Carrillo v. Kearney CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB353022
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Carrillo v. Kearney CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
B353022
LINDA CARRILLO, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25SMCV04586)
Cross-complainant and
Respondent,
v.
RAYMOND KEARNEY,
Cross-defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Judge. Affirmed.
Saul Ewing and William E. Adams for Cross-Defendant
and Appellant.
Grant | Shenon | Almaraz, Alexander S. Kasendorf, and
Ryan Koczara, for Cross-Complainant and Respondent.
Linda Carrillo1 purchased her home from Raymond
Kearney in 2002 pursuant to a grant deed containing covenants,
conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). They became next door
neighbors, and over the years, disputes arose between them
concerning improvements Carrillo made or desired to make to her
property. In 2025, Kearney filed the underlying action, alleging
that Carrillo had undertaken construction in her backyard in
violation of the CC&Rs. Carrillo filed a cross-complaint.
Kearney filed a special motion to strike Carrillo’s
cross-claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing (implied covenant cross-claim) pursuant to the
anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).2 He contended
her entire cross-claim was premised on his filing suit to enforce
the CC&Rs, and therefore, it arose from protected petitioning
activity. He appeals the trial court’s order denying the motion.
We conclude the implied covenant cross-claim does not
arise exclusively from Kearney’s initiation of litigation. Carrillo
alleged Kearney engaged in other actions to interfere with her
right to receive the benefits of her purchase of her home.
Kearney does not show these actions were protected under the
anti-SLAPP statute, and thus, he fails to meet his initial burden
of showing that the entire cause of action arose from protected
conduct. We affirm.
1 Carrillo states she was erroneously sued as “Linda O’Brien,” and
she filed the cross-complaint that is the subject of this appeal as “Linda
Carrillo.” We use her preferred name.
2 “SLAPP” refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation.” Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Kearney’s Complaint and Request for Injunctive
Relief
In his August 2025 complaint, Kearney alleged that
Carrillo bought her Los Angeles home subject to a grant deed.
CC&Rs in the grant deed, he alleged, prohibited Carrillo from
erecting or maintaining buildings, structures, or other
improvements in an area of her backyard defined as the “Rear
Yard Setback,” with limited exceptions.3 Kearney alleged
Carrillo had undertaken construction work in the Rear Yard
Setback in violation of the CC&Rs. He asserted claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief and private nuisance.
Kearney successfully moved ex parte for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to halt Carrillo’s construction activities.
He filed a motion for preliminary injunction, and the hearing was
set for December 18, 2025.
B. Carrillo’s Cross-Complaint
Carrillo answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
declaratory relief, and cancellation of the CC&Rs.
3 Section 1 of the CC&Rs provided in pertinent part: “No
buildings, structures or other improvements shall be erected or
maintained within the portion of [Carrillo’s] Property situated south of
a line parallel to and a distance of seventy-seven feet, ten inches
(77’ 10”) south of the northerly property line of [Carrillo’s] Property
(such portion of [Carrillo’s] Property shall be referred to herein as the
‘Rear Setback Area’), except as otherwise hereinafter expressly
permitted. . . .” The two permitted categories of improvements were a
perimeter fence and gazebos or patios that met certain requirements.
3
In the cross-complaint, Carrillo alleged that the parties’
properties are located on a sloped bluff with backyard views of
the coastline. Kearney’s property “sits marginally above”
Carrillo’s. When Carrillo bought her property, Kearney disclosed
an easement for utility cables and height restrictions on the
“construction of certain improvements and plant materials to
protect the view.” Four provisions in Carrillo’s grant deed
prescribe the alleged “view-related” height restrictions. These
cover (1) construction in the Rear Yard Setback; (2) second story
construction in the side yard; (3) buildings, structures, and
improvements on Carrillo’s property; and (4) plant materials.
