Reneau v. Yoshida & Garcia, Inc.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketB345787
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SUNFA RENEAU, B345787
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 21STCV21762)
YOSHIDA & GARCIA, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kenneth R. Freeman, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Nehme Law Firm and Anthony T. Nehme for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Foley & Lardner, Nicholas M. Gross and Emma E. Soldon
for Defendants and Respondents.
——————————
Defendants and respondents Long Beach Memorial Medical
Center (the Hospital) and Yoshida & Garcia, Inc. (Attorneys)
notified a tortfeasor’s insurance company that the Hospital was
asserting a statutory lien against any payment by the tortfeasor
or his insurance company to plaintiff and appellant Sunfa
Reneau, who obtained medical treatment at the Hospital after a
car accident with the tortfeasor. Reneau is insured under
California’s Medi-Cal insurance. 1 In her complaint, Reneau
alleged that the defendants violated the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.)
because their use of the statutory lien under the Hospital Lien
Act (HLA; Civ. Code, § 3045.1 et seq.) violated the Medi-Cal Act
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14000 et seq.). 2
The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without
leave to amend, reasoning that the defendants acted with legal
authority under the HLA, and Reneau’s status as a Medi-Cal
beneficiary did not limit the Hospital’s legal authority. Based on
our review of the HLA, statutes and regulations governing
Medicaid (42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.; 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 et seq.) and
Medi-Cal (§ 14000 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 51000 et
seq.), as well as related case law, we reach the opposite
conclusion, finding that the Medi-Cal Act prevents defendants
from relying on the HLA as authority for their actions, and that
Reneau has stated a cause of action under the UCL. We
1 The term “ ‘Medi-Cal’ means the California Medical
Assistance Program.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14063.)
2 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless noted otherwise.
2
therefore reverse and remand with directions for the case to
proceed on the UCL claim alone.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3
After being injured by Andre Hernandez in a car accident
on June 3, 2020, Reneau sought treatment at the Hospital on
June 5, 2020. She provided her Medi-Cal card to the admissions
manager, who acknowledged that Reneau was Medi-Cal eligible.
The Hospital billed Medi-Cal for certain services, but charges
totaling $7,683 for other services were not submitted to Medi-Cal
and purportedly remain unpaid.
Acting on behalf of the Hospital, Attorneys mailed a letter
to Hernandez’s insurer, Alliance United, on July 24, 2020. The
letter included a notice of hospital lien stating a right to enforce a
hospital lien related to Reneau’s covered medical treatment
under Civil Code section 3045.5. In the letter, the Hospital
threatened to file an action against Hernandez and Alliance
United to enforce the lien based on the non-submitted, unpaid
amount of $7,683.
On or about March 5, 2021, Reneau, Hernandez, and
Alliance United entered into a settlement agreement. Reneau
agreed to release her claims against Hernandez in exchange for a
payment of $7500 from Alliance United. Attorneys continued to
attempt to collect on the Hospital’s lien. As a result of the
3 In accordance with the standard of review on demurrer,
the facts relevant to the UCL claim at issue on appeal are taken
from the allegations of the operative third amended complaint,
together with incidental background allegations from the original
complaint.
3
defendants’ practice of asserting a lien, Alliance United has
withheld the settlement funds payable to Reneau.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Reneau filed her initial complaint against the defendants
on June 9, 2021. The defendants removed the case to federal
court, where Reneau ultimately filed the operative third amended
complaint asserting class action claims for violation of federal
debt collection law, state debt collection law, and the UCL. 4 In
May 2024, the federal district court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss the cause of action for violation of federal debt
collection law and remanded the remaining claims to state court.
After remand, the defendants filed a demurrer, which the
trial court sustained without leave to amend. Addressing first
Reneau’s claim under state debt collection law, the trial court
rejected Reneau’s argument that the Medi-Cal statutes prohibit
the defendants from asserting a statutory lien under the HLA
against a Medi-Cal beneficiary’s settlement with a tortfeasor.
