In re L.G. CA4/1

Filed 11/5/26 In re L.G. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re L.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D087620 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521344) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING T.W., NO CHANGE IN THE Defendant and Respondent, JUDGMENT L.G., Defendant and Appellant. THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 16, 2026, be modified as follows:  1. On page 12, the fourth line from the top of the page, starting with “losing the relationship against the benefits of the adoptive home” delete the words “the adoptive home” and replace with “a new adoptive home.” 2. On page 14, in the paragraph following subsection C., the last sentence that begins, “We agree the record does not reflect,” is modified to “We agree the record does not reflect the court weighed the benefits of an adoptive placement against the harm of severing the parent-child relationship.” 3. The bottom paragraph of page 15, that begins “But those findings” and ending at the top of page 16 is modified as follows: But those findings addressed only one side of the required inquiry. Under Caden C., the juvenile court was required to make factual determinations concerning the benefits of adoption arising from the security and stability offered by an adoptive home and assess whether those benefits would “offset and even counterbalance” the harm of terminating L.G.’s relationship with Mother. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 634, 640.) The court’s analysis did not meaningfully address that question. (Cf. In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 817 [criticizing trial court’s “conclusory” analysis of the third element as failing to satisfy the court’s duty to state the reasons for its determination].) Thus, although the court found that terminating parental rights would harm L.G., it did not complete the weighing process required under Caden C. In this regard, the court abused its discretion.” 4. On page 17 of footnote 5 is modified to now read: The Agency contends the juvenile court erred by excluding the paternal grandmother’s testimony concerning L.G.’s relationship with another child in the adoptive home. It argues the evidence was relevant to the third element of the beneficial parent-child exception, which requires the court to consider the benefits of an adoptive home. We find the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. (See In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061 [“If the child is considered generally adoptable, we do not examine the suitability of the prospective adoptive home”].) 5. On page 17, in the last sentence of the Disposition, delete “the family’s current circumstances and” so that it reads: “The court shall permit oral argument and consider the record evidence as to whether Mother met the third element of the parental-benefit exception, in conformity with the principles articulated in Caden C., and taking into consideration any 2 developments in the dependency proceedings that may have arisen during the pendency of the appeal.” There is no change in the judgment. The petition for rehearing is denied. _________________________ DATO, Acting P. J. Copies to: All parties 3 Filed 10/16/26 In re L.G. CA4/1 (unmodified opinion) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re L.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D087620 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521344) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.W., Defendant and Respondent, L.G., Minor and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniela A. Reali, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.  Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor and Appellant. Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent. Damon Brown, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court found two-year-old L.G. adoptable but that T.W. (Mother) had established the parental-benefit exception to adoption. (See Welf. & Inst. Code1, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The court therefore declined to terminate Mother’s parental rights finding that legal guardianship, rather than adoption, was the appropriate permanent plan.2 L.G. appeals, joined by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency).3 L.G. concedes that Mother met the first element of the parental-benefit exception in that Mother regularly and consistently visited L.G. She contends, however, the court lacked substantial evidence to find that Mother satisfied the second element of the parental-benefit exception and abused its discretion in finding that she satisfied the third 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 The court also terminated father’s parental rights. Father did not appeal the court’s decision. We refer to him only when necessary to our analysis. 3 The Agency did not submit a formal brief and instead requested consideration of a letter and joinder in lieu of a formal respondent's brief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5). 2 element. Because the record does not reflect the juvenile court fully considered or weighed certain benefits L.G. would derive from adoption against the detriment she would suffer from severing the parent-child relationship, it did not properly apply the balancing test required under the third element. Finding an abuse of discretion, we reverse and remand. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Five-month-old L.G. came to the Agency’s attention after the Agency received a referral alleging that she had unusual markings on her body, which were later determined to be bruises and abrasions consistent with inflicted trauma. Mother, father, and paternal grandmother, who were the only individuals with access to L.G. at that time, denied knowledge of the source of the injuries and offered inconsistent explanations for how they occurred, all of which were ruled out by child abuse experts. The parents agreed to a safety plan in which L.G. would move into maternal grandmother’s home, the parents’ contact would be supervised, and the family would follow all medical recommendations. A. Proceedings Before the Section 366.26 Hearing In November 2023, the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging L.G.’s parents failed to supervise or protect L.G. adequately. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court made true findings on the petition and ordered L.G. detained with her parents at the maternal grandmother’s home subject to certain conditions. In December 2023, during a follow-up physical examination of L.G., a doctor observed multiple new injuries and bruising on different parts of L.G.’s body which were also consistent with inflicted injuries. At a special hearing, the juvenile court ordered L.G. detained out of the parents’ care with liberal supervised visitation. 3  In January 2024, the Agency filed an amended section 300 petition, expanding on the serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally on L.G. and added a subdivision (a) allegation. At hearings in May and June 2024, the juvenile court sustained subdivision (a) of the petition, declared L.G. a dependent, and ordered reunification services and unsupervised visitation for Mother. During the reunification period, L.G. was placed with her paternal step-great-grandparents. While in their care, L.G. sustained various unreported injuries and the caregivers could not provide a clear explanation for them. After the Agency filed a supplemental section 387 petition seeking removal of L.G. from the paternal step-great-grandparents, the juvenile court ordered L.G. detained out of their care and the Agency placed L.G. with maternal relative caregivers. In its December 3, 2024 status review report, the Agency noted that Mother had attended 30 sessions of a child abuse group but had not made the necessary progress to mitigate the Agency’s safety concerns. It further reported that substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence were complicating factors that the parents were not initially upfront about, which caused a delay in the parents receiving the appropriate services. Later that month Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, and the Agency reverted her visits to supervised. In January 2025,4 after four prior unsuccessful placements, the Agency placed L.G. with her paternal grandmother. At a combined six- and 12-month review hearing in April, the juvenile court observed that while Mother made some progress in her domestic 4 All further dates are in 2025 except otherwise noted. 4 violence and child abuse classes, she still required supervised visits, continued to make bad choices, and had a suspected personality disorder that required long-term therapy. The court found that returning L.G. to Mother’s custody would be detrimental to L.G. and that, despite the Agency providing reasonable services, Mother had made limited progress toward reunification. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Meanwhile, L.G. remained under her paternal grandmother’s care and made significant developmental progress which included participating in speech and therapeutic behavior services. The Agency observed that paternal grandmother met all L.G.’s physical, developmental, and emotional needs. Paternal grandmother expressed her desire to adopt L.G. but also agreed to legal guardianship if the juvenile court did not terminate parental rights. In anticipation of the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court authorized a bonding study, which was conducted in October by Dr. Elizabeth Stanton. B. Contested Section 366.26 Hearing The juvenile court held the permanency planning hearing over the course of four days in November, December 2025, and January 2026. The court accepted into evidence the section 366.26 report, three addendum reports, and Dr. Stanton’s curriculum vitae and bonding study report. The court heard testimony from Agency social worker Edwin Laubach, Mother, paternal grandmother, Dr. Stanton, and Anna Hernandez (L.G.’s therapist). 1. Paternal Grandmother’s Testimony Paternal grandmother testified that, during the 10 months L.G. had been in her care, L.G.’s behavior and communication improved. L.G. no longer relied on sign language; she spoke words and formed sentences. 5 Paternal grandmother attended behavioral and speech therapy with L.G. She claimed L.G. was happy when she visited Mother but did not appear distressed when Mother was absent from therapy, cancelled a visit, or when the visits ended. Nevertheless, paternal grandmother believed L.G. benefited from contact with Mother. Paternal grandmother was willing to adopt L.G. and wanted her in her home “forever.” 2. Social Worker’s Testimony and Agency Reports Social worker Laubach testified that, since he was assigned the case in June, he observed numerous encounters between L.G. and paternal grandmother as well as between L.G. and Mother. During this time, he noticed improvements in L.G.’s speech and communication. Mother consistently attended visits and interacted with L.G. approximately half of each visit, while L.G. spent the remainder of the time playing with other children. Mr. Laubach never saw L.G. distressed or upset when the visits ended. In September, however, when abruptly changing locations during a visit, L.G. showed distress and asked for Mother when she was unable to say goodbye to her. Mr. Laubach observed instances in which Mother appeared to have developmentally inappropriate expectations of L.G., including believing that a verbal warning was sufficient to prevent L.G. from running into a busy street. Based on such observations, he expressed concerns about Mother’s lack of understanding of L.G.’s developmental needs. In its August section 366.26 report, the Agency reported Mother continued her twice-weekly supervised visits with L.G. and attended L.G.’s services, Child and Family Team meetings, and medical appointments. During visits, Mr. Laubach observed that Mother was generally attentive, attuned to L.G.’s cues, and engaged in age-appropriate activities. L.G. consistently greeted Mother with excitement and affection and called her 6 “mom” or “mommy.” L.G. responded to Mother’s directions, sought her out for help and comfort, and shared food and danced with Mother. Despite attending most scheduled visits, the Agency reported Mother missed several visits due to travel to Florida, court appearances with father, and other conflicts. In