Marriage of Gonsalves CA5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketF088139
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Marriage of Gonsalves CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of KATERYNA and LLOYD
DANIEL GONSALVES.
F088139
KATERYNA GONSALVES,
(Super. Ct. No. FL-20-001602)
Appellant,
v.
OPINION
LLOYD DANIEL GONSALVES,
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Marcus L.
Mumford, Judge.
Moran Law Firm, Amanda K. Moran, S. Eric Bishop II, and Janay D. Kinder for
Appellant Kateryna Gonsalves.
Law Offices of Goss, Goss & Leavy and Andrea M. Leavy for Appellant Lloyd
Daniel Gonsalves.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Kateryna Gonsalves (Wife) and appellant Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves
(Husband) married on May 20, 2006, and separated on July 8, 2020. Wife filed a petition
for dissolution on July 9, 2020. Following a two-day bench trial, the superior court
issued rulings pertaining to three real properties, designated in this opinion as Backus
Lane, Delta Court, and Lambert Way. The court initially concluded Backus Lane and
Delta Court were Husband’s separate properties whereas Lambert Way—which was sold
while the dissolution action was pending—was community property. Citing Family
Code1 section 2550, the court reserved jurisdiction over unadjudicated claims requesting
reimbursement or asserting pro tanto interests pursuant to the Moore/Marsden2 rule. The
judgment of dissolution was entered on April 26, 2024.
On appeal, Wife makes several contentions. First, Backus Lane “should be
deemed 100% community property” (capitalization omitted) or, in the alternative, Wife is
entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest therein because she “contributed
physically and financially to improving the Backus Lane property.” Second, Wife is
entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest in Delta Court because she “contributed
physically and financially to improvements on the Delta Court property” and
“community funds were used to pay down the loan against the property.” Third, Wife is
entitled to Watts3 charges for Husband’s “continued use of the Backus Lane and Delta
Court properties between the time of separation and the time of trial.” Finally, Husband
breached his fiduciary duties under sections 721 and 1100. We conclude: (1) substantial
evidence supported the superior court’s initial characterization of Backus Lane as
Husband’s separate property; (2) the Moore/Marsden and Watts issues should be
1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Family
Code.
2 In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366; In re Marriage of Marsden
(1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426.
3 In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366.
2.
adjudicated by the superior court, which expressly reserved jurisdiction over them; and
(3) Wife’s failure to raise a claim of breach of fiduciary duty below forfeited such a claim
on appeal.
On cross-appeal, Husband contends Lambert Way could not be deemed
community property because the execution of a grant deed adding Wife to the property’s
title was the product of undue influence. We conclude substantial evidence rebutted the
presumption of undue influence.
BACKGROUND4
I. Backus Lane
a. Documentary evidence
In a grant deed dated January 27, 2011, and recorded February 2, 2011, M.P.
granted to Husband—“a married man”—Backus Lane “as his sole and separate property”
“for a valuable consideration” (capitalization omitted). M.P. marked a checkbox
declaring “[t]his transfer is exempt from the documentary transfer tax pursuant to
Revenue and Taxation Code [section] 11930.”
b. Wife’s trial testimony
Wife testified Husband’s mother M.P. originally owned Backus Lane. At some
point, M.P. could no longer live independently and moved in with Husband and Wife.
4 The appellate record consists of clerk’s transcripts and a settled statement
certified by the superior court as “an accurate summary of the testimony and other
evidence that is relevant to the … reasons for the appeal.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.137.)
Husband filed a May 5, 2026 motion asking this court to augment the appellate
record to include a “missing” “Grant Deed evidencing Husband’s original acquisition of
the Lambert Way property from the sellers.” He indicated this grant deed was supposed
to be included as part of Exhibit H (see at p. 7, post) but was “incorrectly handled.” We
deferred our ruling pending consideration of the appeal on its merits. Having done so, we
now deny Husband’s motion because the information therein “is not germane to the
dispositive issue[s] we address.” (Acosta v. Brown (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 234, 246,
fn. 6.)
