In re D.C. CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketD088016
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 In re D.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re D.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D088016
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. EJ4952)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.C. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Blair A. Soper, Judge. Conditionally reversed in part and remanded with
instructions.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant L.C.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Donald C.
Damon Brown, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Natasha Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
L.C. (Mother) and Donald C. (Father) filed notices of appeal after their
parental rights were terminated. (Welf. & Ins. Code,1 § 366.26.) Father
appeals the juvenile court’s order denying his request to have his minor
daughter D.C. placed with the paternal grandmother under the relative
placement statute pursuant to section 361.3. Mother argues the San Diego
County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to comply
with its duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.). The Agency concedes the Agency erred in failing to contact two
federally recognized Kickapoo Tribes after the paternal grandmother claimed
Kickapoo heritage. We have reviewed the record and agree a concession is
appropriate. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the order and remand the
matter to complete the ICWA inquiry. In all other respects, we affirm the
order.
BACKGROUND
A. The Agency’s Petition
In August 2024, the Agency filed a petition pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), alleging D.C. tested positive for fentanyl and norfentanyl
at birth and Mother admitted to drug use during pregnancy. Father
admitted to a history of drug use, denied knowing Mother used drugs during
pregnancy, “was unable to stop said usage” and therefore there was “a
substantial risk that [D.C.] will suffer serious physical harm.” The juvenile
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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court made a prima facie finding on the petition and detained D.C. out of the
parents’ care.
In September 2024, D.C. moved into the paternal grandmother’s home
after she was approved for placement.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place in October 2024.
The juvenile court made a true finding on the petition, removed custody from
the parents, placed D.C. with the paternal grandmother, and ordered
reunification services and supervised visits for the parents.
B. Reunification
In November 2024, the Agency conducted a home visit to the paternal
grandmother’s home. The paternal grandmother reported transporting D.C.
to the maternal grandmother daily for childcare. The parents lived with the
maternal grandmother and “see [D.C.] all day.” Although the paternal
grandmother did not believe the parents were still using drugs, she
acknowledged “they . . . have a drug problem.” The social worker noted
“there were minimal items for an infant child living in the home,” no “dry
bottles or formula in the kitchen or the bedroom” and “no infant toys in the
home.”
In early December 2024, the Agency conducted an unannounced visit to
the maternal grandmother’s home. D.C. was unattended on the side of a bed
and the maternal grandmother admitted leaving D.C. with Mother
unsupervised during medical appointments. The Agency decided to
immediately remove D.C. given the concerns about D.C.’s safety where she
was residing and unsupervised contact with the parents. However, the
parents fled with D.C and both the paternal grandmother and maternal
grandmother denied knowing their whereabouts. The next day, Mother
returned D.C. to the Agency and D.C. tested positive for fentanyl.
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The Agency filed a notice of change of placement. D.C. was placed with
the maternal great-aunt.
Later in December 2024, the parents had a supervised visit with D.C.
at the Agency’s office. At the end of the two-hour visit, the social worker
noticed D.C. “started to make grunting noises,” her “face was red,” “she was
having a difficult time breathing,” “she appeared lethargic,” and then “was
gasping for air and her eyes were rolling to the back of her head.” Firefighters
arrived while D.C. “was going in and out of consciousness and continued to
have difficulty breathing, her face was red and purple.” Two doses of Narcan
were administered and D.C. stabilized. The social worker noted, while
“paramedics were attempting to stabilize [D.C.], the father was observed
walking around bushes outside the office, reaching into his front shirt pocket,
and throwing something on the ground.” Law enforcement located a burnt
piece of aluminum foil. Evaluation of D.C. at the hospital determined her
condition was “consistent with exposure to an opioid.”
In early January 2025, the Agency filed a section 388 petition
requesting the court prohibit in-person visits with the parents. The court
granted the Agency’s request and gave the Agency discretion to expand the
parents’ visitation to in-person after three negative drug tests.
At the six-month review hearing in April 2025, the Agency
recommended the parents’ services be terminated and a section 366.26
hearing be set. The social worker noted the paternal grandmother requested
D.C. be placed with her again. The social worker facilitated weekly
structured unsupervised visits with D.C. but “informed her that [D.C] will
not be placed back in her care as she was removed from her.” The Agency
noted she “continues to lack insight as to the parents[’] substance abuse as
well as how [D.C.] has been affected by the continued lethal Fentanyl
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exposures.” The Agency was assessing the maternal aunt and uncle for
placement.
