Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Gant CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B342841 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA356209) v. CHARLES DEJUN GANT, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment upon resentencing of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael D. Abzug, Judge. Reversed. William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Appellant and defendant Charles Gant (defendant) appeals from the judgment upon resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.7. Defendant contends the trial court erred in three ways: (1) by failing to apply ameliorative changes to the law regarding gang enhancements under section 186.22 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 333); (2) by imposing the incorrect low term sentence on count 1; and (3) by miscalculating his custody credits. The People agree as to defendant’s first point. We also agree. We further agree there is confusion surrounding defendant’s sentence on count 1 and calculation of his custody credits. We reverse. BACKGROUND2 I. Statement of the case On November 4, 2009, defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 1) and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 2). Defendant admitted a gang enhancement alleged pursuant to 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise designated. 2 Because the facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to the issues on appeal, we omit them. 2 section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A) and a prior drug conviction enhancement alleged pursuant to former Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). On March 16, 2010, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight years eight months, comprised of the low term of three years on count 1 and one-third the midterm of 24 months (eight months) on count 2, plus two years for the gang enhancement and three years for the prior drug conviction allegation. On September 26, 2024, defendant filed a request for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.7. In it, he asked the court to strike his now-invalid Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 prior drug conviction enhancement and, upon full resentencing, “further modify his sentence” by dismissing his gang enhancement. On December 11, 2024, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. The court struck the now-invalid enhancement3 but declined to dismiss defendant’s gang enhancement. The court resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years eight months, comprised of “three years” on count 1, one-third the 3 We note the court indicated it was striking “the so-called … three one-year priors” as opposed to the one 3-year prior drug conviction enhancement imposed in defendant’s case. Fortunately, here, it is a distinction without a material difference. 3 midterm of eight months on count 2, and two years for the gang enhancement.4 The court calculated defendant’s “aggregate credits” to be 6,201 days,5 comprised of 696 total presentence credits and 5,393 actual days of postsentence credit, plus 808 days of postsentence “good time, work time” credit.6 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. DISCUSSION I. Assembly Bill No. 333 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to apply the ameliorative changes effected by Assembly Bill No. 333 during his section 1172.7 resentencing hearing. The People agree. We also agree. Section 1172.7, subdivision (a) states, “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2018, 4 The December 17, 2024 abstract of judgment indicates defendant’s sentence of three years on count 1 was the upper term. 5 We note these totals do not amount to 6,201. We also note the court indicated the “6,201 days [would be applied] against an aggregate sentence of seven years and eight months” (italics added), which is neither defendant’s old sentence (eight years eight months) nor his new sentence (five years eight months). 6 The December 17, 2024 abstract of judgment indicates the court gave defendant 6,201 “total credits” comprised of 5,393 “actual” and 808 “local conduct.” 4 pursuant to Section 11370.2 of the Health and Safety Code … is legally invalid.” When a judgment includes such an enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.7, subd. (c).) Section 1172.7 requires full resentencing for all defendants who qualify for recall of sentence under the statute. (See § 1171, subds. (a) & (c)(2) [in “postconviction proceeding,” including § 1172.7, the “court shall consider any pertinent circumstances that have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed and has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence …”]; People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 361 (Rogers) [§ 1172.7’s sister provision § 1172.75 requires full resentencing].) Upon full resentencing, the court may “revisit all prior sentencing decisions” (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425) and “‘“has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall.”’” (Rogers, at p. 358.) The statute requires the court to apply “changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.7, subd. (d)(2).) In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333 and enacted the STEP Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.) Relevant here, Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section 186.22 by redefining the elements required to prove gang offenses 5 and enhancements and “narrow[ing]” the definitions of “‘criminal street gang,’” “pattern of criminal activity,” and “what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).) In Tran, the Supreme Court held that Assembly Bill No. 333 is ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments as provided for in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). (Tran, supra, at pp. 1206–1207; see also People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 400 [Assem. Bill No. 333 applied retroactively because