Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Marriage of Gonsalves CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of KATERYNA and LLOYD DANIEL GONSALVES. F088139 KATERYNA GONSALVES, (Super. Ct. No. FL-20-001602) Appellant, v. OPINION LLOYD DANIEL GONSALVES, Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Marcus L. Mumford, Judge. Moran Law Firm, Amanda K. Moran, S. Eric Bishop II, and Janay D. Kinder for Appellant Kateryna Gonsalves. Law Offices of Goss, Goss & Leavy and Andrea M. Leavy for Appellant Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves. -ooOoo- Appellant Kateryna Gonsalves (Wife) and appellant Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves (Husband) married on May 20, 2006, and separated on July 8, 2020. Wife filed a petition for dissolution on July 9, 2020. Following a two-day bench trial, the superior court issued rulings pertaining to three real properties, designated in this opinion as Backus Lane, Delta Court, and Lambert Way. The court initially concluded Backus Lane and Delta Court were Husband’s separate properties whereas Lambert Way—which was sold while the dissolution action was pending—was community property. Citing Family Code1 section 2550, the court reserved jurisdiction over unadjudicated claims requesting reimbursement or asserting pro tanto interests pursuant to the Moore/Marsden2 rule. The judgment of dissolution was entered on April 26, 2024. On appeal, Wife makes several contentions. First, Backus Lane “should be deemed 100% community property” (capitalization omitted) or, in the alternative, Wife is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest therein because she “contributed physically and financially to improving the Backus Lane property.” Second, Wife is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest in Delta Court because she “contributed physically and financially to improvements on the Delta Court property” and “community funds were used to pay down the loan against the property.” Third, Wife is entitled to Watts3 charges for Husband’s “continued use of the Backus Lane and Delta Court properties between the time of separation and the time of trial.” Finally, Husband breached his fiduciary duties under sections 721 and 1100. We conclude: (1) substantial evidence supported the superior court’s initial characterization of Backus Lane as Husband’s separate property; (2) the Moore/Marsden and Watts issues should be 1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Family Code. 2 In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366; In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426. 3 In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366. 2. adjudicated by the superior court, which expressly reserved jurisdiction over them; and (3) Wife’s failure to raise a claim of breach of fiduciary duty below forfeited such a claim on appeal. On cross-appeal, Husband contends Lambert Way could not be deemed community property because the execution of a grant deed adding Wife to the property’s title was the product of undue influence. We conclude substantial evidence rebutted the presumption of undue influence. BACKGROUND4 I. Backus Lane a. Documentary evidence In a grant deed dated January 27, 2011, and recorded February 2, 2011, M.P. granted to Husband—“a married man”—Backus Lane “as his sole and separate property” “for a valuable consideration” (capitalization omitted). M.P. marked a checkbox declaring “[t]his transfer is exempt from the documentary transfer tax pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code [section] 11930.” b. Wife’s trial testimony Wife testified Husband’s mother M.P. originally owned Backus Lane. At some point, M.P. could no longer live independently and moved in with Husband and Wife. 4 The appellate record consists of clerk’s transcripts and a settled statement certified by the superior court as “an accurate summary of the testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the … reasons for the appeal.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) Husband filed a May 5, 2026 motion asking this court to augment the appellate record to include a “missing” “Grant Deed evidencing Husband’s original acquisition of the Lambert Way property from the sellers.” He indicated this grant deed was supposed to be included as part of Exhibit H (see at p. 7, post) but was “incorrectly handled.” We deferred our ruling pending consideration of the appeal on its merits. Having done so, we now deny Husband’s motion because the information therein “is not germane to the dispositive issue[s] we address.” (Acosta v. Brown (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 234, 246, fn. 6.) 