3.
Wife acknowledged “there was a ‘Grant Deed’ that transferred title of the property from
[M.P.] into Husband’s name” but “did not know the transfer was a gift to be Husband’s
separate property.” After M.P. vacated Backus Lane, Husband and Wife “elected to
maintain Backus Lane as a rental property during the marriage.” Wife “assisted
physically and financially with the maintenance of the Backus Lane property, including
making improvements to the property.” The rental income was “reported on their taxes”
and “placed into a bank account.” Husband did not allow Wife to access this account, but
Wife “believed [it] belonged to the community” since Husband “used the account to pay
for daily living expenses for the both of them, such as groceries, movie tickets, utility
bills, etc.”
c. Husband’s trial testimony
Husband testified Backus Lane “was gifted to him by his mother [M.P.] via a
Grant Deed to be his separate property.” Wife “assisted him with multiple renovations
and updates to the Backus Lane property for rental purposes.” For instance, “when there
was a change of tenants, the property required remodeling, new paint, new flooring, and
yard cleaning, which Wife assisted with.” Rental income was deposited into a
community property bank account and “used to improve the property and to pay annual
taxes.”
II. Delta Court
a. Documentary evidence
A grant deed dated February 27, 1978, and recorded April 7, 1978, showed Delta
Court was granted to Husband and his former spouse C.G. as joint tenants. The
instrument provided the following description of the property: “Lot 4 in Block 3451 of
University Estates, as per Map filed May 23, 1973 in Vol. 24 of Maps, page 48,
Stanislaus County Records.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
Husband and C.G. signed a “Marital Settlement Agreement” (some capitalization
omitted) on April 15, 2005, and May 2, 2005, respectively. Per the agreement, Delta
4.
Court “shall be the sole and separate property, asset and debt of [Husband],” Husband
“shall take a loan on the home and buy out [C.G.’s] ½ of its value,” and C.G. “will sign
off of the deed to the home.” According to the agreement, Delta Court’s value was
approximately $270,000.
Husband borrowed $165,000 on April 19, 2005, and executed a deed of trust on
Delta Court as security therefor on April 21, 2005. After he married Wife, he borrowed
$164,000 on September 16, 2008, and executed a deed of trust on Delta Court as security
therefor on September 17, 2008. Both deeds of trust listed Delta Court’s Assessor Parcel
Number (APN) as “071-019-037-000.” A “Substitution of Trustee and Deed of Full
Reconveyance” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) executed on September 30,
2008, identified “[Husband] a married man, as his sole & separate property as Trustor”
(boldface omitted). A “Full Reconveyance” (boldface, underscoring & some
capitalization omitted) executed on April 20, 2011, likewise identified “[Husband], a
married man as his sole and separate property as Trustor(s)” (boldface & some
capitalization omitted).
On January 5, 2012, Husband and Wife executed a deed of trust on Delta Court to
secure a home equity line of credit. The instrument identified: (1) “[Husband], a married
man as his sole and separate property, and [Wife], his wife” (boldface & capitalization
omitted) as “Trustor”; (2) Husband and “all co-signers and co-makers signing the
[January 5, 2012] Credit Agreement [in the principal amount of $100,000]” as
“Borrower”; and (3) “Tax ID No[.]: 071-019-037” (boldface & some capitalization
omitted) for Delta Court. A “Substitution of Trustee and Full Reconveyance” (boldface
& some capitalization omitted) executed on May 2, 2016, identified “[Husband], a
married man, as his sole and separate property, and [Wife], his wife” (boldface &
capitalization omitted) as “the Original Trustor.”
On April 8, 2016, Husband executed a deed of trust on Delta Court to secure a
reverse mortgage loan. The instrument identified “[Husband], a married man, as his sole
5.
and separate property” (boldface & capitalization omitted) as “trustor.” A “Substitution
of Trustee and Deed of Reconveyance” (boldface & some capitalization omitted)
executed on December 15, 2020, identified “[Husband], a married man, as his sole and
separate property” (capitalization omitted) as “Trustor.”
