Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 Butler v. LAZ Parking California CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LEONARD BUTLER, D085643 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023- 00027073-CU-OE-CTL) v. LAZ PARKING CALIFORNIA, LLC et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Wendy M. Behan, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Jackson Lewis, Dylan B. Carp, Nathan W. Austin, and Keelia K. Lee, for Defendants and Appellants. Bibiyan Law Group, David D. Bibiyan, Henry G. Glitz; Stiller Law Firm and Ari J. Stiller for Plaintiff and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Leonard Butler sued his former employer and certain of its affiliates (together, LAZ)1 for alleged violations of California wage and hour laws. LAZ moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Butler signed as part of his hiring process. The trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable and further finding that the unconscionability so permeated the agreement that it would be inappropriate to sever the offending provisions and send the matter to arbitration. LAZ appeals, arguing the trial court erred in finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable and in declining to sever the offending provisions. As we will explain, we agree with certain of the trial court’s unconscionability findings and disagree with others. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying LAZ’s motion to compel arbitration, and remand for the court to exercise anew its discretion whether to sever the provisions we find unconscionable and enforce the remainder. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Factual Background LAZ offered Butler a job as a hotel valet on July 18, 2022. As part of LAZ’s electronic “onboarding,”2 LAZ emailed Butler a link to the online 1 The former employer is LAZ Parking California, LLC (LAZ Parking) and the affiliates are LAZ Karp Partners, LLC and LAZ Karp Associates, LLC. Because Butler worked only for LAZ Parking, context will make it clear that some of our references to LAZ are only to LAZ Parking. 2 “ ‘Onboarding’ has emerged from the murky reservoir of corporate jargon and has ‘mainstreamed’ to more general usage. It is ‘defined as “the act or process of orienting and training a new employee.” ’ ” (Santana v. 2 orientation platform that contained new hire paperwork for review and signature. Butler began the process by electronically signing three documents on July 19, 2022. The first document Butler signed was a California Employee Handbook, which contained an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Handbook and Agreement to Arbitrate (Acknowledgement). The Acknowledgement confirms the employee’s receipt of the employee handbook, affirms the employee’s at- will employment status, and contains certain terms regarding arbitration of employment disputes. The Acknowledgement concludes with the following admonition: “Employee is under no obligation to sign this Agreement and may want to consult with an attorney before signing this Agreement.” The second document Butler signed was an Agreement to Arbitrate Employment Disputes (Arbitration Agreement). This one-page agreement consists of four substantive paragraphs and an admonition above the signature block. The first paragraph provides in part: “In consideration of at-will employment by the Company, Employee agrees that any disputes between Employee and the Company … relating in any way to Employee’s employment, including all disputes involving the hiring, termination, terms of employment, wages or any other disputes arising out of the employment relationship with the Company, will be submitted to final binding arbitration … , with the exception of any claim for injunctive relief.” The Arbitration Agreement incorporates the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures and provides a link to access those rules online. Studebaker Health Care Center, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1, 8, fn. 1 (Santana).) 3 In the second paragraph, which applies when “ ‘public policy claims’ ” are at issue, the Arbitration Agreement provides that it (1) does not limit statutory remedies, (2) affords adequate discovery rights, (3) does not require the employee to pay costs unique to arbitration, and (4) requires the arbitrator to issue a written, reasoned arbitration award. The third paragraph includes the following waiver of the right to bring non-individual claims: “The Company and Employee agree that any dispute between them shall be resolved without the inclusion of any other employees or third parties included as parties to the arbitration proceeding, be it as individuals or part of a class action, collective action, private attorney general action or any similar representative action, unless both the Company and Employee agree to such consolidation after a dispute has arisen. No arbitrator shall have the authority under this Agreement to order any such class or representative action. By signing this agreement, Employee is agreeing to waive any rights that Employee may have to bring or participate in any action on a class, collective, private attorney general, representative or other similar basis.” The fourth paragraph of the Arbitration Agreement consists of the following severance clause: “If any term or provision of this Agreement is deemed unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Company and Employee agree that such term or provision may be severed without affecting the other terms of this Agreement.” Finally, just above the signature block, the Arbitration Agreement concludes with the following admonition in boldface type: “By signing below, Employee agrees to the foregoing terms and agrees to waive the right to a trial by jury and instead submit any disputes arising out of or related to this Agreement or Employee’s employment with the Company to arbitration.” 