some circumstances, Mother did not talk to L.G. in a developmentally appropriate manner and gave L.G. her cell phone instead of actively engaging with her. In the Agency’s November addendum report, Mr. Laubach reported that Mother maintained regular visitation and contact, but L.G. did not exhibit any difficulty when she did not see Mother for over a week. On a drive to visit Mother in September, L.G. found a cup that Mother bought for her, looked at the cup, said “thank you mom” while hugging it. When L.G. became fussy in her car seat, Mr. Laubach was able to calm L.G. by telling her she was “going to see her mom.” It was during this visit that L.G. was abruptly separated from Mother, and she became distressed and said, “[D]on’t want mommy go.” The Agency concluded that L.G. had a positive but not substantial emotional attachment to Mother. It noted that, because L.G. had been out of her parents’ care for approximately 78 percent of her life, any parent-child attachment was limited. Also, L.G. called paternal grandmother and other adults “Mom” or “Mommy,” which raised questions about her understanding of parental roles. The Agency also observed that L.G. thrived in the paternal grandmother’s home and shared a strong bond with her. It believed any potential emotional impact from termination of the parental rights could be mitigated through ongoing therapy. Concluding the benefits of permanency, stability and safety through adoption outweighed any limited benefit from 7 continuing the parent-child relationship, the Agency recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption. 3. Child Therapist Testimony L.G.’s therapist testified that Mother attended multiple therapy sessions with L.G, during which Mother was receptive and played with L.G. She believed Mother’s presence benefited L.G. When Mother was absent, L.G. asked about her and pointed to Mother’s empty chair. L.G. maintained a calm and happy demeanor regardless of whether Mother was present. 4. Mother’s Testimony Mother testified she visited L.G. twice weekly and brought items for L.G. on every visit, including toys and clothing purchased on “Yes Day” outings, which were days when L.G. chose the items. She acknowledged giving up one of her two weekly visits from July to early September so father could visit. She attended L.G.’s therapy from April to late August, but she stopped after her schedule changed. At the end of visits, she tried to ease any potential separation distress by walking L.G. to the car, showing her affection, reassuring her that she would see Mother again soon, and waving to her as the car drove away. Mother emphasized her desire for ongoing contact with L.G. so L.G. would know she is supported and that Mother did not disappear. 5. Dr. Stanton’s Bonding Study and Testimony Dr. Stanton observed two visits between Mother and L.G. in October that each lasted approximately two hours. She opined that L.G. “engage[d] in healthy attachment behaviors” toward Mother and that “a substantial and meaningful relationship” existed between them. Dr. Stanton believed that severing the relationship could be detrimental to L.G. by causing her to experience disappointment, disruption in her behaviors, and possible 8 emotional harm, which could destabilize her. She believed, even if such separation was not immediately destabilizing, future challenges could arise relating to negotiating the “ambiguous loss that a child may endure when a parent-child relationship is permanently terminated.” Dr. Stanton testified she observed L.G. become excited to see Mother, remained in close proximity to her, sought her out, reached for her hand, sat in her lap, and engaged with her during visits. She also observed that L.G. was disappointed at the end of the visits. L.G. demonstrated behavior that indicated she trusted Mother, such as looking to Mother’s cues as to whether a stranger was “safe.” According to Dr. Stanton, L.G.’s ability to adjust to leaving Mother without displaying strong negative emotions demonstrated a healthy attachment and an understanding that L.G. could depend on seeing Mother again. 6. Juvenile Court’s Ruling At the conclusion of the hearing, the Agency urged the juvenile court to select a permanent plan of adoption. Counsel for L.G. requested the court adopt the Agency’s recommendations. Counsel for Mother urged the court not to find L.G. adoptable, but if it did, to find the parental-benefit exception to adoption applied. The juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that L.G. was both generally and specifically adoptable but declined to terminate Mother’s parental rights, concluding that the parental-benefit exception applied. The court found Mother satisfied the first element of the exception by maintaining regular visitation with L.G. For the second element, the court found L.G. would benefit from continuing the relationship with Mother, citing the positive interactions during visits, Mother’s participation in therapy sessions, L.G.’s recognition of Mother, and specific incidents showing 9 L.G. looking to Mother for comfort and guidance. The Court recognized that L.G. was thriving in the paternal grandmother’s care, but that fact did not outweigh the detriment to L.G. that would result from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The court therefore declined to terminate Mother’s parental rights finding that legal guardianship, rather than adoption, was the appropriate permanent plan. DISCUSSION A. The Parental-Benefit Exception to Adoption At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must choose one of three permanent plans: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Of these options, “[a]doption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) “ ‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53, quoting In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) When the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is adoptable, “the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless a statutory exception provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Celine R., supra, at p. 53; §366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The parent has the burden of showing the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions to adoption. (See In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.) One of the statutory exceptions to the preference for adoption is the parental-benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception applies where “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact 10 with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B)(i).) As our high court has said, “[t]his exception allows a child a legal basis for maintaining a relationship with the child’s parent if severing that relationship would, on balance, harm the child. The exception preserves [a] child’s right to [a] relationship [with his or her parent] even when the child cannot safely live with that parent. What it does not allow is a judgment about the parent’s problems to deprive a child of the chance to continue a substantial, positive relationship with the parent.