In a grant deed dated September 29, 2020, and recorded October 1, 2020, Husband
and D.G.5 “as joint tenants” (capitalization omitted) granted Delta Court to “The Lloyd
Daniel Gonsalves Trust, Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves as Trustee” (some capitalization
omitted). The instrument listed Delta Court’s APN as “071-019-037-000” and contained
the following description of the property: “Lot 4 in Book [sic] 3451 of University
Estates, as per Map filed May 23, 1973, in Vol. 24 of Maps page 48, Stanislaus County
Records.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
b. Wife’s trial testimony
Wife testified Delta Court “was purchased by Husband prior to their marriage”
and served “as their primary residence during the marriage.” During the marriage, the
property “had an outstanding loan against it in the amount of $165,000.00,” which was
taken out to buy out Husband’s former spouse. Using community income and assets, the
loan was paid off in full on April 28, 2011. Wife’s name was added to a deed of trust for
Delta Court on January 18, 2012. She “contributed to improvements being made on the
property, including new windows, floors, and building a large shop (to be used by
Husband).” Wife “had no knowledge of Husband having any joint bank accounts with
his mother, [M.P.].”
c. Husband’s trial testimony
Husband testified “he acquired the Delta Court property prior to marriage with
Wife.” He “acknowledged that there was a mortgage balance for the property during the
5 In an attachment to a family law settlement conference statement, Husband
identified D.G. as his son and stated he “executed a grant deed to the subject property in
favor of himself and [D.G.]” in May 2019.
6.
marriage, but testified that it was not paid for with community property funds.” Instead,
M.P. “left him between $165,000.00 and $175,000.00 before her passing” and he “used
funds from a joint bank account with his mother” to pay the mortgage in full.
III. Lambert Way
a. Documentary evidence
Lambert Way was purchased on April 17, 2012, using the aforementioned home
equity line of credit. The final closing statement was addressed to Husband.
On March 13, 2012, Wife signed an “Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed” in which
she granted Husband—“a married man”—Lambert Way “as his sole and separate
property.” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) The instrument listed Lambert
Way’s APN as 061-040-013 and contained the following description of the property:
“Lot 13, in Block 364, of Westmont Subdivision, as per Map filed April 12, 1978 in
Volume 27 of Maps, at Page 63, Stanislaus County Records.” A copy of the interspousal
transfer grant deed was admitted and marked as “Respondent’s Exhibit H” (hereafter
Exhibit H) at trial.
Lambert Way was sold in late October 2020 and the proceeds were divided
equally between Husband and Wife.
b. Wife’s trial testimony
Wife testified Lambert Way “was purchased during the marriage with community
funds and assets.” The property “was rented out” and the rental income “was used for
community bills” and “listed on the parties’ joint tax returns.”
During one tax season, Wife was approached by Husband, who “asked her to sign
a document which he stated was for their taxes.” The document “was in English.” Wife,
who “speaks little English and cannot read it,” “trusted Husband and signed the
document.” She “did not know that the document she had signed was an interspousal
transfer deed for the Lambert [Way] property, transferring the property into Husband’s
name alone (without consideration).” Wife “did not learn of what she had actually signed
7.
until years later” and subsequently “filed a police report believing that she had been
defrauded.”
c. Husband’s trial testimony
Husband testified he purchased Lambert Way in March 2012 “in his name” using
“separate property funds” “obtained by a deed of trust against the Delta Court property.”
Title thereto “was taken in his name alone” and Wife “signed off her interest in the
property.” Husband testified “the community did not make mortgage payments toward
this property, as it was purchased with cash.”
