Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CORNELL PRATT, D088214 Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. CD284275, MH117056) v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on petition for writ of mandate challenging orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Dwayne K. Moring, Melinda J. Lasater, Judges. Relief granted. Jo E. Super, Chief Deputy of the Primary Public Defender, and Ryan M. Ahern, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Linh Lam, Valerie Ryan, Emmaline Campbell and Malak Behrouznami, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest. In December 2019 the People charged Cornell Pratt with assault with a deadly weapon pursuant to Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).1 In February 2020 the trial court found that Pratt was not competent to stand trial and ordered that he be committed to Patton State Hospital for the maximum of two years. In February 2022, the hospital determined that there was not a substantial likelihood that Pratt would regain competency, and the trial court released him, but did not dismiss the 2019 case—Case No. CD284275.2 Over three and one-half years later, in November 2025, the People charged Pratt with assault with a deadly weapon based on a wholly separate incident. A question again arose as to Pratt’s competence, but this time, the trial court concluded that he was competent to stand trial in the 2025 case— Case No. CD310762.3 The People then asked the trial court to “piggyback” off the certificate of competence in the 2025 Case to reinstate the charges in the 2019 Case. The trial court did so, over defense counsel’s objection, and after some further proceedings, Pratt filed the instant petition for writ of mandate. Pratt asserts that the trial court did not have statutory authority to reinstate criminal proceedings in the 2019 Case based on the certificate of competence in the 2025 Case, and that doing so violated his right to due 1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Further references to Case No. CD284275 will be referred to as the 2019 Case. 3 Further references to Case No. CD310762 will be referred to as the 2025 Case. 2 process. We agree and issue a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order reinstating the 2019 Case. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Proceedings in the 2019 Case The People filed a felony complaint against Pratt in the 2019 Case in December 2019, alleging one count of assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court did not hold a preliminary hearing at that time, but the record now before us indicates that the charge was based on an incident in which Pratt threw 10 to 15 pound “mini boulders” at an individual that he had gotten into an altercation with at a bus stop. Pratt was arraigned and pled not guilty. At the next hearing, on December 13, 2019, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings in the 2019 Case pursuant to section 1368, and based on a doubt as to Pratt’s mental competence. The trial court ordered that Pratt undergo a mental competency examination and assigned a mental health case number, MH117056. On February 14, 2020, counsel stipulated to a report issued by Dr. Michael Takamura. Based on that report, the trial court found that Pratt was not mentally competent to stand trial and ordered that he be committed to Patton State Hospital for the maximum term of two years. The trial court noted, as it was required to do, that the maximum sentence for the most serious (and only) crime charged was four years. On November 30, 2021, a forensic psychologist and the Medical Director of the Department of State Hospitals submitted a report to the trial court pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (b)(1)(A). The report stated: “In the opinion of this evaluator the above-named patient (Pratt) is not yet competent to stand trial and there is no substantial likelihood he will gain competency in the foreseeable future.” (Boldface in original.) The 3 report went on to provide detailed information regarding that conclusion. The report noted that Pratt’s symptoms had persisted for several years, despite medication. However, it also concluded that Pratt was not a danger to others and had not engaged in any aggressive, threatening, or assaultive behavior while committed. On February 17, 2022, the trial court held a hearing as to Pratt’s competence. The parties stipulated to enter the November 30, 2021 report into evidence. The trial court found that Pratt could not be restored to competency in the foreseeable future and that he had reached the maximum term of commitment. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings and ordered that the sheriff release Pratt and transport him to the county psychiatric hospital. The court requested that the public conservator conduct a Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) investigation. A letter from the public conservator indicates that Pratt did not appear to be gravely disabled; that he was released to a family member who was able to provide for his basic needs; and that he appeared amenable to adhering to the relative’s guidance on medication and treatment. B. Proceedings in the 2025 Case Over three and one-half years later, in November 2025, the People charged Pratt in the 2025 Case with one count of assault with a deadly weapon. The record indicates that the charge arose from another incident in which Pratt threw a rock, or piece of concrete, at an individual. On December 11, 2025, the trial court suspended proceedings in the 2025 Case pursuant to section 1368 and ordered that Pratt be evaluated for mental competency. The court assigned a new mental health case number, MH123552. Dr. Nicolas Badre evaluated Pratt on January 6, 2026, and submitted a report on mental