Butler v. LAZ Parking California CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketD085643
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Butler v. LAZ Parking California CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LEONARD BUTLER, D085643
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
00027073-CU-OE-CTL)
v.
LAZ PARKING CALIFORNIA, LLC et
al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Wendy M. Behan, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Jackson Lewis, Dylan B. Carp, Nathan W. Austin, and Keelia K. Lee,
for Defendants and Appellants.
Bibiyan Law Group, David D. Bibiyan, Henry G. Glitz; Stiller Law
Firm and Ari J. Stiller for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Leonard Butler sued his former employer and certain of its
affiliates (together, LAZ)1 for alleged violations of California wage and hour
laws. LAZ moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Butler signed
as part of his hiring process. The trial court denied the motion, finding the
arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable and
further finding that the unconscionability so permeated the agreement that it
would be inappropriate to sever the offending provisions and send the matter
to arbitration. LAZ appeals, arguing the trial court erred in finding the
arbitration agreement unconscionable and in declining to sever the offending
provisions. As we will explain, we agree with certain of the trial court’s
unconscionability findings and disagree with others. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court’s order denying LAZ’s motion to compel arbitration, and
remand for the court to exercise anew its discretion whether to sever the
provisions we find unconscionable and enforce the remainder.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
LAZ offered Butler a job as a hotel valet on July 18, 2022. As part of
LAZ’s electronic “onboarding,”2 LAZ emailed Butler a link to the online
1 The former employer is LAZ Parking California, LLC (LAZ Parking)
and the affiliates are LAZ Karp Partners, LLC and LAZ Karp Associates,
LLC. Because Butler worked only for LAZ Parking, context will make it clear
that some of our references to LAZ are only to LAZ Parking.
2 “ ‘Onboarding’ has emerged from the murky reservoir of corporate
jargon and has ‘mainstreamed’ to more general usage. It is ‘defined as “the
act or process of orienting and training a new employee.” ’ ” (Santana v.
2
orientation platform that contained new hire paperwork for review and
signature. Butler began the process by electronically signing three
documents on July 19, 2022.
The first document Butler signed was a California Employee
Handbook, which contained an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Handbook and
Agreement to Arbitrate (Acknowledgement). The Acknowledgement confirms
the employee’s receipt of the employee handbook, affirms the employee’s at-
will employment status, and contains certain terms regarding arbitration of
employment disputes. The Acknowledgement concludes with the following
admonition: “Employee is under no obligation to sign this Agreement and
may want to consult with an attorney before signing this Agreement.”
The second document Butler signed was an Agreement to Arbitrate
Employment Disputes (Arbitration Agreement). This one-page agreement
consists of four substantive paragraphs and an admonition above the
signature block. The first paragraph provides in part: “In consideration of
at-will employment by the Company, Employee agrees that any disputes
between Employee and the Company … relating in any way to Employee’s
employment, including all disputes involving the hiring, termination, terms
of employment, wages or any other disputes arising out of the employment
relationship with the Company, will be submitted to final binding
arbitration … , with the exception of any claim for injunctive relief.” The
Arbitration Agreement incorporates the JAMS Employment Arbitration
Rules and Procedures and provides a link to access those rules online.
Studebaker Health Care Center, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1, 8, fn. 1
(Santana).)
3
In the second paragraph, which applies when “ ‘public policy claims’ ”
are at issue, the Arbitration Agreement provides that it (1) does not limit
statutory remedies, (2) affords adequate discovery rights, (3) does not require
the employee to pay costs unique to arbitration, and (4) requires the
arbitrator to issue a written, reasoned arbitration award.
The third paragraph includes the following waiver of the right to bring
non-individual claims: “The Company and Employee agree that any dispute
between them shall be resolved without the inclusion of any other employees
or third parties included as parties to the arbitration proceeding, be it as
individuals or part of a class action, collective action, private attorney general
action or any similar representative action, unless both the Company and
Employee agree to such consolidation after a dispute has arisen. No
arbitrator shall have the authority under this Agreement to order any such
class or representative action. By signing this agreement, Employee is
agreeing to waive any rights that Employee may have to bring or participate
in any action on a class, collective, private attorney general, representative or
other similar basis.”