In 2020, “after divorce papers were served upon him” but “prior to any court
orders being issued,” Husband “was in the process of selling [Lambert Way]” when
Wife’s daughter T.C. “confronted him about the property.” T.C. stated “she contacted
law enforcement” and “Husband would be in criminal trouble if he did not add Wife to
the title and give her half of the sale proceeds.” Husband “was scared and added Wife to
the title only as a result of [T.C.]’s threat of criminal prosecution.”
According to the settled statement, “[t]he trial court commented that it did not
believe Husband’s testimony that he was in fear.”
d. Testimony of T.C.
T.C. testified she witnessed Wife “perform physical labor to
improve/renovate/repair” both Backus Lane and Lambert Way. For months, Husband
and Wife “spent equal time fixing and repairing the Lambert [Way] property to make it
suitable for renting.”
After Husband was served the divorce papers, he “immediately took action to sell
the property.” The proceeds were divided “50/50” between Husband and Wife. Because
Wife “did not speak or communicate with Husband since [she] filed for divorce in 2020,”
T.C. “acted as the initial messenger between them until they acquired attorneys.” T.C.
denied threatening Husband and maintained “she always treated Husband with love and
respect as if he were her own father” and “they had a great relationship.”
8.
According to the settled statement, “[t]he trial court commented that it found
[T.C.]’s testimony credible and did not believe that she ever threatened Husband.”
IV. Rulings
The superior court issued rulings regarding Backus Lane, Delta Court, and
Lambert Way in a tentative statement of decision dated March 7, 2024.
First, the court concluded Backus Lane “is Husband’s separate property and shall
be confirmed to Husband as such.” While recognizing “undisputed” evidence
demonstrated Backus Lane was “acquired during marriage and before separation, which
would ordinarily result in the presumption that the residence is community property,”
“undisputed” evidence also demonstrated Backus Lane “was initially acquired by gift
from Husband’s mother, i.e., a donative transfer without consideration.” In particular,
“the form of title on the deed was to Husband, ‘a married man, as his sole and separate
property,’ ” which evinced “the donative intent of Husband’s mother and Husband’s
acceptance thereof.” The court further remarked: (1) “Wife admitted that she understood
this residence to have been gifted by Husband’s mother to him alone and the deed clearly
reflected Husband’s title to be separate property notwithstanding Husband’s marital
status at the time”; (2) “the parties never made [Backus Lane] their principal residence”;
and (3) “there is no testimony or evidence found to be credible and persuasive by the
Court of a ‘joint gift’ under the circumstances in the case at bar.”
Citing section 2550, the court emphasized its Backus Lane ruling was “limited to
characterization of the subject property and its concordant exclusion from the equal
division rule applicable to the remainder of the marital estate community property” and
reserved jurisdiction over Wife’s claims “to any reimbursement rights as to the subject
property and the use of community efforts to maintain and improve it.” Although
“undisputed” evidence demonstrated “rent from the subject property was collected,
identified as income on the parties’ joint tax return and that various repairs and
improvements were made to the property over the years,” the court specified Wife
9.
“simply has not adduced any evidence that the Court finds credible, persuasive and
sufficient to establish the right of the community to a pro tanto ownership interest in the
subject property” (italics omitted) and “introduced no documentary or testimonial
evidence sufficient for the Court to make the necessary findings.”
Second, the court concluded Delta Court “shall be confirmed to Husband as his
separate property.” The “undisputed” evidence demonstrated: (1) Delta Court “was the
marital residence of Husband and his former wife”; (2) Husband “was awarded the
residence pursuant to a Judgment/Marital Settlement Agreement at a value of
approximately $270,000.00, with each spouse entitled to half, or $135,000.00”; and
(3) Husband “borrowed against the property to buy out his former wife’s interest on or
about April of 2005.” The court also stated, “Wife’s name was originally on title and
Wife signed the loan paperwork associated with a Home Equity Line of Credit,” but she
“later signed an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed removing herself from title and all
encumbrances .…”
Citing section 2550 and employing “the same analysis applicable to the Backus
Lane property,” the court emphasized its Delta Court ruling was limited “to the
characterization of the subject property” and “reserve[d] jurisdiction over any
reimbursement claim that Wife may or may not have .…” Although Wife “offers a
Moore-Marsden calculation,” “there was no evidence introduced before the Court as to
the principal paid on any of the encumbrances from community sources, as opposed to …
interest, insurance and taxes for which the community acquires no pro tanto interest in an
owner spouse’s separate property.” Husband also testified “payments made with
presumptively community income or resources were interest-only” and “there were no
payments of principal made during the marriage and before separation.”
