Li v. Chen CA2/1

Filed 10/27/26 Li v. Chen CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE LINGXIAO LI et al., B348971 Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25SMCV03132) v. SPRING CHEN et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed. Klinedinst, Robert M. Shaughnessy and Regina J. Ryu for Defendants and Appellants. Law Office of Michael E. Israel, Michael E. Israel; Grammatico Law Firm and Paul A. Grammatico for Plaintiffs and Respondents. ______________________  INTRODUCTION Jinwan Shen and his company Da Bai Niu (DBN) allege that Lingxiao “Tim” Li fraudulently induced them to invest in California corporations IY International, Inc. (IY), Horizon Holding Group (Horizon), and other businesses. At the time Shen and DBN sued Li, IY, Horizon, and others for the alleged fraud in February 2024 (the Shen-Li lawsuit), the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) had suspended Horizon’s corporate status. Soon after the lawsuit was filed, the FTB also suspended IY. In September 2024, at Shen’s direction, Spring Chen and her accountancy practice, Classic CPA, (collectively, Chen) filed applications with the FTB to revive IY and Horizon, along with “[s]tatements of [i]nformation” (SOI) and tax returns for the two companies. The SOI documents indicated that Shen had replaced Li as the sole officer and director for IY and Horizon. The same day that FTB lifted the suspension of IY and Horizon, Li filed his own SOI documents indicating that he, and not Shen, was still the companies’ sole officer and director. Following these dueling filings, Li, IY, and Horizon sued Chen for accounting malpractice, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting fraud, alleging that Chen had no authority to file the SOI documents and tax returns on behalf of IY and Horizon and that the documents contained false information. Chen responded by filing a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,1 asserting the 1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. We refer to section 425.16 as the anti-SLAPP statute. For clarity, we refer to a SLAPP or anti-SLAPP motion as “a 2 corporate filings she made constituted protected conduct because they were made in connection with the Shen-Li lawsuit for the purpose of IY and Horizon participating in that case. Chen sought to strike the entire complaint against her; she made no alternative argument to strike particular claims from the complaint. The trial court denied Chen’s motion, finding she failed to establish the claims against her arose from protected activity. Chen now appeals, and we affirm. IY and Horizon have sued Chen for malpractice and related claims for filings she made on their behalf. The anti-SLAPP statute does not protect Chen from malpractice-related claims asserted by the entities on whose behalf she acted. Because the complaint against Chen contains claims that do not arise from protected conduct, the trial court did not err in denying the special motion to strike the entire complaint. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We describe only those portions of the record relevant to the issues in this appeal. A. The Shen-Li Lawsuit The first amended complaint in the Shen-Li lawsuit, filed on June 21, 2024, alleges that Li had induced Shen and DBN “to . . . joint venture and transfer funds into multiple businesses” including IY and Horizon. From 2015 to 2019, Shen and DBN contributed $20 million to IY based on the understanding that Li would contribute $8.6 million; in fact, Li did not contribute any special motion to strike”—the language used in the statute (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)). 3 amount and “dissipated and/or diverted the monies for his own personal benefit.” In late 2018 to early 2019, Li proposed to enter a joint venture with Shen to purchase real estate; Shen was to contribute 70 percent of the money for the venture through a trust he owned, and Li would contribute the other 30 percent. In March 2021, Li induced Shen to contribute $20 million to the venture, which Shen paid through DBN; the money was utilized by a subsidiary of Horizon to purchase a hotel. The grant deed for the property did not identify Shen or DBN as an owner and Li did not provide any documentation confirming Shen’s 70 percent ownership share in Horizon, its subsidiaries, or its parent company. Li did not contribute any money to the venture as he had promised and instead utilized Shen’s money from another trust over which he had control, with the result that Shen and DBN paid the entire purchase price for the hotel. Before Shen and DBN filed suit, Horizon had been suspended by the FTB for failing to file tax returns. On May 1, 2024, the FTB also suspended IY. Among the requests for relief in their first amended complaint, Shen and DBN sought a declaration “that . . . Horizon[ and] IY . . . , being suspended and/or dissolved entities, pursuant to [section] 23301 of the California Revenue [and] Taxation Code, their powers, rights and privileges are deemed suspended and [they] lack the capacity to defend themselves in