Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 In re D.C. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re D.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D088016 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ4952) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.C. et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Blair A. Soper, Judge. Conditionally reversed in part and remanded with instructions. Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.C. Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Donald C. Damon Brown, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. L.C. (Mother) and Donald C. (Father) filed notices of appeal after their parental rights were terminated. (Welf. & Ins. Code,1 § 366.26.) Father appeals the juvenile court’s order denying his request to have his minor daughter D.C. placed with the paternal grandmother under the relative placement statute pursuant to section 361.3. Mother argues the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to comply with its duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). The Agency concedes the Agency erred in failing to contact two federally recognized Kickapoo Tribes after the paternal grandmother claimed Kickapoo heritage. We have reviewed the record and agree a concession is appropriate. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the order and remand the matter to complete the ICWA inquiry. In all other respects, we affirm the order. BACKGROUND A. The Agency’s Petition In August 2024, the Agency filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging D.C. tested positive for fentanyl and norfentanyl at birth and Mother admitted to drug use during pregnancy. Father admitted to a history of drug use, denied knowing Mother used drugs during pregnancy, “was unable to stop said usage” and therefore there was “a substantial risk that [D.C.] will suffer serious physical harm.” The juvenile 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 court made a prima facie finding on the petition and detained D.C. out of the parents’ care. In September 2024, D.C. moved into the paternal grandmother’s home after she was approved for placement. The jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place in October 2024. The juvenile court made a true finding on the petition, removed custody from the parents, placed D.C. with the paternal grandmother, and ordered reunification services and supervised visits for the parents. B. Reunification In November 2024, the Agency conducted a home visit to the paternal grandmother’s home. The paternal grandmother reported transporting D.C. to the maternal grandmother daily for childcare. The parents lived with the maternal grandmother and “see [D.C.] all day.” Although the paternal grandmother did not believe the parents were still using drugs, she acknowledged “they . . . have a drug problem.” The social worker noted “there were minimal items for an infant child living in the home,” no “dry bottles or formula in the kitchen or the bedroom” and “no infant toys in the home.” In early December 2024, the Agency conducted an unannounced visit to the maternal grandmother’s home. D.C. was unattended on the side of a bed and the maternal grandmother admitted leaving D.C. with Mother unsupervised during medical appointments. The Agency decided to immediately remove D.C. given the concerns about D.C.’s safety where she was residing and unsupervised contact with the parents. However, the parents fled with D.C and both the paternal grandmother and maternal grandmother denied knowing their whereabouts. The next day, Mother returned D.C. to the Agency and D.C. tested positive for fentanyl. 3 The Agency filed a notice of change of placement. D.C. was placed with the maternal great-aunt. Later in December 2024, the parents had a supervised visit with D.C. at the Agency’s office. At the end of the two-hour visit, the social worker noticed D.C. “started to make grunting noises,” her “face was red,” “she was having a difficult time breathing,” “she appeared lethargic,” and then “was gasping for air and her eyes were rolling to the back of her head.” Firefighters arrived while D.C. “was going in and out of consciousness and continued to have difficulty breathing, her face was red and purple.” Two doses of Narcan were administered and D.C. stabilized. The social worker noted, while “paramedics were attempting to stabilize [D.C.], the father was observed walking around bushes outside the office, reaching into his front shirt pocket, and throwing something on the ground.” Law enforcement located a burnt piece of aluminum foil. Evaluation of D.C. at the hospital determined her condition was “consistent with exposure to an opioid.” In early January 2025, the Agency filed a section 388 petition requesting the court prohibit in-person visits with the parents. The court granted the Agency’s request and gave the Agency discretion to expand the parents’ visitation to in-person after three negative drug tests. At the six-month review hearing in April 2025, the Agency recommended the parents’ services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. The social worker noted the paternal grandmother requested D.C. be placed with her again. The social worker facilitated weekly structured unsupervised visits with D.C. but “informed her that [D.C] will not be placed back in her care as she was removed from her.” The Agency noted she “continues to lack insight as to the parents[’] substance abuse as well as how [D.C.] has been affected by the continued lethal Fentanyl 4 exposures.” The Agency was assessing the maternal aunt and uncle for placement. In June 2025, the paternal grandmother filed a section 388 petition requesting the Agency place D.C. with her. The Agency asked the court to deny the petition basis noting paternal grandmother “was the sole person responsible for [D.C.] and while under her care, [D.C.] was left unsupervised and tested positive for Fentanyl.” The Agency also noted paternal grandmother “continuously demonstrated a lack of insight into the protective issue and the severity of [D.C.] being exposed to drugs” and “a disregard for the Agency rules” and “admitted to wanting to attempt to utilize a relative to get guardianship of [D.C.] so she could then get her back once the guardianship was established.” The court denied the petition citing “no prima facie showing” to change placement orders. (Some capitalization omitted.) The contested six-month review hearing took place in July 2025. At that time, the caregiver approval process for the maternal aunt was still pending. The paternal grandmother indicated she had reapplied for approval. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. C. The Paternal Grandmother’s Section 388 Petition and the Section 366.26 Hearing In August 2025, the paternal grandmother contacted the Agency and indicated she wanted D.C. placed with her and was going through the caregiver approval process. The social worker explained the Agency was not currently looking for placement but asked her to provide an update when she was approved. The following month, the paternal grandmother again 5 contacted the Agency asking for placement of D.C. For the second time, the social worker stated the Agency was not actively looking for placement. In early October 2025, the paternal grandmother filed another section 388 petition seeking placement of D.C. The petition alleged she had been approved as a caregiver and it was in D.C.’s best interest to be placed with her. The following day, however, the Agency received an update that her approval process was still pending. Also in early October 2025, the Agency received notification that the maternal aunt had been approved as a caregiver. Later that month, D.C. was placed with the maternal aunt and the Agency filed a notice of change of placement. The section 366.26 hearing took place at the end of October 2025. At the hearing, the court observed that paternal grandmother’s section 388 petition triggered “a duty to reassess all relatives” when D.C. was moved to a different relative. It noted it wanted all relatives reassessed if not already done “so that we can have a [section] 361.3 analysis comparing all the factors and determining the best placement.” It commented the Agency might have a “clear plan, but that clear plan is not what the law contemplates. It contemplates all relatives whenever a new placement is necessary.” Mother’s counsel noted the paternal grandmother was still awaiting to be approved as a caregiver. Although the court initially intended to “trail the [section] 388 petition” because “it’s in some ways premature,” it ultimately denied the petition because it “does not state a change in circumstances” as “the [caregiver] is not officially approved.” The court concluded, “the good thing is that the request is essentially for placement and we’re going to consider that anyway.” 6 After the hearing, the maternal grandmother informed the Agency D.C. never resided with the paternal grandmother when the court placed D.C. in the paternal grandmother’s care. She was concerned that if D.C. was placed with the paternal grandmother, she would return D.C. to the parents’ care. The paternal grandmother filed a declaration in November 2025 opining that placement in her care was in D.C.’s best interest based upon their bond. She declared the parents wanted D.C. to be placed with her and that she was a good person and could keep D.C. safe. Soon after the November 25 declaration, paternal grandmother filed another one to which she attached a certificate reflecting she was approved as a caregiver on October 24, 2025. The Agency was previously unaware of that approval. At the continued section 366.26 hearing in December 2025, the Agency recommended terminating parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption for D.C. The Agency assessed placement with the paternal grandmother and the maternal aunt. County Counsel stated the Agency included a section 361.3 assessment in the report but was not recommending a change of placement since D.C. was already with a relative. The court noted that placement under section 361.3 would be considered and continued the matter. The court requested the Agency prepare a report with an updated section 361.3 assessment for the relatives. In January 2026, the paternal grandmother filed a declaration with miscellaneous text messages, social media postings, and documents from different sources with paternal grandmother’s notations on them. Later that month, the maternal aunt and uncle filed a de facto parent request, which the court granted. A week later, the Agency filed a section 361.3 assessment for the paternal grandmother and the maternal aunt. 7 At the continued section 366.26 hearing in February 2026, the court noted disagreement about whether section 361.3 or section 388 applied. Mother’s counsel noted a prior judicial officer found a change of placement was necessary and this triggered a section 361.3 evaluation negating the need for a section 388 petition. The court, in any event, requested a new section 361.3 evaluation and continued the hearing, along with the question of whether section 388 or section 361.3 applied to the proceedings. At the section 366.26 hearing in April 2026, the court found that section 361.3 did not apply because D.C. was in a stable placement. Instead, section 388 applied and the juvenile court allowed the paternal grandmother to renew her previously-filed section 388 petition. After hearing arguments from the paternal grandmother and all counsel, the court summarily denied paternal grandmother’s section 388 petition. The court then terminated parental rights, found D.C. was adoptable and ordered adoption as the permanent plan. D. ICWA The ICWA attachment to the Agency’s petition indicated Mother and Father “gave . . . no reason to believe [D.C.] is or may be an Indian child.” Prior to the detention hearing, Mother, Father, the maternal grandmother, the paternal grandmother and the maternal aunt all denied any Native American ancestry. At the August 2024 detention hearing, the maternal grandmother, the maternal grandfather, the paternal grandmother, and the maternal great aunt all denied Native American ancestry. The parents filed forms indicating no Native American ancestry. The court, without prejudice to renewing the claim, found ICWA did not apply. 