3. Wife acknowledged “there was a ‘Grant Deed’ that transferred title of the property from [M.P.] into Husband’s name” but “did not know the transfer was a gift to be Husband’s separate property.” After M.P. vacated Backus Lane, Husband and Wife “elected to maintain Backus Lane as a rental property during the marriage.” Wife “assisted physically and financially with the maintenance of the Backus Lane property, including making improvements to the property.” The rental income was “reported on their taxes” and “placed into a bank account.” Husband did not allow Wife to access this account, but Wife “believed [it] belonged to the community” since Husband “used the account to pay for daily living expenses for the both of them, such as groceries, movie tickets, utility bills, etc.” c. Husband’s trial testimony Husband testified Backus Lane “was gifted to him by his mother [M.P.] via a Grant Deed to be his separate property.” Wife “assisted him with multiple renovations and updates to the Backus Lane property for rental purposes.” For instance, “when there was a change of tenants, the property required remodeling, new paint, new flooring, and yard cleaning, which Wife assisted with.” Rental income was deposited into a community property bank account and “used to improve the property and to pay annual taxes.” II. Delta Court a. Documentary evidence A grant deed dated February 27, 1978, and recorded April 7, 1978, showed Delta Court was granted to Husband and his former spouse C.G. as joint tenants. The instrument provided the following description of the property: “Lot 4 in Block 3451 of University Estates, as per Map filed May 23, 1973 in Vol. 24 of Maps, page 48, Stanislaus County Records.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Husband and C.G. signed a “Marital Settlement Agreement” (some capitalization omitted) on April 15, 2005, and May 2, 2005, respectively. Per the agreement, Delta 4. Court “shall be the sole and separate property, asset and debt of [Husband],” Husband “shall take a loan on the home and buy out [C.G.’s] ½ of its value,” and C.G. “will sign off of the deed to the home.” According to the agreement, Delta Court’s value was approximately $270,000. Husband borrowed $165,000 on April 19, 2005, and executed a deed of trust on Delta Court as security therefor on April 21, 2005. After he married Wife, he borrowed $164,000 on September 16, 2008, and executed a deed of trust on Delta Court as security therefor on September 17, 2008. Both deeds of trust listed Delta Court’s Assessor Parcel Number (APN) as “071-019-037-000.” A “Substitution of Trustee and Deed of Full Reconveyance” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) executed on September 30, 2008, identified “[Husband] a married man, as his sole & separate property as Trustor” (boldface omitted). A “Full Reconveyance” (boldface, underscoring & some capitalization omitted) executed on April 20, 2011, likewise identified “[Husband], a married man as his sole and separate property as Trustor(s)” (boldface & some capitalization omitted). On January 5, 2012, Husband and Wife executed a deed of trust on Delta Court to secure a home equity line of credit. The instrument identified: (1) “[Husband], a married man as his sole and separate property, and [Wife], his wife” (boldface & capitalization omitted) as “Trustor”; (2) Husband and “all co-signers and co-makers signing the [January 5, 2012] Credit Agreement [in the principal amount of $100,000]” as “Borrower”; and (3) “Tax ID No[.]: 071-019-037” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) for Delta Court. A “Substitution of Trustee and Full Reconveyance” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) executed on May 2, 2016, identified “[Husband], a married man, as his sole and separate property, and [Wife], his wife” (boldface & capitalization omitted) as “the Original Trustor.” On April 8, 2016, Husband executed a deed of trust on Delta Court to secure a reverse mortgage loan. The instrument identified “[Husband], a married man, as his sole 5. and separate property” (boldface & capitalization omitted) as “trustor.” A “Substitution of Trustee and Deed of Reconveyance” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) executed on December 15, 2020, identified “[Husband], a married man, as his sole and separate property” (capitalization omitted) as “Trustor.” In a grant deed dated September 29, 2020, and recorded October 1, 2020, Husband and D.G.5 “as joint tenants” (capitalization omitted) granted Delta Court to “The Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves Trust, Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves as Trustee” (some capitalization omitted). The instrument listed Delta Court’s APN as “071-019-037-000” and contained the following description of the property: “Lot 4 in Book [sic] 3451 of University Estates, as per Map filed May 23, 1973, in Vol. 24 of Maps page 48, Stanislaus County Records.” (Some capitalization omitted.) b. Wife’s trial testimony Wife testified Delta Court “was purchased by Husband prior to their marriage” and served “as their primary residence during the marriage.” During the marriage, the property “had an outstanding loan against it in the amount of $165,000.00,” which was taken out to buy out Husband’s former spouse. Using community income and assets, the loan was paid off in full on April 28, 2011. Wife’s name was added to a deed of trust for Delta Court on January 18, 2012. She “contributed to improvements being made on the property, including new windows, floors, and building a large shop (to be used by Husband).” Wife “had no knowledge of Husband having any joint bank accounts with his mother, [M.P.].” c. Husband’s trial testimony Husband testified “he acquired the Delta Court property prior to marriage with Wife.” He “acknowledged that there was a mortgage balance for the property during the 5 In an attachment to a family law settlement conference statement, Husband identified D.G. as his son and stated he “executed a grant deed to the subject property in favor of himself and [D.G.]” in May 2019. 