4 The third document Butler signed on July 19, 2022, was a Confidentiality and Non-solicitation Agreement (Confidentiality Agreement). Through this agreement, Butler acknowledged he would have access to—and would not disclose—LAZ’s confidential and proprietary information. The “enforcement” clause of this agreement states: “I acknowledge that the continued operations of the Company’s business requires strict compliance with the confidentiality provisions set forth herein, and recognize that in the event of a breach or threat of breach of this Agreement, monetary compensation would not be an adequate remedy or would be impossible to calculate. I agree, therefore, in the event o[f] a breach on my part, or threat of a breach, of this Agreement, the Company shall be entitled to an immediate injunction or temporary restraining order without showing actual damages.” Butler began working on July 25, 2022. That day, he signed two additional onboarding documents not at issue here. Butler’s employment with LAZ ended in December 2022. B. Procedural Background In June 2023, Butler filed a putative class action complaint against LAZ asserting 10 causes of action for alleged violations of California wage and hour laws. A few months later, Butler amended his complaint to add an eleventh cause of action for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) in “a representative action on behalf of himself and similarly Aggrieved Employees.” LAZ moved to compel individual arbitration of all of Butler’s claims, to dismiss the putative class claims, and to stay the non-individual 5 representative PAGA claim. LAZ’s motion invoked the Acknowledgment and the Arbitration Agreement but did not mention the Confidentiality Agreement. Butler opposed the motion, arguing the Arbitration Agreement was unconscionable. He argued the agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was an adhesion contract and he was not given an opportunity to review or negotiate it. Butler submitted a declaration stating that when he began his employment, he was “brought into the main office … to electronically sign a large number of documents.” Butler believed he had to sign all the documents to keep his job. He stated that “[n]o one explained any of the documents to” him or told him he “could take a copy … and have them reviewed by an attorney before [he] signed them.” Butler argued the Arbitration Agreement was substantively unconscionable because it (1) lacked mutuality in that it required only Butler, but not LAZ, to pursue claims via arbitration; (2) contained an unenforceable wholesale PAGA waiver; and (3) improperly allowed LAZ to obtain immediate injunctive relief via the Confidentiality Agreement’s enforcement clause. Butler maintained that the unconscionable provisions “permeate[d]” the Arbitration Agreement and Confidentiality Agreement and could not be severed. The trial court denied LAZ’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found the Arbitration Agreement had only “a limited degree of procedural unconscionability based on its adhesive nature.” Regarding Butler’s claims about the circumstances under which he signed the new-hire paperwork, the court noted the nearly week-long timeframe in which Butler completed the onboarding paperwork and the Acknowledgment’s admonition that he was 6 not obligated to sign the document and could consult an attorney before signing. In contrast to the limited degree of procedural unconscionability, the trial court found “that the Arbitration Agreement contains a high degree of substantive unconscionability.” The court cited six provisions that led to this conclusion. First, the court concluded the Arbitration Agreement lacked mutuality because it stated that “Employee agrees” to arbitrate claims “but does not explicitly impose an obligation to arbitrate on [LAZ].” (Italics added.) Additionally, the court observed that while five “other provisions … appear mutual on their face, they are exactly the type of terms providing an unjustified unilateral benefit to the employer.” The trial court cited (1) the Arbitration Agreement’s “carve out for injunctive relief,” which typically favors employers; (2) the Confidentiality Agreement’s “provi[sion] that when seeking injunctive relief, [LAZ is] not required to establish actual damages or irreparable harm”; (3) the class and representative action waivers, which typically favor employers; (4) a provision in the Acknowledgment entitling a party to attorney fees “against a party that files a court complaint for a claim that is subject to arbitration”; and (5) the Arbitration Agreement’s wholesale PAGA waiver. Regarding LAZ’s request to sever any unconscionable provisions and enforce the remainder, the trial court found that “the Arbitration Agreement, when read in conjunction with the Confidentiality Agreement, is so permeated by an unlawful purpose as [to] prevent severing such parts and the contract is therefore unconscionable and unenforceable.” 