Full Opinion

Filed 11/9/26 M.P. v. Superior Court CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE M.P. et al., Petitioners, v. A177255 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN (San Francisco City & County FRANCISCO, Super. Ct. Nos. JD25-3018 & JD25-3018A) Respondent; SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest. In this writ proceeding, petitioners M.P. (Father) and S.C. (Mother) request that this court vacate different aspects of the juvenile court’s August 7, 2026 order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, and Mother requests a stay of that hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.)1 Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) exercised due diligence to locate an appropriate relative with whom petitioners’ two 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, and all undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court. 1 children (born in 2018 and 2019; collectively, Minors) could be placed. Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in reducing his visits with Minors from twice weekly to twice monthly. We disagree with both contentions, deny the petitions, and deny Mother’s request for a stay. BACKGROUND2 In January 2025, the Agency filed a section 300 petition seeking to remove Minors from Father’s custody. Father had been granted full custody of Minors in August 2023 at the end of a prior dependency case, with visitation to Mother as of August 2024. At the March 2025 combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained allegations that Minors were at risk from domestic violence between Father and his partner while Minors were in the home; from Father’s substance abuse issues, including a recent positive test for cocaine; and from Mother’s history of substance abuse and need for ongoing relapse prevention services. The juvenile court placed Minors with Mother and ordered services for both parents. In August 2025, the Agency reported that Father was in an inpatient treatment program. He had supervised visits with Minors every other weekend and the visits were going well. In October 2025, Minors were removed from Mother’s care after she was arrested on a felony fugitive warrant. Mother had been minimally engaged with the Agency before her arrest, and had several positive drug tests. Minors were placed with a paternal aunt. The court continued reunification services to both parents. 2 We omit background facts that are not relevant to the discrete issues presented in this writ proceeding. We grant Father’s unopposed September 18, 2026 request for judicial notice of records in a related appeal. 2 In February 2026, the Agency reported that Father, who had left his inpatient program after relapsing with alcohol, was no longer engaging in drug testing or treatment. He had twice weekly monitored visitation with Minors, which Minors enjoyed. In addition, as of a March hearing, Father was transporting Minors to school every weekday and also transporting them home from school on some days. The Agency recommended terminating reunification services for both parents. In March 2026, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for Father and continued services for Mother.3 The court continued the twice weekly monitored visitation with Father. In April 2026, the juvenile court removed Minors from their paternal aunt’s care after the Agency learned a registered sex offender was living in the home with Minors. Minors were placed in a new foster home. The Agency had referred another relative for placement, was trying to get in touch with an additional relative, was waiting for Mother to provide information about her family members, and had requested a contracted agency to assist with family finding. Around the same time, the Agency reported it had taken over school transportation for Minors and modified Father’s visits to start and end at the child welfare office because of “concerns around safety in his home and his ongoing substance use.” Father had “been less consistent with communicating and showing up for visits.” The Agency recommended Father’s visits be reduced to twice monthly, noting that “[d]ecreasing the frequency [of visits] offers the children an opportunity to maintain a structured, predictable routine. . . . Considering the children are in a new 3 Father has a pending appeal challenging the court’s order terminating his reunification services (case No. A176592). 3 placement and adapting to new people, places, and expectations, the less emotional disruption they experience the better.” The Agency again recommended terminating reunification services to Mother. In July 2026, the Agency reported that Minors had “experienced several placement changes since May and are now placed in separate home[s].” Minors were “struggling” but receiving “safety, stability, and nurturing care” in their placements. At an August 2026 hearing, Mother’s counsel questioned the Agency social worker about the search for relative placements. The social worker testified that the Agency was investigating a second paternal relative for placement. Because that relative lived in a different county, the county of residence was handling the vetting process. The social worker had made an inquiry about the status of that process in July, but had not heard back. The Agency was also in the process of vetting Minors’ adult maternal half sister. The social worker had been working with both parents to try to assess more family members. Father’s counsel questioned the social worker about Father’s visitation. Father had entered a new residential program in May 2026 and was unable to have in-person visits during the initial 60-day period. At the end of June, the social worker had asked if Minors could call Father because they missed him. Although the social worker received a phone number for Father and gave it to Minors’ caregiver, one of the Minors subsequently had to move to a different placement. The change was challenging for both Minors and the Agency “held off on kind of integrating anything new into their routine until they got a bit more acclimated and worked through some of that with their therapist.” 