court.” B. Chen Files Documents with the Secretary of State and the FTB on Behalf of Horizon and IY When the Shen-Li lawsuit began, Li was identified in the records of the Secretary of State (Secretary) as the sole officer and director of both Horizon and IY. On about September 3, 2024, Chen, at Shen’s direction, filed SOI documents with the 4 Secretary identifying Shen as the sole officer and director of Horizon and IY. Then, on September 4, 2024, Chen filed an application with the FTB to revive Horizon along with tax returns for Horizon for 2022 and 2023, and paid the taxes due according to those returns. On September 5, 2024, Chen filed an application to revive IY with tax returns for IY for 2017 to 2018 and 2020 to 2023 and paid the taxes due according to those returns. That same day the FTB issued notices reviving Horizon and IY. C. Li Files Documents with the Secretary Identifying Himself as the Sole Officer and Director of IY and Horizon On September 5, 2024, Li filed SOI documents with the Secretary identifying himself as the sole officer and director of IY and Horizon, instead of Shen. D. Li, Horizon, and IY Cross-complain for Injunctive Relief to Prevent Li’s Removal as an Officer and Director On September 10, 2024, Li, IY, and Horizon filed a first amended cross-complaint in the Shen-Li lawsuit against Shen and DBN seeking declaratory relief as to whether Shen “[was] the sole shareholder, officer and director” of IY and Horizon. The pleading alleged that on September 3, 2024, Shen filed SOI documents with the Secretary “representing that he was the sole officer and director” of the two entities, when in fact Shen “[had] never been appointed as an officer or director of [either entity], and [was] not and [had] never been a majority shareholder [of either entity].” The next day, Li, IY, and Horizon filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 5 injunction to halt Li’s removal as an officer and director for the two entities. The application is not included in the record. Shen and DBN opposed the ex parte application. They contended that Shen was a majority shareholder in IY and Horizon and therefore had the power to remove Li as an officer and director of the two entities. Adverting to Shen’s purported assumption of the role of sole officer and director for both IY and Horizon, Shen and DBN stated “for judicial economy and to move litigation along, . . . Shen’s intention as the new director of . . . IY . . . and Horizon . . . was to remove these entity defendants from the case.” Although the record does not include the court’s ruling on the ex parte application, it appears that the court granted both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. E. Li, IY, and Horizon Sue Chen On February 14, 2025, Li, IY, and Horizon sued Chen. The complaint alleged as follows: On September 3, 2024, Chen had filed “false and fraudulent” SOI documents for Horizon and IY with the Secretary which incorrectly identified Shen as the sole officer and sole director of the two entities when in fact Li held those positions for both entities. In January of 2025, Li discovered that Chen had filed amended tax returns with the FTB on behalf of Horizon for tax years 2022 and 2023 and on behalf of IY for tax years 2020 through 2023. The amended returns stated that the entities had no net income or loss for each year, which was not accurate. Chen “did not request and/or did not obtain sufficient financial information and documentation to support the information set forth in the [amended tax returns]” and “did not make sufficient inquiry into the financial information and documentation [she] received (if any) to verify 6 the accuracy of the information set forth in the [amended tax returns].” (Underscoring omitted.) IY and Horizon did not retain Chen or “give [her] authority” to file the SOI documents or amended tax returns on their behalf. Li, IY, and Horizon asserted claims for accounting malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and aiding and abetting fraud. F. Chen’s Special Motion to Strike 1. The Motion Chen filed a special motion to strike the entire complaint against her; she did not request in the alternative to strike particular claims from the complaint. Chen asserted that the complaint was “based on services [Chen] provided to [her] client, Jinwan Shen, that were performed at the direction of Shen and his counsel to further Shen’s investigation and prosecution of his claims in [the Shen-Li lawsuit]—specifically to revive corporations that were suspended and thus unable to participate in that case until they were revived.” She contended that all the claims in the complaint therefore “[arose] out of litigation-related activity” which was protected under section 425.16. Chen adduced evidence that Shen hired her as a forensic accountant to investigate possible misconduct by Li in connection with investments made by Shen, and to assist Shen in the Shen- Li lawsuit. Chen understood that Shen held at least a 70 percent ownership stake in Horizon and IY. Chen learned that Horizon and IY had been suspended by the FTB and Secretary for