In re X.G.

Filed 9/30/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE In re X.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A172959 v. (San Francisco City & County X.G., Super. Ct. No. JW24-6142) Defendant and Appellant. X.G. appeals from a postjudgment restitution order made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 (all further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) that required him to pay the entirety of the restitution amount although there were other individuals involved in the underlying crime. X.G. contends the juvenile court was mandated by section 730.6 to apportion restitution based upon share of responsibility or fault but it failed to do so. (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.) We conclude section 730.6 gives juvenile courts the discretion to deviate—and the responsibility to consider whether to deviate—from an award of full restitution where compelling and extraordinary reasons exist. Such reasons may include whether there are individuals responsible, at least in part, for the harm who have not been adjudicated as juvenile co-offenders. 1  Here, the juvenile court misunderstood its ability to potentially apportion responsibility for restitution and therefore did not consider whether to do so. Accordingly, we remand for the juvenile court to reconsider the appropriate amount of restitution. BACKGROUND The San Francisco District Attorney filed an amended juvenile wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) alleging X.G. committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1), two counts of felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a); counts 2–3), unlawful possession of a handgun (Pen. Code, § 29610, subd. (a); count 4), and grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c); count 5). The petition further alleged X.G. personally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery and child endangerment counts (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)). The facts supporting the petition, as relevant to this appeal, are set forth in the probation department’s disposition report: The victim reported a vehicle stopped next to his car as he was parked and getting his two children out of the vehicle following a shopping trip. Four individuals exited the stopped vehicle, three of whom had firearms. One assailant pointed a gun at the victim while taking his Rolex watch and his necklace. Another assailant took his wallet, which contained $2,000 in cash. The San Francisco Police Department’s Community Violence Reduction Team investigated the case as part of an ongoing investigation into a criminal street gang. The police identified X.G. as one of the individuals involved. At the jurisdictional hearing, X.G. pled no contest to count 5 (grand theft). The remaining charges were dismissed. X.G.’s probation was subsequently terminated as unsuccessful, and the court held a disposition and restitution hearing. At that hearing, X.G. argued 2 the amendment to section 730.6 and its use of the term “co-offender” demonstrated that “the legislature did not intend to limit liability only to co- minors in the same proceedings.” He asserted that because two other (adult) individuals were named in the arrest warrant, it would be unfair for X.G. to be responsible for the entire amount of restitution. In response, the prosecutor argued X.G. was “the only person [who’s] been found to have committed this crime,” and both the California Constitution and statute required the court to impose full restitution. The court ordered X.G. to pay the full amount of restitution requested by the victim. It explained the purpose of restitution was to provide redress for victims, and it did not have the ability to apportion because there were no other defendants among whom the amount of restitution could be apportioned. DISCUSSION On appeal, X.G. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to apportion restitution. X.G. asserts that both the plain language of section 730.6 and its legislative history require his liability be limited to his percentage of responsibility or fault. The Attorney General agrees the juvenile court should have apportioned liability for restitution, but disagrees in part with X.G.’s reasoning. I. Relevant Legal Principles In 1982, California voters enacted Proposition 8, the Victims’ Bill of Rights, which added article I, section 28, subdivision (b) to the California Constitution. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652.) The Victims’ Bill of Rights guarantees crime victims the right to receive “restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) The Constitution defines a “victim” as “a 3 person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act.” (Id., art. I, § 28, subd. (e).) Section 730.6 implements this constitutional mandate in juvenile proceedings. (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 304 (Luis M.); In re Scott H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 515, 523 [“[R]estitution is a victim’s right in juvenile delinquency cases.”].) As the Supreme Court explained, “[a]n order of direct victim restitution acts to make the victim whole, rehabilitate the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior,” and a victim’s right to restitution must be broadly and liberally construed. (Luis M., at p. 305.) Consistent with that mandate, section 730.6 authorizes a juvenile court, upon adjudicating a minor a ward of the court, to require the minor to pay restitution to his or her victim or victims. (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1).) The statute further provides that restitution “shall be imposed in the amount of the losses” and requires the court to “order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) Thus, the governing statutory framework requires full restitution for a victim’s economic losses, subject to the statutory exception for compelling and extraordinary reasons. Recently, the Legislature changed how that restitution obligation is allocated among co-offenders who are minors. Prior to 2025, section 730.6 authorized joint and several liability for victim restitution. (Former § 730.6, subd. (h)(2), as amended by Stats. 