6. marriage, but testified that it was not paid for with community property funds.” Instead, M.P. “left him between $165,000.00 and $175,000.00 before her passing” and he “used funds from a joint bank account with his mother” to pay the mortgage in full. III. Lambert Way a. Documentary evidence Lambert Way was purchased on April 17, 2012, using the aforementioned home equity line of credit. The final closing statement was addressed to Husband. On March 13, 2012, Wife signed an “Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed” in which she granted Husband—“a married man”—Lambert Way “as his sole and separate property.” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) The instrument listed Lambert Way’s APN as 061-040-013 and contained the following description of the property: “Lot 13, in Block 364, of Westmont Subdivision, as per Map filed April 12, 1978 in Volume 27 of Maps, at Page 63, Stanislaus County Records.” A copy of the interspousal transfer grant deed was admitted and marked as “Respondent’s Exhibit H” (hereafter Exhibit H) at trial. Lambert Way was sold in late October 2020 and the proceeds were divided equally between Husband and Wife. b. Wife’s trial testimony Wife testified Lambert Way “was purchased during the marriage with community funds and assets.” The property “was rented out” and the rental income “was used for community bills” and “listed on the parties’ joint tax returns.” During one tax season, Wife was approached by Husband, who “asked her to sign a document which he stated was for their taxes.” The document “was in English.” Wife, who “speaks little English and cannot read it,” “trusted Husband and signed the document.” She “did not know that the document she had signed was an interspousal transfer deed for the Lambert [Way] property, transferring the property into Husband’s name alone (without consideration).” Wife “did not learn of what she had actually signed 7. until years later” and subsequently “filed a police report believing that she had been defrauded.” c. Husband’s trial testimony Husband testified he purchased Lambert Way in March 2012 “in his name” using “separate property funds” “obtained by a deed of trust against the Delta Court property.” Title thereto “was taken in his name alone” and Wife “signed off her interest in the property.” Husband testified “the community did not make mortgage payments toward this property, as it was purchased with cash.” In 2020, “after divorce papers were served upon him” but “prior to any court orders being issued,” Husband “was in the process of selling [Lambert Way]” when Wife’s daughter T.C. “confronted him about the property.” T.C. stated “she contacted law enforcement” and “Husband would be in criminal trouble if he did not add Wife to the title and give her half of the sale proceeds.” Husband “was scared and added Wife to the title only as a result of [T.C.]’s threat of criminal prosecution.” According to the settled statement, “[t]he trial court commented that it did not believe Husband’s testimony that he was in fear.” d. Testimony of T.C. T.C. testified she witnessed Wife “perform physical labor to improve/renovate/repair” both Backus Lane and Lambert Way. For months, Husband and Wife “spent equal time fixing and repairing the Lambert [Way] property to make it suitable for renting.” After Husband was served the divorce papers, he “immediately took action to sell the property.” The proceeds were divided “50/50” between Husband and Wife. Because Wife “did not speak or communicate with Husband since [she] filed for divorce in 2020,” T.C. “acted as the initial messenger between them until they acquired attorneys.” T.C. denied threatening Husband and maintained “she always treated Husband with love and respect as if he were her own father” and “they had a great relationship.” 8. According to the settled statement, “[t]he trial court commented that it found [T.C.]’s testimony credible and did not believe that she ever threatened Husband.” IV. Rulings The superior court issued rulings regarding Backus Lane, Delta Court, and Lambert Way in a tentative statement of decision dated March 7, 2024. First, the court concluded Backus Lane “is Husband’s separate property and shall be confirmed to Husband as such.” While recognizing “undisputed” evidence demonstrated Backus Lane was “acquired during marriage and before separation, which would ordinarily result in the presumption that the residence is community property,” “undisputed” evidence also demonstrated Backus Lane “was initially acquired by gift from Husband’s mother, i.e., a donative transfer without consideration.” In particular, “the form of title on the deed was to Husband, ‘a married man, as his sole and separate property,’ ” which evinced “the donative intent of Husband’s mother and Husband’s acceptance thereof.” The court further remarked: (1) “Wife admitted that she understood this residence to have been gifted by Husband’s mother to him alone and the deed clearly reflected Husband’s title to be separate property notwithstanding Husband’s marital status at the time”; (2) “the parties never made [Backus Lane] their principal residence”; and (3) “there is no testimony or evidence found to be credible and persuasive by the Court of a ‘joint gift’ under the circumstances in the case at bar.” Citing section 2550, the court emphasized its Backus Lane ruling was “limited to characterization of the subject property and its concordant exclusion from the equal division rule