Lastly, as to Lambert Way, the court pronounced:
“[T]his property was sold by the parties and the proceeds divided equally.
Accordingly, the Court finds and holds that the property was deemed
10.
community and any argument to the contrary waived. In the overall
equalization and division of the marital estate, each party shall be credited
with their respective half of the proceeds.”
In a minute order dated April 26, 2024, the court adopted the tentative statement of
decision as the final statement of decision.
V. Objections
In a “Petitioner’s Objection to Final Statement of Decision” (boldface & some
capitalization omitted) filed March 14, 2024, Wife “contends that there was no evidence
demonstrating an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed executed related to … Delta
Court .…”
In a “Respondent’s Objection to Statement of Decision and Proposed Division of
Assets and Debts” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) filed March 19, 2024,
Husband challenged the statement of decision “to the extent … [it] does not award [him]
a … [s]ection 2[6]40 reimbursement for his separate property contribution to the
acquisition of” Lambert Way.
In a minute order dated April 26, 2024, the court overruled Wife’s objection on the
grounds “Exhibit H is an [interspousal transfer grant deed] for the Delta Court property
that was signed by [Wife].” The court also overruled Husband’s objection “[b]ecause
Lambert Way was characterized, valued and divided pursuant to the parties’ mutual
agreement before trial” and “the Court is bound by that disposition, as are the parties.”
The court noted it “reserved jurisdiction over reimbursement requests” “with respect to
the Lambert Way property.”
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
“The California Rules of Court provide an appellant with a choice of several types
of records upon which to take an appeal. The choices include a reporter’s transcript, a
clerk’s transcript, an agreed statement and a settled statement. [Citations.]” (Nielsen v.
Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “A settled statement is a summary of the
11.
superior court proceedings approved by the superior court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.137(a).) Where a case is on a settled statement, “[e]vidence to support the findings of
fact and conclusions of law and the judgment must appear in the settled statement
[citation]; we are bound to assume that enough appears in the settled statement to enable
us to decide whether reversible error was committed; and we must make our ruling upon
what is affirmatively shown by the record [citations].” (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Works
v. Bond (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 435, 436; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(d).)
“As a general rule, factual findings that underpin the characterization
determination are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal
significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Roddenberry v.
Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651; cf. ibid. [“Speculation or conjecture alone
is not substantial evidence.”].) “ ‘[W]here the findings are attacked for insufficiency of
the evidence, [a reviewing court’s] power begins and ends with a determination as to
whether there is any substantial evidence to support them; … [the reviewing court] ha[s]
no power to judge … the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to
consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’ [Citations.]” (Leff v. Gunter (1983)
33 Cal.3d 508, 518; see In re Marriage of Slivka (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 159, 162 [“[A]ll
factual matters are to be viewed most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of
the judgment; all issues of credibility are for the trier of fact.”]; In re Marriage of Kahan
(1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 63, 68 (Kahan) [“[W]e must defer to the trial judge’s assessment
of the witnesses and resolve any factual conflict in support of the court’s finding.”].)
“The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in
question in light of the whole record.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, supra, at p. 652;
see Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874 [“If such substantial evidence
be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing
12.
other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (italics
omitted)]; see also In re Marriage of Higinbotham (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 322, 328–329
[“[A] daunting burden [is] placed on one who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a trial court finding.”].)