8 In September 2024, in response to the Agency’s inquiry, Mother, Father, the paternal grandmother, and the maternal grandmother all denied any Native American ancestry or having a reason to believe D.C. was an Indian child. The Agency also mailed relative notification letters including an ICWA inquiry and/or called the maternal grandmother and two other paternal relatives. At the April 2025 six-month review hearing, the maternal aunt denied any Native American ancestry. At another hearing two months later, the court noted Mother’s attorney indicated the paternal grandmother may have Kickapoo ancestry. The matter was continued and the Agency was directed to obtain additional information about the ancestry claim. Later in June 2025, the paternal grandmother disclosed to a social worker that she learned her family had potential Native American ancestry through the website Ancestry.com. She was unaware of any relative living on a reservation, being an enrolled tribal member, or receiving services from the tribe and reported no living relatives could provide additional information. She did not speak any Native American languages, nor did she participate in cultural customs or traditions. That same day, the Agency researched the Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas on the Bureau of Indian Affairs website and obtained a phone number. The social worker contacted the Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas and received a phone number for the tribe’s ICWA director. The court addressed ICWA at the July 2025 six-month review hearing. The Agency noted that the paternal grandmother disclosed she discovered through Ancestry.com the family may have Kickapoo heritage through the Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas. The Agency sent an e-mail and letter to the tribe. The tribal representative spoke with the Agency by phone and wanted to be present to answer questions. However, the tribal representative did not 9 answer when the juvenile court tried to reach her. The court found it still had “no reason to know that [ICWA] applies.” In July 2025, the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas sent a letter confirming D.C. and Father were not members. In March 2026, the maternal aunt and the maternal uncle denied Native American ancestry. At the April 2026 section 366.26 hearing, the court found ICWA did not apply to the proceeding. DISCUSSION A. Standing The Agency argues that the parents lack standing because they did not appeal the order terminating parental rights. We disagree. “We liberally construe the issue of standing and resolve doubts in favor of the right to appeal.” (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 9.) Here, both parents appealed the April 2026 order terminating parental rights. Father’s appeal is from the orders denying relative placement “and the termination of his parental rights under section 366.26” and he requests the “reversal of the termination of parental rights.” Mother requests us to “conditionally reverse the April 6, 2026, order terminating her parental rights.” The Agency concedes error regarding ICWA and agrees that it warrants conditional reversal of the order terminating parental rights. The parents thus have standing because they are appealing the order terminating parental rights. Moreover, the cases cited by the Agency do not support a lack of standing here. For example, the father in In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231 lacked standing because he did not contest termination of his parental rights in the juvenile court or on appeal. (Id. at pp. 235, 237-238.) Here, by contrast, both parents contested termination of parental rights at the section 10 366.26 hearing and asked the trial court to apply the beneficial relationship exception. Similarly, the mother in In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428 opposed termination only if the child was not placed with the relatives she favored. (Id. at p. 436.) Here, by contrast, Mother opposed termination outright and asked for guardianship in the trial court and has joined in Father’s argument under section 361.3 on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) B. Section 361.3 Father argues “the court erred in finding the relative placement statute under section 361.3 inapplicable.” We disagree. The parties agree that the standard of review is de novo. (In re A.F. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 51, 54 [The “appeal raises purely legal issues based on undisputed facts, making our standard of review de novo.”].) “ ‘Preferential consideration’ means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) The preference applies at the disposition hearing and thereafter “whenever a new placement of the child must be made.” (Id., subd. (d); see In re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 285 [“[S]ection 361.3 assures interested relatives that, when a child is taken from her parents and placed outside the home pending the determination whether reunification is possible, the relative’s application will be considered before a stranger’s application.”].) “Preferential consideration ‘does not create an evidentiary presumption in favor of a relative, but merely places the relative at the head of the line when the court is determining which placement is in the child’s best interests.’ ” (In re Antonio G. (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 369, 376.) “[T]he statute expresse[s] a command that relatives be assessed and considered 11 favorably, subject to the juvenile court’s consideration of the suitability of the relative’s home and the best interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320.) “The linchpin of a section 361.3 analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor.” (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 862-863.) Here, the court found section 361.3 did not apply because D.C. was “in a stable home” and the Agency was “not requesting [D.C.] be removed.” The undisputed facts demonstrate D.C. was not in need of a new placement at the time the paternal grandmother was approved. It was not until December 3, 2025, that the Agency and court became aware her home was approved. Because services had already been terminated and D.C. was not in need of a new placement, the juvenile court correctly found section 361.3 did not apply. (In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 577, 595.) Moreover, even if section 361.3 applied, any error was harmless. It was not reasonably probable the court would place D.C. with the paternal grandmother if it applied the section 361.3 factors. The Agency’s report included a section 361.3 assessment of the paternal grandmother and the maternal aunt. The court noted “the Agency on their own did their own [section] 361.3 analysis and compared [the] paternal grandmother with the [maternal aunt] and still found that the most appropriate placement is the [maternal aunt].” Throughout the case, the Agency had significant concerns about the paternal grandmother’s protective capacity. The court found she allowed D.C. “to be placed in very dangerous situations, life-altering situations that could have led to her demise. And there appears to be no remorse in your [the paternal grandmother’s] actions.” The court did not find placement with the paternal grandmother was in D.C.’s “best interest” given she “willingly 12 placed [D.C.] in dangerous situations” and violated “court order on numerous occasions.” The section 361.3 factors include “the good moral character of the relative,” and the ability to “[p]rovide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child,” and “[e]xercise proper and effective care and control of a child.” (§ 361.3, subds. (a)(5), (7)(A)(B).) These factors directly relate to the court’s concerns. Finally, Father attempts to identify factors the court did not consider including that it “never weighed the contentious relationship between [the] maternal aunt [ ] and [the] paternal grandmother, which threatened [D.C.’s] relationship with her paternal side altogether.” We disagree any of the factors identified by Father “could have produced a different result.” Where “regardless of the relative placement preference, the fundamental duty of the court is to assure the best interests of the child” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 321), we conclude there was no prejudicial error. C. ICWA Mother argues the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply was not supported by substantial evidence because “the Agency’s further inquiry reached only one of the three federally recognized Kickapoo tribes.” The Agency concedes “it had a statutory duty to inquire about each of the federally recognized Kickapoo tribes” and that it “failed to inquire” with the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas and the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma. We have reviewed the record and agree a concession is appropriate. The court and the Agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) If the initial inquiry creates a “reason to believe” the child has Native American ancestry, the Agency is required to “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable” 13 (§ 224.2, subd. (e)) to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)). The duty of further inquiry includes contacting “the tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).) The record indicates the Agency failed to inquire about two federally recognized Kickapoo tribes after the paternal grandmother identified Kickapoo heritage. Thus, the court’s finding that ICWA did not apply is not supported by substantial evidence. We conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights with a limited remand for the Agency and juvenile court to comply with ICWA and section 224.2. (See In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1141 [If ICWA “inquiry is inadequate, conditional reversal is required so the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.”].) 14 DISPOSITION The order entered by the juvenile court on April 6, 2026, made pursuant to a hearing under section 366.26, is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of inquiring with the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas and the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma as required by ICWA and the California Indian Child Welfare Act. After proper inquiry has been completed and any notice requirements are met, if either tribe claims D.C. is a Native American child, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and the parallel California statute. If not, the court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. In all other respects, the order is affirmed. RUBIN, J. WE CONCUR: CASTILLO, Acting P. J. AMIN, J. 15