Marriage of Mokhnatkina and Mokhnatkin CA6

Filed 10/20/26 Marriage of Mokhnatkina and Mokhnatkin CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of MARIA H052875 NIKOLAYEVNA MOKHNATKINA (Santa Clara County and TIMOFEY EDUARDOVICH Super. Ct. No. 18FL002598) MOKHNATKIN. MARIA NIKOLAYEVNA MOKHNATKINA, Respondent, v. TIMOFEY EDUARDOVICH MOKHNATKIN, Appellant. Appellant Timofey Eduardovich Mokhnatkin challenges a judgment relating to the division of property and other financial issues stemming from the dissolution of his marriage to respondent Maria Nikolayevna Mokhnatkina. Timofey1 asserts he adequately rebutted the presumption of 1 For clarity we refer to the parties by their first names as they appear in the briefing. (See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, fn. 1.) undue influence applicable to Maria’s relinquishment of her interest in their family home and contends the trial court’s finding that he failed to rebut that presumption was not supported by the evidence. He also argues that the court made various errors relating to a home equity line of credit, attorney fees, child support, temporary spousal support, and sanctions. For the reasons we explain herein, we will modify the judgment to correct an error in the calculation of temporary spousal support arrears and affirm the judgment as modified. I. BACKGROUND The parties married in Russia in 2007 and moved to the United States in 2008. They have two children together, born in 2008 and 2011. In 2013, they purchased a house together. They separated in 2017 after just under 10 years of marriage. In 2018, Maria and the two children moved out of the house. Maria petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, and the trial court held a bench trial relating to financial issues in 2024. A. TRIAL EVIDENCE In 2012, the parties decided to buy a house and began applying for mortgage prequalification. They learned that Maria’s credit score was lower than Timofey’s. Maria testified that Timofey and a loan officer both told her that her name could not be “on the loan.” Timofey testified that, even after learning about Maria’s lower credit score, the parties continued exploring “different options,” including a mortgage in Timofey’s name only; a mortgage in Maria’s name only; or a mortgage in both parties’ names. Timofey was unemployed at the time. Timofey testified that, after he found employment in December 2012, the parties met with a loan officer. According to Timofey, they discussed interest rates and learned that the interest rate available to Timofey as a sole 2 borrower was slightly lower than the rate available to both parties as joint borrowers. Timofey denied the loan officer told the parties that Maria could not be a borrower, or that it would make financial sense for Timofey to purchase a house on his own. He stated that around the time of their meeting with the loan officer, Maria told him she did not want to be included on the mortgage. In January 2013, the parties found a house, and Timofey applied for a mortgage. He applied for the mortgage alone to obtain a lower interest rate, at the recommendation of loan officer Jaime Del Bosque. Del Bosque also told the parties that a “gift letter” would be necessary in order for Maria to make part of the down payment. The parties made the down payment using $44,932 from Timofey’s bank account and $90,000 from Maria’s bank account, accompanied by a gift letter characterizing the $90,000 as a gift from Maria to Timofey. In an e-mail to the parties’ credit union requesting that funds be transferred for the down payment, Timofey wrote: “ ‘Me and my wife are buying house and need to transfer money.’ ” Maria testified that she signed the gift letter only because Timofey told her she had to. She said she believed the house would be the parties’ “common property” and she would “have 50 percent.” The parties, Del Bosque, real estate agent Dolores Marquez, and escrow officer Jodi Holloway were present at the closing in February 2013. At the closing, Maria signed an interspousal grant deed conveying her interest in the property to Timofey. The grant deed included the phrase “FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION,” which Timofey testified he did not understand. Holloway, who notarized the grant deed, testified she would typically tell the grantor that he or she was “signing off all right, title, and interest to this property.” Maria testified that she “felt pressured” during the 3 closing, and Timofey rushed her through the signing process. Based on her conversations with Timofey, she understood that her name would not be on the title at the time of the purchase (because adding it would have prevented the parties from obtaining a mortgage) but would be added at a later date. Timofey denied promising to Maria before the closing that he would later add her name to the title. Deposition testimony by Del Bosque and Marquez was admitted into evidence at trial in lieu of direct examination but is not part of the record on appeal. After reviewing the transcript of Marquez’s deposition testimony, the court asked Marquez whether it was her understanding that “the parties were purchasing the home together” but were “putting the house in [Timofey]’s name only, because it would give them a better interest rate on their mortgage?” Marquez answered affirmatively. The court then referenced deposition testimony in which Marquez had expressed her belief at the time of the closing “that at some point, the parties were going to refinance” the mortgage. When asked whether her belief was an assumption or based on something she had been told, Marquez replied: “That was between the lender and him. It was a recommendation for them to actually refinance it, and at that point if she was going to be added at that point.” Marquez said her understanding of the parties’ plan to refinance was based on a conversation she had with the parties and Del Bosque. The parties obtained a home equity line of credit (HELOC) as “co- borrowers” in August 2013. Timofey acknowledged the HELOC was “a common debt.” At the time of trial, the parties had stipulated that Maria would reimburse Timofey $53,297 for money drawn from the HELOC between September 2017 and June 2023, plus interest. An appraiser testified that the house was worth $1.95 million as of May 2024. 4  B. PRETRIAL SUPPORT ORDERS In September 2019, the trial court ordered Timofey to pay Maria $561 per month in child support. That order was based on a custodial timeshare under which the children spent 34 percent of their time with Timofey. The court also ordered Maria to pay Timofey $415 per month in temporary spousal support, resulting in a net payment of $146 per month from Timofey to Maria. Maria was granted sole custody of the children in March 2020, and Timofey was denied visitation rights. Timofey moved to modify support in July 2020, stating that he had lost his job. Maria filed a response opposing any increase in temporary spousal support and asserting that child support should be increased, as the custodial timeshare underlying the 2019 support order was no longer in place. While the request to modify support was pending, Timofey was granted visitation with the children. Following a hearing on the request to modify support, the trial court issued an order on January 4, 2021 (January 4 order). Although the court found Timofey had not made a sufficient showing to support a modification to spousal support based on a change in income, it found modification of child support appropriate given the change in the custodial timeshare. But, as of the date of the order, there was “insufficient information for the [c]ourt to calculate guideline support” because the parties had not yet “entered a stipulated order reflecting the new visitation schedule.” The court said it could not address the issue of temporary spousal support until first resolving the issue of child support. It denied Timofey’s motion “without prejudice for lack of sufficient information to cause a modification” and added: “The issue of retroactivity need not be considered at this time.” 5  Maria moved for reconsideration of the January 4 order, asking: “Does the [c]ourt intend to reserve the issue of retroactivity for [Ostler/Smith] child support based on our actual custodial timeshare?” On January 13, 2021, the trial court issued an amended order clarifying aspects of the January 4 order. The amended order made no substantial changes to the portion of the January 4 order that addressed child and spousal support. According to the minute order from a hearing held in April 2021, the court found it had “jurisdiction to modify the [January 4] order . . . retroactive to the date of filing of the initial motion.” The minute order further stated that it would be necessary to run a “Dissomaster calculation” using Maria’s base salary and a “2 to 3 percent timeshare” for Timofey, and using Timofey’s “old salary” (with a two-way Ostler/Smith table applied). In a July 2021 order, the court reconsidered the January 4 order; directed the parties to “meet and confer regarding giving [Maria] [Trainotti2] credits”; and “reserve[d] on the issue of overpayment/underpayment of support.” In October 2021, Maria moved for clarification of the July 2021 order insofar as it addressed “child support and additional child support based on an [sic] two way Ostler/Smith [b]onus schedule.” She again asked, “[d]oes the [c]ourt intend to make a child support order based on our actual custodial timeshare?” In February 2022, the trial court denied the motion for clarification and directed Maria’s counsel to file a “proposed revised” order “limited to what is contained within the minute orders.” No revised order appears in the record. In March 2023, Maria moved for modification of child support (retroactive to March 2020) and for termination of temporary spousal 2 In re Marriage of Trainotti (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1072. 