In June 2025, the paternal grandmother filed a section 388 petition
requesting the Agency place D.C. with her. The Agency asked the court to
deny the petition basis noting paternal grandmother “was the sole person
responsible for [D.C.] and while under her care, [D.C.] was left unsupervised
and tested positive for Fentanyl.” The Agency also noted paternal
grandmother “continuously demonstrated a lack of insight into the protective
issue and the severity of [D.C.] being exposed to drugs” and “a disregard for
the Agency rules” and “admitted to wanting to attempt to utilize a relative to
get guardianship of [D.C.] so she could then get her back once the
guardianship was established.” The court denied the petition citing “no
prima facie showing” to change placement orders. (Some capitalization
omitted.)
The contested six-month review hearing took place in July 2025. At
that time, the caregiver approval process for the maternal aunt was still
pending. The paternal grandmother indicated she had reapplied for
approval. The court terminated reunification services and set a section
366.26 hearing.
C. The Paternal Grandmother’s Section 388 Petition and the Section
366.26 Hearing
In August 2025, the paternal grandmother contacted the Agency and
indicated she wanted D.C. placed with her and was going through the
caregiver approval process. The social worker explained the Agency was not
currently looking for placement but asked her to provide an update when she
was approved. The following month, the paternal grandmother again
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contacted the Agency asking for placement of D.C. For the second time, the
social worker stated the Agency was not actively looking for placement.
In early October 2025, the paternal grandmother filed another section
388 petition seeking placement of D.C. The petition alleged she had been
approved as a caregiver and it was in D.C.’s best interest to be placed with
her. The following day, however, the Agency received an update that her
approval process was still pending.
Also in early October 2025, the Agency received notification that the
maternal aunt had been approved as a caregiver. Later that month, D.C. was
placed with the maternal aunt and the Agency filed a notice of change of
placement.
The section 366.26 hearing took place at the end of October 2025. At
the hearing, the court observed that paternal grandmother’s section 388
petition triggered “a duty to reassess all relatives” when D.C. was moved to a
different relative. It noted it wanted all relatives reassessed if not already
done “so that we can have a [section] 361.3 analysis comparing all the factors
and determining the best placement.” It commented the Agency might have
a “clear plan, but that clear plan is not what the law contemplates. It
contemplates all relatives whenever a new placement is necessary.”
Mother’s counsel noted the paternal grandmother was still awaiting to
be approved as a caregiver. Although the court initially intended to “trail the
[section] 388 petition” because “it’s in some ways premature,” it ultimately
denied the petition because it “does not state a change in circumstances” as
“the [caregiver] is not officially approved.” The court concluded, “the good
thing is that the request is essentially for placement and we’re going to
consider that anyway.”
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After the hearing, the maternal grandmother informed the Agency D.C.
never resided with the paternal grandmother when the court placed D.C. in
the paternal grandmother’s care. She was concerned that if D.C. was placed
with the paternal grandmother, she would return D.C. to the parents’ care.
The paternal grandmother filed a declaration in November 2025
opining that placement in her care was in D.C.’s best interest based upon
their bond. She declared the parents wanted D.C. to be placed with her and
that she was a good person and could keep D.C. safe. Soon after the
November 25 declaration, paternal grandmother filed another one to which
she attached a certificate reflecting she was approved as a caregiver on
October 24, 2025. The Agency was previously unaware of that approval.
At the continued section 366.26 hearing in December 2025, the Agency
recommended terminating parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption
for D.C. The Agency assessed placement with the paternal grandmother and
the maternal aunt. County Counsel stated the Agency included a section
361.3 assessment in the report but was not recommending a change of
placement since D.C. was already with a relative. The court noted that
placement under section 361.3 would be considered and continued the
matter. The court requested the Agency prepare a report with an updated
section 361.3 assessment for the relatives.
In January 2026, the paternal grandmother filed a declaration with
miscellaneous text messages, social media postings, and documents from
different sources with paternal grandmother’s notations on them. Later that
month, the maternal aunt and uncle filed a de facto parent request, which
the court granted. A week later, the Agency filed a section 361.3 assessment
for the paternal grandmother and the maternal aunt.
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At the continued section 366.26 hearing in February 2026, the court
noted disagreement about whether section 361.3 or section 388 applied.
Mother’s counsel noted a prior judicial officer found a change of placement
was necessary and this triggered a section 361.3 evaluation negating the
need for a section 388 petition. The court, in any event, requested a new
section 361.3 evaluation and continued the hearing, along with the question
of whether section 388 or section 361.3 applied to the proceedings.
