community interest in the Murphys property. Robyn argues that, contrary to this court’s prior decision, the family court did not require Steven to pay a Watts charge to the community. However, Robyn’s assertion is incorrect. The trial court ordered a $35,677.74 deduction from Steven’s share of the net community equity value, thereby accounting for his obligation to pay the Watts charge. Robyn suggests the family court did not comply with this court’s decision in the first appeal when it considered Steven’s $68,285 post-separation mortgage principal payments under section 2640 [reimbursement for separate contributions to the community] and not as Epstein credits. But this court did not decide that specific issue and Robyn did not assert it in the first appeal under a separate heading with analysis and supporting legal authority. Accordingly, we do not consider it here. (Barber Group, Inc., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1036, fn. 4; Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1045, fn. 1.) 12 V Robyn further claims the trial court abused its discretion in apportioning the 401(k). The original judgment used the time rule to apportion the separate and community property interests in the Lockheed Martin 401(k) account. Robyn challenged that decision, arguing that using the time rule was inappropriate and that the tracing of separate and community property contributions was required. In the first appeal, this court determined that the family court should not have used the time rule, and this court remanded the matter for a redetermination of the separate and community property interests using an apportionment method that would fairly represent the relative separate and community contributions. On remand, Steven asked for an expert to apportion the separate and community interests. In the alternative, he proposed an apportionment method. Robyn proposed an apportionment using a method she attributed to Moon, Schwartz & Madden (Moon Schwartz), which she described as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) expert. Her calculation of the amount due using that method was based on information from a declaration by Steven regarding the separate and community interests as of December 31, 2005, and annual statements for the 401(k) account. The family court ordered the parties to use Moon Schwartz to determine the separate and community apportionment. Robyn now argues the family court abused its discretion by not permitting her to present evidence on whether the method used to apportion the separate and community interests in Steven’s 401(k) account was being correctly applied. We reject the argument. Robyn asserted on remand that apportioning the interests in the 401(k) account was straightforward. She presented calculations setting forth the separate and community property interests and did not state that additional evidence was required. She did not ask 13 for an evidentiary hearing on the apportionment method or application of the method. She waited until after the family court orally announced its judgment to ask for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not permit her to present evidence on whether the method used to apportion the separate and community interests in Steven’s 401(k) account was being correctly applied. In addition, Robyn argues it was ambiguous for the family court to direct Moon Schwartz to make calculations using their standard approach as industry experts. On remand, however, she asserted that Moon Schwartz was a pension valuation and QDRO expert and she described its approach. She stated, “The basic approach used by [Moon Schwartz] is to determine the annual growth and contributions, to then divide that growth and contributions between the separate and community interests based on their existing interests at the beginning of the time period in which the allocation is to occur. … While the present 401(k) involves both pre-marriage and post marriage contributions, the analysis is basically the same.” She presented a calculation of the separate and community property interests in the 401(k) apparently using the Moon Schwartz method. Given her assertions on remand, she has not established that the trial court’s directions to Moon Schwartz were unclear. VI The amended judgment awarded Steven interest from the date of entry of the original judgment. Robyn contends the award is improper and interest should run from the date of entry of the amended judgment or a future judgment. On remand Steven requested an award of interest on the equalization payments due him for the Bear Valley and Murphys properties. He argued interest on such sums began to run on the date of entry of the original judgment because this court modified the judgment as to the Bear Valley and Murphys properties. Robyn countered that interest accrued on the date of entry of the amended judgment because this court reversed the 14 judgment as to those properties. The trial court awarded interest as of the date of entry of the original judgment. The timing of when interest begins to accrue on a judgment is a question of law we review de novo. (Vines v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 693, 702 (Vines); In re Marriage of Dalgleish & Selvaggio (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1177-1178.) “ ‘A judgment bears legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial court even though it is still subject to direct attack.’ ” (Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 816, 818 (Snapp); see Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1961) 55 Cal.2d 439, 442-443 (Stockton Theatres, Inc.); Code Civ. Proc., § 685.020, subd. (a).) Whether interest is due from the date of entry of the original or the amended judgment depends on whether the appellate disposition modified or reversed the original judgment. (Chodos v. Bormon (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 707, 712 (Chodos).) When a judgment is modified on appeal, either upward or downward, interest runs from the date of entry of the original judgment, not from the date of the amended judgment. (Snapp, at pp. 818- 819; Stockton Theatres, Inc., at pp. 442-443.) On the other hand, when a judgment is reversed on appeal, interest runs from the date of entry of the amended judgment. (Snapp, at pp. 818-819; Stockton Theatres, Inc., at pp. 442-443.) The original judgment ordered Steven to pay Robyn an equalization payment in connection with the Bear Valley property. That judgment was reversed on appeal with directions. The amended judgment required Robyn to pay Steven an equalization payment relating to the Bear Valley property. We find Stockton Theatres, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.2d 439 instructive under these circumstances. In that case, the plaintiff sought to recover the cost of obtaining a surety bond after obtaining a judgment in its favor. (Id. at p. 440.) The trial court disallowed the cost. (Id. at pp. 440-441.) The California Supreme Court reversed and directed the trial court to determine if the bond was necessary, and if it was, to allow the cost. (Id. at p. 441.) On remand, the trial court found the bond was unnecessary, and the plaintiff 15 appealed. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court reversed and directed the trial court to allow the premium as a cost. (Ibid.) The case came before the California Supreme Court a third time to determine when interest began to run on the cost award. (Id. at p. 442.) The Supreme Court held that interest ran from the date the trial court ruled on the necessity of obtaining a surety bond, a finding that was required to award the cost of the bond premium. (Id. at pp. 442-444.) Pertinent here, the Supreme Court explained that interest could not have started to run when the trial court disallowed the cost, because at that point no cost award could have been made as there had been no finding on whether the bond was necessary. (Ibid.) Here, the original judgment regarding an equalization payment as to the Bear Valley property was against Steven. There was no judgment against Robyn regarding an equalization payment as to that property until the amended judgment. Consequently, although no new fact finding was required on remand, interest on a judgment requiring Robyn to make an equalization payment as to the Bear Valley property could not have begun to accrue from the date of entry of the original judgment. Interest pertaining to the equalization payment for the Bear Valley property began to accrue upon entry of the amended judgment. Accordingly, the portion of the amended judgment awarding interest in connection with Robyn’s equalization payment for the Bear Valley property as of the date of entry of the original judgment must be reversed. On remand, the family court must calculate the interest due in connection with Robyn’s equalization payment for the Bear Valley property as of the date of entry of the amended judgment. With regard to the Murphys property, the original judgment ordered Robyn to pay Steven an equalization payment of $308,419.91. On appeal, that judgment was reversed with directions for recalculating the equalization payment. “Whether an appellate court’s disposition is a modification or a reversal depends on the substance and effect of the order, not its form. [Citations.] ‘An appellate court order is “a reversal in the legal sense” when it reverses the trial court and remands an issue to the trial court for further 16 hearing and factfinding necessary to the resolution of the issue forming a basis for appeal.’ [Citations.] But where ‘an order stated in terms of reversal amends a trial court order on remand to “state what it should have stated on th[e] date” of the original order, it is “in law and in fact, a modification.” ’ ” (Vines, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 701-702; accord Chodos, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 713.) And a disposition has been found to be a modification, and not a reversal, where further factfinding is not required or undertaken on remand, even if the disposition is stated as a reversal. (Snapp, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 818, 820-822; Chodos, at pp. 711, 714.) Although the decision in the first appeal did not calculate the equalization payment due from Robyn to Steven for the Murphys property, it recited the principles governing the calculation and directed the trial court to calculate the equalization payment pursuant to those principles. No new factfinding was necessary and the trial court did not take further evidence on remand. In effect, as with the appellate court decision in Snapp and the second Supreme Court decision in Stockton Theatres, Inc., this court’s decision in the first appeal modified the judgment as to Robyn’s equalization payment for the Murphys property so that it would state what it should have stated on the date of the original judgment. (Snapp, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 820-821; Stockton Theatres, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 443.) The trial court did not err in awarding interest on the judgment pertaining to Robyn’s equalization payment for the Murphys property as of the date of entry of the original judgment. Robyn further contends that the family court erred in awarding interest on the judgment pertaining to the apportionment of the 401(k) and the reimbursement to the community for tax payments related to separate property. But the amended judgment does not appear to award interest on those items, and Steven did not request such interest on remand. 17 Steven urges that the trial court erred in not awarding interest on the entire amount of the amended judgment. We do not consider the contention because Steven did not appeal from the amended judgment. VII Robyn asks us to assign the case to a different judge on remand pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (c) because the family court judge “makes too many mistakes.” Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (c) provides that at the request of a party or on its own motion, an appellate court must consider whether in the interests of justice it should direct that further proceedings be heard before a judge other than the one whose judgment is on review. The statute was enacted to address the concern that a judge whose determinations are reversed might not act with total objectivity on remand. (People v. Gulbrandsen (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1562.) Disqualification may be necessary where the trial court’s order indicates bias or suggests a whimsical disregard of a statutory scheme. (Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 303; Gulbrandsen, at p. 1562.) Disqualification under the statute should be used sparingly and only where the interests of justice require it. (In re Marriage of Walker (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 137, 153 (Walker); Gulbrandsen, at p. 1562.) Robyn does not show that the interests of justice require disqualification here. Judicial error does not justify disqualification. (Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 203, disapproved on another ground in Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 516, fn. 17; People v. LaBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1079; Walker, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 153.) The challenged portions of the amended judgment do not suggest bias or whimsy by the family court judge. Rather, it appears the family court judge attempted to follow this court’s instructions on remand. 18 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed with regard to the Bear Valley and Murphys properties, the community payment of separate taxes, and the award of interest on the equalization payment for the Bear Valley property. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The matter is remanded to the family court with directions to do the following: 1. Determine, based on admissible evidence, whether Robyn used community funds to pay property taxes on her separate property, and if so, the amount of reimbursement due the community. 2. Rule, as to the Bear Valley property and based on the factual findings from the trial, that the property had a value of $280,000 at the time of trial; Robyn has a separate property interest of $196,193; Robyn is entitled to a credit of $21,185.50 for separate property improvement contributions; the community has a 22.365% interest in the property; the community’s interest in the net rental value is 22.365% of the Watts charge ($54,862.50) minus the Epstein credits ($37,705.60); the community is credited $369.08 (the mortgage payoff refund) and $3,837.14 (the community share of the net rental value); the property is awarded to Robyn; and Robyn shall pay Steven an equalization payment of $33,413.86. 3. Rule, as to the Murphys property and based on the factual findings from the trial, that the property had a value of $850,000 at the time of trial; Robyn has a separate property interest of $223,141.68; Steven has a separate property interest of $68,285; the community has a 65.72% interest in the property; the community’s interest in the net rental value is 65.72% of the Watts charge ($147,000) minus the Epstein credits ($38,416); the community is credited $71,361.40 (the community share of the net rental value); a rent back of $12,000 is deducted from Steven’s share of the community; the property is awarded to Robyn; and Robyn shall pay Steven an equalization payment of $302,967.36. 19 4. Determine the interest due Steven in connection with Robyn’s equalization payment for the