6 support. The trial court denied the request to terminate spousal support, ordered Maria to pay Timofey $632 per month in temporary spousal support (beginning in March 2023), and ordered Timofey to pay Maria $2,410 per month in child support (also beginning in March 2023). The modification order resulted in a new net payment of $1,778 per month from Timofey to Maria. The court stated that any orders “not in conflict with” the modification order were “to remain in effect.” In June 2024, Maria again moved to terminate temporary spousal support. That motion remained pending at the time of trial in August 2024, at which point the parties “agreed for it to go off calendar,” and the court vacated a scheduled hearing on the motion. C. STATEMENT OF DECISION AND JUDGMENT At an October 2024 posttrial hearing, the trial court confirmed the parties’ agreement that Maria owed Timofey “[$]53,297 for home equity line of credit debt from September 1, 2017, to June 30, 2023.” Timofey asserted “there were additional charges from June 2023 to today and that’s an issue that has to be decided as well.” The court considered that issue “waived” because Timofey “didn’t raise it at trial” but said it would “let the parties meet and confer if [Timofey] believes there’s other monies due on the HELOC from [Maria].” Following a lengthy discussion about retroactive child support, the court determined that another judge had “told the parties to meet and confer and include the 2 percent for [Timofey]’s timeshare” and had “used the word [Trainotti] credits because at that time there was still the issue of all the spousal support that was due to [] [Timofey] by [Maria] that hadn’t been paid.” The court noted that temporary spousal support would not have extended beyond August 1, 2024, and that Timofey had not presented 7 any evidence at trial as to the amount owed for the period of April through July. The trial court issued a statement of decision and judgment in December 2024. It first noted the issues resolved by agreement of the parties before the end of trial, including that Maria would “be charged the amount of $53,297 for her draws from the [HELOC] . . . plus interest from September 1, 2017 to June 30, 2023” and that “[c]ommencing August 1, 2024, the [c]ourt’s authority and jurisdiction to order spousal support from either [p]arty shall forever terminate.” As to the HELOC, the court stated in a footnote: “To the extent the court ordered the parties to ‘meet and confer’ during trial, if no agreement was raised and this issue was not again raised with the court, the court finds [Timofey] waived his right to claim any additional equalization for the HELOC.” The court then set forth its rulings on the issues disputed at trial, which we summarize here as relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 1. Community Property Status of the Family Home At trial, Maria argued that the home the parties purchased together during the marriage was community property, while Timofey contended it was his separate property following the interspousal grant deed transferring Maria’s interest in the home to him. Under Family Code3 section 721, subdivision (b), the trial court applied a presumption of undue influence to the grant deed. The court found Timofey failed to rebut that presumption, and the home was thus community property. In support of its conclusion, the trial court noted that the home had been purchased with community funds and that “initial communications with the real estate professional involved in the purchase . . . documented that 3 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code. 8 [Timofey] and [Maria] intended to purchase the home together.” The court found credible Maria’s testimony that “the real estate professionals involved in the transaction recommended that title . . . should be held in [Timofey]’s name alone due to [Timofey]’s better credit score and to obtain a better mortgage interest rate before refinancing in six months.” The trial court “further found that [Maria]’s testimony was supported by two independent witnesses, Dolores Marquez, the realtor . . ., and Jaime Del Bosque, the loan officer.” In the court’s words, “Mr. Del Bosque credibly testified that the expressed intent of [Maria] and [Timofey] was to apply as mortgage borrowers jointly and it was only due to Mr. Del Bosque’s recommendation, that the [p]arties purchased the . . . [p]roperty with [Timofey] as the sole mortgage borrower and title holder. Mr. Del Bosque further testified that he suggested to remove [Maria] from the transaction, and that it was very rare for parties in real estate transactions to read every document they are given at closing. Both [Maria] and [Timofey] testified credibly that Mr. Del Bosque recommended [Timofey] take the loan in his name only to obtain a better mortgage rate due to [Timofey]’s better credit score. Ms. Marquez similarly testified credibly that it was her understanding that the [p]arties intended to refinance the . . . [p]roperty within six months to put [Maria]’s name on the title.” Further explaining its ruling, the trial court quoted from an e-mail Timofey sent to the parties’ credit union in February 2013: “ ‘Me and my wife are buying a house and need to transfer money (down payment) to title company. This is a domestic wire transfer from our MECU accounts ($44,932 from my [Timofey’s] account and $90,000 from [Maria’s] account.’ ” The court found that, when testifying at trial, Timofey “was not able to articulate what valuable consideration was given” in exchange for Maria’s interest in the 9 home. It also noted Timofey’s testimony that the HELOC obtained “in both of their names as guarantors . . . was a ‘common debt.’ ” The trial court concluded Timofey exerted undue influence on Maria by “(i) failing to provide valuable consideration for [Maria]’s execution of the Grant Deed, (ii) representing to [Maria] that the . . . [p]roperty would be ‘their home’; and (iii) rushing [Maria] through the process during closing.” Although the court found credible the notary’s testimony that she had explained the grant deed to Maria, it did not find based on that testimony that Maria “believed she was signing away all right, title, and interest to the . . . [p]roperty by signing that deed.” Rather, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Maria “was credible in her testimony that she believed the [p]arties were purchasing the . . . [p]roperty together.” The court emphasized that Maria “gave more money than [Timofey] from their community property accounts to purchase the property” and “spent over $15,869 of community property funds in an account in her name on various remodeling after the purchase.” It “question[ed] why, if [Maria] intended to gift the . . . [p]roperty to [Timofey], she would consent to put additional monies into the property - it just does not make sense.” 2. Retroactive Modification of Child Support The parties agreed that Timofey had satisfied his child support obligations for the period beginning in March 2023, but Maria requested that child support be modified retroactive to March 2020 “to reflect [Timofey]’s actual timeshare with the children.” The court applied section 4009, which provides that a child support order “may be made retroactive to the date of filing the petition, complaint, or other initial pleading.” It found that, for a three-year period beginning in March 2020, “the child support never reflected 10 the actual timeshare, despite multiple requests by [Maria] to modify the orders.” The court summarized the procedural history, beginning with Timofey’s July 2020 motion to modify child and spousal support. As the court recounted, that motion was addressed by multiple judges. “[O]n September 2, 2020, Judge Stoelker heard [Timofey]’s motion and took it under submission. On January 4, 2021, the [c]ourt issued its [o]rder [a]fter [h]earing, and found that modification of support was appropriate, but that insufficient information was provided to calculate guideline support. The [c]ourt denied [Timofey]’s motion without prejudice for lack of sufficient information to cause a modification.” Maria sought clarification of the January 4 order. “On April 26, 2021, Judge McCracken (the judicial officer who took Judge Stoelker’s caseload after Judge Stoelker’s retirement) found that she had jurisdiction to reconsider the January 4, 2021 order retroactive to the date of filing of the initial motion – [Timofey]’s petition to modify support dated July 9, 2020.” A third judge (Judge Pegg) presided over trial and authored the statement of decision and judgment. The trial court continued: “Judge McCracken’s minute order from April 26, 2021 states: ‘The [c]ourt finds that it has jurisdiction to modify the order from January 4, 2021, retroactive to the date of filing of the initial motion,’ which the court finds to be [Timofey]’s motion to modify support dated July 9, 2020. The [c]ourt further notes that Judge McCracken’s minute order states: “ ‘A DissoMaster calculation needs to be run with a base salary of [Maria] inputted and a 2 to 3 percent timeshare for [Timofey]. [Timofey]’s old salary should be inputted with a two-way [Ostler/Smith] table applied.’ ” In the court’s view, it was “clear” from the minute order that “Judge McCracken retroactively modified the support order to more accurately reflect [Timofey]’s 11 time share retroactive to July 9, 2020, the date [Timofey] filed [a request for order] to modify both child and spousal support” and “ordered the parties to run a DissoMaster calculation with a 2 to 3 percent timeshare for [Timofey].” But the written order corresponding to that hearing “omitted the language regarding the modified timeshare.” Instead, Timofey’s counsel (who prepared the order) “added the language ‘the parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding giving [Maria] Trainotti credits,’ which language is not reflected in the minutes. The court then hand-wrote on the written order ‘The court reserves on the issue of over payment/underpayment of support.’ ” Based on its understanding of the procedural history, the trial court found that “Judge McCracken ordered the parties to both modify the child support order to reflect [Timofey]’s 2 to 3 percent timeshare with the [c]hildren and to give [Maria] Trainotti credits for her payments for work- related daycare and unreimbursed medical expenses.” As the court characterized it, “Judge McCracken’s April 26, 2021, order reconsidered Judge Stoelker’s findings on attorney’s fees and costs, ordered the [p]arties to reconsider timeshare, and ordered retroactivity to the filing of [Timofey]’s July 9, 2020 motion” (which the court found to be pending at the time of the April 2021 hearing). The court found “credible evidence” that the parties “were ordered to meet and confer and include the 2 [percent] for [Timofey]’s timeshare retroactive to July 9, 2020.” It concluded Maria “should receive child support for the actual accurate timeshare in the time period” beginning when Timofey moved to modify support in July 2020, and ordered Timofey to pay $48,762 in retroactive child support for that time period. 