Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Torres v. Gonzalez CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO DANIEL TORRES, B346640 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23CHCP00019) v. ALBERT GONZALEZ, JR., Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gary I. Micon, Judge. Affirmed. The Green Law Group and Leah S. Schoen for Plaintiff and Appellant Law Offices of C. Scott Zeidman and C. Scott Zeidman for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff and appellant Daniel Torres (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered following defendant and respondent Albert Gonzalez, Jr.’s (respondent) successful motion for summary judgment.1 Appellant contends the trial court should have granted a continuance under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), to allow him to conduct additional discovery.2 We conclude the court reasonably denied a continuance because appellant failed to make the required showing under section 437c, subdivision (h). Thus, we affirm. BACKGROUND I. The complaint Appellant filed this lawsuit against respondent and Alda Management, Inc., on January 18, 2023, alleging respondent mismanaged Alda Management and excluded appellant from the company’s affairs. Appellant later named Evangelina Gonzalez and Olivos Property Management, Inc., as defendants in the lawsuit.3 The operative complaint asserted causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and accounting against respondent. Appellant also had causes of action for involuntary dissolution of 1 The record fails to include a judgment entered following the order granting the summary judgment motion. However, an order granting summary judgment may also be construed as an appealable judgment in the interests of justice and efficiency. (Dang v. Maruichi American Corp. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 604, 608, fn. 1.) Given the absence of prejudice, we construe the March 18, 2025 order as an appealable judgment. 2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 Alda Management, Evangelina Gonzalez and Olivos Property Management, are not parties to this appeal. 2 corporation (against Alda Management) and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty (against Evangelina Gonzalez and Olivos Property Management.). The operative complaint alleged Alda Management is a real estate management and leasing company. Appellant and respondent each maintains 50 percent of the issued shares of Alda Management. Respondent allegedly handled the day-to-day operations of the company to the exclusion of appellant. Appellant alleged respondent blocked him from accessing his assigned e-mail address with Alda Management, failed to call a single meeting of the board of directors, and allowed Evangelina Gonzalez to file statements of information for the company without access to its corporate records. Appellant further alleged respondent issued checks from Alda Management without authorization. The operative complaint lists many checks respondent allegedly executed without proper consent from appellant and the board of directors. Respondent also allegedly failed to maintain adequate corporate records and refused to disclose such records with appellant. II. The motion for summary judgment On December 19, 2024, respondent filed his second motion for summary judgment,4 contending the statute of limitations bars appellant’s claims. Respondent indicated appellant’s claims are based on a number of checks written on Alda Management’s bank account. Respondent argued the dates on those checks all fall outside the limitations periods for appellant’s claims. In addition, respondent posited appellant lacks standing and cannot 4 On June 28, 2024, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellant filed an opposition, and respondent withdrew the motion in October 2024 because exhibits were inadvertently omitted. 3 show he was harmed because neither appellant nor Alda Management had rights to the funds allegedly misused. Respondent maintained Alda Management is a pass-through entity set up specifically to manage properties and assets jointly owned by Albert Gonzalez, Sr. (respondent’s father) and Irma Torres (appellant’s mother). In opposition, appellant requested a 120-day continuance of the summary judgment motion hearing to conduct additional discovery pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (h). Appellant indicated a neutral forensic accountant, David B. Connelly, appointed in Gonzalez v. Torres (Super. Ct. Case, L.A. County, 2025, No. 22CHCV00729), was performing a forensic accounting of Alda Management’s financials. Appellant maintained there had been much uncertainty and confusion as to the source, identity, and purpose of funds going in and out of Alda Management. Appellant’s counsel attested, “The results of the forensic accounting are necessary to understand what funds are coming in and going out of Alda Management and to file a substantive opposition to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment which addresses the arguments asserted by Defendant in that motion.” Appellant argued, while respondent claimed Alda Management is a pass-through company, this is contradicted by the fact the company’s federal tax returns identify income and deductions. Appellant indicated Alda Management’s 2021 tax return showed $60,000 received in management fees, $225,000 in royalties, an accounting expense of $1,100, and $66,574 in cash assets. Appellant asserted it to be unreasonable to characterize Alda Management as a pass- through company because such entities are not subject to federal income taxes. 4 Further, appellant maintained Connelly could not complete the forensic investigation before the scheduled hearing date, adding he only became aware of Connelly’s appointment when Connelly requested documents from him. Appellant argued a continuance would not prejudice respondent and would simply allow for clarification and ultimate resolution of the main dispute between the parties involving Alda Management. In reply, respondent contended appellant failed to satisfy the requirements for a continuance under section 437c, subdivision (h). Respondent argued appellant only indicated he needed to understand the funds going in and out of Alda Management, failing to detail the essential facts he expected to obtain to justify his opposition. Respondent asserted Connelly’s forensic examination is for another unrelated case and is not about Alda Management. Respondent supported this assertion with a declaration from Connelly. Respondent maintained appellant failed to show he was diligent in seeking discovery. As to appellant’s arguments challenging Alda Management as a pass-through company and its 2021 tax return, respondent submitted a declaration from the company’s