People v. Gant CA2/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketB342841
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Gant CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B342841
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA356209)
v.
CHARLES DEJUN GANT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment upon resentencing of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael D. Abzug, Judge.
Reversed.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant and defendant Charles Gant (defendant) appeals
from the judgment upon resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.7. Defendant contends the trial court erred in three
ways: (1) by failing to apply ameliorative changes to the law
regarding gang enhancements under section 186.22 as amended
by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill
No. 333); (2) by imposing the incorrect low term sentence on
count 1; and (3) by miscalculating his custody credits. The People
agree as to defendant’s first point. We also agree. We further
agree there is confusion surrounding defendant’s sentence on
count 1 and calculation of his custody credits. We reverse.
BACKGROUND2
I. Statement of the case
On November 4, 2009, defendant was convicted by a jury of
one count of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11351.5; count 1) and one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 2).
Defendant admitted a gang enhancement alleged pursuant to
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise designated.
2 Because the facts of the underlying offense are not relevant
to the issues on appeal, we omit them.
2
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A) and a prior drug conviction
enhancement alleged pursuant to former Health and Safety Code
section 11370.2, subdivision (a).
On March 16, 2010, defendant was sentenced to an
aggregate term of eight years eight months, comprised of the low
term of three years on count 1 and one-third the midterm of 24
months (eight months) on count 2, plus two years for the gang
enhancement and three years for the prior drug conviction
allegation.
On September 26, 2024, defendant filed a request for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.7. In it, he asked the court
to strike his now-invalid Health and Safety Code section 11370.2
prior drug conviction enhancement and, upon full resentencing,
“further modify his sentence” by dismissing his gang
enhancement.
On December 11, 2024, the trial court held a resentencing
hearing. The court struck the now-invalid enhancement3 but
declined to dismiss defendant’s gang enhancement. The court
resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years eight
months, comprised of “three years” on count 1, one-third the
3 We note the court indicated it was striking “the so-called …
three one-year priors” as opposed to the one 3-year prior drug
conviction enhancement imposed in defendant’s case.
Fortunately, here, it is a distinction without a material
difference.
3
midterm of eight months on count 2, and two years for the gang
enhancement.4 The court calculated defendant’s “aggregate
credits” to be 6,201 days,5 comprised of 696 total presentence
credits and 5,393 actual days of postsentence credit, plus 808
days of postsentence “good time, work time” credit.6
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Assembly Bill No. 333 applies retroactively to
nonfinal judgments
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to apply
the ameliorative changes effected by Assembly Bill No. 333
during his section 1172.7 resentencing hearing. The People
agree. We also agree.
Section 1172.7, subdivision (a) states, “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2018,
4 The December 17, 2024 abstract of judgment indicates
defendant’s sentence of three years on count 1 was the upper
term.
5 We note these totals do not amount to 6,201. We also note
the court indicated the “6,201 days [would be applied] against an
aggregate sentence of seven years and eight months” (italics
added), which is neither defendant’s old sentence (eight years
eight months) nor his new sentence (five years eight months).
6 The December 17, 2024 abstract of judgment indicates the
court gave defendant 6,201 “total credits” comprised of 5,393
“actual” and 808 “local conduct.”
4
pursuant to Section 11370.2 of the Health and Safety Code … is
legally invalid.” When a judgment includes such an
enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence
the defendant.” (§ 1172.7, subd. (c).) Section 1172.7 requires full
resentencing for all defendants who qualify for recall of sentence
under the statute. (See § 1171, subds. (a) & (c)(2) [in
“postconviction proceeding,” including § 1172.7, the “court shall
consider any pertinent circumstances that have arisen since the
prior sentence was imposed and has jurisdiction to modify every
aspect of the defendant’s sentence …”]; People v. Rogers (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 340, 361 (Rogers) [§ 1172.7’s sister provision
§ 1172.75 requires full resentencing].) Upon full resentencing,
the court may “revisit all prior sentencing decisions” (People v.
Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425) and “‘“has jurisdiction
to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion
subjected to the recall.”’” (Rogers, at p. 358.) The statute
requires the court to apply “changes in law that reduce sentences
or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.7,
subd. (d)(2).)
In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333 and
enacted the STEP Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699,
§ 1.) Relevant here, Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section
186.22 by redefining the elements required to prove gang offenses
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and enhancements and “narrow[ing]” the definitions of “‘criminal
street gang,’” “pattern of criminal activity,” and “what it means
for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.”
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).) In Tran,
the Supreme Court held that Assembly Bill No. 333 is
ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments as
provided for in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).