applicable to the remainder of the marital estate community property” and reserved jurisdiction over Wife’s claims “to any reimbursement rights as to the subject property and the use of community efforts to maintain and improve it.” Although “undisputed” evidence demonstrated “rent from the subject property was collected, identified as income on the parties’ joint tax return and that various repairs and improvements were made to the property over the years,” the court specified Wife 9. “simply has not adduced any evidence that the Court finds credible, persuasive and sufficient to establish the right of the community to a pro tanto ownership interest in the subject property” (italics omitted) and “introduced no documentary or testimonial evidence sufficient for the Court to make the necessary findings.” Second, the court concluded Delta Court “shall be confirmed to Husband as his separate property.” The “undisputed” evidence demonstrated: (1) Delta Court “was the marital residence of Husband and his former wife”; (2) Husband “was awarded the residence pursuant to a Judgment/Marital Settlement Agreement at a value of approximately $270,000.00, with each spouse entitled to half, or $135,000.00”; and (3) Husband “borrowed against the property to buy out his former wife’s interest on or about April of 2005.” The court also stated, “Wife’s name was originally on title and Wife signed the loan paperwork associated with a Home Equity Line of Credit,” but she “later signed an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed removing herself from title and all encumbrances .…” Citing section 2550 and employing “the same analysis applicable to the Backus Lane property,” the court emphasized its Delta Court ruling was limited “to the characterization of the subject property” and “reserve[d] jurisdiction over any reimbursement claim that Wife may or may not have .…” Although Wife “offers a Moore-Marsden calculation,” “there was no evidence introduced before the Court as to the principal paid on any of the encumbrances from community sources, as opposed to … interest, insurance and taxes for which the community acquires no pro tanto interest in an owner spouse’s separate property.” Husband also testified “payments made with presumptively community income or resources were interest-only” and “there were no payments of principal made during the marriage and before separation.” Lastly, as to Lambert Way, the court pronounced: “[T]his property was sold by the parties and the proceeds divided equally. Accordingly, the Court finds and holds that the property was deemed 10. community and any argument to the contrary waived. In the overall equalization and division of the marital estate, each party shall be credited with their respective half of the proceeds.” In a minute order dated April 26, 2024, the court adopted the tentative statement of decision as the final statement of decision. V. Objections In a “Petitioner’s Objection to Final Statement of Decision” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) filed March 14, 2024, Wife “contends that there was no evidence demonstrating an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed executed related to … Delta Court .…” In a “Respondent’s Objection to Statement of Decision and Proposed Division of Assets and Debts” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) filed March 19, 2024, Husband challenged the statement of decision “to the extent … [it] does not award [him] a … [s]ection 2[6]40 reimbursement for his separate property contribution to the acquisition of” Lambert Way. In a minute order dated April 26, 2024, the court overruled Wife’s objection on the grounds “Exhibit H is an [interspousal transfer grant deed] for the Delta Court property that was signed by [Wife].” The court also overruled Husband’s objection “[b]ecause Lambert Way was characterized, valued and divided pursuant to the parties’ mutual agreement before trial” and “the Court is bound by that disposition, as are the parties.” The court noted it “reserved jurisdiction over reimbursement requests” “with respect to the Lambert Way property.” DISCUSSION I. Standard of review “The California Rules of Court provide an appellant with a choice of several types of records upon which to take an appeal. The choices include a reporter’s transcript, a clerk’s transcript, an agreed statement and a settled statement. [Citations.]” (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “A settled statement is a summary of the 11. superior court proceedings approved by the superior court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a).) Where a case is on a settled statement, “[e]vidence to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment must appear in the settled statement [citation]; we are bound to assume that enough appears in the settled statement to enable us to decide whether reversible error was committed; and we must make our ruling upon what is affirmatively shown by the record [citations].” (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Works v. Bond (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 435, 436; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(d).) “As a general rule, factual findings that underpin the characterization determination are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651; cf. ibid. [“Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence.”].) “ ‘[W]here the findings are attacked for insufficiency of the evidence, [a reviewing court’s] power begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence to support them; … [the reviewing court] ha[s] no power to judge … the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’ [Citations.]” (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 518; see In re Marriage of Slivka (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 159, 162 [“[A]ll factual matters are to be viewed most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of the judgment; all issues of credibility are for the trier of fact.”]; In re Marriage of Kahan (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 63, 68 (Kahan) [“[W]e must defer to the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses and resolve any factual conflict in support of the court’s finding.”].) “The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, supra, at p. 652; see Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874 [“If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing 12. other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (italics omitted)]; see also In re Marriage of Higinbotham (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 322, 328–329 [“[A] daunting burden [is] placed on one who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court finding.”].) II. Analysis a. Wife’s appeal i. Backus Lane Wife contends Backus Lane “should be deemed 100% community property.” (Capitalization omitted.) “In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court’s characterization of the parties’ property—as community property or separate property—determines the division of the property between the spouses.” (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1399 (Valli); see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291 [“Characterization must take place in order to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to a particular asset or obligation and is an integral part of the division of property on marital dissolution.”].) “Section 760 states the presumption that, except as otherwise provided by statute, all property acquired during marriage is community property.” (In re Marriage of Ettefagh (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1585; accord, In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th 903, 914 (Brace).) Nevertheless, this presumption may be rebutted upon a showing the property acquired during marriage was “acquired by gift or bequest .…” (Valli, supra, at p. 1400, citing § 770, subd. (a)(2); accord, Brace, supra, at p. 914.) “The elements of a gift are: ‘(1) competency of the donor to contract; (2) a voluntary intent on the part of the donor to make a gift; (3) delivery, either actual or symbolical; (4) acceptance, actual or imputed; (5) complete divestment of all control by the donor; and (6) lack of consideration for the gift.’ [Citation.]” (Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036, fn. 5.) 13. We conclude substantial evidence supported the superior court’s initial characterization of Backus Lane as Husband’s separate property acquired after marriage by gift. The record—viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling—demonstrates M.P. transferred title thereto to Husband via a 2011 grant deed. The instrument specified Husband was “a married man” but Backus Lane would be “his sole and separate property.”6 Wife herself acknowledged “there was a ‘Grant Deed’ that transferred title of the property from [M.P.] into Husband’s name .…”7 (Cf. Louknitsky v. Louknitsky (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 406, 410 [“ample support for the trial court’s finding that the home property belongs to the community” where—among other things—the husband did not know the wife “took the property in her name only” at the time of purchase].) After 6 Citing Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th 903, Wife claims “the fact that only [Husband’s] name was on the title holds no weight in characterizing the Backus Lane property.” Brace does not stand for such a blanket proposition. In that case, the “central point of disagreement … concern[ed] the applicability of two statutes: … section 760 and Evidence Code section 662.” (Id. at p. 914.) As noted, section 760 sets forth the community property presumption. (In re Marriage of Ettefagh, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1585.) Evidence Code section 662 reads: “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” The Supreme Court held “Evidence Code section 662 does not apply to property acquired during marriage when it conflicts with … section 760.” (Brace, supra, at p. 938.) Nothing in the opinion circumscribes a gift analysis under section 770, subdivision (a)(2), which the high court recognized as a “[s]tatutory exception[] to the community property presumption explicitly provid[ing] for separate property treatment.” (Brace, supra, at p. 914; cf. id. at p. 915 [“Evidence Code section 662 is not a separate property exception to … section 760 .…”].) 7 According to the settled statement, Wife testified she “did not know the transfer was a gift to be Husband’s separate property.” By contrast, in the statement of decision, the superior court recalled, “Wife admitted that she understood this residence to have been gifted by Husband’s mother to him alone .