competency in the 2025 Case. In the report, Dr. Badre noted that Pratt had been evaluated by Dr. Takamura for mental competency 4 in January 2020, and that Dr. Takamura had found that Pratt was unable to understand court proceedings or assist counsel. When Dr. Badre tried to speak with Pratt, Pratt said, “I don’t want to talk to you” and remained “mostly mute for the remainder of the interview.” Dr. Badre noted that Pratt’s refusal to engage could be an “indication of volitional noncompliance” and found, based primarily on his noncompliance, that Pratt was competent. On January 22, 2026, defense counsel opposed the findings made by Dr. Badre. The trial court continued the matter to allow defense counsel to obtain an independent evaluation. The record does not indicate whether an independent evaluation occurred. However, on March 19, 2026, counsel stipulated that the court could receive Dr. Badre’s report into evidence and waived Dr. Badre’s presence. The trial court found that Pratt was mentally competent to stand trial in the 2025 Case and reinstated criminal proceedings in that case. At the felony readiness hearing for the 2025 Case on March 27, 2026, the trial court, with the Honorable Dwayne K. Moring presiding, noted, “we have discovered that [the 2019 Case] has not been resolved.” The People said that the 2019 Case was “a max commit. However, it is in limbo, as Your Honor well knows.” The People then made an oral motion to reinstate criminal proceedings in the 2019 Case, stating, “The People would request to use the certificate of competence from [the 2025 Case] to piggyback off of that” and have the 2019 Case reinstated. The trial court asked if there was any objection and defense counsel stated, “I believe the law is clear that they are not allowed to do that.” The trial court granted the motion. At a hearing on April 10, 2026, with the Honorable Melinda J. Lasater presiding, defense counsel asked the court to reconsider the order reinstating proceedings in the 2019 Case. He asserted that the trial court did not have 5 jurisdiction under the relevant statutes to reinstate proceedings given that the trial court had released Pratt after finding that he could not be restored to competency in the foreseeable future and that he had reached the maximum term of commitment. The trial court took the matter under submission and set a hearing for May 20. Defense counsel then declared a doubt as to Pratt’s competency, asserting that he had deteriorated since the last evaluation. The trial court once again suspended proceedings pursuant to section 1368. The minute order indicates, “Case MH117056 [the mental health case tied to the 2019 Case] to be pulled for next hearing.”4 At the hearing on May 20, 2026, the trial court noted that the 2019 Case was still suspended under section 1368 but that it would proceed as a special set to hear the motion to reconsider the reinstatement. The trial court initially indicated that it believed the 2019 Case needed to be dismissed. Defense counsel argued that the trial court should follow the statutory law and that the only mechanism available under the law to reevaluate competency in the 2019 Case was to dismiss and refile as described in section 1370, subdivision (c)(4). After hearing further argument, the trial court changed course and denied the motion to vacate Judge Moring’s prior order. The court explained: “A judge can suspend criminal proceedings and then reinstate them. So just [under] a general authority of the judge. I don’t think there has to be any specific code section in order to reinstate those criminal proceedings.” The trial court noted that proceedings remained suspended under section 1368, and that a competency hearing was set for May 26. Pratt filed 4 Defense counsel agreed to proceed with the Preliminary Hearing for the 2019 Case, and the court held Pratt to answer. 6 his petition for writ of mandate and sought a stay, which this court granted, before the May 26 hearing occurred. II. DISCUSSION Pratt argues, as he did in the trial court, that the decision to reinstate criminal proceedings in the 2019 Case based on a competency finding in a newer, unrelated case and without dismissing and refiling the charges in the 2019 Case, violated the statutory scheme surrounding mental competency and, thus, his right to due process. Although a number of recent cases analyze portions of the mental competency statutes to resolve related issues, this particular question—whether the People can “piggyback” off a mental competency finding in a new case to reinstate proceedings in an old case without dismissing and refiling—appears to be an issue of first impression. A. The Statutory Scheme We begin with an overview of the statutory scheme addressing mental competency in criminal proceedings. “Trial in the accused’s absence is a general due process violation and an infringement of the accused’s constitutional and statutory right to appear and defend in person.” (People v. Avila (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 771, 777.) “ ‘Mere physical presence without mental realization of what was going on would obviously be of no value to the accused. A defendant in such condition would be unable to confer with or assist counsel, unable to testify, and without ability to understand the nature of the accusation or the mechanics or consequences of the trial.’ ” (Ibid.) Sections 1367 through 1376 codify procedures and protections for ensuring that defendants are mentally competent to stand trial. Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: “A person shall not be tried or adjudged to punishment . . . while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of a mental 7 health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” As our high court has explained, the Legislature enacted this set of statutes in 1974, following legal developments in the United States and California Supreme Courts limiting the period of confinement, or commitment, for individuals found incompetent to stand trial. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2026) 15 Cal.5th 472, 490–491.) Since then, the Legislature has amended the statutory scheme numerous times. (Ibid.) The result is a detailed set of statutes that set forth the procedures the courts must follow in a comprehensive and detailed manner. “As it now stands, the statutory scheme governing competency works as follows: When a doubt arises in the trial court judge’s mind[, or when defense counsel declares a doubt] regarding the mental competency of a criminal defendant, the judge may order a hearing to determine the defendant’s competency. (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).) All criminal proceedings are suspended once the order issues. (Id., subd. (c).) At the competency hearing, the defendant is presumed competent and incompetence must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); see also Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446–449, 452–453.)” (Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 493.) The defendant is returned to court if, as relevant here, “a medical director or comparable personnel certifies to the court that the defendant has been restored to competency;” “an appointed psychiatrist or psychologist opines that the defendant has regained competency;” “a medical director or comparable personnel reports to the court that there is no substantial likelihood the defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future;” or 8 “the maximum commitment period set by section 1370(c)(1) has been reached.” (Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 493–494; see also § 1372, subd. (a)(1), (3)(C); § 1370, subds. (a)(1)(I), (b)(1)(A), (c)(1).) “[W]hen a defendant returns to court after a certificate of restoration has been filed, the defendant is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise at a hearing.” (Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 495.) However, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant has recovered competency and can resume proceedings only after deciding to accept the certificate of restoration. (Ibid.; § 1372, subd. (c)(1), (2).) “Different procedures apply if the maximum commitment term has been reached [and the defendant has not been restored to competency]. [S]ection 1370[, subdivision](c)(1) prohibits commitments lasting more than two years. If the defendant has not regained competency, the statute does not provide for a hearing to redetermine a defendant’s competency at this point. (Accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 239, 246 (Taitano) [holding that trial courts are not authorized to hold competency hearings after the maximum statutory commitment period has expired where the court ‘had not received a certification that [the defendant] has been restored to competence by certain mental health officials (including the county medical health director) or the conservator”]; People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375 (Quiroz) [holding that a trial judge has no power ‘to convene a competency hearing after a state hospital certifies that a defendant, who has been involuntarily confined for three years [now two] due to incompetence to stand trial, is not likely to regain competency’].) Instead, section 1370 directs the committing court to ‘initiate conservatorship proceedings for the defendant’ if ‘it appears to the court that the defendant is gravely disabled.’ (§ 1370, subd. (c)(3).)” (Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 495.) 9 “ ‘If the defendant is not gravely disabled, the defendant must be released [citation], and the trial court may dismiss the action in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 [citations]. Such a dismissal is “without prejudice to the initiation of any proceedings that may be appropriate” under the [Lanterman-Petris-Short] Act.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 496.) “With the exception of proceedings alleging a violation of mandatory supervision, or in those instances where the defendant has been placed under a conservatorship pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (h) of Section 5008 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the criminal action remains subject to dismissal pursuant to Section 1385.” (§ 1370, subd. (d).) In sum: “If a defendant has not regained competency within two years of the date of commitment, the defendant is either released or subject to civil conservatorship proceedings.” (Rodriguez, at p. 496.) The statutory scheme does not provide as much detail regarding what happens to a defendant who has not regained competency but also is not gravely disabled after the maximum time of commitment. Not surprisingly, then, the courts have grappled with several related questions in recent years, including the question at issue in this case. (See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 497; Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 239; People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1379 (Quiroz).) B. Judicial Jurisdiction Is Strictly Limited by the Statutory Scheme As the court in Quiroz explained: “A competency hearing is a special proceeding, not a criminal action. [Citations] ‘ “Special proceedings are creatures of statute and the court’s jurisdiction in such proceedings is limited by statutory authority.” ’ ” (Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379.) “ ‘ “As special proceedings are created and authorized by statute, the jurisdiction over any special proceeding is limited by the terms and conditions 10 of the statute under which it was authorized [citation], and . . . [t]he statutory procedure must be strictly followed.