failing to file tax returns for several years. She further learned that to lift the suspensions the entities would have to file tax returns, pay the taxes due, and file updated SOI documents with the Secretary. To accomplish these tasks, Shen executed corporate documents titled, “Action by Written Consent” (capitalization 7 omitted), stating that he was the entities’ sole shareholder and was installing himself as the entities’ sole officer and director in place of Li. These corporate documents were provided to Chen along with powers of attorney authorizing Chen to communicate and act with the FTB on behalf of Horizon and IY. Chen assisted Shen in filing the SOI documents listing Shen as the sole officer and director of Horizon and IY. Later, on September 4, 2024, Chen went to an FTB office where she submitted Shen’s first amended complaint in the Shen-Li lawsuit, “paid the outstanding tax liability for years 2022 and 2023” for Horizon, and filed tax returns for Horizon. The next day, Chen visited the FTB office to submit tax returns for IY for tax years 2017 to 2018 and 2020 to 2023 and pay the taxes due. According to Chen, the tax returns she filed on behalf of Horizon and IY were “ ‘place holder’ ” returns, which she described as “a common practice in a situation when a company was hijacked by a rogue former employee.” On September 5, 2024, the FTB issued a notice reviving Horizon and IY. Shen’s counsel, Charles Wu, averred that IY and Horizon were named as defendants in Shen’s lawsuit because Li allegedly used them to defraud Shen, and “it was . . . imperative” that they be able to participate in Shen’s lawsuit as “active litigants,” which was only possible if they were revived from their suspensions by the FTB. According to Wu, he and Shen asked Chen to determine how to revive Horizon and IY and then to take the necessary steps to do so. With respect to the second prong of the special motion to strike analysis—whether the claims against her had merit— Chen contended the claims all failed for four reasons: (1) her conduct was subject to the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, 8 subd. (b)) because it related to the Shen-Li lawsuit; (2) she relied on “corporate documents executed by Shen” in filing the SOI documents and tax returns; (3) she owed no fiduciary duty to Horizon, IY, or Li; and (4) Li had unclean hands for failing to file tax returns and pay taxes on behalf of Horizon and IY. Chen adduced evidence that, as the accountant for Shen and DBN, she confirmed that Shen’s capital contributions to both Horizon and IY totaled $30 million. Chen also reviewed a report provided by Li to Shen in October of 2023 which represented that Shen was at least a 70 percent shareholder of both entities. 2. Opposition to the Special Motion to Strike In their opposition, Li, IY, and Horizon contended that their claims were premised on acts by Chen—filing SOI documents for Horizon and IY with the Secretary and tax returns for the entities with the FTB—which were not protected activity under section 425.16. The filings were not “forensic accounting or litigation support services” related to the Shen-Li lawsuit. In addition, Chen’s argument that she took the actions so that the entities could participate in the Shen-Li lawsuit “[was] not credible” because she did not need to “chang[e] ownership and include[e] false financials” to revive the entities, and Chen and Shen did not have authority to act on behalf of IY or Horizon. Li, IY, and Horizon also contended that Chen’s conduct in filing “false” tax returns and SOI documents was not protected because it was illegal. As to the second prong, Li, IY, and Horizon contended that only Li, not Shen, had authority to manage IY or Horizon, Chen knew she was not retained by the entities and had no communications with them, and Chen knew that she was submitting false information in the filings. They further 9 contended that the litigation privilege did not protect Chen’s actions and that they did not act with unclean hands because IY and Horizon owed only small amounts in unpaid taxes. Li, IY, and Horizon adduced Shen’s deposition testimony that he and Li orally agreed Li would “manage[]” the companies in America, he wanted to install himself as manager in place of Li because he found out that Li had “cheated [him],” and Chen told him “[he] had 70 percent of [the] shares, so [he] could be the manager.” They also adduced Li’s declaration in which he averred that Shen was never the chief executive officer of IY or Horizon, neither Shen nor Chen ever had authority to file tax returns on behalf of the entities, and Li never interacted with Chen or provided her with any financial information regarding IY or Horizon. They also relied on the trial court’s order, in the Shen-Li lawsuit, granting their application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting Shen from assuming corporate control over Horizon and IY. 3. The Trial Court’s Ruling After hearing argument, the trial court denied Chen’s special motion to strike. The court found that the complaint at issue “[arose] from allegations that [Chen] caused a false and fraudulent . . . []SOI[] to be filed with the [Secretary] on behalf of Horizon and IY” and “filed amended tax returns on behalf of IY and Horizon” which “were not based on actual financials of the entities” and were filed without authority. It also concluded, “[t]he [filings] allegedly drafted by [Chen] were not in furtherance of claimed litigation goals, such as forensic accounting, review of financial materials, or preparation of a forensic accounting report.” The court thus ruled that Chen had failed to make the 10 showing required under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis and did not reach the second prong of the analysis. DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review The Legislature enacted section 425.16 “[t]o combat lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) Under the statute, “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) When considering whether to strike a claim, courts undertake a two-prong analysis. “First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) “In deciding whether the initial ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability . . . is based.’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, citing § 425.16, subd. (b).) In Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057, our Supreme Court set forth how to determine whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of speech or petitioning rights for purposes of section 425.16: “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the 11 defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] . . . [T]he focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.] . . . In short, in ruling on an anti- SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park, at pp. 1062-1063.) Courts should be “attuned to and . . . respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id. at p. 1064; see Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394 [“Assertions that are ‘merely incidental[,]’ . . . ‘collateral[,]’ ” or “provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute”].) In the second prong of the section 425.16 analysis, “for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.” ’ ” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) To do this, the plaintiff must “show[] that the complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts that, if proved at trial, would support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. [Citation.] The court cannot weigh the evidence, but must determine as a matter of law whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. [Citation.] The defendant can defeat the plaintiff’s evidentiary showing by presenting evidence that establishes as a matter of law that the 12 plaintiff cannot prevail.” (City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 214.) “We independently review an order granting or denying a special motion to strike under section 425.16.” (Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370, 381.) “If the trial court’s decision is correct on any theory applicable to the case, we affirm the order regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the lower court reached its conclusion.” (Robles v. Chalilpoyil (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 566, 573.) B. Chen Has Failed to Show that the Claims Against Her All Arise From Protected Activity When, as here, “a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1108.) In light of this standard, we need focus only on the malpractice-related claims asserted by IY and Horizon against Chen. IY and Horizon’s counts for accounting malpractice and negligence are premised on allegations that Chen, by filing documents with the Secretary and FTB purportedly on behalf of IY and Horizon, owed a duty to IY and Horizon to use reasonable care in performing services for the entities. IY and Horizon alleged that Chen breached this duty by filing inaccurate SOI documents and tax returns without properly investigating the facts presented in the filings and without being authorized by them to make the filings. They alleged the tax returns 13 incorrectly stated that the entities had no income or loss for each year. The breach of fiduciary duty count is based on allegations that Chen owed a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty “to act with the utmost good faith in the best interests of . . . Horizon and . . . IY when providing accounting services,” and that Chen breached that duty “by failing to obtain authorization from an officer, director, or manager” of IY or Horizon before making the filings on behalf of the entities. Chen contends her actions in filing the SOI documents and tax returns constitute protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) as “written or oral statement[s] or writing[s] made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Ibid.) She specifically contends she made the filings in connection with the Shen-Li lawsuit because they were for the purpose of reviving IY and Horizon from suspension “so those entities could fully participate in discovery and trial” in the litigation.2 2 Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) provides parallel protection to “any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Italics added.) Chen does not contend that the claims against her are premised on any statements or writings she made in court proceedings. Chen does contend for the first time on appeal that the Secretary and FTB undertook “twin administrative proceedings” to determine whether to revive IY and Horizon, and thus her filings with the two agencies were protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) as communications “made before” either an “executive . . . 