At the section 366.26 hearing in April 2026, the court found that
section 361.3 did not apply because D.C. was in a stable placement. Instead,
section 388 applied and the juvenile court allowed the paternal grandmother
to renew her previously-filed section 388 petition. After hearing arguments
from the paternal grandmother and all counsel, the court summarily denied
paternal grandmother’s section 388 petition.
The court then terminated parental rights, found D.C. was adoptable
and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
D. ICWA
The ICWA attachment to the Agency’s petition indicated Mother and
Father “gave . . . no reason to believe [D.C.] is or may be an Indian child.”
Prior to the detention hearing, Mother, Father, the maternal grandmother,
the paternal grandmother and the maternal aunt all denied any Native
American ancestry.
At the August 2024 detention hearing, the maternal grandmother, the
maternal grandfather, the paternal grandmother, and the maternal great
aunt all denied Native American ancestry. The parents filed forms indicating
no Native American ancestry. The court, without prejudice to renewing the
claim, found ICWA did not apply.
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In September 2024, in response to the Agency’s inquiry, Mother,
Father, the paternal grandmother, and the maternal grandmother all denied
any Native American ancestry or having a reason to believe D.C. was an
Indian child. The Agency also mailed relative notification letters including
an ICWA inquiry and/or called the maternal grandmother and two other
paternal relatives.
At the April 2025 six-month review hearing, the maternal aunt denied
any Native American ancestry. At another hearing two months later, the
court noted Mother’s attorney indicated the paternal grandmother may have
Kickapoo ancestry. The matter was continued and the Agency was directed
to obtain additional information about the ancestry claim.
Later in June 2025, the paternal grandmother disclosed to a social
worker that she learned her family had potential Native American ancestry
through the website Ancestry.com. She was unaware of any relative living on
a reservation, being an enrolled tribal member, or receiving services from the
tribe and reported no living relatives could provide additional information.
She did not speak any Native American languages, nor did she participate in
cultural customs or traditions. That same day, the Agency researched the
Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas on the Bureau of Indian Affairs website and
obtained a phone number. The social worker contacted the Kickapoo Tribe of
Kansas and received a phone number for the tribe’s ICWA director.
The court addressed ICWA at the July 2025 six-month review hearing.
The Agency noted that the paternal grandmother disclosed she discovered
through Ancestry.com the family may have Kickapoo heritage through the
Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas. The Agency sent an e-mail and letter to the tribe.
The tribal representative spoke with the Agency by phone and wanted to be
present to answer questions. However, the tribal representative did not
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answer when the juvenile court tried to reach her. The court found it still
had “no reason to know that [ICWA] applies.”
In July 2025, the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas sent a letter confirming
D.C. and Father were not members.
In March 2026, the maternal aunt and the maternal uncle denied
Native American ancestry.
At the April 2026 section 366.26 hearing, the court found ICWA did not
apply to the proceeding.
DISCUSSION
A. Standing
The Agency argues that the parents lack standing because they did not
appeal the order terminating parental rights. We disagree.
“We liberally construe the issue of standing and resolve doubts in favor
of the right to appeal.” (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 9.) Here, both
parents appealed the April 2026 order terminating parental rights. Father’s
appeal is from the orders denying relative placement “and the termination of
his parental rights under section 366.26” and he requests the “reversal of the
termination of parental rights.” Mother requests us to “conditionally reverse
the April 6, 2026, order terminating her parental rights.” The Agency
concedes error regarding ICWA and agrees that it warrants conditional
reversal of the order terminating parental rights. The parents thus have
standing because they are appealing the order terminating parental rights.
Moreover, the cases cited by the Agency do not support a lack of
standing here. For example, the father in In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231
lacked standing because he did not contest termination of his parental rights
in the juvenile court or on appeal. (Id. at pp. 235, 237-238.) Here, by
contrast, both parents contested termination of parental rights at the section
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366.26 hearing and asked the trial court to apply the beneficial relationship
exception. Similarly, the mother in In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428
opposed termination only if the child was not placed with the relatives she
favored. (Id. at p. 436.) Here, by contrast, Mother opposed termination
outright and asked for guardianship in the trial court and has joined in
Father’s argument under section 361.3 on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.200(a)(5).)
B. Section 361.3
Father argues “the court erred in finding the relative placement statute
under section 361.3 inapplicable.” We disagree.
The parties agree that the standard of review is de novo. (In re A.F.
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 51, 54 [The “appeal raises purely legal issues
based on undisputed facts, making our standard of review de novo.”].)