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 643 (Caden C.).) There are three elements a parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “to establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) A “crucial aspect of the [juvenile] court’s responsibility” at the section 366.26 hearing is deciding “whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.] By making this decision, the [juvenile] court determines whether terminating parental rights serves the child’s best interests.” (Id. at pp. 631–632.) We review the first two elements for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) In assessing the third element—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child—“the court must make a series of factual determinations” such as “specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent” and what and how much harm the child would experience from losing those specific features. (Id. at p. 640.) The court must consider factual evidence to determine how adoption could counterbalance any of those harms, which requires “assessing what the 11 child’s life would be like in an adoptive home without the parent in [his or her] life.” (Ibid.) While we review the court’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, the court’s ultimate decision in weighing the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of the adoptive home, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Second Element of the Exception The parties do not dispute the first element of the exception was met. For the second element, L.G. contends Mother did not demonstrate a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment,” and any evidence merely showed “frequent and loving contact” and “pleasant visits,” which is insufficient to meet the second element under Caden C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 318–319.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother satisfied the second element of the exception by demonstrating L.G. would benefit from continuing the relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For this element, courts assess several factors including the child’s age, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parents’ custody, the positive or negative effect of the interaction between the parent and child, and the child’s needs. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) While the court considered that L.G. had spent most of her life out of Mother’s care, their interactions were “very positive” and L.G. was “very aware” of Mother’s role as a parent. For example, L.G. looked forward to Mother’s visits, ran to greet Mother, and displayed affection when they interacted. During visits, L.G. initiated play with Mother on the playground, reached for Mother’s hand, and invited Mother to join her. (Id. at p. 632 [“[C]ourts often consider how children . . . interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.”].) 12  In addition to engaging in positive play and interactions, the evidence demonstrated that L.G. benefited from Mother’s help, guidance, and comfort. When L.G. fell or cried, Mother was attentive to her. L.G. looked to Mother for guidance when she was pushed by another child and sought comfort from Mother by showing her a “boo boo” on her finger and a scratch on her knee. L.G. looked for cues from Mother to determine whether it was safe to engage with other adults. Additionally, Mother supported L.G.’s development by attending behavioral therapy sessions. The court observed that, even in Mother’s absence, L.G. maintained an awareness of their relationship. For example, L.G. noticed when Mother was absent from a therapy session, pointing to Mother’s empty seat. L.G. recognized Mother’s car, called Mother’s apartment “home,” and shouted out Mother’s name when she saw locations where she visited with Mother. When the social worker passed the freeway exit typically taken to go visits with Mother, L.G. experienced some distress and called out for Mother. These examples support a finding that L.G. had substantial, positive, and emotional attachment to Mother beyond “frequent and loving contact” or “pleasant visits.” Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that L.G. would continue to benefit from a continued relationship with Mother. L.G. and the Agency also argue L.G.’s young age and the significant portion of her life spent out of Mother’s care weighs against finding that L.G. would benefit from a continued relationship with Mother. In reaching its conclusion, however, the juvenile court recognized while L.G. spent the “majority of her young life out of the care of her parents,” her ongoing, positive interactions with Mother carried significant weight. Despite Mother’s problems, she had been a constant presence for the entirety of L.G.’s young life, including being L.G.’s caretaker during L.G.’s first six months of 13 life. After L.G. was removed, Mother’s biweekly visits were consistent. According to Dr. Stanton, Mother and L.G.’s interactions were “indicative of a healthy relationship.” (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632–633 [noting that expert psychologists “will be an important source of information about the psychological importance of the relationship for the child”].) Even L.G.’s paternal grandmother agreed that Mother and L.G.’s interactions were positive and that L.G. would benefit from continued