…” Wife, whose primary language is Ukrainian, insists this discrepancy “was due to an inaccurate translation” by a “non- certified,” “non-registered” Ukrainian interpreter and “prejudiced [her].” Even assuming, arguendo, the court misstated this portion of Wife’s testimony, it is not “reasonably probable a result more favorable to [Wife] would have been reached in the absence of the error” (In re Marriage of Jackson (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 980, 997) because substantial evidence still supported a gift finding. 14. M.P. vacated the premises, Backus Lane was maintained as a rental property during Husband and Wife’s marriage. While Wife testified M.P. could no longer live independently and thus moved in with her and Husband, she did not intimate M.P. was incompetent or did not transfer Backus Lane of her own volition. Wife stresses the 2011 grant deed contains the phrase “for a valuable consideration” (capitalization omitted) and argues “a plain reading of the deed document … leads to no other conclusion than this transfer was not a gift, and that payment of some kind was provided in exchange for title of the property.” Not so. It is generally true “[t]he facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest” (Evid. Code, § 622), but “this rule does not apply to the recital of a consideration” (ibid.). In fact, “parol evidence is admissible to show lack or failure of consideration.” (Coast Bank v. Holmes (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 581, 590; see Bertelsen v. Bertelson (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 479, 483 [“[T]he plaintiffs were not bound by the consideration recited in the defendant’s deed but were entitled to show all of the facts.… On the contrary, they were entitled to show that the deed was in truth and in fact a gift deed.”]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (f) [“Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute, this section does not exclude evidence relevant to that issue.”].) Notwithstanding the phrase “for a valuable consideration,” M.P. marked the checkbox in the instrument declaring “[t]his transfer is exempt from the documentary transfer tax pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code [section] 11930.” This provision explicitly deals with inter vivos gifts. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 11930 [“Any tax imposed pursuant to this part shall not apply to any deed, instrument, or other writing which purports to grant, assign, transfer, convey, divide, allocate, or vest lands, tenements, or realty, or any interest therein, if by reason of such inter vivos gift or by reason of the death of any person, such lands, tenements, realty, or interests therein are transferred outright to, or in trust for the benefit of, any person or entity.”].) Husband also testified Backus Lane “was gifted to him by his mother [M.P.] 15. via a Grant Deed to be his separate property.” (See Kahan, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 68 [“Substantial evidence to sustain a finding may consist of testimony of a party or other single witness.”].) Finally, although “[t]here is no general presumption in favor of a gift, … this rule should be viewed in the light of the principle that valuable services rendered between persons having kinship by blood … will be presumed to be gratuitous.” (35 Cal.Jur.3d (2026) Gifts, § 43, fns. omitted; see Newbert v. McCarthy (1923) 190 Cal. 723, 726 [“[T]he relationship existing between the parties, as parent and child, stepparent and stepchild, brother and sister, and the like, is itself strong … proof that no remuneration was intended.”].) Alternatively, Wife contends she is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest in Backus Lane because she “contributed physically and financially to improving the Backus Lane property.” Under the Moore/Marsden rule, “[w]hen community property is used to reduce the principal balance of a mortgage on one spouse’s separate property, the community acquires a pro tanto interest in the property.” (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1421–1422; accord, In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1552.) “The Moore/Marsden rule is based upon the principle that where community funds contribute to the owner’s equity in separate property, the community obtains a pro tanto quasi-ownership stake in the property” (In re Marriage of Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 497, 502). “Because contributions to capital improvements also increase [a] property’s equity value, [the Moore/Marsden rule] applies as well to capital improvements made to separate property.” (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Sherman (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 795, 800 [“Courts have applied this so-called Moore/Marsden rule not only where the parties use community funds to pay down a mortgage, but also where they use community funds to make improvements to a residence purchased by one of the parties before marriage and those improvements increase the property’s equity value.”]; Bono v. Clark, supra, at p. 1423 [Moore/Marsden rule “applies with equal force to capital improvements” “as a 16. matter of both logic and fairness”].) Conversely, “community payments made for taxes, interest, and maintenance are not subject to the rule.” (In re Marriage of Allen, supra, at p. 502.) At trial, Wife testified she “assisted physically and financially with the maintenance of the Backus Lane property, including making improvements to the property.” Husband testified Wife “assisted him with multiple renovations and updates to the Backus Lane property for rental purposes,” such as “remodeling, new paint, new flooring, and yard cleaning.” However, there was a paucity of evidence establishing the extent to which these “improvements” constituted capital improvements that enhanced the property’s equity value. Wife’s assertion the failure to “provide[] documentation of the exact increase in value of the property” “resulted in an outright dismissal of her right to a pro tanto interest” is belied by the statement of decision, in which the superior court—which could not “make the necessary findings” at the time—expressly reserved jurisdiction over her claims “to any reimbursement rights as to the subject property and the use of community efforts to maintain and improve it.” (See § 2550 [court in dissolution proceeding shall “divide the community estate of the parties equally” “either in its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment of legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division”]; McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 903, 919 (McMillin) [family court reserved jurisdiction to adjudicate community property reimbursement claims].) Given the superior court’s reservation of jurisdiction and in light of the principle “factual matters are assessed in the first instance by the trial court” (In re Clarissa H. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 120, 125), adjudication of the Moore/Marsden claim is “properly within the province of the family law court” (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 920). (See People v. Asghedom (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 718, 728 (Asghedom) [“As an appellate court, it is not our role to resolve factual issues and exercise discretion in the first instance.”]; Hicks v. Barnes (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 (Hicks) [“[T]he function of 17. the trial court as the normal and primary finder of the facts has been uniformly recognized and it was never intended that the appellate court should perform those functions in the first instance.”].) ii. Delta Court Wife points out “[t]he trial court erroneously determined that [she] signed away any interest in the Delta Court property.” (Boldface & italics omitted.) We agree. In the statement of decision, the superior court—in making the Delta Court ruling—stated “Wife’s name was originally on title” but she “later signed an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed removing herself from title and all encumbrances .…” In the April 26, 2024 minute order, the court reiterated “Exhibit H is an [interspousal transfer grant deed] for the Delta Court property that was signed by [Wife].” By its terms, however, the interspousal transfer grant deed referred to Lambert Way, not Delta Court. Husband agrees. This error notwithstanding, Wife does not challenge the superior court’s initial characterization of Delta Court as Husband’s separate property.8 Rather, she contends she is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest in Delta Court because she “contributed physically and financially to improvements on the Delta Court property” and “community funds were used to pay down the loan against the property.” At trial, Wife testified Delta Court “had an outstanding loan against it in the amount of $165,000.00” during the marriage and “was paid off in full” using “community income and assets.” However, as observed by the superior court, “there was no evidence … as to [the] principal paid on any of the encumbrances from community sources, as opposed to … interest, insurance and taxes for which the community acquires no pro tanto interest in an owner spouse’s separate property.” Wife also testified she “contributed to improvements being made on the property, including new windows, 8 For our part, we will not raise such a challenge on Wife’s behalf. (See Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties.”].) 18. floors, and building a large shop (to be used by Husband),” but there was a lack of evidence establishing the extent to which these “improvements” constituted capital improvements that enhanced the property’s equity value. Wife’s assertion the court “rul[ed] that [she] was not entitled to a pro tanto interest in the property” is fallacious. Employing “the same analysis applicable to the Backus Lane property,” the court expressly reserved jurisdiction over her Moore/Marsden claim, which was not adjudicated prior to entry of the dissolution judgment. (See § 2550; McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 903, 919.) Given the superior court’s reservation of jurisdiction and in light of the principle “factual matters are assessed in the first instance by the trial court” (In re Clarissa H., supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 125), adjudication of the Moore/Marsden claim is “properly within the province of the family law court” (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 920). (See Asghedom, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 728; Hicks, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d at p. 863.) iii. Watts charges “ ‘Where one spouse has the exclusive use of a community asset during the period between separation and trial, that