7 III. DISCUSSION LAZ contends the trial court erred by finding the Arbitration Agreement had a high degree of substantive unconscionability and in declining to sever the offending provisions and enforce the remainder. A. Relevant Legal Principles “Federal and California law treat valid arbitration agreements like any other contract and favor their enforcement.” (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 492 (Ramirez).) “A written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, ‘save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 1281; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 [substantially similar provision in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)].)3 “Unconscionability provides such grounds.” (Ramirez, at p. 492.) “The ‘general principles of unconscionability are well established. A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 492; accord, Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 103 (Fuentes).) Courts “have referred to these two aspects of unconscionability as 3 LAZ asserts, and Butler does not dispute, that the FAA applies here because LAZ’s moving papers showed that “LAZ engaged in transactions involving interstate commerce by marketing itself and providing services to clients nationwide and recruiting and hiring employees from throughout the United States.” We will apply the FAA, noting in any event that neither party cites any relevant differences between federal and state law regarding the issues before us. 8 its ‘procedural and substantive elements.’ ” (Fuentes, at p. 103.) “The procedural element concerns ‘the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation,’ particularly ‘oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power.’ [Citation.] The substantive element, by contrast, concerns ‘the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms,’ i.e., whether those terms ‘are overly harsh or one-sided.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Both procedural and substantive elements must be present to conclude a term is unconscionable, but these required elements need not be present to the same degree.’ [Citation.] Courts ‘apply a sliding scale analysis under which “the more substantively oppressive [a] term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” ’ ” (Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 103.) “The party resisting enforcement of an arbitration agreement has the burden to establish unconscionability.” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 492.) “Appellate review of an order regarding an arbitration agreement’s validity is de novo if the evidence is not in conflict and the ruling is based entirely on an interpretation of law. [Citation.] If a validity ruling rests on the trial court’s resolution of evidentiary disputes, substantial evidence review applies to the court’s factual findings.” (Id. at p. 493.) B. The Arbitration Agreement Has a Limited Degree of Procedural Unconscionability Butler argued in the trial court that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it is an adhesion contract and because he was not provided an opportunity to review it. The trial court agreed with the first of these contentions but rejected the second. Based on these 9 findings, the trial court concluded the Arbitration Agreement had only “a limited degree of procedural unconscionability based on its adhesive nature.” Neither party challenges this finding, which, in any event, is supported by the substantial evidence LAZ submitted to the trial court. (See Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493 [factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence].) Accordingly, we conclude the Arbitration Agreement has only a low degree of procedural unconscionability. Still, “although adhesion alone generally indicates only a low degree of procedural unconscionability, the potential for overreaching in the employment context warrants close scrutiny of the contract’s terms.” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 494.) C. Several Provisions of the Arbitration Agreement Are Substantively Unconscionable “The substantive unconscionability analysis ‘examines the fairness of a contract’s terms. This analysis “ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as ‘ “ ‘overly harsh’ ” ’ [citation], ‘ “unduly oppressive” ’ [citation], ‘ “so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience’ ” ’ [citation], or ‘unfairly one-sided’ [citation]. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain’ [citation], but with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.’ ” ’ [Citation.] … ‘Ultimately, the question is whether [the nondrafting employee], through oppression and surprise, was coerced or misled into making an unfair bargain.’ ” (Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 106.) The trial court found six aspects of the Arbitration Agreement substantively unconscionable: (1) it lacked mutuality, (2) it contained a 10 carveout for injunctive relief that primarily benefited LAZ, (3) it entitled LAZ to injunctive relief to enforce the Confidentiality Agreement without requiring proof of actual damages or irreparable harm, (4) it contained a class action waiver, (5) it contained an invalid attorney fee provision, and (5) it included an invalid wholesale PAGA waiver. We discuss each turn. 1. Mutuality “ ‘ “[T]he paramount consideration in assessing [substantive] conscionability is mutuality.” ’ [Citation.] An arbitration agreement requires a ‘ “modicum of bilaterality,” ’ meaning the drafter cannot require another to submit to arbitration to pursue a claim but not accept the same limitation when it would act as the plaintiff, ‘without at least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on “business realities.” ’ [Citation.] ‘When only the weaker party’s claims are subject to arbitration, and there is no reasonable justification for that lack of symmetry, the agreement lacks the requisite degree of mutuality. [Citations.] As our [Supreme Court] recognized in Armendariz [v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 (Armendariz)], “an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.” [Citation.] As the court also recognized, “lack of mutuality can be manifested as much by what the agreement does not provide as by what it does.” ’ ” (Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. etc. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1059 (Hasty); see Armendariz, at p. 117.) In finding a lack of mutuality, the trial court observed that “the Arbitration Agreement[] states that the ‘Employee agrees that any disputes 11 between Employee and the Company … relating in any way to Employee’s employment …’ are subject to arbitration.” The court read the emphasized language as “indicat[ing] that the obligation is being imposed on the employee only and is not mutual.” Although the court recognized that “[s]ubsequent language in the Agreement references the Company’s understanding of the Agreement’s requirements, [it] does not explicitly impose an obligation to arbitrate on the employer.” (Italics added.) We read the Arbitration Agreement differently. “Absent some indicia in the agreement that arbitration is limited to the employee’s claims against the employer, the use of … ‘I agree’ language in an arbitration clause that expressly covers ‘all disputes’ creates a mutual agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of the applicant’s employment.” (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466 (Roman).) In Roman, the employee signed an arbitration provision that stated: “ ‘I hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims arising out of the submission of this application. I further agree, in the event that I am hired by the company, that all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal resolution which might arise out of my employment with the company, whether during or after that employment, will be submitted to binding arbitration.’ ” (Id. at p. 1467, fn. omitted.) The Roman court rejected the employee’s non-mutuality argument, holding that “the mere inclusion of the words ‘I agree’ by one party in an otherwise mutual arbitration provision [does not] destroy[] the bilateral nature of the agreement.” (Id. at p. 1473; see Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 252 [holding that “ ‘ “I agree” ’ ” in an employer-employee arbitration agreement did not destroy mutuality where the agreement required arbitration of “ ‘all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the submission of [the] 12 application’ ” and “ ‘all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal resolution which might arise out of or relate to [the employee’s] employment with the company’ ”]; Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 182 [“[W]here an arbitration agreement sets forth that ‘any and all’ disputes between the parties will be arbitrated, courts (including this one) have found the agreement to be fully mutual in scope.”].) The Arbitration Agreement here includes the broad “ ‘all disputes’ ” (Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467) language that courts have held establishes mutuality. It provides that “Employee agrees that any disputes between Employee and the Company … relating in any way to Employee’s employment … will be submitted to final binding arbitration … , with the exception of any claim for injunctive relief.” (Italics added.) We see no “indicia in the agreement that arbitration is limited to the employee’s claims against the employer.” (Id. at p. 1466.) To the contrary, there are many signs the parties intended the arbitration obligation to be mutual. For example, the Arbitration Agreement states that it is “entered into between [LAZ] and [Butler]” and it is signed on behalf of LAZ. This reflects the parties’ intent that LAZ also be bound by the agreement. (See Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467.) Additionally, the passage stating that any disputes “will be submitted” to arbitration—as opposed to merely stating that “Employee will submit” any dispute to arbitration—suggests a mutual obligation to arbitrate. Finally, the Arbitration Agreement’s statute of limitations provision directly contemplates a mutual arbitration obligation: “The Company and Employee understand that a written request for