“ ‘Preferential consideration’ means that the relative seeking placement
shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.” (§ 361.3,
subd. (c)(1).) The preference applies at the disposition hearing and thereafter
“whenever a new placement of the child must be made.” (Id., subd. (d); see In
re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 285 [“[S]ection 361.3 assures
interested relatives that, when a child is taken from her parents and placed
outside the home pending the determination whether reunification is
possible, the relative’s application will be considered before a stranger’s
application.”].)
“Preferential consideration ‘does not create an evidentiary presumption
in favor of a relative, but merely places the relative at the head of the line
when the court is determining which placement is in the child’s best
interests.’ ” (In re Antonio G. (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 369, 376.) “[T]he
statute expresse[s] a command that relatives be assessed and considered
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favorably, subject to the juvenile court’s consideration of the suitability of the
relative’s home and the best interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320.) “The linchpin of a section 361.3 analysis is
whether placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor.”
(Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 862-863.)
Here, the court found section 361.3 did not apply because D.C. was “in
a stable home” and the Agency was “not requesting [D.C.] be removed.” The
undisputed facts demonstrate D.C. was not in need of a new placement at the
time the paternal grandmother was approved. It was not until December 3,
2025, that the Agency and court became aware her home was approved.
Because services had already been terminated and D.C. was not in need of a
new placement, the juvenile court correctly found section 361.3 did not apply.
(In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 577, 595.)
Moreover, even if section 361.3 applied, any error was harmless. It was
not reasonably probable the court would place D.C. with the paternal
grandmother if it applied the section 361.3 factors. The Agency’s report
included a section 361.3 assessment of the paternal grandmother and the
maternal aunt. The court noted “the Agency on their own did their own
[section] 361.3 analysis and compared [the] paternal grandmother with the
[maternal aunt] and still found that the most appropriate placement is the
[maternal aunt].”
Throughout the case, the Agency had significant concerns about the
paternal grandmother’s protective capacity. The court found she allowed
D.C. “to be placed in very dangerous situations, life-altering situations that
could have led to her demise. And there appears to be no remorse in your
[the paternal grandmother’s] actions.” The court did not find placement with
the paternal grandmother was in D.C.’s “best interest” given she “willingly
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placed [D.C.] in dangerous situations” and violated “court order on numerous
occasions.” The section 361.3 factors include “the good moral character of the
relative,” and the ability to “[p]rovide a safe, secure, and stable environment
for the child,” and “[e]xercise proper and effective care and control of a child.”
(§ 361.3, subds. (a)(5), (7)(A)(B).) These factors directly relate to the court’s
concerns.
Finally, Father attempts to identify factors the court did not consider
including that it “never weighed the contentious relationship between [the]
maternal aunt [ ] and [the] paternal grandmother, which threatened [D.C.’s]
relationship with her paternal side altogether.” We disagree any of the
factors identified by Father “could have produced a different result.” Where
“regardless of the relative placement preference, the fundamental duty of the
court is to assure the best interests of the child” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 295, 321), we conclude there was no prejudicial error.
C. ICWA
Mother argues the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply was not
supported by substantial evidence because “the Agency’s further inquiry
reached only one of the three federally recognized Kickapoo tribes.” The
Agency concedes “it had a statutory duty to inquire about each of the
federally recognized Kickapoo tribes” and that it “failed to inquire” with the
Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas and the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma.
We have reviewed the record and agree a concession is appropriate.
The court and the Agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
If the initial inquiry creates a “reason to believe” the child has Native
American ancestry, the Agency is required to “make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable”
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(§ 224.2, subd. (e)) to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)). The duty of further inquiry includes
contacting “the tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be
expected to have information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship
status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)
The record indicates the Agency failed to inquire about two federally
recognized Kickapoo tribes after the paternal grandmother identified
Kickapoo heritage. Thus, the court’s finding that ICWA did not apply is not
supported by substantial evidence. We conditionally reverse the order
terminating parental rights with a limited remand for the Agency and
juvenile court to comply with ICWA and section 224.2. (See In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1141 [If ICWA “inquiry is inadequate, conditional
reversal is required so the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard
the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.”].)
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DISPOSITION
The order entered by the juvenile court on April 6, 2026, made
pursuant to a hearing under section 366.26, is conditionally reversed. The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of inquiring
with the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas and the Kickapoo Tribe of
Oklahoma as required by ICWA and the California Indian Child Welfare Act.
After proper inquiry has been completed and any notice requirements are
met, if either tribe claims D.C. is a Native American child, the court shall
proceed in conformity with ICWA and the parallel California statute. If not,
the court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. In all other
respects, the order is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, Acting P. J.
AMIN, J.
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