The court reasoned instead that the language of the two statutory
schemes could be harmonized because the HLA does not carve
out an exception for liens asserted to collect for services to Medi-
Cal beneficiaries, and because existing case law did not limit
remedies under the HLA when the injured party is a Medi-Cal
4 Reneau brought the claims on behalf of a putative class
and subclass of (1) all Medi-Cal eligible California residents who
received notice of a hospital lien within four years of the filing of
the complaint and (2) all Medi-Cal eligible California residents
from whom Hospital attempted to collect a debt through a
hospital lien within one year of the filing of the complaint.
4
beneficiary. Considering the two schemes together, the trial
court concluded the provision of the Medi-Cal Act that permits a
provider to collect from a “third-party payor who provides a
contractual or legal entitlement to health care services” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 14019.4, subd. (a)) authorized the defendants to
assert an HLA lien to collect from the third party tortfeasor,
Hernandez, and his insurance company, Alliance United.
Relying on its determination that the complaint failed to allege a
violation of the state debt collection law, the court also reasoned
that plaintiff “may not invoke the UCL to assault the ‘safe
harbor’ provided under the HLA,” and sustained the demurrer to
Reneau’s UCL claim, also without leave to amend. 5 The
defendants filed and served a notice of entry of judgment, and
Reneau timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The parties take opposing views on whether the defendants
asserted a valid lien against Reneau’s settlement proceeds.
Reneau contends the lien was invalid because the Hospital was
seeking payment for services rendered to a Medi-Cal beneficiary.
The defendants contend the lien was valid under the HLA.
Because we conclude a hospital cannot assert an HLA lien for
services provided to a Medi-Cal beneficiary, we find the lien to be
invalid.
The defendants also argue that even if we find the lien
invalid, the Hospital’s reliance on the HLA provides them safe
5 On appeal, Reneau only challenges the trial court’s
decision on her UCL claim, not her claim under state debt
collection law.
5
harbor protection from UCL liability, and that our finding should
not be given retroactive effect. We reject the defendants’ safe
harbor and retroactivity arguments as well.
A. Standard Of Review
“The function of a demurrer is to test whether, as a matter
of law, the facts alleged in the complaint state a cause of action
under any legal theory.” (Cardenas v. Horizon Senior Living, Inc.
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1069.) “An order sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend is reviewed de novo. The court
exercises its independent judgment to determine whether or not
the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
as a matter of law. [Citation.] We assume the truth of properly
pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred
from those expressly pleaded, and matters that are judicially
noticeable. [Citation.] We construe the pleading in a reasonable
manner and read the allegations in context. [Citation.]” (Genis
v. Schainbaum (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1014–1015; Allied
Anesthesia Medical Group, Inc. v. Inland Empire Health Plan
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 794, 801.)
B. Statutory Schemes Governing Payments to Medical
Providers When There is Potential Third Party
Liability
To determine whether the defendants asserted a valid lien
under the HLA, we first review the legal landscape governing a
medical provider’s authority to collect payment after providing
services to a person injured by a third party tortfeasor.
6
1. The Hospital Lien Act
The HLA enables hospitals to recover the cost of providing
emergency services and ongoing services related to emergency
care. (See Yaffee v. Skeen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1300–
1307.) Under the HLA, “ ‘when a hospital provides care for a
patient, the hospital has a statutory lien against
any . . . settlement received by the patient from a third person
responsible for his or her injuries, or the third person’s insurer, if
the hospital has notified the third person or insurer of the lien.’
(Mercy Hospital & Medical Center v. Farmers Ins. Group of
Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 215.) The HLA prohibits an
insurer from paying a patient without paying the hospital the
amount of its lien, or as much as can be satisfied from 50 percent
of the patient’s recovery from the tortfeasor or insurer.” (Long
Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 710, 713.)
In Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West (2005) 35
Cal.4th 595, 607 (Parnell), the California Supreme Court held
that “a lien under the HLA is based upon a debt owed by the
patient to the hospital.” Similar to the case currently before us,
the underlying case in Parnell involved a patient plaintiff who
brought a UCL claim against his treating hospital after the
hospital filed an HLA notice of lien against any settlement or
judgment between the patient and his tortfeasor. (Id. at pp. 599–
600.) The hospital had already received payment of a negotiated
amount for the care provided to the patient in accordance with a
provider agreement between the hospital and the patient’s health
plan, and the hospital asserted the lien to recover the difference
7
between the hospital’s negotiated rate and “the ‘actual’ cost of the
medical services.” (Id. at p. 599.) After a thorough review of the
HLA’s statutory text (id. at pp. 601−603), the legislative history
(id. at pp. 603−605), and an analogous statute authorizing
counties to file similar liens (id. at pp. 605−608), the Supreme
Court concluded that the hospital lacked authority to assert the
lien because the patient did not owe an underlying debt (id. at
pp. 607, 609 [holding “that a lien under the HLA requires the
existence of an underlying debt owed by the patient to the
hospital and that, absent such a debt, no lien may attach”]).
“When a hospital receives payment from a patient and his
health insurer at a reduced negotiated rate under a prior
agreement in which the hospital agreed to accept that payment
as ‘payment in full’ for its services, the hospital cannot assert a
lien under the HLA to ‘recover the difference between its usual
and customary charges and the amount received from the patient
and his insurer.’ (Parnell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 598.)”6 (Yaffee
v. Skeen, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1298 [“ ‘[If] hospitals wish
to preserve their right to recover the difference between usual
and customary charges and the negotiated rate through a lien
under the HLA, they are free to contract for this right’ when
negotiating their contracts with insurers. [Citation]”].)
In announcing its holding, the Parnell court expressly
disapproved of Swanson v. St. John’s Regional Medical Center
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 245 (Swanson), to the extent it conflicted
with the court’s decision. (Parnell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 609.)
6 The Parnell court declined to address whether litigation
immunity applied and which of plaintiff’s causes of action could
move forward, leaving those questions for the trial court to
consider. (Parnell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 611, fn. 16.)
8
The disapproved Swanson opinion held that the HLA authorized
hospitals to pursue payment of their reasonable and necessary
charges from a tortfeasor without drawing a distinction between
insured and uninsured patients, providing hospitals a safe harbor
from UCL claims. (Swanson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.)
2. Medicaid/Medi-Cal
Our discussion focuses on the limitations on a Medi-Cal
provider’s authority to seek payment for services provided to a
Medi-Cal beneficiary 7 after injury by a tortfeasor.
Congress created the federal Medicaid program in 1965 by
enacting Title XIX of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396 et
seq.). “Medicaid is a medical assistance program for low-income
individuals that is jointly funded by the federal and state
governments. States’ participation in the Medicaid program is
optional; however, any state that chooses to participate must
develop and implement a state plan that conforms to federal law.
(Harris v. McRae (1980) 448 U.S. 297, 301.)” (Daniel C. v. White
Memorial Medical Center (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 789, 800 (Daniel
C.).) Federal law “strictly limits the ability of providers to obtain
reimbursement for their services,” requiring states to limit
participation in the state’s Medicaid program to providers who
7 Section 14124.70, subdivision (b) defines the term
“Beneficiary” as “any person who has received benefits or will be
provided benefits under this chapter because of an injury for
which another person or party may be liable. It includes such
beneficiary’s guardian, conservator or other personal
representative, his estate or survivors.” For purposes of our
discussion, we use the terms “Medi-Cal patient” and “Medi-Cal
beneficiary” interchangeably.
9
accept payment from the state agency as payment in full.
(Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 812
(Olszewski), citing and quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(C);
42 C.F.R. §§ 447.15 & 447.20.)
California has chosen to participate in Medicaid and has
adopted the Medi-Cal Act to implement its state plan, with the
California Department of Health Care Services administering the
Medi-Cal program. (Daniel C., supra, at p. 800.) Consistent with
the federal requirements limiting the manner in which a provider
may seek payment for services provided to a Medi-Cal
beneficiary, the Medi-Cal Act requires participating providers to
submit Medi-Cal claims for reimbursement (§14019.3, subd. (c)), 8
and prohibits providers from seeking reimbursement or
attempting to obtain payment for the cost of health services from
the Medi-Cal beneficiary (§ 14019.4, subd. (a)). 9 In Olszewski,
supra, 30 Cal.4th 798, the California Supreme Court concluded
that the federal statutes and regulations “are unambiguous and
limit provider collections from a Medicaid beneficiary to, at most,
8 The relevant text states: “Upon presentation of the Medi-
Cal card or other proof of eligibility, a provider shall submit a
Medi-Cal claim for reimbursement, subject to the rules and
regulations of the Medi-Cal program.” (§ 14019.3, subd. (c).)