II. Analysis
a. Wife’s appeal
i. Backus Lane
Wife contends Backus Lane “should be deemed 100% community property.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
“In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court’s characterization of the parties’
property—as community property or separate property—determines the division of the
property between the spouses.” (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1399
(Valli); see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291 [“Characterization
must take place in order to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect
to a particular asset or obligation and is an integral part of the division of property on
marital dissolution.”].) “Section 760 states the presumption that, except as otherwise
provided by statute, all property acquired during marriage is community property.” (In re
Marriage of Ettefagh (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1585; accord, In re Brace (2020) 9
Cal.5th 903, 914 (Brace).) Nevertheless, this presumption may be rebutted upon a
showing the property acquired during marriage was “acquired by gift or bequest .…”
(Valli, supra, at p. 1400, citing § 770, subd. (a)(2); accord, Brace, supra, at p. 914.) “The
elements of a gift are: ‘(1) competency of the donor to contract; (2) a voluntary intent on
the part of the donor to make a gift; (3) delivery, either actual or symbolical;
(4) acceptance, actual or imputed; (5) complete divestment of all control by the donor;
and (6) lack of consideration for the gift.’ [Citation.]” (Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036, fn. 5.)
13.
We conclude substantial evidence supported the superior court’s initial
characterization of Backus Lane as Husband’s separate property acquired after marriage
by gift. The record—viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling—demonstrates
M.P. transferred title thereto to Husband via a 2011 grant deed. The instrument specified
Husband was “a married man” but Backus Lane would be “his sole and separate
property.”6 Wife herself acknowledged “there was a ‘Grant Deed’ that transferred title of
the property from [M.P.] into Husband’s name .…”7 (Cf. Louknitsky v. Louknitsky
(1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 406, 410 [“ample support for the trial court’s finding that the
home property belongs to the community” where—among other things—the husband did
not know the wife “took the property in her name only” at the time of purchase].) After
6 Citing Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th 903, Wife claims “the fact that only [Husband’s]
name was on the title holds no weight in characterizing the Backus Lane property.”
Brace does not stand for such a blanket proposition. In that case, the “central point of
disagreement … concern[ed] the applicability of two statutes: … section 760 and
Evidence Code section 662.” (Id. at p. 914.) As noted, section 760 sets forth the
community property presumption. (In re Marriage of Ettefagh, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1585.) Evidence Code section 662 reads: “The owner of the legal title to property is
presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted
only by clear and convincing proof.” The Supreme Court held “Evidence Code section
662 does not apply to property acquired during marriage when it conflicts with … section
760.” (Brace, supra, at p. 938.) Nothing in the opinion circumscribes a gift analysis
under section 770, subdivision (a)(2), which the high court recognized as a “[s]tatutory
exception[] to the community property presumption explicitly provid[ing] for separate
property treatment.” (Brace, supra, at p. 914; cf. id. at p. 915 [“Evidence Code section
662 is not a separate property exception to … section 760 .…”].)
7 According to the settled statement, Wife testified she “did not know the transfer
was a gift to be Husband’s separate property.” By contrast, in the statement of decision,
the superior court recalled, “Wife admitted that she understood this residence to have
been gifted by Husband’s mother to him alone .…” Wife, whose primary language is
Ukrainian, insists this discrepancy “was due to an inaccurate translation” by a “non-
certified,” “non-registered” Ukrainian interpreter and “prejudiced [her].” Even assuming,
arguendo, the court misstated this portion of Wife’s testimony, it is not “reasonably
probable a result more favorable to [Wife] would have been reached in the absence of the
error” (In re Marriage of Jackson (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 980, 997) because substantial
evidence still supported a gift finding.
14.
M.P. vacated the premises, Backus Lane was maintained as a rental property during
Husband and Wife’s marriage. While Wife testified M.P. could no longer live
independently and thus moved in with her and Husband, she did not intimate M.P. was
incompetent or did not transfer Backus Lane of her own volition.