3. Sanctions Against Timofey In her trial brief, Maria requested $200,000 in sanctions against Timofey under section 271. At the outset of trial, Timofey’s counsel verbally 12 acknowledged Maria’s “request for [section] 271 sanctions.” Timofey also filed a posttrial opposition to Maria’s request for sanctions. Acknowledging Timofey’s “actions in both denying the community property nature of the parties’ home and his refusal to accept Judge McCracken’s orders,” the court ordered $5,000 in sanctions. 4. Interest on Spousal Support Arrears The parties stipulated before trial that Maria owed Timofey $215,446 in spousal support arrears through 2022, reserving for trial the “issue of any interest” to be added to that amount. Timofey requested “interest of $10,507 on the $215,446 spousal support [Ostler/Smith] arrears” owed to him. The trial court denied the request, noting that Timofey “also delayed the payment of child support and engaged in bad faith tactics.” Specifically, the court found it “unreasonable” for Timofey “to take the position he took at trial regarding Judge McCracken’s rulings regarding child support owed and thereby deprived [Maria] of child support owed to her for her 100 [percent] support of the [c]hildren.” 5. Timofey’s Request for Attorney Fees Timofey requested need-based attorney fees under section 2030. At the time of the request, Timofey had already been awarded “$40,062 in need- based attorney’s fees and costs during the pendency of the action.” The trial court found that Timofey owed his attorney $64,318 and Maria owed her attorney $209,687. It described Timofey’s attorney fees as “very reasonable” and expressed no opinion on the reasonableness of Maria’s “much” higher attorney fees. The court noted that Maria’s monthly income of “$22,083 per month plus $5,567 in bonus” exceeded Timofey’s monthly income of $14,165. But the court also observed that Maria had “been paying all daycare-related childcare expenses, extracurricular activities for the [c]hildren, and their 13 healthcare since separation” (including “special services” for a child with autism) and “presented evidence that she has paid over $80,000 for the children” without assistance from Timofey. The trial court concluded that Maria was not financially able to contribute to Timofey’s attorney fees and Timofey did not have a financial need, as his expenses were “lower than his income” and he had “been able to pay his attorney’s fees throughout the litigation.” It again noted Timofey’s “unreasonable positions over the years on issues in this litigation,” and denied his request for attorney fees. 6. Termination and Calculation of Temporary Spousal Support The trial court noted that Maria had moved in June 2024 to terminate temporary spousal support and that a hearing on that motion had been “continued . . . to this trial.” It granted Maria’s motion, retroactive to June 30, 2024. Finding that Maria had initially failed to submit documentation of her income in the second quarter of 2024, then submitted “a declaration indicating that nothing had changed” between the first quarter of 2024 and her June 24, 2024 motion, the court concluded “her income did not change until July 1, 2024.” It imputed to Maria “her income from [q]uarter 1 to [q]uarter 2 only through June 30, 2024” and determined she owed $19,042 in temporary spousal support “for April and May 2024 for [q]uarter 2 2024” (in addition to $28,563 in “arrears owed and offset for [q]uarter 1 2024”). Adding those totals to the $68,525 Maria owed for the year 2023, the court ordered her to pay Timofey a “total amount of $116,130” in temporary spousal support arrears for 2023 and 2024. The court further ordered that Maria was “to receive her community property monies due” in connection with the 14 family home before she would be required to pay Timofey “anything under this order.” II. DISCUSSION Timofey challenges eight aspects of the judgment, contending the trial court erred in treating the family home as community property; denying attorney fees; not ordering additional HELOC reimbursement; modifying child support retroactive to July 2020; terminating temporary spousal support; imposing sanctions; denying interest on spousal support arrears; and allowing Maria to withhold spousal support pending her receipt of community property funds from the home. “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 (Arceneaux).) As to each issue raised on appeal, Timofey bears the burden to both provide an accurate record and demonstrate error. (In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9.) A. PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE In property-related transactions between spouses, section 721, subdivision (b) “imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse.” This duty stems from “the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other” and prohibits each spouse from taking “any unfair advantage of the other.” (Ibid.) “ ‘If one spouse secures an advantage from the transaction, a statutory presumption arises under section 721 that the advantaged spouse exercised undue influence and the transaction will be set aside.’ ” (In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 344.) An advantage results to one spouse when that spouse gains or when the other 15 spouse is hurt by the transaction. (Gaines v. California Trust Co. (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 709, 714.) A spouse obtains an advantage when the “spouse’s position is improved, he or she obtains a favorable opportunity, or otherwise gains, benefits, or profits.” (In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624, 629 (Mathews).) The presumption is rebuttable; the spouse advantaged by the transaction must establish that the disadvantaged spouse acted freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of all the facts and a complete understanding of the effect of the transaction. (Fossum, at p. 344.) Timofey contends that the trial court’s finding that he failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence applicable to his acquisition of Maria’s interest in the family home was not supported by the evidence. We reject the contention for two independent reasons. First, Timofey has not provided an adequate record for review of the issue. In finding Maria’s testimony credible and concluding Timofey failed to rebut the presumption, the court relied in part on testimony from realtor Marquez and loan officer Del Bosque. Deposition testimony from those two witnesses, which was admitted at trial in lieu of direct examination, has not been included in the record on appeal. Timofey asserts in his reply brief that “[t]he [j]udgment shows that the [t]rial [c]ourt based its decision on the witness’ trial testimony and not on their deposition testimony.” But the record contradicts his characterization of the judgment. Marquez and Del Bosque were briefly cross-examined at trial, and the court engaged in limited questioning of its own. In questioning Marquez, the court referenced her deposition testimony and attempted to clarify portions of that testimony. The court stated in its written statement of decision that Marquez “testified credibly that it was her understanding that the [p]arties intended to refinance the . . . [p]roperty within six months to put [Maria]’s name on the title.” The reference to a six-month timeframe 16 does not appear in the transcript of Marquez’s brief trial testimony and suggests the court relied on portions of the deposition testimony in making its findings. Without the deposition testimony, we must presume that testimony supports the judgment. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) Apart from these deficiencies, the appellate record supports the judgment. Although Timofey characterizes the trial court’s finding that he failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence as a factual determination reviewed for substantial evidence, that characterization is misplaced. “In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) “Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (I.W., at p. 1528.) Timofey’s evidence was neither uncontradicted, nor so compelling as to preclude the conclusion that he failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence. He analogizes this case to Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 624, where the presumption was adequately rebutted. The wife in Mathews quitclaimed her interest in the family home at the time of purchase, and the husband purchased the house alone to obtain a more favorable interest rate 17 on a mortgage. (Id. at p. 627.) But in Mathews, the trial court found no undue influence by the husband on the wife’s quitclaim deed. (Id. at p. 628.) The question on appeal in Mathews was thus whether the trial court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence—not, as here, whether the evidence compelled that finding as a matter of law. This case also differs from Mathews in another key respect. “While the Mathews court mentioned in passing that the wife ‘assumed’ or ‘believed’ she would be added onto the title, there is no indication that her husband ever promised that would happen.” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 287.) Here, Maria (whose testimony the court found credible) testified that she had signed the grant deed based on Timofey’s assurance that he would “ ‘add [her] to title later.’ ” That distinction alone is “fatal” to Timofey’s contention that Mathews compelled a finding in his favor. (Starr, at p. 283.) For these reasons, Timofey has not persuaded us that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its determination that he failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence. B. ATTORNEY FEES Timofey contends the court abused its discretion in denying his request for need-based attorney fees under section 2030. “When a request for attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “[T]he proper legal standard for determining an attorney fee award requires the trial court to determine how to apportion the cost of the 18 proceedings equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 (Falcone & Fyke).) “Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall costs of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances” (§ 