9 The relevant text states: “A provider of health care
services who obtains a label or copy from the Medi-Cal card or
other proof of eligibility pursuant to this chapter shall not seek
reimbursement nor attempt to obtain payment for the cost of
those covered health care services from the eligible applicant or
recipient, or a person other than the department or a third-party
payor who provides a contractual or legal entitlement to health
care services.” (§ 14019.4, subd. (a).)
10
the cost-sharing charges allowed under the state plan, even when
a third party tortfeasor is later found liable for the injuries
suffered by that beneficiary.” (Id. at p. 820.)
Under the Medi-Cal Act, it is the state agency, not the
provider, that has the right and the duty to recover the
reasonable value of the Medi-Cal benefits when a provider
renders services to a Medi-Cal beneficiary who has been injured
by a third party. (§ 14124.71, subd. (a); Olszewski, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 811 [“federal Medicaid law requires state plans to
recover from liable third parties whenever possible”].) The state
agency “may obtain reimbursement by filing an action directly
against a third party tortfeasor, by intervening in a Medi-Cal
beneficiary’s action against a third party, or by filing a lien
against a beneficiary’s settlement, judgment, or award.
[Citations.]” (Daniel C., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 800–801;
see also Olszewski, at p. 811 [“the state plan must provide for the
mandatory assignment of the beneficiary’s rights ‘to payment for
medical care from any third party’ to the state agency”)].
In Olszewski, the Supreme Court drew a sharp distinction
between (a) the state agency seeking reimbursement for Medi-Cal
payments and (b) a Medi-Cal provider seeking payment by
imposing a lien on any tort recovery. While a Medi-Cal
beneficiary must assign any right of recovery from a third party
to the state agency, the beneficiary is expressly not required to
reimburse the health care provider: “Medicaid beneficiaries do
not, however, have to assign to providers their right to recover
from third parties. Thus, a provider does not have a direct cause
of action against a third party tortfeasor and may not
independently recover any amount from that tortfeasor.”
(Olszewski, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 823.)
11
Under section 14019.4, subdivision (a), a Medi-Cal provider
“shall not seek reimbursement nor attempt to obtain payment for
the cost of those covered health care services” with the exception
of “a third-party payor who provides a contractual or legal
entitlement to health care services.” However, “a settling third
party tortfeasor is not a ‘third party pay[o]r’ as that term is used
in” section 14019.4, subdivision (a). (Palumbo v. Myers (1983)
149 Cal.App.3d 1020, 1034−1035.)
In Dameron Hospital Assn. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 530, 549 (Dameron), the court rejected a
hospital’s efforts to collect a Medi-Cal patient’s uninsured
motorist benefits, sustaining the insurance company’s demurrer
to the hospital’s complaint. Emphasizing that an insurance
company providing uninsured motorist coverage is not “a
provider of a contractual or legal entitlement to health care
services,” the court explained that “under laws that govern the
provision of Medi-Cal services in California, providers do not
have the authority to ignore a patient’s Medi-Cal coverage and
instead seek full payment—i.e., payment above Medi-Cal rates—
from [the patient’s uninsured motorist] insurance.” (Ibid.)
C. The Hospital’s HLA Lien Was Invalid
The defendants contend that the Hospital asserted a valid
lien under the HLA because nothing in the statutory language of
either the HLA or the Medi-Cal Act prohibits such a lien. We
disagree. The case law implementing the two statutory schemes
makes clear that a Medi-Cal provider lacks authority to seek
payment from either the patient or a third party tortfeasor.
12
Under Parnell, a provider treating a privately insured
patient cannot use the HLA to seek additional payment beyond
what it has agreed to accept as full payment from the insurer,
unless it has made contractual arrangements with the insurer
permitting it to do so. (Parnell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 598, 607,
609.) The defendants offer no convincing argument for why the
same limitation should not apply when a patient is insured under
Medi-Cal and the provider has agreed to accept Medi-Cal rates as
full payment. The reasoning in Parnell is equally applicable in
the Medi-Cal context as in the context of a private insurer: if the
patient does not owe money to the hospital, the hospital lacks
authority to assert an HLA lien. Sections 14019.3 and 14019.4
make it clear that a provider cannot collect from a Medi-Cal
patient, and the defendants here do not argue that Reneau owes
money to the Hospital. In addition, the Medi-Cal Act requires
the patient to assign any right of payment to the state agency,
not to the provider, and the statutory scheme tasks the state
agency with the primary responsibility for determining whether
and how to seek payment from a third party tortfeasor.
(Olszewski, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 811.)
The defendants argue that Dameron and Palumbo are
distinguishable because neither case involved a hospital’s
authority to act under the HLA, nor did they involve a dispute
between a hospital and the Medi-Cal patient. In Parnell
however, the Supreme Court held that a hospital’s use of the
HLA is invalid when the patient does not owe a debt to the
hospital; in other words, if the hospital lacks authority under the
HLA to collect from the patient directly, it also lacks authority to
collect from the third party tortfeasor. (Parnell, supra, 35 Cal.4th
at pp. 600–601, 607 [“a lien under the HLA is based on a debt
13
owed by the patient to the hospital”].) Dameron and Palumbo
support our conclusion that in the Medi-Cal context, the state
agency, not the health care provider, has authority to seek
reimbursement for the cost of patient care, and section 14019.4,
subdivision (a), prohibits a provider from seeking payment from a
Medi-Cal patient, even where a third party tortfeasor may be
liable for the patient’s injuries. (Dameron, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at pp. 546–550; Palumbo, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1024−1034.)
Construing the statutory language of the Medi-Cal Act and
the HLA in light of the case law discussed above, we conclude
that the defendants’ use of the HLA to pursue payment from
Hernandez and Alliance United is inconsistent with the Medi-Cal
Act’s prohibition against collecting from a Medi-Cal patient. The
Hospital’s lien was therefore invalid.
D. Unfair Competition Law Claim
Reneau’s complaint alleges the assertion of an invalid lien
was an unlawful business practice supporting liability under the
UCL. The defendants contend that even if we conclude the HLA
lien was invalid, their actions in asserting the lien do not support
Reneau’s UCL claim. We conclude the Hospital’s invalid lien
may serve as the basis of a UCL claim; none of the defenses
asserted by the defendants apply in this case.
The UCL “prohibits ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising.’ (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, see
§§ 17203, 17204.)” (Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc.
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 166, 185.) The law’s “purpose is ‘to
14
safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of
monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by
prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent
and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest
competition is destroyed or prevented.’ (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17001.)” (Ibid.) “ ‘In service of that purpose, the Legislature
framed the UCL’s substantive provisions in “ ‘broad, sweeping
language’ ” ’ [citation] to reach ‘ “anything that can properly be
called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden
by law” ’ [citation]. ‘By proscribing “any unlawful” business
practice, “section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and
treats them as unlawful practices” that the unfair competition
law makes independently actionable.’ ” (Abbott Laboratories v.
Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 642, 651–652.) “However, the
law does more than just borrow. The statutory language
referring to ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent’ practice (italics
added) makes clear that a practice may be deemed unfair even if
not specifically proscribed by some other law.
‘Because . . . section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it
establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or
practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ ” (Cel-
Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (Cel-Tech).)
While the UCL has a broad reach, it cannot be used to
invade “ ‘safe harbors’ ” provided by other statutes. (Cel–Tech,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 182; Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1081, 1125.) “Specific legislation may limit the
judiciary’s power to declare conduct unfair. If the Legislature has
permitted certain conduct or considered a situation and
concluded no action should lie, courts may not override that
15
determination. When specific legislation provides a ‘safe harbor,’
plaintiffs may not use the general unfair competition law to
assault that harbor.” (Cel–Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 182.)
Defendants present three arguments for why Reneau’s
UCL claim fails, none of which are convincing. First, defendants
contend the HLA provided a safe harbor protecting them from
UCL liability. As we have explained above, existing statutory
and case law provide ample support for the conclusion that in the
context of Medi-Cal, the defendants here lacked legal authority
under the HLA to impose a statutory lien on Reneau’s settlement
funds, and we are unconvinced that the HLA provides any
protection from liability in the context before us.
Second, the defendants argue that our determination that
an HLA lien is invalid in the Medi-Cal context should not serve
as a basis for retroactively holding the defendants liable for
conduct that was lawful at the time it was taken. In other words,
they argue that our legal conclusion that their HLA lien was
invalid should not be given “retroactive” or “ex post facto” effect
to support liability for violation of the UCL. We find the
defendants’ arguments unconvincing. The statutes in question
were enacted long ago, and several of the cases most pertinent to
our analysis, Palumbo, Olszewski, and Parnell, were decided
more than twenty years ago. Nothing about our holding
regarding the legal limitations on the Hospital’s HLA lien
authority is novel or groundbreaking. Instead, we apply long-
standing case law to a set of facts that has not yet been the
subject of a published opinion.
The defendants argue that we should follow Olszewski,
where the reviewing court declined to hold the defendant in that
case retroactively liable for its reliance on a statute that the court
16
found preempted by federal law. 10 (Olszewski, supra, 30 Cal.4th
at pp. 806, 827−830.) The defendants try to gloss over an
important distinction between the legal authority underpinning
the HLA lien in this case and the Medi-Cal lien in Olszewski, but
we agree with Reneau that the distinction is material. In
Olszewski, the Supreme Court determined that the code section
authorizing the defendant’s lien, a section enacted in 1992 as a
revision to the Medi-Cal Act in order to permit Medi-Cal
providers to pursue payment from tortfeasors, was
unconstitutional because it was preempted by federal law.
(Olszewski, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 805, 822, 826 [“federal law is
not ambiguous and unequivocally prohibits California from
authorizing provider recovery on liens against the entire
judgment or settlement obtained by a Medicaid beneficiary from
a third party tortfeasor”].) The Olszewski court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that the revised Medi-Cal statutes
(§§ 14214.791 & 14214.74) did not shield the defendant from
liability, reasoning that “Californians should be able to presume
10 Discussing whether this court should give retroactive
effect to our holding, the defendants mischaracterize a quote from
Olszewski to imply that one of the reasons it declined to apply its
preemption holding retroactively was “that the assertion of liens
as authorized by validly enacted California statutes is shielded
by the litigation privilege.” (Olszewski, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 832.) The quoted language comes from a section concerning
other tort claims in the case; it is not part of the discussion of
whether the preempted code sections can provide defendants a
safe harbor from UCL liability. Any argument about application
of the litigation privilege is forfeited, because failure to provide
proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief
but are not clearly identified by a heading. (Pizarro v. Reynoso
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.)
17
that statutes enacted by the Legislature are constitutional.
Otherwise, we place our citizens in the untenable position of
guessing whether their conduct may subject them to penalty even
when the Legislature has expressly condoned it.” (Olszewski,
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 829.) In contrast here, we are not finding
any statute to be invalid or preempted; instead, we have
determined that the defendants’ use of a facially valid statute
(the HLA) is invalid in the context where the patient is a Medi-
Cal beneficiary. As Reneau points out in her reply brief, she is
not seeking a declaration that the HLA is invalid or preempted.
Rather, she is alleging that defendants’ use of the HLA to assert
a lien violated the Medi-Cal statutory scheme, and sections
14019.3 and 14019.4 in particular, making it an unlawful or
unfair business practice under the UCL.
Third, the defendants rely on Olszewski for their argument
that Reneau was required to allege a separate cause of action for
declaratory relief. (Olszewski, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 830.)
Because the complaint seeks a judicial declaration that the
defendants’ practices are prohibited and the lien was invalid, we
conclude that she may proceed on her UCL claim.
18
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the portion of the order sustaining the
demurrer to the UCL claim are reversed. The case is remanded
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Appellant Sunfa Reneau is awarded her costs on appeal.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
19