Adoption of L.V. CA1/1

Filed 10/21/26 Adoption of L.V. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE Adoption of L.V., a Minor. V.P., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A176063 J.V., (Alameda County Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 24AD090798) MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant J.V. challenges an order freeing his son L.V. from parental control and custody so that L.V.’s step-father, respondent V.P., can adopt him. J.V.’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court did not satisfy all of its obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., ICWA). We agree and conditionally reverse.1 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1) and recite only those facts necessary to resolve the limited issue before us (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851). 1  Attached to the adoption request filed in September 2024 was a statement from the child’s mother that she had asked her mother (the child’s maternal grandmother) about the child’s Indian ancestry, and the grandmother gave her no reason to believe the child was or may be an Indian child. The mother also completed a Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020) that stated that none of the enumerated bases for Indian status applied. As part of the adoption process, V.P. in June 2025 filed a petition to declare L.V. free from parental custody, and J.V. objected to the termination of his parental rights. The Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) filed two reports in August. The first one did not contain any information about ICWA or the child’s possible Indian ancestry. It did, however, state that J.V. wanted his “son to know his paternal side of the family, including [L.V.’s] grandfather and cousins.” There is no indication the paternal grandfather or any cousins were contacted. The second report stated, “On September 4, 202[4], the petitioner submitted the ICWA (010) and the ICWA (020) forms. It does not appear ICWA is applied to this case.” A contested hearing on V.P.’s petition was held in January 2026. J.V. testified about his relationship with his son, and he acknowledged that he had not seen L.V. in several years and that he was a stranger to his son. After the close of evidence, J.V.’s counsel argued that there was insufficient evidence to terminate parental rights. Counsel also argued that it would be inappropriate to terminate parental rights since the investigator had not conducted sufficient ICWA inquiry. V.P.’s counsel responded that this was the first time the issue had been raised, that she had “never heard anything about any Indian heritage,” and that she believed an inquiry could be done that same day. 2  After taking a recess to consider the ICWA issue, the trial court asked J.V.’s counsel if she had been aware when she made her ICWA objection that one of the Agency’s reports included the mother’s sworn statement that her son did not have Indian ancestry, and counsel responded that she had not. At the trial court’s direction, J.V.’s counsel questioned J.V. under oath about possible Indian ancestry. J.V. testified that he was not a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, and he did not know if he was eligible for such membership, but that he had never lived on a reservation, rancheria, or Alaskan native village. He further testified that he did not know whether his son or any other family members were members of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or whether his son had ever been a ward of a tribal court. After J.V. testified, the trial court stated, “I’m finding that [ICWA] has been complied with in this case.” The trial court concluded that J.V. had abandoned his son (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd. (a)(3)) and that it would be in L.V.’s best interests to grant the petition. It thus granted the petition to terminate J.V.’s parental rights to free L.V. for adoption, though the formal order does not make any express ICWA findings. L.V. has an older half sibling whose adoption by V.P. apparently already had been approved, and V.P.’s counsel asked after the court issued its ruling whether J.V. planned to appeal or whether the two boys could schedule a joint adoption hearing “so these two brothers can have a nice day.” J.V. did ultimately appeal from the order declaring L.V. free from parental control and custody. ICWA is meant to protect Indian children who are members of Indian tribes or who are eligible for such membership. (Adoption of M.R. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 537, 541 (M.R.); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) State law “codifies and expands on ICWA’s duty of inquiry to determine whether a child is an Indian 3 child.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131 (Dezi C.); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a)2 [court and social services agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child”].) Such inquiry shall be directed at, among others, “extended family members” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2)), which includes the child’s grandparents, aunts and uncles, adult siblings, and adult first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) This duty of inquiry applies in the context of a petition to free a minor from parental custody under Family Code, section 7822. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.480(4) & 5.481(a)(1); see M.R., at p. 541; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1386–1387.) “We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian ancestry for substantial evidence.” (M.R. at p. 542.) We agree with J.V. that the ICWA inquiry here was insufficient since no paternal relatives (other than J.V.) were questioned. (See M.R., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 543–544 [limited remand where no inquiry made of extended family members].) State law compels this outcome even though there is “nothing within the record of this case, or even offered for us to consider on appeal, [that] indicates any reason to believe [that] ICWA may apply to the minor,” and “all available evidence is to the contrary.” (Id. at p. 543.) And we stress that on remand, the Agency need only reach out to “ ‘people who are reasonably available to help . . . with the investigation’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140); we do not expect the Agency “to hound family members who say they will supply contact information, but do not do so” (In re K.L. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 989, 996); and it is “not required to ‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads” (In re 2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 4 D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053). If any relative refuses to cooperate, the Agency is likewise “not required to stalk them in the vain hope they might change their mind.” (In re X.A. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1327, 1338.) And although J.V. suggests that the Agency must question L.V.’s older half sibling, this is not required if the child is a minor (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c)), and such inquiry appears unnecessary in any event since the minor has the same maternal relatives as L.V. and a different father. In concluding that remand is mandatory, we must presume that J.V. is not “engag[ing] in gamesmanship to delay resolution of a case or a minor’s permanency,” since “there appears to be little incentive for parents to engage in such conduct in the first instance, and we will not assume parents are engaging in this tactic.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1149.) The order freeing L.V. from parental control and custody is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for compliance with the inquiry provisions of ICWA. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152.) Should the trial court thereafter find a proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence have been conducted and concludes that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate the order. (Ibid.) If the court concludes that ICWA applies, it shall then proceed in conformity with ICWA and state implementing provisions. (Ibid.) 5  _________________________ Humes, P. J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ Banke, J. _________________________ Smiley, J. Adoption of L.V. A176063 6