Wife stresses the 2011 grant deed contains the phrase “for a valuable
consideration” (capitalization omitted) and argues “a plain reading of the deed document
… leads to no other conclusion than this transfer was not a gift, and that payment of some
kind was provided in exchange for title of the property.” Not so. It is generally true
“[t]he facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as
between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest” (Evid. Code, § 622), but “this
rule does not apply to the recital of a consideration” (ibid.). In fact, “parol evidence is
admissible to show lack or failure of consideration.” (Coast Bank v. Holmes (1971) 19
Cal.App.3d 581, 590; see Bertelsen v. Bertelson (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 479, 483 [“[T]he
plaintiffs were not bound by the consideration recited in the defendant’s deed but were
entitled to show all of the facts.… On the contrary, they were entitled to show that the
deed was in truth and in fact a gift deed.”]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (f)
[“Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute, this section does not exclude
evidence relevant to that issue.”].) Notwithstanding the phrase “for a valuable
consideration,” M.P. marked the checkbox in the instrument declaring “[t]his transfer is
exempt from the documentary transfer tax pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code
[section] 11930.” This provision explicitly deals with inter vivos gifts. (See Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 11930 [“Any tax imposed pursuant to this part shall not apply to any deed,
instrument, or other writing which purports to grant, assign, transfer, convey, divide,
allocate, or vest lands, tenements, or realty, or any interest therein, if by reason of such
inter vivos gift or by reason of the death of any person, such lands, tenements, realty, or
interests therein are transferred outright to, or in trust for the benefit of, any person or
entity.”].) Husband also testified Backus Lane “was gifted to him by his mother [M.P.]
15.
via a Grant Deed to be his separate property.” (See Kahan, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at
p. 68 [“Substantial evidence to sustain a finding may consist of testimony of a party or
other single witness.”].) Finally, although “[t]here is no general presumption in favor of
a gift, … this rule should be viewed in the light of the principle that valuable services
rendered between persons having kinship by blood … will be presumed to be gratuitous.”
(35 Cal.Jur.3d (2026) Gifts, § 43, fns. omitted; see Newbert v. McCarthy (1923) 190 Cal.
723, 726 [“[T]he relationship existing between the parties, as parent and child, stepparent
and stepchild, brother and sister, and the like, is itself strong … proof that no
remuneration was intended.”].)
Alternatively, Wife contends she is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest
in Backus Lane because she “contributed physically and financially to improving the
Backus Lane property.”
Under the Moore/Marsden rule, “[w]hen community property is used to reduce the
principal balance of a mortgage on one spouse’s separate property, the community
acquires a pro tanto interest in the property.” (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
1409, 1421–1422; accord, In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1552.)
“The Moore/Marsden rule is based upon the principle that where community funds
contribute to the owner’s equity in separate property, the community obtains a pro tanto
quasi-ownership stake in the property” (In re Marriage of Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
497, 502). “Because contributions to capital improvements also increase [a] property’s
equity value, [the Moore/Marsden rule] applies as well to capital improvements made to
separate property.” (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Sherman (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 795,
800 [“Courts have applied this so-called Moore/Marsden rule not only where the parties
use community funds to pay down a mortgage, but also where they use community funds
to make improvements to a residence purchased by one of the parties before marriage and
those improvements increase the property’s equity value.”]; Bono v. Clark, supra, at
p. 1423 [Moore/Marsden rule “applies with equal force to capital improvements” “as a
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matter of both logic and fairness”].) Conversely, “community payments made for taxes,
interest, and maintenance are not subject to the rule.” (In re Marriage of Allen, supra, at
p. 502.)