2015, ch. 131, § 1 [contemplating restitution orders that identify “co-offenders who are jointly and severally liable for victim restitution”]; In re S.S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 550 [affirming minor’s restitution obligation that was joint and several with a co- 4 offender where “both juveniles were fully responsible for the victim’s losses”]; see id. at pp. 550–551.) Effective January 1, 2025, however, the Legislature eliminated joint and several liability for victim restitution in juvenile delinquency matters. (In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 364.) Section 730.6 now provides, “For the purposes of victim restitution, each minor shall be held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally liable as co-offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution.” (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(3); see Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) § 6 (Assembly Bill 1186).) The amendment preserved the victim’s entitlement to restitution while changing the manner in which liability for those losses is allocated among co-offending minors. Courts generally review restitution orders for abuse of discretion. (Luis M., supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 305.) But where, as here, the issue is a question of law—whether a court has the authority to calculate or allocate restitution in a certain manner—we review it de novo. (In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1098.) II. Application of Section 730.6 Under the amended version of section 730.6, juvenile offenders and co- offenders, if any, are severally liable for victim restitution. The statute further provides that liability must be apportioned among co-offenders “based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution.” (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(3).) The issue before us is whether this amendment permits a juvenile court to apportion restitution liability to individuals who have not been adjudicated as offenders. 5  The question is one of statutory construction. “ ‘[W]e begin by looking to the statutory language. [Citation.] We must give “the language its usual, ordinary import and accord[] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” [Citation.] If the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we must look to additional canons of statutory construction to determine the Legislature’s purpose. [Citation.] “Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.” ’ ” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849–850 (Carmack).) A. “Co-offender” Refers to an Adjudicated Minor Both X.G. and the Attorney General contend the term “co-offender” encompasses individuals who have not been adjudicated, including, in this case, the two adults listed in the arrest warrant. The statutory language and the legislative history do not support that interpretation. Section 730.6 does not define “co-offender” or “offender.” We therefore begin with the standard definition of “offender.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “offender” as “[s]omeone who has committed a crime; esp., one who has been convicted of a crime.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1296.) It similarly defines “youthful offender” as “[a] person in late adolescence or early adulthood who has been convicted of a crime.” (Ibid.) These definitions reflect an understanding that an “offender” is an individual who has been determined to have committed a crime through conviction or adjudication. 6 And this understanding is consistent with the fundamental principle that a person is not treated as having committed a crime—i.e., not an “offender”— unless and until the person has been adjudicated as such. That interpretation is reinforced by the plain language of section 730.6. Section 730.6 requires the court to order “full restitution” in “the amount of the losses” unless there exist “compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so.” (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(1).) But section 730.6 only authorizes such restitution awards against minors who have been adjudicated a ward of the court. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) It does not purport to apply to unadjudicated minors or other individuals. Accordingly, the juvenile court cannot award “full restitution” if it apportions the victim’s losses between an adjudicated minor and other persons not before the court. Read in that context, the reference to a “co-offender” in subdivision (b)(3) necessarily refers to another minor who has likewise been adjudicated a ward of the court. (Carmack, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 850 [“ ‘ “The words of the statute must be construed in context.” ’ ”].) The legislative history confirms this interpretation. In describing the amendment, the Senate Committee on Public Safety explained that the bill was intended to “[p]rospectively end[] joint and several liability for youth co- defendants.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023– 2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 24, 2024, p. 4., italics added.) An individual whose case has not been (or is not being) adjudicated is not a codefendant. (Black’s Law Dict., supra, at p. 528 [defining “codefendant” as “[o]ne of two or more defendants sued in the same litigation or charged with the same crime.”].) The legislative history therefore provides no basis for expanding “co-offender” beyond minors who are subject to the juvenile court’s adjudication. And we note the obvious difficulty presented to a court if it 7 were required to allocate liability for restitution among individuals not present before it and potentially not tried in any court. Nor does the legislative history’s explanation of the amendment’s purpose support the parties’ position. The Legislature sought to address situations in which one minor had satisfied his or her share of restitution but remained liable for another co-offender’s unpaid portion. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 24, 2024, p. 6.) That purpose—preventing one minor from remaining responsible for another minor’s restitution obligation—is distinct from expanding the class of persons against whom a juvenile court may impose restitution in the first instance. We do not find X.G.’s analogy to Civil Code section 1431.2 persuasive. Civil Code section 1431.2, enacted in 1986 via passage of Proposition 51, “limits a defendant’s share of noneconomic damages to his or her own proportionate share of comparative fault.” (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 604, 596.) Accordingly, a civil defendant may not be held jointly and severally liable for unpaid noneconomic damages beyond that defendant’s proportionate share of fault. (Id. at p. 596.) While Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 may superficially resemble Civil Code section 1431.2 because both provisions address allocation of liability according to fault, these statutory schemes serve materially different purposes. Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 implements the Victims’ Bill of Rights, which entitles crime victims the right to receive “restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) No equivalent constitutional provision entitles civil litigants to recover restitution from those responsible for their losses. 8  In sum, neither the plain language of section 730.6 nor the legislative history supports the parties’ proposed interpretation of “co-offender.” Rather, “co-offender” must refer to another minor adjudicated a ward of the court. B. Section 730.6 Nevertheless Permits the Court To Consider a Minor’s Individual Responsibility in Determining the Amount of Restitution Rejecting the parties’ interpretation of “co-offender,” however, does not resolve the separate question of whether the juvenile court generally has discretion to establish the appropriate level of restitution imposed on a minor, which could include among other factors the minor’s degree of responsibility. The Legislature appears to have addressed that question through a separate sentence: “The court shall apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution.” (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(3).) The legislative history demonstrates that the Legislature was concerned with the consequences of the then-existing restitution system for young people and their families. It identified cycles of debt, increased poverty, reduced social mobility, and barriers to reentry as problems associated with excessive restitution orders. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 24, 2024, p. 7.) The original version of the bill introduced in the Legislature went further: it would have entirely eliminated courts’ authority to require minors to pay restitution and instead directed the California Victim Compensation Board to make restitution payments. (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2023, pp. 1–2.) After subsequent amendments to Assembly Bill 1186, the Legislature retained victim restitution orders but sought to limit the scope of 9 a minor’s liability. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 24, 2024, p. 3.) Accordingly, the percentage-of-responsibility provision of section 730.6 must be read within the context of the entire statutory section. (Carmack, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 850 [“ ‘ “[S]tatutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” ’ ”].) If only one minor is adjudicated a ward of the court, there are no other “co-offenders” to whom liability can be apportioned under subdivision (b)(3). But that does not end the inquiry. As noted above, subdivision (b)(1) allows juvenile courts to order less than full restitution for “compelling and extraordinary reasons.” The statute thus requires courts to consider whether the particular circumstances of a case justify a reduced award, and the failure to do so constitutes error. Those circumstances may include the involvement of other participants, if those individuals are being tried in separate actions, the minor’s role in the crime, and the minor’s impact in causing the losses. Alternatively, such circumstances may not justify awarding less than full restitution; whether an adjustment from full restitution under subdivision (b)(1) is appropriate must be determined by the juvenile court based on the specific facts of the adjudication and the statute’s purpose. As explained by the Legislature, excessive restitution awards disproportionate to a minor’s fault or responsibility create cycles of harm and run counter to the goals of rehabilitation. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 24, 2024, p. 7.) C. The Juvenile Court Failed To Exercise Its Discretion Here, the juvenile court concluded it was required to order full restitution due to the lack of co-offenders. In so holding, the court failed to recognize the discretion allowed under section 730.6 to consider whether the 10 circumstances of this case constitute “compelling and extraordinary reasons” for imposing less than full restitution, and it had an obligation to consider whether such reasons were present. That discretion is central to the statutory scheme as restitution serves multiple purposes, including “making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor, and deterring future delinquent behavior.” (In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) A court has not properly exercised its discretion in reaching a decision if it did so based on an incorrect understanding of the law or a lack of awareness as to the full scope of its discretion. And so “ ‘a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.’ ” (Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 709.) The appropriate remedy, however, is to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion in the first instance to assess whether the facts of this case support a reduced restitution award. (People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 262–263 [“[T]he question of how to exercise discretion, based on the full range of relevant facts and a proper understanding of the governing law, generally remains for the trial court to decide in the first instance.”].) D. Permitting a Reduced Restitution Award Does Not Conflict with the Victims’ Bill of Rights Our conclusion that section 730.6 permits the juvenile court to award less than the victim’s full economic loss does not conflict with the Victims’ Bill of Rights. As the Attorney General correctly observes, the Victims’ Bill of Rights establishes a general right to restitution and does not expressly require an award of full restitution in every proceeding or from each perpetrator. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) Rather, the rights to full restitution 11 arise from the statutes implementing that constitutional mandate. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (b)(1); Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) The Legislature thus may amend those statutory requirements, as it did here. Nor does our conclusion undermine the constitutional right to restitution. Section 730.6 continues to authorize restitution and continues to establish full restitution as the general rule. The Legislature has simply provided that, in appropriate circumstances, the juvenile court may determine that compelling and extraordinary reasons justify a reduced award. Accordingly, section 730.6 requires the juvenile court to consider whether the specific circumstances before it, including but not limited to a minor’s responsibility and fault, constitute a compelling and extraordinary basis for deviating from an order of full restitution. Because the juvenile court did not undertake that analysis, we remand the matter for the court to exercise its discretion in the first instance. DISPOSITION The restitution order is reversed and the matter remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion under section 730.6 in accordance with the guidance set forth in this opinion. 12  PETROU, J. WE CONCUR: TUCHER, P. J. FUJISAKI, J. A172959 / In re X.G. 13 Trial Court: Superior Court of San Francisco County Trial Judge: Hon. Richard C. Darwin Counsel: Eileen Manning-Villar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Bridget Billeter, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 14