Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 Carrillo v. Kearney CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR B353022 LINDA CARRILLO, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25SMCV04586) Cross-complainant and Respondent, v. RAYMOND KEARNEY, Cross-defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Judge. Affirmed. Saul Ewing and William E. Adams for Cross-Defendant and Appellant. Grant | Shenon | Almaraz, Alexander S. Kasendorf, and Ryan Koczara, for Cross-Complainant and Respondent. Linda Carrillo1 purchased her home from Raymond Kearney in 2002 pursuant to a grant deed containing covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). They became next door neighbors, and over the years, disputes arose between them concerning improvements Carrillo made or desired to make to her property. In 2025, Kearney filed the underlying action, alleging that Carrillo had undertaken construction in her backyard in violation of the CC&Rs. Carrillo filed a cross-complaint. Kearney filed a special motion to strike Carrillo’s cross-claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (implied covenant cross-claim) pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).2 He contended her entire cross-claim was premised on his filing suit to enforce the CC&Rs, and therefore, it arose from protected petitioning activity. He appeals the trial court’s order denying the motion. We conclude the implied covenant cross-claim does not arise exclusively from Kearney’s initiation of litigation. Carrillo alleged Kearney engaged in other actions to interfere with her right to receive the benefits of her purchase of her home. Kearney does not show these actions were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus, he fails to meet his initial burden of showing that the entire cause of action arose from protected conduct. We affirm. 1 Carrillo states she was erroneously sued as “Linda O’Brien,” and she filed the cross-complaint that is the subject of this appeal as “Linda Carrillo.” We use her preferred name. 2 “SLAPP” refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Kearney’s Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief In his August 2025 complaint, Kearney alleged that Carrillo bought her Los Angeles home subject to a grant deed. CC&Rs in the grant deed, he alleged, prohibited Carrillo from erecting or maintaining buildings, structures, or other improvements in an area of her backyard defined as the “Rear Yard Setback,” with limited exceptions.3 Kearney alleged Carrillo had undertaken construction work in the Rear Yard Setback in violation of the CC&Rs. He asserted claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and private nuisance. Kearney successfully moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to halt Carrillo’s construction activities. He filed a motion for preliminary injunction, and the hearing was set for December 18, 2025. B. Carrillo’s Cross-Complaint Carrillo answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, declaratory relief, and cancellation of the CC&Rs. 3 Section 1 of the CC&Rs provided in pertinent part: “No buildings, structures or other improvements shall be erected or maintained within the portion of [Carrillo’s] Property situated south of a line parallel to and a distance of seventy-seven feet, ten inches (77’ 10”) south of the northerly property line of [Carrillo’s] Property (such portion of [Carrillo’s] Property shall be referred to herein as the ‘Rear Setback Area’), except as otherwise hereinafter expressly permitted. . . .” The two permitted categories of improvements were a perimeter fence and gazebos or patios that met certain requirements. 3 In the cross-complaint, Carrillo alleged that the parties’ properties are located on a sloped bluff with backyard views of the coastline. Kearney’s property “sits marginally above” Carrillo’s. When Carrillo bought her property, Kearney disclosed an easement for utility cables and height restrictions on the “construction of certain improvements and plant materials to protect the view.” Four provisions in Carrillo’s grant deed prescribe the alleged “view-related” height restrictions. These cover (1) construction in the Rear Yard Setback; (2) second story construction in the side yard; (3) buildings, structures, and improvements on Carrillo’s property; and (4) plant materials. Carrillo alleged that, over the years, Kearney “has attempted to broaden the terms of the Grant Deed to prevent [her] from making any improvements to her property, view[-]related or not.” In support, Carrillo pointed to Kearney’s own complaint in which he “claim[ed], under penalty of perjury, that by his reading of the Grant Deed[,] ‘no buildings, structures or other improvements would be erected or maintained’ anywhere in [Carrillo’s] backyard . . . .” Kearney’s “recent complaint,” Carrillo alleged, challenged trenching and terracing work in her backyard and installation of a water trough. She alleged this work did not concern any erected improvements, buildings, or structures and did not interfere with Kearney’s view. According to Carrillo, this litigation was “not the first time [Kearney] has used the veil of the Grant Deed to try and prevent [her] from using and enjoying her property.” In 2007, Kearney wanted to stop Carrillo from installing retaining walls, wood steps, and a perimeter fence. When she took the position that the work did not violate the grant deed, Kearney called the Los Angeles Building and Safety Department nearly every day to 4 make unfounded complaints. The following year, upon learning of Carrillo’s plans to install a roof overhang and make other improvements, Kearney harassed her and demanded final approval authority over her construction plans, in addition to threatening legal action. In 2012, Kearney harassed her over the placement of trashcans on the property line and insisted on placing his trashcans within inches of her vehicle. During a confrontation, he grabbed Carrillo’s arm and pushed her. The same year, he incorrectly claimed Carrillo had planted bamboo with invasive roots that might cross the property line, and he threatened to sue her until she obtained verification from the nursery confirming the source of the bamboo and its species of origin. Carrillo described these activities as Kearney’s “disingenuous enforcement” of the grant deed. C. The Anti-SLAPP Motion On December 11, 2025, Kearney specially moved to strike Carrillo’s implied covenant cross-claim pursuant to section 425.16 and set the motion for hearing in April 2026. He argued that cross-claim challenged his protected right to petition the court to enforce the CC&Rs. He filed no declarations or other supporting evidence. On December 18, 2025, the trial court heard and denied Kearney’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In the same minute order, the court denied the anti-SLAPP motion without explanation. On December 31, 2025, the trial court issued a minute order correcting the December 18, 2025, order nunc pro tunc to add: “‘On the Court’s own motion, the Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) 5 scheduled for 04/03/2026 is advanced to this date and heard.’” Kearney appealed from this latter order.4 DISCUSSION A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Filing a lawsuit is an exercise