Carrillo alleged that, over the years, Kearney “has
attempted to broaden the terms of the Grant Deed to prevent
[her] from making any improvements to her property,
view[-]related or not.” In support, Carrillo pointed to Kearney’s
own complaint in which he “claim[ed], under penalty of perjury,
that by his reading of the Grant Deed[,] ‘no buildings, structures
or other improvements would be erected or maintained’ anywhere
in [Carrillo’s] backyard . . . .” Kearney’s “recent complaint,”
Carrillo alleged, challenged trenching and terracing work in her
backyard and installation of a water trough. She alleged this
work did not concern any erected improvements, buildings, or
structures and did not interfere with Kearney’s view.
According to Carrillo, this litigation was “not the first time
[Kearney] has used the veil of the Grant Deed to try and prevent
[her] from using and enjoying her property.” In 2007, Kearney
wanted to stop Carrillo from installing retaining walls, wood
steps, and a perimeter fence. When she took the position that the
work did not violate the grant deed, Kearney called the Los
Angeles Building and Safety Department nearly every day to
4
make unfounded complaints. The following year, upon learning
of Carrillo’s plans to install a roof overhang and make other
improvements, Kearney harassed her and demanded final
approval authority over her construction plans, in addition to
threatening legal action. In 2012, Kearney harassed her over the
placement of trashcans on the property line and insisted on
placing his trashcans within inches of her vehicle. During a
confrontation, he grabbed Carrillo’s arm and pushed her. The
same year, he incorrectly claimed Carrillo had planted bamboo
with invasive roots that might cross the property line, and he
threatened to sue her until she obtained verification from the
nursery confirming the source of the bamboo and its species of
origin. Carrillo described these activities as Kearney’s
“disingenuous enforcement” of the grant deed.
C. The Anti-SLAPP Motion
On December 11, 2025, Kearney specially moved to strike
Carrillo’s implied covenant cross-claim pursuant to section 425.16
and set the motion for hearing in April 2026. He argued that
cross-claim challenged his protected right to petition the court to
enforce the CC&Rs. He filed no declarations or other supporting
evidence.
On December 18, 2025, the trial court heard and denied
Kearney’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In the same
minute order, the court denied the anti-SLAPP motion without
explanation.
On December 31, 2025, the trial court issued a minute
order correcting the December 18, 2025, order nunc pro tunc to
add: “‘On the Court’s own motion, the Hearing on Special Motion
to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion)
5
scheduled for 04/03/2026 is advanced to this date and heard.’”
Kearney appealed from this latter order.4
DISCUSSION
A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute
“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to
a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Filing
a lawsuit is an exercise of one’s constitutional right of petition.
(Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 312.)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step
process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.”
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant carries its burden, the
4 At the request of the clerk of our court, the parties submitted
briefs on appealability. Though the notice of appeal states that the
appeal is taken from the December 31, 2025, order, it also states the
appeal is from an order “under Code of Civil Procedure,
§ 904.1(a)(3)-(13).” We liberally construe the notice of appeal as an
appeal from the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 904.1,
subd. (a)(13).) It is reasonably clear what Kearney is trying to appeal
from, and Carrillo does not contend she was misled or prejudiced.
(K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).)
6
plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal
merit.’” (Ibid.)
We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de
novo and employ the same two-step analysis. (Waterford
Property Co. v. County of Orange (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 530,
538.) If the decision is correct on any theory, we affirm the order
regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the trial
court reached its conclusion. (White v. Davis (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 270, 287.)
B. Step One – Kearney Fails to Demonstrate the Implied
Covenant Cross-Claim Arises Exclusively from
Protected Activity
Kearney contends that Carrillo “grounded the entirety” of
her implied covenant cross-claim on his attempts to enforce
compliance with the CC&Rs beyond what their terms require.
He contends the only way he could “enforce” the CC&Rs was to
petition the trial court for relief, and therefore, Carrillo sued him
for exercising his constitutionally-protected right. We disagree.