the defendant’s judgment “was not reduced to a final disposition” after the Court of Appeal remanded to the trial court to correct sentencing issues].) Thus, because defendant’s sentence was rendered nonfinal upon recall of his sentence pursuant to section 1172.7, he is entitled to the retroactive benefits of Assembly Bill No. 333 and the changes to the proof requirements of gang enhancements. Accordingly, defendant’s judgment upon resentencing must be reversed and the case remanded for the court to consider the applicability of Assembly Bill No. 333 to defendant’s case. II. Upon remand, the trial court must clarify its intended sentence on count 1 Defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to three years on count 1 because the low term for his offense is two years. The People contend defendant “has failed to show that 6 the court intended to impose a two-year term, rather than a three-year term” on count 1. The People also argue, because the case is being remanded as discussed in our Discussion, part I, ante, the issue is moot. In our view, the issue outlined by the parties reflects the trial court’s confusion as to the current sentencing triad for Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. At the time of defendant’s original sentencing, the sentencing triad for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 was three, four, or five years. (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11351.5.) Effective January 1, 2015, however, the sentencing triad was amended to reflect punishment of two, three, or four years in prison. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5, as amended by Stats. 2014, ch. 749, § 3.) At his original sentencing, defendant was sentenced to the low term of three years. Just ahead of resentencing, the court indicated its intention to impose the “low term on count 1, which would be three years.” At the time the court imposed sentence it said, “The new sentence is: on count 1, the three years … .”7 As noted, three years represents the low term under the triad in 7 We note the December 11, 2024 minute order reflects the “Court selects the High Term of 3 Years in State Prison,” and the amended abstract of judgment also incorrectly reflects the three years imposed on count 1 is the upper term. 7 effect at the time of defendant’s original sentencing, but the midterm under the triad now in effect. Thus it is unclear whether the court, in stating it would impose the “low term,” while also imposing three years, intended to select the current low term (two years) or simply readopt defendant’s original three- year sentence without accounting for the amended triad. Accordingly, upon remand, the court shall clarify its intended sentence on count 1. III. Upon remand, the court shall recalculate defendant’s presentence and postsentence custody credits The parties agree the court erred in calculating defendant’s presentence actual and conduct custody credits, as well as his postsentence actual custody credits. However, the parties disagree as to whether this court should conduct the calculation of his presentence credits. The parties also agree the court must recalculate defendant’s postsentence credits upon remand. We agree the court erred in calculating and awarding defendant’s custody credits and the errors must be corrected on remand. First, the People contend the court miscalculated defendant’s presentence actual and good time/work time credits. During resentencing, the court indicated defendant’s “original” presentence credits were 348 actual days ending on March 6, 2010, but defendant was originally sentenced on March 16, not March 6. We agree this was an error by the resentencing court. 8 The People also contend the actual days of presentence custody credit were miscalculated by the original sentencing court. Specifically, based on defendant’s date of arrest as listed in the probation report—April 12, 2009—and his date of sentencing—March 16, 2010—defendant should have been awarded 339 actual days of custody credit, not 348. We agree with this calculation based on those dates. However, we also agree with defendant that there is not enough information in the record before us as to how the original sentencing court arrived at its custody calculation of 348 actual days. Therefore, upon remand, the trial court shall recalculate defendant’s actual presentence custody credits based on the record before it. (See People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647.) Second, the parties agree that defendant’s postsentence credits should have been calculated from March 17, 2010, through December 11, 2024, the date of his resentencing, resulting in a total of 5,384 actual days in custody. Because the court calculated from the wrong date, March 7, 2010, it arrived at 5,393 actual days in custody. Upon remand, the court shall recalculate defendant’s actual postsentence custody credits. Third, the parties agree that the court should not have calculated defendant’s postsentence conduct credits. (See People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [“[W]hen a prison term already in progress is modified … the sentencing court must 9 recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody”].) The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is responsible for calculating defendant’s postsentence conduct credits. (Id. at p. 31.) This was error. Upon remand, the court must recalculate defendant’s presentence actual custody and conduct credits, as well as his postsentence actual custody credits without postsentence conduct credits. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to determine whether the gang sentencing enhancement meets the requirements of Assembly Bill No. 333 and, if not, to allow the People the opportunity to retry defendant for the gang enhancement. Also upon remand, the court is ordered to make clear the intended sentence on count 1 and recalculate defendant’s custody credits consistent with this opinion. 10 CHAVEZ, J. We concur: LUI, P. J. GOORVITCH, J. 11