14  Well-settled law is to the contrary. Malpractice and claims related to it such as breach of fiduciary duty brought by current or former clients of the defendant are not protected under section 425.16 as being based on communications made in the context of litigation where those communications were made on behalf of the plaintiff client. Chen may claim that her client was Shen, but the filings she made were on behalf of IY and Horizon, and the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to those entities’ suit for malpractice in connection with the forms filed in their name and on their behalf. In PrediWave Corp. v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204 (PrediWave), a corporation (PrediWave) sued attorneys who had previously represented it and its former president and chief executive officer (Qu) in a lawsuit. (Id. at pp. 1209-1210.) PrediWave alleged that the attorneys acted against its interests and to Qu’s benefit, ultimately allowing Qu to loot PrediWave. (Id. at p. 1214.) It asserted causes of action including breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. (Id. at pp. 1214-1215.) The attorneys filed a special motion to strike which the trial court granted. (Id. at pp. 1216-1217.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the plaintiff’s causes of action did not arise from protected activity. The court rejected the attorneys’ argument that section 425.16 applied because “PrediWave [was] seeking to hold them ‘liable in damages for litigation activities they allegedly performed on PrediWave’s behalf,’ ” stating, “[a]lthough [the proceeding” or an “official proceeding authorized by law” under the statute. (Ibid.) This argument fails for the same reason discussed in the text, namely that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to malpractice claims of the type asserted here. 15 attorneys] impliedly engaged in speaking and writing in connection with the [underlying litigation], [the attorneys] engaged in those activities as plaintiff PrediWave’s legal representative. . . . [C]lients do not bring such lawsuits to deter the speech and petitioning activities done by their own attorneys on their behalf but rather to complain about the quality of their former attorneys’ performance.” (Id. at p. 1227.) When “clients’ causes of action against attorneys [are] based upon the attorneys’ acts on behalf of those clients,” “the alleged speech and petitioning activity was carried out by attorneys on behalf of the plaintiffs in the lawsuits now being attacked as SLAPP[]s, although the attorneys may have allegedly acted incompetently or in violation of the Professional Rules of Conduct. [Such] causes of action . . . are not being brought ‘primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition . . . .’ (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)” (PrediWave, at p. 1227.) The court acknowledged that section 425.16 “has been interpreted broadly to protect qualifying statements made or conduct undertaken by a person on another person’s behalf against a cause of action by a third person,” but concluded “it is unreasonable to interpret [the statutory] language to include a client’s causes of action against the client’s own attorney arising from litigation-related activities undertaken for that client” because that would “unreasonably expand[] the language beyond the clear legislative purpose and lead[] to absurd results.” (PrediWave, at p. 1228.) In Robles v. Chalilpoyil, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 566, former litigants sued their retained expert for negligence and conspiracy to commit fraud premised on allegations that the expert testified falsely and then disrupted prosecution of the case 16 by entering into a business relationship with their attorney. (Id. at pp. 570-571.) The trial court denied the expert’s special motion to strike and the Court of Appeal affirmed. As relevant here, the expert contended the negligence cause of action “[was] based on his ‘false deposition testimony’ and thus ‘unquestionably constitute[d] an “oral statement . . . made before a . . . judicial proceeding,” ’ within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1).” (Id. at p. 575.) The court rejected this argument, stating, “It is true that the statute protects litigation-related speech and petitioning activity undertaken on another’s behalf [citations], but the statute should not be used to insulate those statements from recourse by the very client