(Tran, supra, at pp. 1206–1207; see also People v. Lopez (2025)
17 Cal.5th 388, 400 [Assem. Bill No. 333 applied retroactively
because the defendant’s judgment “was not reduced to a final
disposition” after the Court of Appeal remanded to the trial court
to correct sentencing issues].) Thus, because defendant’s
sentence was rendered nonfinal upon recall of his sentence
pursuant to section 1172.7, he is entitled to the retroactive
benefits of Assembly Bill No. 333 and the changes to the proof
requirements of gang enhancements.
Accordingly, defendant’s judgment upon resentencing must
be reversed and the case remanded for the court to consider the
applicability of Assembly Bill No. 333 to defendant’s case.
II. Upon remand, the trial court must clarify its
intended sentence on count 1
Defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him
to three years on count 1 because the low term for his offense is
two years. The People contend defendant “has failed to show that
6
the court intended to impose a two-year term, rather than a
three-year term” on count 1. The People also argue, because the
case is being remanded as discussed in our Discussion, part I,
ante, the issue is moot.
In our view, the issue outlined by the parties reflects the
trial court’s confusion as to the current sentencing triad for
Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. At the time of
defendant’s original sentencing, the sentencing triad for a
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 was three,
four, or five years. (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11351.5.)
Effective January 1, 2015, however, the sentencing triad was
amended to reflect punishment of two, three, or four years in
prison. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5, as amended by Stats.
2014, ch. 749, § 3.)
At his original sentencing, defendant was sentenced to the
low term of three years. Just ahead of resentencing, the court
indicated its intention to impose the “low term on count 1, which
would be three years.” At the time the court imposed sentence it
said, “The new sentence is: on count 1, the three years … .”7 As
noted, three years represents the low term under the triad in
7 We note the December 11, 2024 minute order reflects the
“Court selects the High Term of 3 Years in State Prison,” and the
amended abstract of judgment also incorrectly reflects the three
years imposed on count 1 is the upper term.
7
effect at the time of defendant’s original sentencing, but the
midterm under the triad now in effect. Thus it is unclear
whether the court, in stating it would impose the “low term,”
while also imposing three years, intended to select the current
low term (two years) or simply readopt defendant’s original three-
year sentence without accounting for the amended triad.
Accordingly, upon remand, the court shall clarify its intended
sentence on count 1.
III. Upon remand, the court shall recalculate defendant’s
presentence and postsentence custody credits
The parties agree the court erred in calculating defendant’s
presentence actual and conduct custody credits, as well as his
postsentence actual custody credits. However, the parties
disagree as to whether this court should conduct the calculation
of his presentence credits. The parties also agree the court must
recalculate defendant’s postsentence credits upon remand. We
agree the court erred in calculating and awarding defendant’s
custody credits and the errors must be corrected on remand.
First, the People contend the court miscalculated
defendant’s presentence actual and good time/work time credits.
During resentencing, the court indicated defendant’s “original”
presentence credits were 348 actual days ending on March 6,
2010, but defendant was originally sentenced on March 16, not
March 6. We agree this was an error by the resentencing court.
8
The People also contend the actual days of presentence
custody credit were miscalculated by the original sentencing
court. Specifically, based on defendant’s date of arrest as listed
in the probation report—April 12, 2009—and his date of
sentencing—March 16, 2010—defendant should have been
awarded 339 actual days of custody credit, not 348. We agree
with this calculation based on those dates. However, we also
agree with defendant that there is not enough information in the
record before us as to how the original sentencing court arrived at
its custody calculation of 348 actual days. Therefore, upon
remand, the trial court shall recalculate defendant’s actual
presentence custody credits based on the record before it. (See
People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647.)
Second, the parties agree that defendant’s postsentence
credits should have been calculated from March 17, 2010,
through December 11, 2024, the date of his resentencing,
resulting in a total of 5,384 actual days in custody. Because the
court calculated from the wrong date, March 7, 2010, it arrived at
5,393 actual days in custody. Upon remand, the court shall
recalculate defendant’s actual postsentence custody credits.
Third, the parties agree that the court should not have
calculated defendant’s postsentence conduct credits. (See People
v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [“[W]hen a prison term
already in progress is modified … the sentencing court must
9
recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual
time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison,
and whether before or since he was originally committed and
delivered to prison custody”].) The California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation is responsible for calculating
defendant’s postsentence conduct credits. (Id. at p. 31.) This was
error.
Upon remand, the court must recalculate defendant’s
presentence actual custody and conduct credits, as well as his
postsentence actual custody credits without postsentence conduct
credits.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with
directions to the trial court to determine whether the gang
sentencing enhancement meets the requirements of Assembly
Bill No. 333 and, if not, to allow the People the opportunity to
retry defendant for the gang enhancement. Also upon remand,
the court is ordered to make clear the intended sentence on count
1 and recalculate defendant’s custody credits consistent with this
opinion.
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CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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