The fourth paragraph of the Arbitration Agreement consists of the
following severance clause: “If any term or provision of this Agreement is
deemed unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Company and
Employee agree that such term or provision may be severed without affecting
the other terms of this Agreement.”
Finally, just above the signature block, the Arbitration Agreement
concludes with the following admonition in boldface type: “By signing below,
Employee agrees to the foregoing terms and agrees to waive the right to a
trial by jury and instead submit any disputes arising out of or related to this
Agreement or Employee’s employment with the Company to arbitration.”
4
The third document Butler signed on July 19, 2022, was a
Confidentiality and Non-solicitation Agreement (Confidentiality Agreement).
Through this agreement, Butler acknowledged he would have access to—and
would not disclose—LAZ’s confidential and proprietary information. The
“enforcement” clause of this agreement states: “I acknowledge that the
continued operations of the Company’s business requires strict compliance
with the confidentiality provisions set forth herein, and recognize that in the
event of a breach or threat of breach of this Agreement, monetary
compensation would not be an adequate remedy or would be impossible to
calculate. I agree, therefore, in the event o[f] a breach on my part, or threat
of a breach, of this Agreement, the Company shall be entitled to an
immediate injunction or temporary restraining order without showing actual
damages.”
Butler began working on July 25, 2022. That day, he signed two
additional onboarding documents not at issue here.
Butler’s employment with LAZ ended in December 2022.
B. Procedural Background
In June 2023, Butler filed a putative class action complaint against
LAZ asserting 10 causes of action for alleged violations of California wage
and hour laws. A few months later, Butler amended his complaint to add an
eleventh cause of action for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) in “a
representative action on behalf of himself and similarly Aggrieved
Employees.”
LAZ moved to compel individual arbitration of all of Butler’s claims, to
dismiss the putative class claims, and to stay the non-individual
5
representative PAGA claim. LAZ’s motion invoked the Acknowledgment and
the Arbitration Agreement but did not mention the Confidentiality
Agreement.
Butler opposed the motion, arguing the Arbitration Agreement was
unconscionable. He argued the agreement was procedurally unconscionable
because it was an adhesion contract and he was not given an opportunity to
review or negotiate it. Butler submitted a declaration stating that when he
began his employment, he was “brought into the main office … to
electronically sign a large number of documents.” Butler believed he had to
sign all the documents to keep his job. He stated that “[n]o one explained any
of the documents to” him or told him he “could take a copy … and have them
reviewed by an attorney before [he] signed them.”
Butler argued the Arbitration Agreement was substantively
unconscionable because it (1) lacked mutuality in that it required only Butler,
but not LAZ, to pursue claims via arbitration; (2) contained an unenforceable
wholesale PAGA waiver; and (3) improperly allowed LAZ to obtain immediate
injunctive relief via the Confidentiality Agreement’s enforcement clause.
Butler maintained that the unconscionable provisions “permeate[d]” the
Arbitration Agreement and Confidentiality Agreement and could not be
severed.
The trial court denied LAZ’s motion to compel arbitration. The court
found the Arbitration Agreement had only “a limited degree of procedural
unconscionability based on its adhesive nature.” Regarding Butler’s claims
about the circumstances under which he signed the new-hire paperwork, the
court noted the nearly week-long timeframe in which Butler completed the
onboarding paperwork and the Acknowledgment’s admonition that he was
6
not obligated to sign the document and could consult an attorney before
signing.
In contrast to the limited degree of procedural unconscionability, the
trial court found “that the Arbitration Agreement contains a high degree of
substantive unconscionability.” The court cited six provisions that led to this
conclusion. First, the court concluded the Arbitration Agreement lacked
mutuality because it stated that “Employee agrees” to arbitrate claims “but
does not explicitly impose an obligation to arbitrate on [LAZ].” (Italics
added.) Additionally, the court observed that while five “other provisions …
appear mutual on their face, they are exactly the type of terms providing an
unjustified unilateral benefit to the employer.” The trial court cited (1) the
Arbitration Agreement’s “carve out for injunctive relief,” which typically
favors employers; (2) the Confidentiality Agreement’s “provi[sion] that when
seeking injunctive relief, [LAZ is] not required to establish actual damages or
irreparable harm”; (3) the class and representative action waivers, which
typically favor employers; (4) a provision in the Acknowledgment entitling a
party to attorney fees “against a party that files a court complaint for a claim
that is subject to arbitration”; and (5) the Arbitration Agreement’s wholesale
PAGA waiver.