arbitration must be made to the other party within the applicable statute of limitations limits which would apply to the claim or the complaining party will waive their right to pursue such claim.” (Italics added.) If the 13 arbitration obligation were not mutual, this passage would state that a request to arbitrate “must be made to the Company” in a timely manner “or Employee will waive” the claim. We therefore conclude that although the Arbitration Agreement nominally provides that only the “[e]mployee agrees” to submit any dispute to arbitration, the obligation is in fact mutual because there are no other “indicia in the agreement [indicating] that arbitration is limited to the employee’s claims against the employer.” (Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466.) The trial court acknowledged that “the Arbitration Agreement … contains other provisions that appear mutual on their face [but are] exactly the type of terms providing an unjustified unilateral benefit to the employer.” We now address these provisions. 2. Carveout for Injunctive Relief As further evidence of substantive unconscionability, the trial court asserted that while “the Agreement provides a carve out for injunctive relief, allowing either party to obtain injunctive relief outside of arbitration[,] [s]uch claims for injunctive relief … are exactly the type of claims most likely to be brought by the employer, while unlikely to be brought by the employee.” Our Supreme Court, however, has rejected this view. In Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237 (Baltazar), the employee-plaintiff argued that a carveout for injunctive relief in the employer’s arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it “unfairly favor[ed] [the employer] because [the employer] is more likely than one of its employees to seek such relief.” (Id. at p. 1246.) Even “accept[ing] for the sake of argument that employers are, in general, more likely than employees 14 to seek provisional relief during the pendency of an arbitration,”4 the court rejected this unconscionability claim because the contractual “provisional relief clause does no more than recite the procedural protections already secured by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1281.8[, subdivision] (b), which expressly permits parties to an arbitration to seek preliminary injunctive relief during the pendency of the arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1247.)5 The injunctive relief carveout in the Arbitration Agreement here is not unconscionable—it merely “confirms the parties’ [mutual] ability to invoke undisputed statutory rights.” (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1248; cf. Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1254 [finding a lack of mutuality where an arbitration agreement contained a unilateral injunctive relief carveout for the stronger party]; Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 234 [same].) 3. Entitlement to Injunctive Relief on a Lesser Showing Considering the Arbitration Agreement together with the Confidentiality Agreement,6 the trial court observed that “[t]he 4 We note that Butler’s complaint prays for injunctive relief. 5 Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.8, subdivision (b) provides in part: “A party to an arbitration agreement may file in the court in the county in which an arbitration proceeding is pending, or if an arbitration proceeding has not commenced, in any proper court, an application for a provisional remedy in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief.” 6 The trial court properly considered the Confidentiality Agreement when interpreting the Arbitration Agreement. (See Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 8, fn. 2 [“Because [the employee] signed the three 15 Confidentiality Agreement … provides that when seeking … injunctive relief, Defendants are not required to establish actual damages or irreparable harm.”7 We agree this provision is substantively unconscionable. “Confidentiality agreements that allow an employer (but not an employee) to seek injunctive relief are not necessarily substantively unconscionable. A ‘ “contract can provide a ‘margin of safety’ that provides the party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable.” ’ ” (Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 21, quoting Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 117; see Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1250 [recognizing an employer’s “legitimate commercial need to protect [its] ‘valuable trade secrets and proprietary and confidential information’ from public disclosure”].) But “[s]ome courts have found substantively unconscionable confidentiality agreements that relieve an employer of multiple, burdensome aspects of enforcing the agreement.” (Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at documents at the same time and they relate to the same matter, we construe them together.”]; Civ. Code, § 1642 [“Several contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together.”].) 