certified public accountant, Miguel Ramos, to explain the tax return. Respondent maintained appellant failed to identify any facts related to the tax return that support the claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The motion for summary judgment was heard on March 18, 2025. The court denied appellant’s request for a continuance and granted the motion. The court found appellant did not state the essential facts he seeks from determining the funds going in and out of Alda Management. The court added, while appellant noted some discrepancies between the claims in respondent’s motion and Alda Management’s 2021 tax return, appellant failed to state the specific information he seeks, and whether he can get a copy 5 of the forensic examination report to support his opposition. The court noted that Connelly stated appellant’s counsel did not hire him to do an investigation, his investigation does not involve Alda Management’s financial profile, and he does not recall offering his final report to appellant’s counsel. The trial court also addressed appellant’s contentions challenging Alda Management as a pass-through company and its 2021 tax return. The court concluded appellant provided no explanation or argument opposing Ramos’s declaration concerning the items on the 2021 tax return. The court further noted appellant deposed Ramos in March 2023 and did not state he conducted discovery into respondent’s other entities or was prevented from doing so. Accordingly, the court found appellant failed to state the specific essential facts or the reason why such facts exist. The trial court went on to find respondent presented sufficient evidence to establish the two causes of action at issue lack merit because the funds respondent spent were not owned by Alda Management, and the evidence falls outside the limitations period. The court found appellant did not dispute respondent’s evidence and thus granted summary judgment. Appellant timely appealed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Appellant asserts three main arguments. First, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying him a continuance of the summary judgment motion to conduct additional discovery pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (h). Second, appellant argues the court erroneously considered new evidence respondent submitted with his reply brief without allowing appellant to respond. Finally, appellant asserts the court improperly granted summary judgment because the denial 6 of a continuance deprived appellant from presenting evidence necessary to oppose the motion. DISCUSSION I. Standard of review “We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s decision not to continue a summary judgment motion for the purpose of allowing further discovery.” (Combs v. Skyriver Communications, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1270.) “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.) “Under the abuse of discretion standard, ‘“[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.”’” (G.F. Galaxy Corp. v. Johnson (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) II. Appellant failed to meet requirements of section 437c, subdivision (h) to continue the summary judgment motion A. Appellant did not show essential facts to oppose the summary judgment motion Appellant contends he satisfied the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (h), to continue the summary judgment motion because he specifically identified the need for forensic accounting to determine the movement of funds and financial structure of the entities at issue. Appellant posits the trial court improperly focused on diligence and required him to prove the results of an ongoing forensic investigation before it was completed. We disagree. 7 “A declaration in support of a request for continuance under section 437c, subdivision (h) must show: ‘(1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts.’” (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 254 (Cooksey).) “Generally speaking, the party seeking the continuance must ‘provide supporting affidavits or declarations detailing facts that would establish the existence of controverting evidence ….’” (Lerma v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, 715 (Lerma).) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) requires more than a simple recital that ‘facts essential to justify opposition may exist.’ The affidavit or declaration in support of the continuance request must detail the specific facts that would show the existence of controverting evidence.” (Ibid.) “Where a lack of diligence results in a party’s having insufficient information to know if facts essential to justify opposition may exist, and the party is therefore unable to provide the requisite affidavit under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), the trial judge may deny the request for continuance of the motion.” (Desaigoudar v. Meyercord (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 173, 190.) “There is good reason for [section 437c, subdivision (h)’s] more exacting requirement. The statute cannot be employed as a device to get an automatic continuance by every unprepared party who simply files a declaration stating that unspecified essential facts may exist. The party seeking the continuance must justify the need, by detailing both the particular essential facts that may exist and the specific reasons why they cannot then be presented.” (Lerma, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 715–716.) 8 We conclude the trial court was not unreasonable in denying appellant’s request for a continuance under section 437c, subdivision (h), because appellant failed to set forth facts essential to opposing the summary judgment motion. In response to respondent’s claim that Alda Management is a pass-through entity, appellant’s counsel highlighted in her supporting declaration certain discrepancies in the company’s 2021 tax return. Appellant’s counsel explained that a pass-through entity generates no income, but Alda Management’s tax return lists certain management fees, royalties, and cash assets. Appellant’s counsel maintained Alda Management’s books and records cannot be reconciled with respondent’s claim the company is a pass-through entity. However, when appellant’s counsel attempted to explain why appellant needed Connelly’s forensic examination report, she only broadly stated, “The results of the forensic accounting are necessary to understand what funds are coming in and going out of Alda Management ….” The declaration completely failed to detail the facts appellant expected to obtain from the forensic report and why they are essential to opposing respondent’s motion. Appellant’s counsel did not even mention how the evidence sought addresses the statute of limitations issue raised in the summary judgment motion. Appellant argues the opposing party is not required to prove what discovery will establish. But this does not address appellant’s burden under section 437c, subdivision (h), to provide the specific facts he expects to obtain from the additional discovery that are essential to opposing the summary judgment motion. (See Lerma, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.) No statements were submitted detailing any essential facts appellant expected to learn and why such facts may exist. 