Regarding LAZ’s request to sever any unconscionable provisions and
enforce the remainder, the trial court found that “the Arbitration Agreement,
when read in conjunction with the Confidentiality Agreement, is so
permeated by an unlawful purpose as [to] prevent severing such parts and
the contract is therefore unconscionable and unenforceable.”
7
III. DISCUSSION
LAZ contends the trial court erred by finding the Arbitration
Agreement had a high degree of substantive unconscionability and in
declining to sever the offending provisions and enforce the remainder.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
“Federal and California law treat valid arbitration agreements like any
other contract and favor their enforcement.” (Ramirez v. Charter
Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 492 (Ramirez).) “A written
agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable, ‘save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any
contract.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 1281; see 9 U.S.C. § 2
[substantially similar provision in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
(9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)].)3 “Unconscionability provides such grounds.”
(Ramirez, at p. 492.)
“The ‘general principles of unconscionability are well established. A
contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in
deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 492; accord, Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 103
(Fuentes).) Courts “have referred to these two aspects of unconscionability as
3 LAZ asserts, and Butler does not dispute, that the FAA applies here
because LAZ’s moving papers showed that “LAZ engaged in transactions
involving interstate commerce by marketing itself and providing services to
clients nationwide and recruiting and hiring employees from throughout the
United States.” We will apply the FAA, noting in any event that neither
party cites any relevant differences between federal and state law regarding
the issues before us.
8
its ‘procedural and substantive elements.’ ” (Fuentes, at p. 103.) “The
procedural element concerns ‘the circumstances of contract negotiation and
formation,’ particularly ‘oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining
power.’ [Citation.] The substantive element, by contrast, concerns ‘the
fairness of an agreement’s actual terms,’ i.e., whether those terms ‘are overly
harsh or one-sided.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Both procedural and substantive elements must be present to
conclude a term is unconscionable, but these required elements need not be
present to the same degree.’ [Citation.] Courts ‘apply a sliding scale analysis
under which “the more substantively oppressive [a] term, the less evidence of
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the
term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” ’ ” (Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at
p. 103.)
“The party resisting enforcement of an arbitration agreement has the
burden to establish unconscionability.” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 492.) “Appellate review of an order regarding an arbitration agreement’s
validity is de novo if the evidence is not in conflict and the ruling is based
entirely on an interpretation of law. [Citation.] If a validity ruling rests on
the trial court’s resolution of evidentiary disputes, substantial evidence
review applies to the court’s factual findings.” (Id. at p. 493.)
B. The Arbitration Agreement Has a Limited Degree of
Procedural Unconscionability
Butler argued in the trial court that the Arbitration Agreement is
procedurally unconscionable because it is an adhesion contract and because
he was not provided an opportunity to review it. The trial court agreed with
the first of these contentions but rejected the second. Based on these
9
findings, the trial court concluded the Arbitration Agreement had only “a
limited degree of procedural unconscionability based on its adhesive nature.”
Neither party challenges this finding, which, in any event, is supported by
the substantial evidence LAZ submitted to the trial court. (See Ramirez,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493 [factual findings are reviewed for substantial
evidence].)
Accordingly, we conclude the Arbitration Agreement has only a low
degree of procedural unconscionability. Still, “although adhesion alone
generally indicates only a low degree of procedural unconscionability, the
potential for overreaching in the employment context warrants close scrutiny
of the contract’s terms.” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 494.)
C. Several Provisions of the Arbitration Agreement Are
Substantively Unconscionable
“The substantive unconscionability analysis ‘examines the fairness of a
contract’s terms. This analysis “ensures that contracts, particularly contracts
of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as
‘ “ ‘overly harsh’ ” ’ [citation], ‘ “unduly oppressive” ’ [citation], ‘ “so one-sided
as to ‘shock the conscience’ ” ’ [citation], or ‘unfairly one-sided’ [citation]. All
of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability
doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain’ [citation],
but with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful
party.’ ” ’ [Citation.] … ‘Ultimately, the question is whether [the nondrafting
employee], through oppression and surprise, was coerced or misled into
making an unfair bargain.’ ” (Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 106.)