on whose behalf the statement was made.” (Id. at p. 576.) The court “conclude[d] that section 425.16 does not shield statements made on behalf of a client who alleges negligence in the defendant’s representation of the client or breach of the duty of loyalty.” (Id. at pp. 578-579.) In Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 496, a company (Loanvest) asserted a malpractice claim against attorneys who had represented it in prior litigation, claiming the attorneys breached their duty of loyalty by undertaking litigation conduct to benefit its former manager over the interests of Loanvest itself. (Id. at pp. 499-500.) The trial court granted the attorneys’ special motion to strike (id. at pp. 500-501) and the Court of Appeal reversed on the ground the malpractice claim did not arise from protected conduct. Following PrediWave, the court held, “[w]here . . . a legal malpractice action is brought by an attorney’s former client, claiming that the attorney breached fiduciary obligations to the client as the result of a conflict of interest or other deficiency in the representation of the client, the action does not threaten to chill the exercise of protected rights 17 and the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis is not satisfied.” (Loanvest I, LLC, at p. 504.) The court concluded section 425.16 did not apply even though “the complaint ‘focus[es] specifically on particular statements or positions taken in connection with matters under review by a court’ ” because “the claim [was] not for injuries suffered by a third party caused by the attorney’s advocacy but [was] based on the alleged breach of loyalty owed to [the plaintiff company].” (Loanvest I, LLC, at p. 505; see also Chodos v. Cole (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 692, 702 [“ ‘California courts have held that when a claim [by a client against a lawyer] is based on a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty or negligence, it does not concern a right of petition or free speech, though those activities arose from the filing, prosecution of and statements made in the course of the client’s lawsuit. The reason is that the lawsuit concerns a breach of duty that does not depend on the exercise of a constitutional right’ ”]; Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1535 [“Legal malpractice is not an activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. That the malpractice allegedly occurred in the course of petitioning activity does not mean the claim arose from the activity itself”].) These cases demonstrate that Chen’s acts of filing the SOI documents and tax returns did not constitute protected activity because the documents, and any statements contained in them, were made on behalf of IY and Horizon. Section 425.16 “should not be used to insulate [such] statements from recourse by the very client on whose behalf the statement was made.” (Robles v. Chalilpoyil, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Chen concedes that communications made by attorneys or other professionals are not protected under the anti-SLAPP 18 statute from malpractice claims by the parties on whose behalf the communications were made. She contends this rule does not apply to her because she made the filings for Shen and was never retained by Li, IY, or Horizon. But it is undisputed that the filings purported to be on behalf of IY and Horizon. Regardless of who hired Chen and for what purpose, IY and Horizon are suing her for official communications she made on their behalf.3 Similar circumstances were present in both PrediWave and Loanvest I, LLC, where the defendant attorneys allegedly followed the directions of former company officials and the plaintiff companies sued after new management assumed control (PrediWave, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1215-1217; Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 499-500), and the courts found the defendants’ statements on behalf of the companies were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.4 3 Chen’s contention that Li, IY, and Horizon are “circumvent[ing] the anti-SLAPP statute by labeling claims against an adversary’s litigation consultant as professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty” similarly fails because Li, IY, and Horizon are suing Chen for her actions in filing documents in the names of the entities themselves. Chen relies on Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141 but that case has no application here because the claim at issue in the defendant attorneys’ special motion to strike arose from communications made on behalf of others “excluding” the plaintiff (id. at p. 147), and the plaintiff did not claim malpractice (id. at p. 158). 4 Because IY and Horizon’s malpractice-related claims against Chen do not arise from conduct protected under section 425.16, we need not address the remaining contentions of Li, IY, and Horizon. 19  DISPOSITION The order denying the special motion to strike is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J. We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J. 20