9 Appellant’s counsel identified only a general need to “understand what funds are coming in and going out of Alda Management.” This general statement is not a description of essential facts appellant expected to obtain from the discovery. B. Appellant did not substantively challenge issues raised in the motion for summary judgment We note appellant’s opposition to the summary judgment motion did not substantively challenge the issues raised in the motion. Appellant presented no separate statement nor corresponding evidence addressing the merits of respondent’s positions. Instead, appellant only discussed the pass-through entity matter and requested a continuance pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (h). As discussed above, unprepared parties cannot use the statute to simply get an automatic continuance when essential facts are unspecified. (See Lerma, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 715–716.) Without detailing essential facts, appellant failed to show the discovery sought was not merely an excuse to secure more time to prepare a substantive opposition. With only a general statement concerning the need to understand Alda Management’s funds, appellant provided no assurance the additional discovery was actually critical to opposing respondent’s motion. Nothing in appellant’s opposition spelled out why existing discovery in the case was insufficient to address the issues raised in the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant a continuance because he failed to satisfy the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (h). 10 III. The trial court’s consideration of the declarations submitted by respondent on reply is not reversible error Appellant posits the trial court erred by considering new evidence respondent introduced for the first time on reply, contending he was given no opportunity to respond to the evidence. Appellant argues the error was prejudicial, as the evidence filled gaps in respondent’s initial showing and materially affected the outcome of the summary judgment motion. While new evidence in reply papers supporting a summary judgment motion may be considered only if the opposing party had notice and an opportunity to respond (see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 499), appellant fails to show the court’s consideration of the declarations at issue was prejudicial. “The California Constitution states: ‘No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause … for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) [¶] This provision usually prohibits reversal where the challenged error did not affect the outcome of the proceedings and thus did not prejudice the appellant.” (In re Marriage of Tara & Robert D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 871, 883– 884.) “Error in and of itself does not necessarily require the reversal of a judgment. Prejudice resulting from the error must be shown, and that such prejudicial error under the circumstances justifies a reversal.” (Hoyt v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 534, 538– 11 539.) “‘Prejudicial error will never be presumed, and the burden is upon the appellant to show that it exists.’” (Id. at p. 539.) In the summary judgment proceeding, respondent submitted with its reply brief, declarations from forensic accountant Connelly and certified public accountant Ramos in response to appellant’s request for continuance and arguments concerning Alda Management’s 2021 tax return. The trial court considered these declarations in its ruling on the motion. While appellant maintains he was denied an opportunity to respond to the declarations, appellant fails to show he could have presented a response with a reasonable chance of changing the outcome of the proceeding. Appellant identifies no rebuttal arguments or evidence he would have presented that were material to the ruling. Instead, appellant only generally asserts the new evidence filled gaps in respondent’s initial showing, and appellant was denied an opportunity to respond. This argument only highlights the significance of respondent’s new evidence without showing appellant could have meaningfully responded. Since appellant did not file a substantive opposition to the summary judgment motion, appellant needs to show he could have demonstrated respondent failed to meet his initial burden of the motion. (See Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 492 [“A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing a cause of action is without merit.”].) However, appellant provides no meaningful discussion of respondent’s arguments nor evidence in the motion. Appellant fails to demonstrate he could respond to Ramos’s declaration, showing respondent’s initial burden was not met despite the matters already presented in the motion. As to the trial court’s consideration of Connelly’s declaration in denying a continuance, appellant again fails to 12 show this was prejudicial. Appellant does not show how any response he could have made to Connelly’s declaration would been determinative in that he provided no essential facts for opposing the motion. The court had adequate grounds to deny appellant’s request for a continuance under section 437c, subdivision (h), regardless of Connelly’s declaration. In short, appellant has failed to establish the trial court erroneously granted the summary judgment motion. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant a continuance under section 437c, subdivision (h), as appellant provided no essential facts he expected to obtain from the additional discovery to oppose the motion. Further, the court’s consideration of the declarations submitted on reply was not prejudicial. Nothing shows appellant could have responded in a manner that was material to the outcome of the proceeding. Appellant fails to demonstrate respondent did not meet his initial burden of the motion, and appellant admits he submitted no substantive opposition to the motion. Hence, appellant fails to show any error in the court granting summary judgment. DISPOSITION The March 18, 2025 order granting the motion for summary judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs of appeal. CHAVEZ, J. We concur: LUI, P. J. RICHARDSON, J. 13