The trial court found six aspects of the Arbitration Agreement
substantively unconscionable: (1) it lacked mutuality, (2) it contained a
10
carveout for injunctive relief that primarily benefited LAZ, (3) it entitled LAZ
to injunctive relief to enforce the Confidentiality Agreement without
requiring proof of actual damages or irreparable harm, (4) it contained a class
action waiver, (5) it contained an invalid attorney fee provision, and (5) it
included an invalid wholesale PAGA waiver. We discuss each turn.
1. Mutuality
“ ‘ “[T]he paramount consideration in assessing [substantive]
conscionability is mutuality.” ’ [Citation.] An arbitration agreement requires
a ‘ “modicum of bilaterality,” ’ meaning the drafter cannot require another to
submit to arbitration to pursue a claim but not accept the same limitation
when it would act as the plaintiff, ‘without at least some reasonable
justification for such one-sidedness based on “business realities.” ’ [Citation.]
‘When only the weaker party’s claims are subject to arbitration, and there is
no reasonable justification for that lack of symmetry, the agreement lacks the
requisite degree of mutuality. [Citations.] As our [Supreme Court]
recognized in Armendariz [v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 (Armendariz)], “an arbitration agreement imposed in an
adhesive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one
contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.”
[Citation.] As the court also recognized, “lack of mutuality can be manifested
as much by what the agreement does not provide as by what it does.” ’ ”
(Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. etc. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1059
(Hasty); see Armendariz, at p. 117.)
In finding a lack of mutuality, the trial court observed that “the
Arbitration Agreement[] states that the ‘Employee agrees that any disputes
11
between Employee and the Company … relating in any way to Employee’s
employment …’ are subject to arbitration.” The court read the emphasized
language as “indicat[ing] that the obligation is being imposed on the
employee only and is not mutual.” Although the court recognized that
“[s]ubsequent language in the Agreement references the Company’s
understanding of the Agreement’s requirements, [it] does not explicitly
impose an obligation to arbitrate on the employer.” (Italics added.) We read
the Arbitration Agreement differently.
“Absent some indicia in the agreement that arbitration is limited to the
employee’s claims against the employer, the use of … ‘I agree’ language in an
arbitration clause that expressly covers ‘all disputes’ creates a mutual
agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of the applicant’s employment.”
(Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466 (Roman).) In
Roman, the employee signed an arbitration provision that stated: “ ‘I hereby
agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims arising out of
the submission of this application. I further agree, in the event that I am
hired by the company, that all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal
internal resolution which might arise out of my employment with the
company, whether during or after that employment, will be submitted to
binding arbitration.’ ” (Id. at p. 1467, fn. omitted.) The Roman court rejected
the employee’s non-mutuality argument, holding that “the mere inclusion of
the words ‘I agree’ by one party in an otherwise mutual arbitration provision
[does not] destroy[] the bilateral nature of the agreement.” (Id. at p. 1473;
see Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 252
[holding that “ ‘ “I agree” ’ ” in an employer-employee arbitration agreement
did not destroy mutuality where the agreement required arbitration of “ ‘all
disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the submission of [the]
12
application’ ” and “ ‘all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal
resolution which might arise out of or relate to [the employee’s] employment
with the company’ ”]; Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 165, 182 [“[W]here an arbitration agreement sets forth that ‘any
and all’ disputes between the parties will be arbitrated, courts (including this
one) have found the agreement to be fully mutual in scope.”].)
The Arbitration Agreement here includes the broad “ ‘all disputes’ ”
(Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467) language that courts have held
establishes mutuality. It provides that “Employee agrees that any disputes
between Employee and the Company … relating in any way to Employee’s
employment … will be submitted to final binding arbitration … , with the
exception of any claim for injunctive relief.” (Italics added.) We see no
“indicia in the agreement that arbitration is limited to the employee’s claims
against the employer.” (Id. at p. 1466.) To the contrary, there are many
signs the parties intended the arbitration obligation to be mutual.