“At the first anti-SLAPP step, the question is whether a
defendant has met the burden of showing that a plaintiff’s ‘claim
arises from protected activity.’” (Nirschl v. Schiller (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 386, 404.) Whether a plaintiff’s claim arises from
protected activity depends on the elements of the challenged
claim and what acts by the defendant supply those elements,
forming the basis for liability. (Pechkis v. Trustees of California
State University (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 497, 504, citing Bonni v.
St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).)
Once identified, each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief,
of which there may be several in a single cause of action, must be
7
examined to determine whether it is protected and subject to step
two analysis. (Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 616, 628, citing Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.)5
When the defendant requests an order striking a cause of
action in its entirety and nothing less, it has the burden of
showing all acts supplying the elements of that cause of action
are protected. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) If a cause of
action is “mixed,” meaning it rests on allegations of multiple acts,
some of which constitute protected activity and some of which do
not, the defendant may request that the court take “a surgical
approach” and strike less than the entirety of the cause of action.
(Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109.) The
defendant’s initial motion must, however, “propose where to
make the incisions. This is done by identifying, in the initial
motion, each numbered paragraph or sentence in the complaint
that comprises a challenged claim and explaining ‘the claim’s
elements, the actions alleged to establish those elements, and
wh[y] those actions are protected.’” (Ibid, quoting Bonni, supra,
11 Cal.5th at 1015.) “[T]he trial court is not required to take on
the burden of identifying the allegations susceptible to a special
motion to strike.” (Ibid.)
An essential element of a cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is conduct by the
5 Citing a pre-Bonni decision, Kearney argues the first step
analysis requires courts to examine only the principal thrust or
gravamen of a cause of action and the allegedly wrongful and injury-
producing conduct that provides its foundation. He suggests that if he
shows the conduct underlying the gravamen of Carrillo’s implied
covenant cross-claim is protected, he meets his step one burden. Our
Supreme Court rejected this approach in favor of the step-one analysis
we discuss above.
8
defendant that frustrated the plaintiff’s right to the benefits of
the parties’ agreement. (Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
1027, 1037.) Here, Carrillo alleged that Kearney interfered with
her rights as purchaser of the property by attempting to enforce
the grant deed and its CC&Rs beyond their express language.
She alleged that Kearney’s “disingenuous enforcement” efforts
included not only filing a lawsuit but also other acts such as
demanding final approval authority over her construction plans,
placing trashcans inches from her car, and harassing, grabbing,
and pushing her. These allegations were all incorporated into the
implied covenant cross-claim.
Kearney addresses only the allegations pertaining to his
filing of the underlying lawsuit and ignores the rest. He does not
explain how the other allegations upon which Carrillo’s cause of
action is based constitute protected conduct. Having failed to
show the implied covenant cross-claim rests exclusively on
protected conduct, Kearney has failed to meet his burden of
showing he is entitled to an order striking it in its entirety.
Resisting this conclusion, Kearney contends our step one
inquiry should be restricted to allegations concerning the
underlying litigation because any claims based upon other
conduct are time-barred. We are not persuaded. Anti-SLAPP
motions exist to protect acts in furtherance of the right of petition
or free speech. (See § 425.16, subd. (a).) This is why step one of
the anti-SLAPP analysis focuses on whether a claim arises from
such protected acts. If not, the anti-SLAPP statute does not
apply, and we do not evaluate the adequacy of the pleadings or
merits of the claims. (Xu v. Huang (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 802,
808–809, fn. 6.) Any statute of limitations defense Kearney may
have does not relieve him of the obligation to demonstrate all
9
alleged acts of wrongdoing upon which Carrillo’s implied
covenant cross-claim was based were protected. Because
Kearney failed to carry his step one burden, it is unnecessary for
us to conduct the step two analysis of the merits of Carrillo’s
claims.6
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is
affirmed. Carrillo shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
6 Kearney suggests it was “improper” for the trial court to
advance the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. He does not, however,
(1) include a separately-headed section in his opening brief arguing
that this constituted reversible error, (2) provide citation to any
supporting authority, or (3) analyze this topic. Any related argument
is forfeited. (See Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 368, 377, fn. 3, citing Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852; In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
244, 255.)
10