At trial, Wife testified she “assisted physically and financially with the
maintenance of the Backus Lane property, including making improvements to the
property.” Husband testified Wife “assisted him with multiple renovations and updates
to the Backus Lane property for rental purposes,” such as “remodeling, new paint, new
flooring, and yard cleaning.” However, there was a paucity of evidence establishing the
extent to which these “improvements” constituted capital improvements that enhanced
the property’s equity value. Wife’s assertion the failure to “provide[] documentation of
the exact increase in value of the property” “resulted in an outright dismissal of her right
to a pro tanto interest” is belied by the statement of decision, in which the superior
court—which could not “make the necessary findings” at the time—expressly reserved
jurisdiction over her claims “to any reimbursement rights as to the subject property and
the use of community efforts to maintain and improve it.” (See § 2550 [court in
dissolution proceeding shall “divide the community estate of the parties equally” “either
in its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment of legal separation of the
parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property
division”]; McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 903, 919 (McMillin) [family
court reserved jurisdiction to adjudicate community property reimbursement claims].)
Given the superior court’s reservation of jurisdiction and in light of the principle
“factual matters are assessed in the first instance by the trial court” (In re Clarissa H.
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 120, 125), adjudication of the Moore/Marsden claim is “properly
within the province of the family law court” (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 920).
(See People v. Asghedom (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 718, 728 (Asghedom) [“As an appellate
court, it is not our role to resolve factual issues and exercise discretion in the first
instance.”]; Hicks v. Barnes (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 (Hicks) [“[T]he function of
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the trial court as the normal and primary finder of the facts has been uniformly
recognized and it was never intended that the appellate court should perform those
functions in the first instance.”].)
ii. Delta Court
Wife points out “[t]he trial court erroneously determined that [she] signed away
any interest in the Delta Court property.” (Boldface & italics omitted.) We agree. In the
statement of decision, the superior court—in making the Delta Court ruling—stated
“Wife’s name was originally on title” but she “later signed an Interspousal Transfer Grant
Deed removing herself from title and all encumbrances .…” In the April 26, 2024 minute
order, the court reiterated “Exhibit H is an [interspousal transfer grant deed] for the Delta
Court property that was signed by [Wife].” By its terms, however, the interspousal
transfer grant deed referred to Lambert Way, not Delta Court. Husband agrees. This
error notwithstanding, Wife does not challenge the superior court’s initial
characterization of Delta Court as Husband’s separate property.8 Rather, she contends
she is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest in Delta Court because she
“contributed physically and financially to improvements on the Delta Court property”
and “community funds were used to pay down the loan against the property.”
At trial, Wife testified Delta Court “had an outstanding loan against it in the
amount of $165,000.00” during the marriage and “was paid off in full” using
“community income and assets.” However, as observed by the superior court, “there was
no evidence … as to [the] principal paid on any of the encumbrances from community
sources, as opposed to … interest, insurance and taxes for which the community acquires
no pro tanto interest in an owner spouse’s separate property.” Wife also testified she
“contributed to improvements being made on the property, including new windows,
8 For our part, we will not raise such a challenge on Wife’s behalf. (See Paterno
v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“An appellate court is not required
to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties.”].)
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floors, and building a large shop (to be used by Husband),” but there was a lack of
evidence establishing the extent to which these “improvements” constituted capital
improvements that enhanced the property’s equity value. Wife’s assertion the court
“rul[ed] that [she] was not entitled to a pro tanto interest in the property” is fallacious.
Employing “the same analysis applicable to the Backus Lane property,” the court
expressly reserved jurisdiction over her Moore/Marsden claim, which was not
adjudicated prior to entry of the dissolution judgment. (See § 2550; McMillin, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at pp. 903, 919.)
Given the superior court’s reservation of jurisdiction and in light of the principle
“factual matters are assessed in the first instance by the trial court” (In re Clarissa H.,
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 125), adjudication of the Moore/Marsden claim is “properly
within the province of the family law court” (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 920).
(See Asghedom, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 728; Hicks, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d at
p. 863.)
iii. Watts charges
“ ‘Where one spouse has the exclusive use of a community asset during the period
between separation and trial, that