4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for November 25, 2026. The court found the Agency exercised due diligence in seeking other family placements. The court ordered a minimum of two visits per month for Father, “as long as he is testing and he is clean and sober.” DISCUSSION I. Relative Assessment Mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency exercised due diligence in searching for relative placements. We reject the challenge. When a child is removed from parental custody, the Agency social worker has “an ongoing responsibility to exercise due diligence to engage in family finding until the time the child is placed for adoption.” (Rule 5.637(d)(1).) “ ‘Family finding’ means conducting an investigation to identify kin and connect the child with those kin in an effort to provide family support and possible placement.” (Rule 5.637(a)(1).) “The court must find whether the social worker . . . has exercised due diligence in family finding by,” as relevant here, “[a]sking the child, in an age-appropriate manner and consistent with the child’s best interests, about the identity and location of kin,” and “[u]sing a computer-based search engine and internet-based search tools to locate kin identified as support for the child and their family.” (Rule 5.637(d)(2).) “When making the finding of due diligence, the court may also consider other efforts, including whether the social worker . . . has done any of the following: [¶] (A) Obtained information regarding the location of the child’s kin; [¶] (B) Reviewed the child’s case file for any information regarding kin; [¶] (C) Telephoned, emailed, or visited all identified kin; [¶] (D) Asked located kin for the names and locations of other kin; or [¶] (E) Developed 5 tools—including a genogram, family tree, family map, or other diagram of family relationships—to help the child, parent, guardian, or Indian custodian to identify kin.” (Rule 5.637(d)(3).) “The question of whether the [Agency] exercised due diligence to identify, locate, and contact Minors’ relatives is ‘primarily a factual matter’ that considers the [Agency]’s efforts. [Citation.] We therefore review the trial court’s due diligence findings for substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘[W]e examine the whole record and ask whether any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s finding[s], indulging all reasonable inferences in support of it.’ ” (In re K.B. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 689, 696–697.) As an initial matter, Mother’s assertion that the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard is not supported by the record. Mother also argues there is no evidence that, after Minors were removed from the paternal aunt’s home, the social worker either asked Minors about adult relatives or conducted a social media search. (See Rule 5.637(d)(2).) Mother argues a finding of no due diligence is therefore required. We disagree. While the Agency’s family finding obligations are ongoing, the rule does not require the identified conduct be repeated during every reporting period or after every change of placement. Mother points to evidence that the social worker (1) did not ask Minors’ adult sister if she knew of other adult relatives, (2) referred family finding to a contractor, and (3) did not “escalat[e]” or make a second follow-up inquiry about the pending out-of-county assessment of a potential relative. Whether the Agency could conceivably have done more is not the inquiry before us. The social worker actively pursued family finding both throughout the dependency proceeding and after Minors’ removal from the paternal aunt. 6 Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency exercised due diligence. II. Father’s Visitation Father challenges the juvenile court’s order reducing his visitation from twice weekly to twice monthly. We reject the challenge. “We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] We will not disturb the order unless the trial court made an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.) As an initial matter, Father’s reliance on authority regarding the denial of visitation is not apposite. (E.g., § 366.21, subd. (h) [when a court terminates reunification services and sets a section 366.26 hearing, “[t]he court shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child”].) To the extent Father equates the reduction in frequency ordered here with termination, we disagree. (See 1 Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2026) § 2.129[6][c] [“defining the terms and conditions of visitation is very different from denying visitation”].) To be sure, Father’s visits with Minors during the dependency proceeding were generally good and Minors expressed missing him after he entered an inpatient program in May 2026. However, several months before the challenged order, the Agency recommended reducing visitation, expressing concerns with “safety in [Father’s] home and his ongoing substance use”; Father’s recent conduct of being “less consistent with communicating and showing up for visits”; and Minors’ need for “an opportunity to maintain a structured, predictable routine” in light of their “new placement.” Minors’ counsel agreed with the recommendation to reduce 7 the frequency of visits. The juvenile court’s order was not an abuse its discretion. DISPOSITION The writ petitions are denied on the merits. Mother’s request for a stay is also denied. Because the section 366.26 hearing is set for November 25, 2026, our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).) SIMONS, J. We concur. JACKSON, P. J. BURNS, J. (A177255) 8