7 As noted (see part II.A., ante), the Confidentiality Agreement’s enforcement clause reads: “I acknowledge that the continued operations of the Company’s business requires strict compliance with the confidentiality provisions set forth herein, and recognize that in the event of a breach or threat of breach of this Agreement, monetary compensation would not be an adequate remedy or would be impossible to calculate. I agree, therefore, in the event o[f] a breach on my part, or threat of a breach, of this Agreement, the Company shall be entitled to an immediate injunction or temporary restraining order without showing actual damages.” 16 p. 21; Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436, 451 (Lange) [“ ‘An arbitration provision lacks mutuality and is substantively unconscionable when it authorizes the stronger party to obtain injunctive relief without establishing all of the essential elements for the issuance of an injunction.’ ”].) Specifically, “provisions that waive the employer’s need to obtain a bond before seeking an injunction, waive the employer’s need to show irreparable harm, and require an employee to consent to an immediate injunction are unconscionable” because “[t]hey exceed the legitimate ‘margin of safety’ for the employer and are not mutual.” (Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 492, italics omitted (Alberto).) In Alberto, for example, the court found unconscionable a provision in a confidentiality agreement that “required [the employee] to ‘acknowledge’ that unauthorized use or disclosure of [the employer’s] proprietary information ‘would cause irreparable injury to the [employer],’ and to ‘consent to the order of an immediate injunction, without bond, from any court of competent jurisdiction, enjoining and restraining’ [the employee] from ‘violating or threatening to violate’ the agreement.” (Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 487, italics added.) Similarly, in Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1311 (Silva), the court found unconscionable “contractually mandated concessions in [an] [e]mployment [a]greement (without similar concessions in the employees’ favor) that … confidentiality, noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants are lawful, that any breach of those covenants ‘will cause irreparable harm’ to [the employer] (thereby justifying injunctive relief), that [the employer] (but not the employee) is ‘entitled to temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief,’ and that [the employer] need not post a bond to obtain any such relief.” (Id. at p. 1329, italics added.) 17 By contrast, the court in Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th 1 distinguished the injunctive relief provision at issue there from the provision in Silva on the ground that the Santana provision used less definitive and less concessionary terminology. (Santana, at p. 22.) For example, while the Silva agreement required the employee to agree that a breach will cause irreparable harm and will entitle the employer to specific injunctive relief, the Santana agreement required the employee to acknowledge only that “a breach of the confidentiality agreement ‘may allow a party … to unfairly compete’ with [the employer]” and that the employer “ ‘will be entitled to appropriate equitable relief … from a court of competent jurisdiction,’ i.e., whatever relief a court determines is appropriate based on [the employer]’s evidentiary showing.” (Santana, at p. 22, italics added.) The Santana provision also lacked a bond waiver. (Ibid.) We find the Confidentiality Agreement’s language more like the language in the agreements in Alberto and Silva than in Santana. The agreement here includes definitive language—it requires Butler to “recognize that in the event of a breach or threat of breach … , monetary compensation would not be an adequate remedy or would be impossible to calculate.” (Italics added.) He, therefore, agreed that LAZ “shall be entitled to an immediate injunction or temporary restraining order without showing actual damages.” (Italics added.) Although the Confidentiality Agreement does not include a bond waiver, the concessions it imposes grant LAZ an unfair, unilateral advantage in pursuing injunctive relief. It is therefore substantively unconscionable. (See Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 451 [“[The employer] has articulated—and we can discern—no legitimate commercial need for the specific provisions in the [confidentiality agreement] granting it predispute relief from having to ‘establish[ ] all of the essential 18 elements for the issuance of an injunction.’ ”]; cf. Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 24 [“The confidentiality agreement does not relieve [the employer] of the burden to establish either a likelihood of success at trial or interim harm. The confidentiality agreement provides only that a breach of that agreement ‘may’ allow a third party to unfairly compete with [the employer]. It does not include an agreement or concession by [the employee] that a breach of the confidentiality agreement will necessarily result in harm to [the employer], nor does it contain any other provision diminishing the proof required to obtain an injunction.”].) LAZ argues that Butler’s concession in the Confidentiality Agreement that LAZ “shall be entitled to an immediate injunction or temporary restraining order without showing actual damages” “confers no advantage to LAZ that would otherwise be unavailable in court” because neither “actual damages” nor irreparable