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see also Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 254–255 [explaining that courts are without power to conduct competency hearings that are not authorized by statute].) Accordingly, our analysis here must be guided by the authority conferred on the courts within the foregoing statutory scheme. We review questions regarding the interpretation of the statutory scheme de novo as pure questions of law. (Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 496.) “In interpreting the competency statutory scheme, ‘ “our task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the words of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “If ‘ “the [statutory] language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 496–497.) C. There Was No Statutory Basis to Reinstitute the Proceedings Pratt served the maximum term of confinement and was released in the 2019 Case. He was not placed in any type of conservatorship, and the trial court did not dismiss the charges. According to the People, this left the 2019 Case in a state of “limbo.” Our high court addressed a similar procedural dilemma in Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96 (Jackson). There, as here, “defendant Patrick Jackson was found incompetent to stand trial and was involuntarily committed for three years, during which he did not regain competence. Because he was not made the subject of a conservatorship, he was released.” 11 (Id. at p. 100.) However, unlike the case at hand, in Jackson, “the Riverside County District Attorney obtained a superseding indictment with identical charges under a new case number, as permitted by section 1387.” (Ibid.) “Jackson was rearrested [and] the trial court declared a doubt as to Jackson’s competence and suspended criminal proceedings in the new case.” (Id. at p. 103.) Jackson sought release, as he had already been held for the maximum commitment and when the trial court denied that relief, he sought a writ of mandate. (Ibid.) On appeal from the writ, the California Supreme Court held “that a defendant may be rearrested, and a trial court may order a new competency hearing, following the prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges pursuant to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously committed for [the statutory maximum period].” (Jackson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.) However, if the defendant is again found incompetent, the maximum time for commitment cannot be extended and therefore, the defendant must be released. (Ibid.) The Jackson court went on to acknowledge Quiroz, another recent case addressing postrelease competency proceedings, but concluded it did not help Jackson. In Quiroz, the court held that the mental competency statutory scheme does not “authorize a trial court to convene a new competency hearing upon the prosecution’s request when the hospital returns the defendant from commitment at the end of three years or upon the hospital’s finding of no substantial likelihood of regaining competency to stand trial. Nor do the statutes authorize the trial court to convene a competency hearing upon the prosecution’s request when the public guardian determines not to initiate conservatorship proceedings.” (Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380, italics added; accord Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 254–256.) 12 In Jackson, the California Supreme Court explained that “Quiroz is . . . not applicable where there is a statutory basis for holding a competency hearing. [In Jackson’s case], the prosecution refiled charges as permitted by section 1387, and Jackson was rearrested. The trial court then declared a doubt as to Jackson’s competence under section 1367 and proposed to hold a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. The refiled charges and the ensuing arrest provided the required statutory basis for a new competency hearing. At the same time, although there is no statutory provision that explicitly establishes the maximum time a defendant can be held in custody under these circumstances, we underscore that a defendant can be held only for a reasonable time pending the new competency hearing.” (Jackson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 107.) The Legislature codified this procedural avenue following Jackson. Effective 2025, section 1370, subdivision (c)(4) provides that “[i]f a defendant is returned to court” under specified subdivisions and the “prosecution elects to dismiss and refile charges pursuant to Section 1387, the court shall presume that the defendant is incompetent unless . . . presented with relevant and credible evidence that the defendant is competent. This evidence may include medical records, witness statements, or reports by qualified medical experts. If . . . satisfied that it has received substantial evidence that the defendant is competent, the court shall proceed as provided in Section 1369.” (Ibid. [also addressing process if defendant is not found competent].) But here, the People elected not to dismiss and refile the charges, as set forth in Jackson and section 1370, subdivision (c)(4). Instead, after the trial court found that Pratt was mentally competent to stand trial in a different 13 case, the People asked the trial court to “piggyback” off that ruling and reinstate proceedings in the 2019 Case. The People concede that Quiroz and Taitano “confirm that once the commitment term has ended, the statutory scheme provides no authority to restart or replicate a competency process in that suspended matter.”5 However, they assert that the statutes do not address this specific procedural posture—where that same defendant has picked up a new case and the trial court has made a finding that the defendant is competent to stand trial in that new case—and that the trial court in this case “reasonably filled the gaps.” We disagree. As we have explained, the Legislature has provided a mechanism for reevaluating a defendant’s mental competency to stand trial for charges when new information regarding competency arises after the term of maximum confinement—the People can dismiss and recharge under section 1387. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(4); Jackson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 107.) Section 1370, subdivision (c)(4) provides a procedural avenue to deal with a suspended proceeding in cases like this, where the defendant has been released but the People have reason to believe that a defendant has regained competency, either because they were judged competent in another case or for some other reason. If the People elect to dismiss and refile the charges, the process begins again, with a new competency determination. The only difference is that if the defendant is found incompetent again, the court 5 The People also do not contend, and assert that the record does not show, that the trial court treated the competency finding in the 2025 Case as a certificate of restoration in the 2019 Case, which would permit a new competency determination under section 1372. 14 would not be able to order commitment past the maximum term. (See Jackson, at p. 107.) Nowhere in the statutes is there any indication that a finding that the defendant is competent to stand trial in one case may be applied to a different case, let alone to reinstate criminal proceedings in an older, post maximum confinement case. Nor, as we have discussed, do the statutes allow for a new competency hearing in the older, still pending case, in the absence of a dismissal and recharging. (See Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 254– 256; Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380.) The People assert that competency is a measured in “present-tense” terms and so, in the absence of a statutory mandate, it makes sense for the trial court to apply a competency finding in a new criminal case to a separate pending, post maximum commitment criminal case. The analysis is not so simple; the competency finding in the 2025 Case was merely evidence that Pratt might also be competent to stand trial in the 2019 Case, and the People should have followed the mechanism that is provided in the statutes, dismissing and recharging, to create the statutory authority to hold a new competency hearing in the 2019 Case. As we explain, dismissing and recharging allows the court to comply strictly with the statutory scheme, which provides important protections to defendants. Pursuant to section 1367, subdivision (a), “A defendant is mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (Italics added.) While we agree that a given defendant’s competence to stand trial may change over time, as recognized by several provisions in the statutory scheme, the fact that a defendant may be capable 15 of understanding the nature of the criminal proceedings against them or to assist counsel in one case does not necessarily mean that they are able to do so in a different case. Nor do the People provide any authority indicating that it does. A given defendant’s present abilities or general mental capacity may be invariable at any one point in time, but that does not mean that the defendant has the same rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings in one case versus another. (See, Dusky v. U.S. (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402 [“the ‘test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding— and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’ ”].) The statutory scheme supports the conclusion that competency findings are, at least to some degree, case specific. Notably, there are no provisions applying a finding of either competency or incompetency in one case to any other concurrently pending or future cases.6 Although the charges in the two cases at issue here are quite similar, each alleging one count of assault with a deadly weapon, the relevant evidence regarding Pratt’s competency to stand trial in each case was not identical. Pratt was willing to submit on Dr. Badre’s report in the 2025 Case, but at that point the 2019 Case was not at issue. The Badre report does not consider whether Pratt had any contemporaneous understanding of the nature of the criminal proceedings in the 2019 Case. While this is perhaps a 6 People v. Avila (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 717, in which the trial court specifically “ordered that a single competency hearing would be held for all three pending cases,” does not conflict with this conclusion. (Id. at p. 722.) There, the trial court simply consolidated the statutorily authorized competency hearings in three pending cases. Nothing precluded the introduction of different evidence and separate findings in each case. 16 minor distinction in this case, given the similarity of the charges, the same may not be true in all instances. The point remains, here there has not yet been an affirmative determination that Pratt has regained competence, as defined by the statute, to stand trial in the 2019 Case. Thus, there was no statutory basis to reinstate the suspended proceedings. Moreover, allowing the trial court to reinstate proceedings without following the statutory procedure may result in a loss of procedural protections. As noted, section 1370, subdivision (c)(4) provides that if the prosecutor dismisses and refiles under 1387, “the court shall presume that the defendant is incompetent unless . . . presented with relevant and credible evidence that the defendant is competent. This evidence may include medical records, witness statements, or reports by qualified medical experts. If . . . satisfied that it has received substantial evidence that the defendant is competent, the court shall proceed as provided in Section 1369.” (Ibid. [also addressing process if defendant is not found competent].) If the People had followed this statutory procedure, the Badre report and/or the trial court’s finding that Pratt was competent in the 2025 Case could perhaps have been used as evidence in a competency hearing for the 2019 Case that Pratt was competent to stand trial in that case.7 But having opted not to follow that procedure, in the absence of a certificate of restoration, the court is without authority to conduct a competency hearing. (See Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 239, 246 [trial courts are not authorized to hold 7 At the competency hearing, other contrary evidence might have included the 2021 report from the Medical Director that Pratt was not yet competent to stand trial; that “there is no substantial likelihood he will gain competency in the foreseeable future;” and that his symptoms had persisted for several years, even with medication. 17 competency hearings after the maximum statutory commitment period has expired where the court “had not received a certification that [the defendant] has been restored to competence by certain mental health officials (including the county medical health director) or the conservator”].) We acknowledge that the trial court did order another competency hearing in the 2019 Case, the outcome of which remains pending, but that was because Pratt’s counsel declared a new doubt as to competency, based on his belief that Pratt’s mental state had deteriorated since the trial court reinstated the proceedings. Thus, the now pending competency hearing is not related to, or part of, the original competency determination on which the trial court relied in reinstating the 2019 Case.8 The reinstatement, which appears to have been based only on Dr. Badre’s report summarizing Pratt’s noncooperation, did not allow Pratt the procedural protections of a competency hearing at which he could have presented evidence tending to prove his incompetence in that case. Under this procedural posture, the defense had the burden of establishing that a competency hearing was necessary, as opposed to the section 1370, subdivision (c)(4) requirement that the court proceed under section 1369. Notably, there was no guarantee that Pratt would be afforded a competency hearing specific to the 2019 Case. “A defendant is constitutionally entitled to a hearing under section 1368 if he has come forward with substantial evidence of present mental incompetence. 8 We acknowledge the record does reflect that the trial court gave defense counsel an opportunity to object to Dr. Badre’s January 6, 2026 report and to seek an independent evaluation in the 2025 Case. However, it was only after the court made a competency finding specific to the 2025 Case that the People asked the trial court to utilize that finding to reinstate proceedings in the 2019 Case. 18 [Citation.] However, ‘[r]eviewing courts give great deference to a trial court’s decision whether to hold a competency hearing. “ ‘ “An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Avila (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 771, 778.) Proceeding under a dismissal and refile procedural would have afforded Pratt additional protection within the construct of the statutory scheme. No statute authorizes the trial court, or the People, to proceed in a manner that avoids those additional protections. As a final matter, the People argue that neither the opinion in Jackson nor section 1370, subdivision (c)(4) mandate dismissing and refiling in every case, and that they instead merely recognize one available pathway to overcome a specific type of procedural hurdle. Regardless, the fact remains that the courts endorsed, and the Legislature then codified, this pathway. Accordingly, any argument that there is a “procedural gap” that the trial court must fill using its inherent powers falls flat. If the People believed that the finding of mental competence in the 2025 Case indicated that Pratt was also competent to stand trial in the 2019 Case, they simply needed to dismiss and refile the charges, thereby availing themselves, and Pratt, of the statutory framework for determining competency. If the Legislature intended to also allow trial courts to reinstate criminal proceedings based on a finding of competence in a different case, it could provide a statutory basis to do so, but it has not. As our high court explained in Jackson, “there is a statutory basis for holding a competency hearing” in a suspended criminal proceeding such as the one at issue here, if the charges are dismissed and refiled as permitted by section 1387. (Jackson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 107.) The limitations set forth 19 in section 1387 serve important public policy purposes. (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1018.) Section 1387 “curtails prosecutorial harassment by placing limits on the number of times charges may be refiled,” and reduces “the possibility that prosecutors might use the power to dismiss and file to forum shop.” (Ibid.) These same principles apply in the context of competency determinations. We decline to conclude that the trial court may use its inherent powers to fill a perceived procedural gap, where, as here, there is a statutorily defined procedural pathway available that provides important due process protections to the defendant. III. DISPOSITION Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate its order reinstating proceedings in Case No. CD284275 and to enter a new order denying the People’s request to reinstate proceedings. KELETY, J. WE CONCUR: DATO, Acting P. J. DO, J. 20