2032, subd. (b)), and the parties’ litigation tactics may also be considered. (Falcone & Fyke, at p. 975.) We will not reverse an order on a request for need-based attorney fees “absent a showing that no judge could reasonably have made the order, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the order.” (Ibid.) Although Timofey appears to suggest the trial court did not make the findings required under section 2030, subdivision (a)(2), the court’s decision sets forth findings as to each of the statutory factors. The court found an award of attorney fees inappropriate due in part to Timofey’s “unreasonable” litigation tactics. It found no disparity in access to funds to retain counsel where Timofey had “been able to pay his attorney’s fees throughout the litigation.” And it found Maria was unable to pay for both parties’ legal representation where she owed her attorney $209,687, Timofey owed his attorney $64,318, and Maria had spent over $80,000 on expenses related to the children without any financial contribution from Timofey. Construing the evidence in favor of the trial court’s decision, as we must, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of Timofey’s request for additional need-based attorney fees beyond the $40,062 already awarded. C. HELOC REIMBURSEMENT Before the August 2024 trial, the parties agreed that Maria would reimburse Timofey $53,297 for money drawn from the HELOC between September 2017 and June 2023. At an October 2024 posttrial hearing, 19 Timofey suggested for the first time that “there were additional charges from June 2023 to today and that’s an issue that has to be decided as well.” The court considered the issue “waived” because Timofey “didn’t raise it at trial” but allowed for the possibility that the parties could “meet and confer if [Timofey] believes there’s other monies due on the HELOC from [Maria].” The record does not indicate that Timofey ever produced evidence of the “additional charges” for which he sought reimbursement, or attempted to meet and confer on the issue before the court issued its statement of decision and judgment in December 2024. In its decision, the court again noted that Timofey “waived his right to claim any additional equalization for the HELOC.” Timofey now argues on appeal that the court “abused its discretion in denying the final home equity line of credit true-up.” (Boldface & underscoring omitted.) The parties frame the issue differently, with Maria characterizing Timofey’s posttrial objection as a request for discretionary reimbursement under section 2626, and Timofey replying that he instead sought the equal division of community debt under section 2550. The disagreement is of little consequence to our resolution of this issue on appeal. Whatever the basis for Timofey’s request, he bore the burden of making a specific request supported by evidence. (See In re Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1057–1058 [the party claiming a right of reimbursement has the burden of proof]; In re Marriage of Feldner (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 617, 625–626 [the party seeking reimbursement must make a specific request]; In re Marriage of Warren (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 777, 784 [the party asserting the existence of a community debt has the burden of producing evidence of its existence].) Where Timofey belatedly requested reimbursement for unspecified “additional charges” and produced no evidence of those charges either during 20 trial or in the four months following trial, the court did not err in concluding he had forfeited4 the right to request additional reimbursement. D. RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT According to Timofey, his July 2020 motion to modify child support was denied in January 2021 and was no longer pending at the time the trial court eventually modified support. He contends support could only be modified retroactive to March 2023 (when Maria moved to modify support), not July 2020 (when Timofey filed his motion). “An order modifying or terminating a support order may be made retroactive to the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate, or to any subsequent date,” subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. (§ 3653, subd. (a).) We review a child support order for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282.) Reversal is warranted only if the record shows prejudicial error. (In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1233–1234.) We resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial court’s determination. (Id. at p. 1234.) When “the trial court’s order . . . finds substantial support in the evidence, . . . no abuse of discretion is shown.” (Dean v. Dean (1963) 59 Cal.2d 655, 657.) In its decision, the trial court made factual findings concerning the previous child support orders in the case. The court found Maria had made “multiple requests . . . to modify the orders” beginning in 2020 before Judge Stoelker and that in April 2021, “Judge McCracken (the judicial officer who 4 Although the trial court spoke in terms of “waiver,” the appropriate term is “forfeiture.” “ ‘Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion