In re J.G.

Filed 9/29/26 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION * IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE In re J.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.G., A172867 Defendant and Appellant. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. JV-036525-01) Appellant and defendant J.G., a minor, was part of a group of males who stole several items from the renter of an Airbnb rental home and damaged that home and the renter’s car. Although at least six other males may have been involved in the thefts and damage at the rental home, only J.G. was charged with any crimes. After the People charged J.G. with four counts in a wardship petition under Welfare & Institutions Code section 602, 1 he eventually admitted to carrying a loaded firearm on his person (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)) and assault by means of force (id., § 245, subd. (a)(4)). At * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts A and B of the Discussion. 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless other stated. 1 a contested restitution hearing, the juvenile court ordered J.G. to pay $6,294.01 in restitution, the full amount claimed by one of the victims, the renter. J.G. appeals the restitution order, contending that: (1) the restitution award was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) due to an amendment to section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3) (section 730.6(b)(3)) that went into effect on January 1, 2025, the juvenile court should have apportioned the restitution award among all members of the group who participated in the incidents even though J.G. was the only one charged; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject J.G.’s first and third contentions but agree with his second. Section 730.6(b)(3) applies here and requires that the court consider the culpability of all potentially responsible parties when determining the “percentage of responsibility or fault” to be allocated to the minor for the victim’s economic losses. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment holding J.G. responsible for the entire restitution award and remand for further proceedings so the court may consider whether that award should be apportioned. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts J.G. stipulated to the following facts contained in the police report as the basis for his admission. On July 30, 2023, Johan Hernandez hosted a birthday party at an Airbnb rental home and invited five friends as guests, including Herly Pineda. Around 2:20 a.m., J.G., as part of a group of males, attempted to enter the home and join the party. Neither Hernandez nor Pineda knew anybody in the group, including J.G., so Hernandez turned them away. When he was refused entry into the party, J.G. tried to start a fight with 2 Hernandez. When Hernandez again asked the group to leave, an “unknown male” ripped a gold chain with a pendant off Hernandez’s neck and stole Hernandez’s iPhone. Hernandez ran into the rental home and “multiple males . . . kick[ed] in the house’s windows . . .[,] [threw] beer bottles at them[,] . . . [and broke] two windows on the house.” After J.G. and the group left, Hernandez discovered that his car’s front windshield had been smashed. About an hour later, “a group of males returned to the house and forced entry into the home by kicking in the door.” Pineda woke Hernandez, who had been asleep, and Hernandez “quickly jumped out of a window and hid near the house.” Pineda also called the police to report that there were people outside with guns. “[T]wo males [then] entered the home,” held Pineda at gun and knife point, and stole Pineda’s cell phone and cash, and Hernandez’s shoes. The dispatcher heard the front door being kicked in and Pineda say “something to the effect of don’t shoot[,] don’t shoot.” While officers were en route to the rental home, the dispatcher reported that the call from Pineda’s phone was still connected and that “the suspects were talking about a crime they had just committed.” The police tracked the location of Pineda’s phone through GPS and located a car in the same area as the phone. After officers stopped the car, they found seven males in the car and detained them. J.G. was the driver. Hernandez and Pineda went to the scene of the traffic stop and recognized all seven males as being involved in the two incidents at the rental home. Pineda identified J.G. “as the male suspect who broke into the home, pointed a gun at him[,] and demanded his property.” Officers searched the group’s car and found two loaded guns, Hernandez’s stolen shoes, and Pineda’s stolen cell phone. They arrested five of the minor males, who were 3 later released to their parents. They also arrested J.G., who was transported to juvenile hall. The remaining male, who was an adult, was booked into jail. B. Procedural History The People filed a juvenile wardship petition, charging J.G. with: (1) first degree residential robbery against Pineda (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1); (2) first degree residential burglary against Hernandez and Pineda (id., § 459; count 2); (3) carrying a loaded firearm on one’s person in a city (id., § 25850, subd. (a); count 3); and (4) carrying a concealed firearm within a vehicle (id., § 25400, subd. (a)(1); count 4). The petition also included special allegations as to each count. J.G. admitted to carrying a loaded firearm on his person (count 3) and assault by means of force (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), a lesser related offense of count 1. The remaining counts, as well as the special allegations, were dismissed “with facts and restitution open as to all counts.” The juvenile court accepted J.G.’s admission, finding that the police report provided a factual basis for the admission pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. On August 30, 2023, the juvenile court adjudged J.G. a ward and placed him on probation. Although the court did not impose restitution as a condition of probation, it set a hearing to consider victim restitution. 2 Before the hearing, the probation officer filed a memorandum, informing the court that Hernandez had submitted a restitution claim form and reported the following losses totaling $4,902.70: (1) an iPhone valued at $1,200; (2) a pair of sunglasses valued at $350; (3) a chain with a pendant valued at $2,500; (4) a crossbody bag valued at $50; (5) lost wages of $360 for two days of work; 2 We discuss only the facts related to Hernandez’s restitution claim because only that claim is at issue in this appeal. 4 and (6) damage to his car’s windshield valued at $442.70. A few days later, the probation officer filed a progress report that included a copy of Hernandez’s restitution claim form. On January 8 and March 6, 2024, the probation officer filed additional restitution memoranda and recommended that the juvenile court order J.G. to pay restitution to Hernandez in the full requested amount of $4,902.70. At the March 11 hearing, the court found “that a prima facie case has been established with respect to the losses noted and therefore the burden shifts to the defense and the defense would need to subpoena any witnesses.” On October 3, 2024, the juvenile court directed the probation office to file an amended restitution claim because “there’s been a kink in the chain in the claim.” As ordered, the probation officer filed an updated restitution memorandum. The updated memorandum stated that Hernandez had submitted an amended restitution claim, reporting the following losses totaling $7,994.01: (1) an iPhone valued at $1,200; (2) a pair of sunglasses valued at $350; (3) a chain with a pendant valued at $2,500; (4) a crossbody bag valued at $50; (5) damages to the Airbnb rental in the amount of $3,794.01; and (6) a $100 deductible for the replacement of Hernandez’s car windshield. The probation officer recommended that the court order J.G. to pay restitution in the amended amount of $7,994.01. On October 29 and November 27, 2024, the juvenile court held a contested restitution hearing. Hernandez’s testimony at the first day of the hearing differed from or expanded upon the police report in several respects. First, he testified that a gun was pointed at him during the first incident “when they took [his] chain” and that he was afraid “[b]ecause they took [his] chain and . . . wanted to fight with [him].” Second, he testified that he heard the males kicking his car’s windshield during the first incident but admitted 5 that he did not see who kicked it. Third, he testified that he did not immediately escape through the window during the second incident after Pineda woke him up as stated in the police report. As a result, he saw a group of “[m]ore or less about three” males enter his bedroom and take his “shoes and [his] bag and the rest of [his] things.” He testified that the group was armed. Hernandez then saw the group of males “[i]n most of the rooms and in the main bedroom where they took the TV and in the living room . . . .” He also saw them destroy “[t]ables, . . . an AC . . ., the walls, the bathroom, one of the bedroom[s], the doors, [and] the windows.” He could not, however, remember whether the floor had been damaged as claimed on the Airbnb invoice because the incident had happened more than a year ago. He also acknowledged that the police eventually returned his wallet and shoes. Finally, Hernandez identified J.G. as one of the males who came to the rental home both times on the night of the party. At the start of the second day of the hearing, J.G. brought the gold chain and returned it to Hernandez. The People therefore reduced Hernandez’s restitution claim by the value of that chain ($1,700) to $6,294.01. The officer who prepared the police report then testified that upon arriving after the first incident, he saw broken windows on the rental home and a car in the driveway with a smashed windshield. He further testified that upon responding to the second incident, Hernandez reported to him that his shoes were stolen. The officer did not, however, recall Hernandez claiming any damage to the inside of the rental home or the theft of his sunglasses and crossbody bag. But the officer acknowledged that he did not go inside the home during his second call to the rental home. In her closing statements, J.G.’s counsel conceded that J.G. was responsible for the stolen iPhone and pendant. The juvenile court took the 6 matter under submission. In the minute order issued immediately after hearing, the court wrote: “Restitution to Johan Hernandez modified from $7[,]994.01 to $6[,]294.01 as the gold necklace was returned through counsel. [¶] Matter is taken under submission and continued for decision.” The court continued the matter again on December 12, 2024 because it “require[d] additional time” to make its ruling on Hernandez’s restitution claim. On January 17, 2025, J.G. requested that any restitution be apportioned based on the recent amendment to section 730.6, which became effective on January 1, 2025. In response, the juvenile court opined that the co-participants “would have to have been charged in order for the [c]ourt to make an apportion[ment].” The court then continued the matter again so the People could file an update on whether any coparticipants were charged and to allow J.G. to file a brief on apportionment. The People filed a declaration confirming that no other coparticipant had been charged and J.G. filed a brief in support of apportionment. On March 4, 2025, the juvenile court ordered J.G. to pay Hernandez restitution in the amount of $6,294.01. The court declined to apportion because “[t]he only offender identified that was charged to be held responsible . . . was [J.G.]. The fact that others were arrested doesn’t change [that] fact.” The court reasoned that apportionment in this case “would create an odd scenario if the individual who is charged states that there were numerous people involved and those numerous people fled and could not be identified and therefore [the person charged] should only be receiving accountability for one-seventh or one-20th and that’s not the intent of the [L]egislature.” The court then dismissed the wardship and terminated probation. J.G. timely appealed the restitution order. 7  II. DISCUSSION A. The People’s Misstatements of Fact Before we turn to the substance of J.G.’s appeal, we address apparent misstatements of fact made in the respondent’s brief. In that brief, the People made assertions of fact for which we were unable to find support in the record, including: (1) J.G. entered the house during the first incident; and (2) J.G. was the “mastermind and leader” of the group who “controlled . . . the encounters with the victims” (italics added). Given that the People failed to provide any record citations to support these factual assertions in violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court, we are confident that based on our own independent review of the record, no such support exists. These misstatements of fact were careless, at best, and intentional, at worst. They were also not trivial. Each misstatement inflated J.G.’s role in the two incidents, making him seem more responsible or blameworthy for the losses suffered by Hernandez. This is problematic to say the least. Indeed, these factual misstatements by the People increased the time it took this court to review the record and sort through the starkly different versions of the facts presented by the parties. We would find this troubling from any party. But we are especially troubled here because an attorney representing the People “is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819–820.) Needless to say, we admonish the People for these misstatements and their failure to include record citations and trust that they will be more careful and diligent in future court filings. 8 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence J.G. contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the restitution award for Hernandez’s iPhone, pendant, windshield, crossbody bag, and sunglasses as well as the damage to the rental home. We disagree. 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “An order of direct victim restitution acts to make the victim whole, rehabilitate the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior.” (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 305.) Section 730.6, subdivision (b)(1) requires that a restitution award be “of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in [s]ection 602, including all of the following: [¶] (A) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible, whichever is less.” (Italics added.) The italicized language is the “ ‘language of causation.’ ” (In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 804, quoting In re A.M. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 668, 673.) Thus, a minor is responsible for an “economic loss incurred by the victim or victims” if “the minor’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing” that loss. (In re S.E., at p. 805.) However, the minor’s conduct “need not have been the sole cause of that loss.” (Ibid.) Finally, “ ‘ “[t]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542 (Gemelli).) We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion and the factual findings underpinning that order for substantial evidence. (In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1098.) “No particular type of proof is required, and a 9 court may accept a victim’s unsworn statement about the amount of loss a minor’s delinquent acts caused.” (In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 362.) A court also “may accept a property owner’s statement made in the probation report about the value of stolen or damaged property.” (Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.) 2. Restitution for the First Incident Based on the first incident, the juvenile court ordered restitution for Hernandez’s iPhone, pendant, and car windshield. Citing People v. Rivera (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1153, J.G. initially argues that he cannot be ordered to pay restitution for these items because he was not charged or convicted for any conduct resulting in those economic losses. But J.G., as the factual basis for his admission, stipulated to the facts contained in the police report, which described J.G.’s involvement in the first incident and the connection between the two incidents. Thus, unlike the defendant in Rivera (id. at p. 1162), J.G. stipulated to the factual basis that served as the foundation for the restitution award. In any event, there is evidence that J.G. used a firearm in the first incident based on Hernandez’s testimony that someone who wanted to start a fight during the first incident “pointed [a gun] at [him] when they took [his] chain” and the police report’s identification of J.G. as the person who tried to start that fight. As a result, the losses suffered by Hernandez during the first incident are sufficiently related to J.G.’s conviction for possession of a firearm to support a restitution award. J.G. further argues that there is no evidence that he caused the theft of the iPhone or pendant or the damage to the windshield. According to J.G., “an unknown male” took Hernandez’s iPhone and pendant. And Hernandez admitted that he did not see who smashed his windshield because he was inside the rental home when it happened. J.G. also maintains that he cannot 10 be found to have caused those losses under an aiding and abetting theory because the 2024 amendment to section 730.6, which prohibited the imposition of joint and several liability on minors, establishes that a minor may only be held liable for his own individual conduct. Finally, J.G. contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish his liability as an aider or abettor. We conclude otherwise. First, we find that the recent amendment to section 730.6 does not preclude an award of restitution under an aiding and abetting theory. This is because an aider and abettor is liable based on his or her own acts and mental state. “When a person ‘chooses to become a part of the criminal activity of another, she says in essence, “your acts are my acts . . . .” ’ [Citation.] But that person’s own acts are also her acts for which she is also liable. Moreover, that person’s mental state is her own; she is liable for her mens rea, not the other person’s.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118.) Thus, holding J.G. responsible under an aiding and abetting theory does not run afoul of the prohibition on joint and several liability found in section 730.6(b)(3). Second, we find that there is enough evidence to support J.G.’s liability for Hernandez’s losses during the first incident as an aider or abettor. Aiding and abetting liability “requires ‘proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’ ” (In re K.M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 323, 327 (K.M.), quoting People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) 11  Here, J.G.’s trial counsel conceded that J.G. should be held responsible for the loss of the iPhone and pendant. But even without this concession, there was sufficient evidence that J.G. aided and abetted the theft of the iPhone and pendant as well as the damage to the windshield. J.G. admitted that he was part of the group of males that Hernandez turned away from his party. He also admitted that he started the chain of events that led to the thefts and damage by “trying to start a fight with Hernandez.” Hernandez testified that someone who wanted to start a fight pointed a gun at him when he was robbed during the first incident. Meanwhile, the police report identified J.G. as the person who tried to start a fight with Hernandez. The report also identified only one person with a gun in the rental home during the second incident. That person, J.G., robbed Pineda at gunpoint. J.G. was also part of the group in the car that bragged about the crimes they committed at the rental home. Finally, J.G. returned the necklace which held the pendant on Hernandez’s neck stolen during the first incident. These admissions and the return of the necklace are sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the three elements for aider and abettor liability: (1) the direct perpetrators’ actus reus—the theft of Hernandez’s property and damage to his windshield; (2) J.G.’s unlawful intent and his intent to assist in the theft and damage as evidenced by his attempt to enter the rental home, his attempt to start a fight that would distract Hernandez while another male stole his iPhone and pendant, his admitted use of a gun during the second incident, his participation in bragging about the thefts and damage, and his return of the gold chain attached to the pendant; and (3) J.G.’s actus reus—i.e., attempting to enter the rental home, and trying to start a fight. (CALCRIM No. 401.) 12  3. Restitution for the Second Incident Based on the second incident, Hernandez sought restitution for the loss of his crossbody bag and sunglasses and the damage to the rental home. J.G. maintains that there was no evidence that he took the bag or sunglasses— which were never recovered even though the police did find some property stolen from the rental home in the car that J.G. was driving after the incident. J.G. also notes that Hernandez never told the responding officer that those items had been stolen during the second incident. Finally, he contends that there was no evidence to support the damage sustained by the rental home or that he caused that damage. We disagree. At the restitution hearing, Hernandez identified J.G. as one of the males who broke into the rental home. J.G. argues that because the group’s time in the house was “very short,” the theft of Hernandez’s bag and sunglasses “inferentially took place while [J.G.] was engaged with Mr. Pineda in a different room.” But Hernandez testified that he did not immediately leave the rental home after Pineda woke him up to alert him to the home invasion. Hernandez also testified that he saw J.G. in the home and saw the males who entered the home steal his property. This testimony gives rise to a reasonable inference that J.G. was part of the group that stole Hernandez’s property. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that J.G. was not merely “present at the scene of [the] crime.” (K.M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 329.) Instead, Hernandez’s testimony is sufficient to establish that J.G. was an active participant, had the requisite men’s rea, and assisted in the theft of Hernandez’s bag and sunglasses. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly included the cost of the bag and sunglasses in its restitution award. As for the damage to the rental home, J.G. raises several contentions, but none carry the day. 13  First, J.G. argues that “there was no testimony or other evidence to support the finding that [he] caused damage to the Airbnb rental.” But Hernandez’s testimony established that J.G. broke into the rental home with a group of males and took part in the destruction that ensued. Second, J.G. challenges the evidence of the damages to the rental home. That evidence consists of an e-mail from an Airbnb representative to Hernandez itemizing the $3,794.01 in damages to the rental home—which both J.G. and Hernandez describe as an “invoice.” J.G. acknowledges that statements attached to a probation report may constitute prima facie evidence of a loss (Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543), but argues that the invoice is too informal and too unspecific to support the requested damages. J.G. also argues that there is insufficient evidence to establish that J.G. or the other males who broke into the home caused the damage to its floors because Hernandez could not remember that damage. Again, we disagree. The invoice stated that Airbnb conducted a “careful review of all photos, documentation, and related communication provided by both parties.” It also described each item of damage to the rental home and the cost attributed to that item. Contrary to J.G.’s assertion, the invoice was not merely “statements made by the victim to the defendant’s probation officer or . . . the [juvenile] court’s speculation as to actual amounts.” Indeed, the invoice appears to be no different than estimates provided by a contractor or repair shop that courts have relied upon to support a restitution award. (See People v. Aguilar (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 857, 865 [accepting a flat-rate graffiti removal invoice when paired with testimony that the fee was a “ ‘fair price’ ” to abate the graffiti and the contractor considered photographs of the graffiti].) And Hernandez’s failure to recall any damage to the floor of the 14 rental home does not contradict the invoice. Indeed, it may be reasonably inferred that the invoice itemized the damages found by the owner immediately after the second incident. Third, J.G.’s argument that reliance on the invoice violated due process because the invoice “lack[ed] inherent reliability and its reliability was not supported by any other substantial evidence” is unpersuasive. J.G. does not explain why the invoice was more unreliable than an invoice from a repair shop or how the invoice prevented him from challenging the claimed damages to the rental home. Indeed, J.G. could have, but chose not to, subpoena the homeowner to testify about those damages. In any event, the Airbnb invoice is “detailed and facially credible” and is therefore more than sufficient to support the restitution award, especially when paired with Hernandez’s testimony and the police report. (Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544.) Finally, J.G. contends that the award for damage to the rental home violated section 730.6, subdivision (b)(1)(A) because there was no evidence that the losses “were . . . the lesser of the repair or replacement cost.” But as the People argue, the invoice provided sufficient evidence of “the costs to put the [Airbnb] rental house back into rentable condition.” As a result, “[t]he burden . . . shifted to [J.G.] to provide evidence that the cost should be lower because one or more items could be repaired for less money than [the] replacement cost.” J.G. failed to provide that evidence. Thus, the award did not violate section 730.6, subdivision (b)(1)(A). Accordingly, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the award of restitution for the loss of the crossbody bag and sunglasses and the damage to the rental home. 15 C. Apportionment J.G. contends that the juvenile court erred by refusing to apportion restitution pursuant to the 2024 amendment to section 730.6. At oral argument, the People conceded the court should have considered apportionment. We agree. 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2025, amended section 730.6(b)(3) to prohibit joint and several liability for restitution awards against a minor. (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.) As relevant here, that subdivision now states: “For the purposes of victim restitution, each minor shall be held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally liable as co-offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution. The aggregate amount of apportioned liability for all minors involved shall not exceed 100 percent in total.” (§ 730.6(b)(3), italics added.) We review the juvenile court’s interpretation of this statutory amendment de novo. (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016.) 2. Analysis The juvenile court declined to apportion the restitution award because J.G. was the only person charged with any crime in connection with the two incidents. Apparently, the court concluded that the term “co-offenders,” as used in section 730.6(b)(3), only encompassed persons charged with a crime. We do not agree. Instead, we find that section 730.6(b)(3) requires apportionment regardless of whether the other responsible parties have been charged with a crime or not. 16  Because the court issued its restitution order on March 4, 2025, over two months after the effective date of the 2024 amendment, section 730.6(b)(3) applies here. We must therefore determine whether it requires apportionment under the facts of this case. To make this determination, we apply the well-established rules of statutory construction. “ ‘ “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls. [Citation.]” ’ ” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 52.) “When ‘words themselves provide no definitive answer,’ we look to other interpretive aids such as legislative history . . . .” (Brown v. City of Inglewood (2025) 18 Cal.5th 33, 44.) And one “important consideration in determining the intention of the Legislature in enacting the new section is the state of the law as it existed prior to the enactment . . . .” (Estate of Simoni (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 339, 341.) The language in section 730.6(b)(3) requiring apportionment states: “The court shall apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution.” Nothing in this language limits apportionment “of responsibility or fault” to those who have been charged with a crime as suggested by the juvenile court or “judgment[s] against multiple defendants” as suggested by the People. (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(3).) And nothing in this language precludes apportionment “of responsibility or fault” among all of the males involved in the two incidents at issue in this case. (Ibid.) Despite this, the juvenile court concluded that a restitution award may only be apportioned among “offender[(s)],” which do not include persons who were arrested but not charged or convicted. The court presumably relied upon the sentence in section 730.6(b)(3) that precedes the apportionment language. That sentence states in relevant part that “each minor shall be 17 held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally liable as co- offenders.” (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(3), italics added.) By its terms, this sentence only prohibits the imposition of joint and several liability on a minor “co- offender[ ]”; it does not limit apportionment. 3 (Ibid.) But because it precedes the apportionment language, it could conceivably limit apportionment to “co- offenders.” This is because there can be no apportionment if there is joint and several liability. The state of the law before the amendment, however, clarifies any ambiguity that may exist and makes clear that the juvenile court may consider the responsibility of all culpable parties, whether charged or not, in apportioning restitution. Before that amendment, juvenile courts had broad “discretion to apportion restitution in a manner which [would] effectuate the legislative objectives of making the victim whole and rehabilitating the minor.” (In re S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 549.) Thus, the juvenile court could impose joint and several liability. (Id. at p. 550.) It could also apportion fault in imposing restitution. (See In re Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 (Brian S.) [“the juvenile court should take into account other culpable parties in imposing a restitution order”].) And in apportioning restitution, the juvenile court could take into account “the responsibility of other guilty parties, not only those who were convicted in the . . . court, but also the total number of” potentially culpable parties. (See People v. Kay (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 759, 762–763 (Kay) [reversing order that required five convicted defendants to each pay one-fifth of the restitution award because 3 A joint and several restitution order “merely means that the defendant (or juvenile) is responsible to make restitution for the full amount of the victim’s losses, but that the defendant’s obligation shall be reduced by any payments to the victim by other wrongdoers.” (In re S.S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 550.) 18 the trial court did not consider the responsibility of the other 123 demonstrators, most of whom were not charged or convicted of a crime].) This is consistent with former section 730.6, subdivision (h)(2)—which stated: “If feasible, the court shall also identify on the court order, any co-offenders who are jointly and severally liable for victim restitution.” (Italics added.) Thus, the 2024 amendment to section 730.6 simply took joint and several liability off the table for restitution orders in juvenile cases. It did not limit the juvenile court’s ability to consider the responsibility of all culpable parties, including those who were not charged or convicted of a crime, in apportioning fault. In this case, this means that the court could and should consider the responsibility of all of the males involved in the two incidents, even though only J.G. was charged or convicted of a crime. The legislative history is also instructive. As introduced on February 16, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 1186 proposed to do away with the payment of victim restitution by minors altogether. (Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) § 16 [“It is the intent of the legislature that no minor . . . shall be ordered to pay restitution to a victim that incurred economic loss as a result of the conduct of that minor,” italics added].) In support, the Legislature explained that “[y]outh, as a class, are generally unable to pay restitution.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 16, 2023, p. 6.) As a result, “most restitution orders [are] symbolic, rather than an effective method of compensating victims for their losses” and “results in significant long-term financial consequences for young people . . . .” (Id. at p. 7.) Apparently due to some concern that eliminating victim restitution in juvenile cases may conflict with a victim’s right to restitution under article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(13) of the California Constitution (compare Assem. 19 Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1186, supra, Feb. 16, 2023, at p. 7 [“Arguably, this does not run afoul of the California Constitution . . . .”] with Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 16, 2023, p. 2 [“Under Marsy’s Law, a person who suffers a loss resulting from criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution. This bill would limit a victim’s right to secure monetary restitution, as it eliminates from [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 202, [subdivision] (f) the requirement that a minor pay restitution to the victim”]), the Senate amended Assembly Bill No. 1186 to prohibit joint and several liability and to require apportionment of a minor’s responsibility for restitution. (Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 2024, § 6.) In support, the Legislature continued to cite the burden that court-ordered restitution places on minors. (See, Assem. Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 24, 2024, p. 3 [“Restitution was meant to make crime survivors whole, but in reality, it’s creating a perpetual cycle of debt . . . . California is in need of an alternative system that holds young people accountable while placing them, and survivors, on a more just and economically secure path”]; id., p. 4 [“Criminologists have found that young people who had outstanding debt from . . . restitution had a higher risk of recidivism”].) Thus, the Legislature intended for apportionment to minimize the amount of restitution that minors would have to pay. This would presumably include apportionment among all potentially culpable persons, whether charged or not. To the extent that any doubts remain, the comments within the analysis of Assembly Bill No. 1186 by the Senate Committee on Public Safety removes them. In those comments, the committee, citing In re S.S., observed that, under existing law, “[t]he juvenile court is vested with discretion to 20 apportion restitution in a manner that will effectuate the legislative objectives of making the victim whole and rehabilitating the minor.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, coms. on Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 24, 2024, p. 6.) It then explained that the bill now “requires the court to apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution . . . . This change is intended to address situations where one minor has complied with their portion of restitution owed but may still be held liable for the other co-offenders’ who have not paid their portion.” (Ibid., italics added.) This indicates that the Legislature intended to require apportionment in accordance with existing law, which allowed juvenile courts to consider the fault of all potentially culpable parties. (See Brian S., supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 533; Kay, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at pp. 762–763.) Indeed, the absence of any suggestion to the contrary in the legislative history confirms this. (See National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 504 [omissions in the legislative history may be telling in light of the “overarching motivation” behind the enactment of the law].) In reaching this conclusion, we reject the People’s argument to the contrary in their respondent’s brief. According to the People, “[w]here there