of one’s constitutional right of petition. (Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 312.) “Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant carries its burden, the 4 At the request of the clerk of our court, the parties submitted briefs on appealability. Though the notice of appeal states that the appeal is taken from the December 31, 2025, order, it also states the appeal is from an order “under Code of Civil Procedure, § 904.1(a)(3)-(13).” We liberally construe the notice of appeal as an appeal from the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(13).) It is reasonably clear what Kearney is trying to appeal from, and Carrillo does not contend she was misled or prejudiced. (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) 6 plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Ibid.) We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo and employ the same two-step analysis. (Waterford Property Co. v. County of Orange (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 530, 538.) If the decision is correct on any theory, we affirm the order regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the trial court reached its conclusion. (White v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 270, 287.) B. Step One – Kearney Fails to Demonstrate the Implied Covenant Cross-Claim Arises Exclusively from Protected Activity Kearney contends that Carrillo “grounded the entirety” of her implied covenant cross-claim on his attempts to enforce compliance with the CC&Rs beyond what their terms require. He contends the only way he could “enforce” the CC&Rs was to petition the trial court for relief, and therefore, Carrillo sued him for exercising his constitutionally-protected right. We disagree. “At the first anti-SLAPP step, the question is whether a defendant has met the burden of showing that a plaintiff’s ‘claim arises from protected activity.’” (Nirschl v. Schiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 386, 404.) Whether a plaintiff’s claim arises from protected activity depends on the elements of the challenged claim and what acts by the defendant supply those elements, forming the basis for liability. (Pechkis v. Trustees of California State University (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 497, 504, citing Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) Once identified, each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single cause of action, must be 7 examined to determine whether it is protected and subject to step two analysis. (Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 616, 628, citing Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.)5 When the defendant requests an order striking a cause of action in its entirety and nothing less, it has the burden of showing all acts supplying the elements of that cause of action are protected. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) If a cause of action is “mixed,” meaning it rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of which do not, the defendant may request that the court take “a surgical approach” and strike less than the entirety of the cause of action. (Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109.) The defendant’s initial motion must, however, “propose where to make the incisions. This is done by identifying, in the initial motion, each numbered paragraph or sentence in the complaint that comprises a challenged claim and explaining ‘the claim’s elements, the actions alleged to establish those elements, and wh[y] those actions are protected.’” (Ibid, quoting Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 1015.) “[T]he trial court is not required to take on the burden of identifying the allegations susceptible to a special motion to strike.” (Ibid.) An essential element of a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is conduct by the 5 Citing a pre-Bonni decision, Kearney argues the first step analysis requires courts to examine only the principal thrust or gravamen of a cause of action and the allegedly wrongful and injury- producing conduct that provides its foundation. He suggests that if he shows the conduct underlying the gravamen of Carrillo’s implied covenant cross-claim is protected, he meets his step one burden. Our Supreme Court rejected this approach in favor of the step-one analysis we discuss above. 8 defendant that frustrated the plaintiff’s right to the benefits of the parties’ agreement. (Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1037.) Here, Carrillo alleged that Kearney interfered with her rights as purchaser of the property by attempting to enforce the grant deed and its CC&Rs beyond their express language. She alleged that Kearney’s “disingenuous enforcement” efforts included not only filing a lawsuit but also other acts such as demanding final approval authority over her construction plans, placing trashcans inches from her car, and harassing, grabbing, and pushing her. These allegations were all incorporated into the implied covenant cross-claim. Kearney addresses only the allegations pertaining to his filing of the underlying lawsuit and ignores the rest. He does not explain how the other allegations upon which Carrillo’s cause of action is based constitute protected conduct. Having failed to show the implied covenant cross-claim rests exclusively on protected conduct, Kearney has failed to meet his burden of showing he is entitled to an order striking it in its entirety. Resisting this conclusion, Kearney contends our step one inquiry should be restricted to allegations concerning the underlying litigation because any claims based upon other conduct are time-barred. We are not persuaded. Anti-SLAPP motions exist to protect acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. (See § 425.16, subd. (a).) This is why step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis focuses on whether a claim arises from such protected acts. If not, the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply, and we do not evaluate the adequacy of the pleadings or merits of the claims. (Xu v. Huang (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 802, 808–809, fn. 6.) Any statute of limitations defense Kearney may have does not relieve him of the obligation to demonstrate all 9 alleged acts of wrongdoing upon which Carrillo’s implied covenant cross-claim was based were protected. Because Kearney failed to carry his step one burden, it is unnecessary for us to conduct the step two analysis of the merits of Carrillo’s claims.6 DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Carrillo shall recover her costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS MORI, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. DAUM, J. 6 Kearney suggests it was “improper” for the trial court to advance the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. He does not, however, (1) include a separately-headed section in his opening brief arguing that this constituted reversible error, (2) provide citation to any supporting authority, or (3) analyze this topic. Any related argument is forfeited. (See Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 377, fn. 3, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852; In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 244, 255.) 10