For example, the Arbitration Agreement states that it is “entered into
between [LAZ] and [Butler]” and it is signed on behalf of LAZ. This reflects
the parties’ intent that LAZ also be bound by the agreement. (See Roman,
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467.) Additionally, the passage stating that
any disputes “will be submitted” to arbitration—as opposed to merely stating
that “Employee will submit” any dispute to arbitration—suggests a mutual
obligation to arbitrate. Finally, the Arbitration Agreement’s statute of
limitations provision directly contemplates a mutual arbitration obligation:
“The Company and Employee understand that a written request for
arbitration must be made to the other party within the applicable statute of
limitations limits which would apply to the claim or the complaining party
will waive their right to pursue such claim.” (Italics added.) If the
13
arbitration obligation were not mutual, this passage would state that a
request to arbitrate “must be made to the Company” in a timely manner “or
Employee will waive” the claim.
We therefore conclude that although the Arbitration Agreement
nominally provides that only the “[e]mployee agrees” to submit any dispute to
arbitration, the obligation is in fact mutual because there are no other
“indicia in the agreement [indicating] that arbitration is limited to the
employee’s claims against the employer.” (Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1466.)
The trial court acknowledged that “the Arbitration Agreement …
contains other provisions that appear mutual on their face [but are] exactly
the type of terms providing an unjustified unilateral benefit to the employer.”
We now address these provisions.
2. Carveout for Injunctive Relief
As further evidence of substantive unconscionability, the trial court
asserted that while “the Agreement provides a carve out for injunctive relief,
allowing either party to obtain injunctive relief outside of arbitration[,] [s]uch
claims for injunctive relief … are exactly the type of claims most likely to be
brought by the employer, while unlikely to be brought by the employee.” Our
Supreme Court, however, has rejected this view.
In Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237 (Baltazar), the
employee-plaintiff argued that a carveout for injunctive relief in the
employer’s arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it “unfairly
favor[ed] [the employer] because [the employer] is more likely than one of its
employees to seek such relief.” (Id. at p. 1246.) Even “accept[ing] for the
sake of argument that employers are, in general, more likely than employees
14
to seek provisional relief during the pendency of an arbitration,”4 the court
rejected this unconscionability claim because the contractual “provisional
relief clause does no more than recite the procedural protections already
secured by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1281.8[, subdivision] (b), which
expressly permits parties to an arbitration to seek preliminary injunctive
relief during the pendency of the arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1247.)5
The injunctive relief carveout in the Arbitration Agreement here is not
unconscionable—it merely “confirms the parties’ [mutual] ability to invoke
undisputed statutory rights.” (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1248;
cf. Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1254 [finding a
lack of mutuality where an arbitration agreement contained a unilateral
injunctive relief carveout for the stronger party]; Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 234 [same].)
3. Entitlement to Injunctive Relief on a Lesser Showing
Considering the Arbitration Agreement together with the
Confidentiality Agreement,6 the trial court observed that “[t]he
4 We note that Butler’s complaint prays for injunctive relief.
5 Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.8, subdivision (b) provides in part:
“A party to an arbitration agreement may file in the court in the county in
which an arbitration proceeding is pending, or if an arbitration proceeding
has not commenced, in any proper court, an application for a provisional
remedy in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but only upon the
ground that the award to which the applicant may be entitled may be
rendered ineffectual without provisional relief.”
6 The trial court properly considered the Confidentiality Agreement
when interpreting the Arbitration Agreement. (See Santana, supra, 120
Cal.App.5th at p. 8, fn. 2 [“Because [the employee] signed the three
15
Confidentiality Agreement … provides that when seeking … injunctive relief,
Defendants are not required to establish actual damages or irreparable
harm.”7 We agree this provision is substantively unconscionable.
“Confidentiality agreements that allow an employer (but not an
employee) to seek injunctive relief are not necessarily substantively
unconscionable. A ‘ “contract can provide a ‘margin of safety’ that provides
the party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for
which it has a legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable.” ’ ”
(Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 21, quoting Armendariz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 117; see Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1250 [recognizing
an employer’s “legitimate commercial need to protect [its] ‘valuable trade
secrets and proprietary and confidential information’ from public
disclosure”].)
But “[s]ome courts have found substantively unconscionable
confidentiality agreements that relieve an employer of multiple, burdensome
aspects of enforcing the agreement.” (Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at
documents at the same time and they relate to the same matter, we construe
them together.”]; Civ. Code, § 1642 [“Several contracts relating to the same
matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one
transaction, are to be taken together.”].)