harm are required to obtain injunctive relief in court. (Italics added.) LAZ reads the Confidentiality Agreement too narrowly. Not only does the agreement compel Butler to forgo proof of actual damages, it also forces him to agree that “monetary compensation would not be an adequate remedy or would be impossible to calculate.” These factors are relevant to a court’s determination of whether to issue injunctive relief. (See Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110 [“before a court may issue a nonstatutory injunction as a provisional remedy for breach of contract, it must appear that monetary relief would not afford adequate relief or that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of damages”].) “The showing of potential harm that a plaintiff must make in support of a request for preliminary injunctive relief may be expressed in various linguistic formulations, such as the inadequacy 19 of legal remedies or the threat of irreparable injury [citations] but whatever the choice of words it is clear that a plaintiff must make some showing which would support the exercise of the rather extraordinary power to restrain the defendant’s actions prior to a trial on the merits. [Citations.] In general, if the plaintiff may be fully compensated by the payment of damages in the event he prevails, then preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.” (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471, fn. omitted (Tahoe Keys).) Regardless of the precise “linguistic formulation[ ]” (Tahoe Keys, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471), the Confidentiality Agreement’s enforcement provision, read together with the Arbitration Agreement, is substantively unconscionable because it entitles LAZ to injunctive relief on a reduced showing of harm. 4. Class Action Waiver As further evidence of a lack of mutuality and of unconscionability, the trial court found that the Arbitration Agreement’s purportedly mutual class action waiver “unilaterally favors the employer since … class claims are unlikely to be brought by them, but are likely to be brought by an employee.” In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, however, the United States Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts state law unconscionability attacks on class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. (Concepcion, at p. 352.) In doing so, Concepcion overruled the contrary holding in Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148, which found class action waivers unconscionable in consumer adhesion contracts in part because they unfairly benefit the stronger contracting party. (See Concepcion, at p. 342; Discover Bank, at p. 161 [“[C]lass action or 20 arbitration waivers are indisputably one-sided. ‘Although styled as a mutual prohibition on representative or class actions, it is difficult to envision the circumstances under which the provision might negatively impact [a credit card company], because credit card companies typically do not sue their customers in class action lawsuits.’ [Citation.] Such one-sided, exculpatory contracts in a contract of adhesion, at least to the extent they operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be imposed under California law, are generally unconscionable.”].) These holdings have been extended to class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements. (See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 502, 525; Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 359–360 (Iskanian).) Butler cites two cases to support a contrary outcome but neither is persuasive here. In Navas v. Fresh Venture Foods, LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 626, the appellate court observed that the arbitration agreement at issue specified nine specific categories of “ ‘Covered Claims’ ” and included a class action waiver, both of which the court found “are the type of claims that only employees bring against employers.” (Id. at p. 636.) The court held that “Arbitration agreements that primarily require arbitration of the type of claims only employees bring against employers are substantively unconscionable as being ‘one-sided and harsh.’ ” (Ibid.) The Navas court, however, appeared to focus on the specific “ ‘Covered Claims’ ” and did not directly address the class action waiver or any of the controlling authorities discussed above. (Ibid.) The other case Butler cites—Hasty, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 1041— simply follows Navas without any meaningful discussion regarding class action waivers. (Hasty, at pp. 1062–1063.) 21 Absent contrary controlling authority, we must follow high court authority holding that class action waivers in arbitration agreements are not unconscionable. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [“all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction”].) 5. Payment of Attorney Fees The Acknowledgment contains an attorney fee provision that reads: “The Company and Employee further agree that if either of them files with a court a complaint which is subject to arbitration, the complaining party will reimburse the other costs and attorneys’ fees associated with compelling arbitration of the complaint.” The trial court found this provision unconscionable because, “when read in con