contact with Mother. The evidence that L.G. continued bonding with Mother, despite her young age and time she spent outside Mother’s care, further demonstrated the strength and benefit from their continued relationship. Thus, we find substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that Mother satisfied the second element of the parental-benefit exception to adoption. C. The Juvenile Court Abused its Discretion By Not Weighing the Offsetting Benefits of the Adoptive Home Against the Detriment Caused By Terminating Parental Rights L.G. contends that even assuming she would benefit from continuing her relationship with Mother, Mother failed to demonstrate that terminating parental rights would cause substantial harm outweighing the benefits of adoption. Similarly, the Agency argues the juvenile court failed to weigh the detriment to L.G. against the benefits she would receive from adoption. We agree the record does not reflect the court weighed the benefits of the adoptive placement against the harm of severing the parent-child relationship. Because the Legislature strongly favors adoption absent exceptional circumstances, the juvenile court’s weighing of the benefits of adoption against the detriment of terminating parental rights is critical. The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies only when the 14 relationship is so beneficial that the harm from its termination outweighs the child’s need for the stability and permanency that adoption provides. (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683.) As Caden C. clarified, the juvenile court must determine whether “the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh[s] ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent.]’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) This inquiry requires the court to “make a series of factual determinations” ranging from the “specific features” of the parent-child relationship and the harm that would come from losing them to a higher-level conclusion of how harmful in total that loss would be. The court must then determine, “for the particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those harms.” (Id. at. p. 640.) Thus, the court must assess “what the child’s life would be like in an adoptive home” when weighing the harm of losing the parental relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home. (Ibid.) Here, the juvenile court found that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to L.G., relying heavily on Dr. Stanton’s testimony that severing the relationship could destabilize L.G. and adversely affect her. The court also considered Dr. Stanton’s opinion that L.G. could face “challenges related to negotiating the ambiguous loss” of losing contact with Mother. The court also viewed L.G.’s ability to separate from Mother without distress, in conjunction with Mother and Dr. Stanton’s testimony, as evidence that she felt secure in her relationship with Mother. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to L.G. But those findings addressed only one side of the required inquiry. Under Caden C., the juvenile court was required to make factual 15 determinations concerning the benefits of adoption arising from the security and stability offered by the prospective adoptive home and assess whether those benefits would “offset and even counterbalance” the harm of terminating L.G.’s relationship with Mother. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 634, 640.) The court’s analysis did not meaningfully address that question. Instead, its only observation about what L.G.’s “life would be like in the adoptive home” was the conclusory statement that L.G. was “thriving” in her paternal grandmother’s care. The court did not consider whether the concededly positive aspects of the grandmother’s home made permanent by adoption might counterbalance the detriment. (Cf. In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 817 [criticizing trial court’s “conclusory” analysis of the third element as failing to satisfy the court’s duty to state the reasons for its determination].) Thus, although the court found that terminating parental rights would harm L.G., it did not complete the weighing process required under Caden C. In this regard, the court abused its discretion. Because the juvenile court did not fully consider whether the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweighed the harm L.G. would experience, we must reverse the court’s order and remand for the court to reconsider the evidence under the applicable standard.5 (See, e.g., In re Dy.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153.) On remand, the juvenile court should permit the 5 The Agency contends the juvenile court erred by excluding the paternal grandmother’s testimony concerning L.G.’s relationship with another child in the adoptive home. It argues the evidence was relevant to the third element of the beneficial parent-child exception, which requires the court to consider the benefits of the adoptive home. This evidence appears to be marginally relevant to this analysis. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 633 [“What courts need to determine . . . [is] what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home.”].) If the parties seek to offer this evidence on remand, the court may receive and consider it in conducting the weighing process. 16 parties to present oral argument and the court should consider the record evidence, including the Agency reports and testimony, in conducting the required weighing under Caden C. DISPOSITION The order finding that legal guardianship, and not adoption, as the permanency plan is reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for a renewed section 366.26 hearing at which it should reconsider the third element to the parental-benefit exception. The court shall permit oral argument and consider the record evidence as to whether Mother met the third element of the parental-benefit exception, in conformity with the principles articulated in Caden C., and taking into consideration the family’s current circumstances and any developments in the dependency proceedings that may have arisen during the pendency of the appeal. BERMÚDEZ, J. WE CONCUR: DATO, Acting P. J. KELETY, J. 17