7 As noted (see part II.A., ante), the Confidentiality Agreement’s
enforcement clause reads: “I acknowledge that the continued operations of
the Company’s business requires strict compliance with the confidentiality
provisions set forth herein, and recognize that in the event of a breach or
threat of breach of this Agreement, monetary compensation would not be an
adequate remedy or would be impossible to calculate. I agree, therefore, in
the event o[f] a breach on my part, or threat of a breach, of this Agreement,
the Company shall be entitled to an immediate injunction or temporary
restraining order without showing actual damages.”
16
p. 21; Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436, 451 (Lange)
[“ ‘An arbitration provision lacks mutuality and is substantively
unconscionable when it authorizes the stronger party to obtain injunctive
relief without establishing all of the essential elements for the issuance of an
injunction.’ ”].) Specifically, “provisions that waive the employer’s need to
obtain a bond before seeking an injunction, waive the employer’s need to
show irreparable harm, and require an employee to consent to an immediate
injunction are unconscionable” because “[t]hey exceed the legitimate ‘margin
of safety’ for the employer and are not mutual.” (Alberto v. Cambrian
Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 492, italics omitted (Alberto).)
In Alberto, for example, the court found unconscionable a provision in a
confidentiality agreement that “required [the employee] to ‘acknowledge’ that
unauthorized use or disclosure of [the employer’s] proprietary information
‘would cause irreparable injury to the [employer],’ and to ‘consent to the order
of an immediate injunction, without bond, from any court of competent
jurisdiction, enjoining and restraining’ [the employee] from ‘violating or
threatening to violate’ the agreement.” (Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 487, italics added.)
Similarly, in Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1311 (Silva), the court found unconscionable “contractually
mandated concessions in [an] [e]mployment [a]greement (without similar
concessions in the employees’ favor) that … confidentiality, noncompete and
nonsolicitation covenants are lawful, that any breach of those covenants ‘will
cause irreparable harm’ to [the employer] (thereby justifying injunctive
relief), that [the employer] (but not the employee) is ‘entitled to temporary,
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief,’ and that [the employer] need
not post a bond to obtain any such relief.” (Id. at p. 1329, italics added.)
17
By contrast, the court in Santana, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th 1
distinguished the injunctive relief provision at issue there from the provision
in Silva on the ground that the Santana provision used less definitive and
less concessionary terminology. (Santana, at p. 22.) For example, while the
Silva agreement required the employee to agree that a breach will cause
irreparable harm and will entitle the employer to specific injunctive relief,
the Santana agreement required the employee to acknowledge only that “a
breach of the confidentiality agreement ‘may allow a party … to unfairly
compete’ with [the employer]” and that the employer “ ‘will be entitled to
appropriate equitable relief … from a court of competent jurisdiction,’ i.e.,
whatever relief a court determines is appropriate based on [the employer]’s
evidentiary showing.” (Santana, at p. 22, italics added.) The Santana
provision also lacked a bond waiver. (Ibid.)
We find the Confidentiality Agreement’s language more like the
language in the agreements in Alberto and Silva than in Santana. The
agreement here includes definitive language—it requires Butler to “recognize
that in the event of a breach or threat of breach … , monetary compensation
would not be an adequate remedy or would be impossible to calculate.”
(Italics added.) He, therefore, agreed that LAZ “shall be entitled to an
immediate injunction or temporary restraining order without showing actual
damages.” (Italics added.) Although the Confidentiality Agreement does not
include a bond waiver, the concessions it imposes grant LAZ an unfair,
unilateral advantage in pursuing injunctive relief. It is therefore
substantively unconscionable. (See Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 451
[“[The employer] has articulated—and we can discern—no legitimate
commercial need for the specific provisions in the [confidentiality agreement]
granting it predispute relief from having to ‘establish[ ] all of the essential
18
elements for the issuance of an injunction.’ ”]; cf. Santana, supra,
120 Cal.App.5th at p. 24 [“The confidentiality agreement does not relieve [the
employer] of the burden to establish either a likelihood of success at trial or
interim harm. The confidentiality agreement provides only that a breach of
that agreement ‘may’ allow a third party to unfairly compete with [the
employer]. It does not include an agreement or concession by [the employee]
that a breach of the confidentiality agreement will necessarily result in harm
to [the employer], nor does it contain any other provision diminishing the
proof required to obtain an injunction.”].)
LAZ argues that Butler’s concession in the Confidentiality Agreement
that LAZ “shall be entitled to an immediate injunction or temporary
restraining order without showing actual damages” “confers no advantage to
LAZ that would otherwise be unavailable in court” because neither “actual
damages” nor irreparable harm are required to obtain injunctive relief in
court. (Italics added.) LAZ reads the Confidentiality Agreement too
narrowly.
Not only does the agreement compel Butler to forgo proof of actual
damages, it also forces him to agree that “monetary compensation would not
be an adequate remedy or would be impossible to calculate.” These factors
are relevant to a court’s determination of whether to issue injunctive relief.
(See Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th
1100, 1110 [“before a court may issue a nonstatutory injunction as a
provisional remedy for breach of contract, it must appear that monetary relief
would not afford adequate relief or that it would be extremely difficult to
ascertain the amount of damages”].) “The showing of potential harm that a
plaintiff must make in support of a request for preliminary injunctive relief
may be expressed in various linguistic formulations, such as the inadequacy
19
of legal remedies or the threat of irreparable injury [citations] but whatever
the choice of words it is clear that a plaintiff must make some showing which
would support the exercise of the rather extraordinary power to restrain the
defendant’s actions prior to a trial on the merits. [Citations.] In general, if
the plaintiff may be fully compensated by the payment of damages in the
event he prevails, then preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.”
(Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471, fn. omitted (Tahoe Keys).)
Regardless of the precise “linguistic formulation[ ]” (Tahoe Keys, supra,
23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471), the Confidentiality Agreement’s enforcement
provision, read together with the Arbitration Agreement, is substantively
unconscionable because it entitles LAZ to injunctive relief on a reduced
showing of harm.
4. Class Action Waiver
As further evidence of a lack of mutuality and of unconscionability, the
trial court found that the Arbitration Agreement’s purportedly mutual class
action waiver “unilaterally favors the employer since … class claims are
unlikely to be brought by them, but are likely to be brought by an employee.”
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, however, the
United States Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts state law
unconscionability attacks on class action waivers in consumer arbitration
agreements. (Concepcion, at p. 352.) In doing so, Concepcion overruled the
contrary holding in Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148,
which found class action waivers unconscionable in consumer adhesion
contracts in part because they unfairly benefit the stronger contracting party.
(See Concepcion, at p. 342; Discover Bank, at p. 161 [“[C]lass action or
20
arbitration waivers are indisputably one-sided. ‘Although styled as a mutual
prohibition on representative or class actions, it is difficult to envision the
circumstances under which the provision might negatively impact [a credit
card company], because credit card companies typically do not sue their
customers in class action lawsuits.’ [Citation.] Such one-sided, exculpatory
contracts in a contract of adhesion, at least to the extent they operate to
insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be imposed under
California law, are generally unconscionable.”].) These holdings have been
extended to class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements. (See
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 502, 525; Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 359–360 (Iskanian).)
Butler cites two cases to support a contrary outcome but neither is
persuasive here. In Navas v. Fresh Venture Foods, LLC (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 626, the appellate court observed that the arbitration agreement
at issue specified nine specific categories of “ ‘Covered Claims’ ” and included
a class action waiver, both of which the court found “are the type of claims
that only employees bring against employers.” (Id. at p. 636.) The court held
that “Arbitration agreements that primarily require arbitration of the type of
claims only employees bring against employers are substantively
unconscionable as being ‘one-sided and harsh.’ ” (Ibid.) The Navas court,
however, appeared to focus on the specific “ ‘Covered Claims’ ” and did not
directly address the class action waiver or any of the controlling authorities
discussed above. (Ibid.)
The other case Butler cites—Hasty, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 1041—
simply follows Navas without any meaningful discussion regarding class
action waivers. (Hasty, at pp. 1062–1063.)
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Absent contrary controlling authority, we must follow high court
authority holding that class action waivers in arbitration agreements are not
unconscionable. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [“all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required
to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction”].)
5. Payment of Attorney Fees
The Acknowledgment contains an attorney fee provision that reads:
“The Company and Employee further agree that if either of them files with a
court a complaint which is subject to arbitration, the complaining party will
reimburse the other costs and attorneys’ fees associated with compelling
arbitration of the complaint.” The trial court found this provision
unconscionable because, “when read in con